Original poster here. Thank you, Justin, times a billion for sharing this.

Here’s a resistance strategy. Argue that race, gender and sexuality have been topics of interest to philosophy from the very beginning and that many of the key texts in the Western canon touch on these topics. Hence one can hardly teach the classic texts of the Western tradition without being prepared to discuss these issues. To debar discussion of race, gender and sexuality is either to debar discussion of key texts in the history of Western thought or to debar discussion of parts of such texts, both of which would be arguably inconsistent with the First Amendment.

Here’s a list of some classic philosophy texts (some of which I teach) which touch on the verboten topics:  

Plato: Apology, Republic, Gorgias, Protagoras, Symposium.  

Geek homosexuality both in in its socially approved and disapproved variants is part of the backdrop to these dialogues. For instance, Callicles is reproached for being a slave to the whims of his boyfriend Demos; there is, lot of talk about male beauticians and what they did for their (male) clients; the life of a pleasure-seeking tyrant is likened to that of a rent boy; and a constant running theme is Socrates’ attachment to Alcibiades. Plato was also a weird kind of proto-feminist, admitting women (Philosopher Queens) into his ruling class. So sexuality, equity and gender roles are all sub-themes in the key dialogues. Student questions are likely to arise. The symposium, of course is explicitly about love both homosexual and heterosexual. The institution of slavery is also part of the cultural backdrop and, since Greek slavery was partially a race-based affair (it was thought more acceptable to have barbarian rather than Greek slaves), race might be an issue.

Aristotle; Nicomachean Ethics and the Politics. 

Aristotle defends a patriarchal social order and gives a race-based defence of slavery, both of which are central to his conception of the household and hence of the state. His argument that on the whole it pays to be good, is in effect an argument that it pays (in a certain kind of society) to be good if you are a certain kind of male privileged person. Should we be discussing Aristotle? Yes. Can we do so sensibly without raising the issues of race, gender or sexuality? No. 

Aquinas, the two Summa’s, and books of excepts such as Aquinas Political Writings.

Since Aquinas is a practical as well as a theoretical moralist he naturally discusses sex, sexuality and gender roles. For example: ‘The sin of fornication consists in a man cohabiting with a woman who is not his wife; but by the addition of the circumstance of the woman with whom he cohabits being the wife of another, the sin is transferred to a new kind, namely, injustice, inasmuch as he takes to his own use what belongs to another; and in this way adultery is a more grievous sin than fornication’. This seems to presuppose that wives are the property of their husbands which, abhorrent though it may be, is clearly a thesis that pertains to sexuality and gender. 

And of course my point generalises. Any serious book about practical ethics or politics, whether horribly sexist or not, is likely to touch on sexuality and gender, though not necessarily on race. 

Hobbes: Leviathan
When Hobbes talks about men he means men and women but mostly men. That is to say his model of a human being is primarily a model of a male human being. There is therefore a question about whether his state of nature would really devolve into a state of war if he took seriously the fact that women comprise half of the human race. However in an odd way Hobbes was a kind of anti-patriarchalist since he thinks men and women are fundamentally equal and that in a state of nature parental power belongs to women rather than men. Nonetheless there is no injustice in the fact that most extant societies are run in the interests of men rather than women. Again, questions of gender and sexuality, though not so much race, are likely to arise. 

Locke: Second Treatise of Government 

Like Hobbes, Locke was an anti-patriachalist though hardly a feminist. Parental power belongs to both the mother and the father, so not to the father exclusively, contradicting Filmer. Indeed, this plays an important part in his arguments against Filmerian absolutism. So gender roles and rights are an issue. There is also the inconvenient fact that William III, extolled as ‘our glorious deliverer from popery and slavery’, was the head of a slaver state, the slavery being mostly race-based, and that Locke himself was a shareholder in two slaving outfits, The Royal African Company  and The Bahamas Company.  Thus the arguments against slavery in the Second Treatise of Government were employed selectively by Locke in favour of white as opposed to black people. Smart students are likely to notice. Then there is the Lockean idea that one can acquire property in land by mixing ones labour with it thereby improving it, which means that if you don’t mix your labour with the land and don’t ‘improve’ it, you don’t own it, an idea that has been employed in a race-biased way to justify the dispossession of indigenous people. So race, sexuality and gender all raise their debatable heads. 

David Hume A Treatise of Human Nature and an Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals. 
In the Treatise Hume has an extensive discussion of Chastity as an artificial virtue, justifying a sexual double standard. In the Enquiry  there is an extensive compare-and-contrast between the mores of the French aristocracy with their relaxed attitude towards adultery and those of the ancient Athenians who considered adultery on a par with robbery and poisoning but were relaxed about or even approving of homosexuality. 

Adam Smith The Wealth of Nations and the Theory of the Moral Sentiments

Smith discusses and critiques the institution of slavery, race-based in his day.  

The Utilitarians , Godwin, Bentham, Mill Sidgwick etc. 
Since they were pioneers of women’s rights and gay rights, and indeed contraception, often critiquing traditional feminine roles, it would be pretty difficult to discuss their work without touching on sexuality and gender unless the course confined itself to abstract discussion of utility and stayed away from any practical applications. And of course the issue of race arises since many of the early utilitarians have been criticised for their racist biases and their complicity in Britain’s imperial project.

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The challenge then is this. You say to the authorities ‘We can’t teach the classics without raising issues of race, sexuality and gender. Are you saying that we can’t teach the classics?’ The response hopefully would be ‘Er.. well, no’. You then go on to say ‘Well if we are allowed to raise these issues when discussing classic texts, why can’t we raise them in the context of contemporary philosophy?’. But what if the answer is ‘In that case you can’t teach the classic texts’ ? Then in my view the right course of actions is open defiance: ‘I am going to teach the great texts of the Western tradition in a way that encourages student discussion, including discussion of sensitive topics: fire me if you dare!’  And what if they fire you? Then sue. Is this course of action risky? It sure is, though the risk would be mitigated if say the entire department adopted the same strategy.  It would be highly embarrassing to fire an entire department on the grounds that they insisted on teaching the classics of Western thought without either censoring student discussion or steering them away from sensitive topics because of the say-so of a political appointee. 

The advantage of this approach is that it exposes the Trumpistas for what they are – enemies of the liberal principles (imperfectly) enshrined the American constitution. It exposes them as traitors to ideals that they sometimes profess. By contrast, Professor Dr Rushlau’s implied strategy – denouncing the Trimpistas for ‘racism, misogyny and homophobia’ – is not likely to cut much ice with those who think that ‘racism, misogyny and homophobia’ (or what Dr Rushlau calls ‘racism, misogyny and homophobia’) are not necessarily bad things. 

Might this policy require sacrifice? Absolutely. But consider this. If a fascistic foreign invader were trying to overthrow America’s liberal and democratic institutions (radically imperfect as they are ) and if you were of military age wouldn’t you think yourself obliged to defend them even at the risk of your life? Well, a set of domestic enemies are trying to overthrow America’s liberal and democratic institutions including the universities. If it would be right to defend those institutions at the risk of your lives in the case of a foreign invader, it is surely right to defend them at them at risk of your livelihoods in the case of a domestic foe. Defiance breeds defiance; compliance (even if accompanied by covert defiance) breeds compliance. Those who comply in the short term when they could do otherwise (though at some personal risk) may well find in the long term that defiance is no longer a option.  

Easy for me to say, safe on the other side of the world, where even the radical right has a grudging respect for liberal and democratic institutions? Sure. But that does not mean that I am wrong. I spent years as a member of Amnesty International writing on behalf of of people who took much bigger risks for the sake of freedom. Whenever in my life I have taken a political risk – for instance by publicly criticising the Vice-Chancellor of my university – and felt some qualms of fear, I have been fortified by the thought that I would be pretty poor specimen if I were too timid to take a slight risk (that of disciplinary action or, much less likely, dismissal) for what I believed in, when so many others were willing to lay their lives and liberties on the line.