methodology
TagTeam Philosophy (guest post)
“There are clear advantages to team science… Would this model work for philosophy?” (more…)
Does Studying Philosophy Develop Special Skills That Improve One’s Intuitions?
A new study suggests the answer to that question is “no.” Rather, according to the study’s authors, what explains why the intuitions about particular cases of those who’ve studied philosophy differ from others is simply that they’ve been taught the standard interpretation of those specific cases, while the others have not. (more…)
The Social Turn in Analytic Philosophy: Promises and Perils (guest post)
“The linguistic turn is over. We partied hard, got hungover, and now we’re trying to live as respectable adults… Today, a new revolution is brewing. Analytic philosophy is in the midst of a social turn.” (more…)
Some Remarks on Form in Philosophy (guest post)
“When my younger self complained angrily in the margins with scrawls of ‘where is this going?’, he missed the sights and insights that the journey itself provided.” (more…)
In Defense of Boring and Derivative Philosophy (guest post)
“Even if you prefer the sexiness of radicalism or the glory of revolution: you need boring, work-a-day normal conservative philosophy.” (more…)
Moral Dumbfounding and Philosophical Humility (guest post)
“I need to have the humility to recognize that, in this case, I have not found that truth, and that I may not ever find it. And it has also shown me that I need to be more generous to people who are dumbfounded by cases where I happen to have clear and consistent intuitions.” (more…)
Philosophers, Concepts, and Cognitive Biases
“We found some evidence of differences in conceptual competence between philosophers and laypeople, and documented a difference in linguistic diet; but these differences did not translate into different susceptibility to even the most pertinent cognitive bias, or render philosophers’ judgments appreciably more accurate.” (more…)
Which Questions Can’t Philosophy Answer By Itself?
In an interview in The Undergraduate Philosophy Journal of Australasia, Thomas Spiteri asks Peter Godfrey-Smith (Sydney) about “how best to make epistemic progress” answering philosophical questions about minds and consciousness. (more…)
Philosophy that “Tries to Get You to See Something”
At the beginning of his interviews of philosophers, Richard Marshall asks his subjects, “What made you become a philosopher?” (more…)
In Defense of the Details (guest post)
Are today’s younger philosophers “focusing too much on detailed investigations of individual things and not enough on the big picture”? (more…)
An Empirical Approach to the Analytic-Continental Divide
What’s the difference between analytic philosophy and Continental philosophy? In a new paper, a pair of researchers use a computer analysis of the content of different journals to test one way the distinction is sometimes characterized. (more…)
Evidence for a Probabilistic Turn in Philosophy (guest post)
“If our data is representative of the philosophy literature, then the use of formal methods in philosophy changed starkly over the course of just a single decade.” (more…)
Shaping the AI Revolution In Philosophy (guest post)
“Despite the great promise of AI, we maintain that unless philosophers theorize about and help develop philosophy-specific AI, it is likely that AI will not be as philosophically useful.” (more…)
Optimism about Metaphysics (and Philosophy in General)
Is there reason to be optimistic about progress in metaphysics? Jessica Wilson (Toronto) thinks so. (more…)
Computer Simulation as “Core Philosophical Method”
“Modeling and computer simulations, we claim, should be considered core philosophical methods.” (more…)
The Origins of Analytic Philosophy
“I find the usual story exaggerated, incomplete, and mistaken in various ways.” (more…)
Intuitions, Common Sense, and “Earning the Right” to Judgments about Philosophy
“Intuitions and common sense are not, I claim, a good basis on which to reach philosophical conclusions.” (more…)
Common Sense and Philosophical Method
What’s the relationship between common sense and philosophy?
How Do I Figure Out What To Think? (guest post by Martin Lenz)
“Picking a side helps you to play the game. But it doesn’t help you in figuring out what you should think. In other words, in order to work out what to think, you don’t have to pick a side at all.” (more…)
The Current State of Early Modern Philosophy
“While no one was looking, contextualism replaced rational reconstructionism (also known as ‘appropriationism,’ ‘presentism,’ and ‘collegialism’) as the dominant methodology among English-speaking early modern historians of philosophy.” (more…)
Agnes Callard’s List of “views that are considered controversial that shouldn’t be”
“There’s no such thing as being good or bad at philosophy.” (more…)
When Scientists Read Philosophy, Are They Reading The “Wrong Philosophers”?
“The trouble with physicists who denigrate philosophy is that they read the wrong philosophers, which sad to say is most philosophers.”
That’s Clark Glymour (Carnegie Mellon) in an interview with Richard Marshall at 3:AM Magazine. (more…)
The Apologetics Charge Against Philosophy of Religion
Dean Zimmerman (Rutgers) and Paul Draper (Purdue) discuss their views on the relationship between philosophy of religion and religious apologetics in a pair of recent posts at Philosophy of Religion.
A Call for Higher Standards in Philosophy
We ought hold ourselves to stricter argumentative standards than we often do, in our philosophical research manuscripts or public-forum presentations. (more…)
Analytic Philosophy’s Egalitarianism and Standpoint Epistemology’s Privileging
“My views about how to do metaphysics as a feminist are undergoing a radical transformation… chiefly because of the Hypatia affair.” (more…)
Philosopher Drops Some Bombs
There’s a fun interview with University of Waterloo’s John Turri at 3:AM Magazine in which he blithely drops a few philosophy bombs:
Quality Control, Methodological Bias, and Persistent Disagreement in Philosophy
Recently, mainstream philosophy journals have tended to implement more and more stringent forms of peer review (e.g., from double-anonymous to triple-anonymous), probably in an attempt to prevent editorial decisions that are based on factors other than quality. Against this trend, we propose that journals should relax their standards of acceptance, as well as be les..
What Are Philosophers Supposed To Do?
The summer issue of The Hedgehog Review is out and features a symposium, “On the Business of Philosophy.” The main element of the symposium is Richard Rorty’s Page-Barbour Lectures at the University of Virginia, with responses from Susan Haack (Miami), Robert Pippin (Chicago), and Matthew Crawford (Virginia). (more…)