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The Vanderbilt Report’s Sub-Report on Philosophy

“Academic philosophy is generally healthy in most respects relevant to the work of the Commission.”

That commission is the group of ten scholars (including three philosophers from NYU and one from Princeton), who, at the request of the Chancellors of Vanderbilt University and Washington University, this summer produced a “Report on the State of Scholarship in the Humanities and the Humanistic Social Sciences,” which came to be known as the Vanderbilt Report.

Despite the generality of the report’s title, readers may recall that the commission took as its focus just one type of potential threat to the state of today’s humanistic scholarship: politicization, or, more specifically, “a distinctive form of politicization in which the scholarly enterprise is taken to be subordinate to, or in the service of, political (social or moral) goals beyond the advancement of knowledge and understanding.”

The Vanderbilt Report was followed by several discipline-specific reports, and the last one, on philosophy, was released earlier this month. You can read it here.

The quote at the top of this post is the opening line of the report. In regard to their concern with politicization, academic philosophy is “generally healthy,” say the authors, Kit Fine (NYU) and Gideon Rosen (Princeton). There is mainly just one exception to this, they think: the philosophy of sex and gender. Fine and Rosen write:

For roughly a decade now, this relatively new field has been marked by what amounts to a de facto orthodoxy around a cluster of substantive ideas: that socially relevant sex and gender categories are socially constructed, that sex in human beings is not binary, and most importantly, that trans women are women and should be treated as such for every social and legal purpose. Scholarship that questions these assumptions is routinely met with the sort of opposition that is designed, not to challenge objectionable positions on substantive grounds, but to suppress discussion… [H]eterodox scholars are anathematized, excluded from conferences and other academic forums, and demonized on social media. Journals and academic presses that move to publish heterodox scholarship are met with intense pressure against publication, both from scholars and from a wider public. The chief worry is not that published scholarship in these areas amounts to the sort of advocacy that distorts the facts, much less the sort of “post-truth” repudiation of scholarly norms one sometimes sees elsewhere. It is rather that the scholarly ecosystem that normally serves to vet academic work has been distorted in these areas by a pattern of extraordinary pressure whose cumulative effect is to suppress dissent.

The authors then discuss several cases they think support their concern about this area of scholarship.

A manipulated image of a Bridget Riley painting

One factor that I think is missing from the analysis Fine and Rosen present is today’s communication environment. Because trans identity is currently a live, heated, political topic, it has not been uncommon for scholars working in the area to also be activists engaging in political debates and advocacy. Because of the internet, this brings together two kinds of discourse that work against each other.

The relatively mild discursive norms characteristic of truth-seeking academic work are quite different from the rough, rude, and highly aggressive discursive norms of the vicious point-scoring typical of today’s politics. While each set of norms might seem like it would function well in its respective domain, today’s communication technology erases the borders of those domains, presenting everything in “uni-context“, to use Agnes Callard’s helpful phrase. It’s not as if someone can be an activist in the streets and a scholar in the sheets (of paper). Philosophers are taking to the internet ( X.com or wherever) to post about their latest journal article one minute and their latest political screed the next. So we get everything altogether all at once. When these different forms of discourse are crowded into the same channel, there is no space for the pretense of the shared end of academic inquiry—truth—that in turn facilitates civil academic discourse and charitable engagement with those with whom you disagree.

In plainer terms, in their activist voices, some so-called “gender critical” philosophers have been shockingly horrible to trans women, including trans women philosophers. There has been malicious misgendering, mockery of appearance, various personal insults and cruelty online for anyone to see. And similarly, in their activist voices, some philosophers who are pro-trans activists have publicly said awful, aggressive, and vilifying things to and about those with “gender critical” views, including other philosophers. Even if you think such rhetoric is fine in a political or activist context, its reach is not so limited. Philosophers are people, too. They are unlikely to be able to silo the hateful rhetoric directed at them as a mere political device such that it doesn’t affect their judgments about the person saying it and the kind of thinker they are. People who have been called deluded perverts or transphobic Nazis by each other in political discourse online are unlikely to convince themselves of their opponent’s ability to engage in good faith debate elsewhere. And perhaps they shouldn’t. And if they shouldn’t, then some of the actions Fine and Rosen identify as problematic (e.g., non-co-platforming) may be rational (even if, in some ways, they are still regrettable).

By the way, the point of the foregoing is not to “both sides” the issue. I’m not claiming that those on either side of this debate have been equally bad; I’m not claiming anything about relative badness. Rather, I am just saying that Fine and Rosen overlooked one source of what they characterize as a “distorted” scholarly ecosystem which they find “surprising” and “puzzling”.

Discussion of this and other aspects of the report is welcome.

Comments are moderated. If you haven’t lately, please do look at the comments policy before commenting.

Sanders Prize in Philosophy of Religion

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Max DuBoff
Max DuBoff
26 days ago

Adding to what Justin said about political context, the exact timeframe under discussion matters. We needn’t relitigate “Woke 1.0,” but the efforts to shut down opposing viewpoints from roughly 2017-2024 were not limited to academic philosophy.

The authors also claim that very few syllabi on philosophy of sex and gender teach gender-critical philosophers. If that’s true, it’s quite unfortunate. I deeply disagree with gender-critical philosophers, but I want my students to be able to develop reasoned views on these issues, as on any other issue, and disagreement is crucial.

CMP
CMP
26 days ago
Reply to  Max DuBoff

I haven’t taught philosophy of sex, gender, feminism focused courses in a while, so starting from that assumption: How many of those syllabi have modules on philosophizing transgender and transexual notions of sex and gender, or feminist positions on these, to begin with? In my context, I would have to catch up on the literature before including any perspective on the subject (I often address intersexuality, however), which would mean leaving out any side of the debate, except for perhaps simply including a text the introduces to topic. 30 syllabi is a very small sample, which might mean they only looked at syllabi that explicitly include the module. There is also the case that many publicly available syllabi are no longer detailed enough to serve as a sample at all – at least not in the US context.

This reminds me that I did not read the Appendix they mentioned in the document.

Max DuBoff
Max DuBoff
26 days ago
Reply to  CMP

CMP: For philosophy of sex and gender, I assume many do, if not most. Trans issues are central questions in philosophy of sex and gender. As for general feminist philosophy courses, that will depend; as with most areas, there are far more fitting topics to cover in a survey course than there is time. But it would certainly be appropriate to cover some philosophy of sex and gender, and if so, to include gender-critical folks at least a bit.

By the way (informationally and non-judgmentally), the standard term in non-scientific contexts is “intersex.”

CMP
CMP
26 days ago
Reply to  Max DuBoff

Thanks! My language is a clear indication of being disconnected – and being Spanish-English bilingual might be informing my word choices as well. I counted the syllabi – assuming no mistakes, 26 out of the 30 listed have modules/lit on the subject. Appendix B and others: https://www.vanderbilt.edu/principles/state-of-scholarship-report/philosophy/fine-rosen/

Last edited 26 days ago by CMP
Eric Winsberg
Eric Winsberg
26 days ago

The philosophy of science applied to Covid-related topics had none of this in like 2020, 21. /s

norms are not cheap explanations!
norms are not cheap explanations!
26 days ago
Reply to  Eric Winsberg

Speaking from philosophy of science, but outside this topic— is the sarcasm tag actually accurate?

It seems to me that diagnosing areas of philosophy as failing to replicate wider professional norms in the discipline, in the sense of the sub-discipline exhibiting competing professional norms, requires a long enough time period in which enough professional activity is occurring. I don’t know how to specify these conditions exactly, but in any case I do not recall the situation in 2020-21 on Covid-related philosophy of science satisfying them.

I do have recollections of a lot of chatter by philosophers on these subjects, which I gather is where the sarcastic sentiment comes from—and fine, this maybe fits the uni-context mold Justin describes. Still, I think there is a substantive difference between assessments of (relatively) fleeting reactions by philosophers to events of the day and assessments of norms describing/explaining patterns in a more developed discourse carried out by those philosophers.

Eric winsberg
Eric winsberg
25 days ago

Omg. I was accused of being a eugenics supporter. Of agreeing with lt governor of Texas that old people should just die. People i never engaged with blocked me on social media. Read my Facebook page from 2020. Its all still there.

norms are not cheap explanations!
norms are not cheap explanations!
25 days ago
Reply to  Eric winsberg

I’ll take your point on the behaviors by (social media active) *philosophers* of science, but “the philosophy of science applied to covid-related topics had none of this” suggests to me a claim about trends in scholarship. Did that social media conduct “make the jump” over to entail scholarship not conducted with norms consistent with the wider discipline? That would be what I’d be looking for, for the comparison to be apt/the sarcasm justified. (Well, justification for sarcasm might be cheaper than that! But the matter of the gap being jumped is the reason I originally wrote my comment.)

KLY
KLY
26 days ago

The authors’ assessment strikes me as reasonable and I agree that openness to opposing viewpoints is a key criterion that we should be looking at when assessing the state of subfields in philosophy. I also agree that the philosophy of sex and gender is an exception to an otherwise open and healthy culture in philosophy more generally. If we look at openness as a spectrum, however, we might also compare different subfields and perhaps identify ones that, while overall relatively healthy, still do less well than others. The philosophy of pregnancy seems to me to be one such field; there is more openness than on transgender issues, but nonetheless something of a reluctance to challenge certain liberal, feminist assumptions (I say this as someone who is broadly sympathetic to feminist philosophy). And perhaps we as a discipline can also identify subfields that fare especially well. Just a thought.

oxan
oxan
26 days ago

It must be wonderful to be a completely secure representative of high orthodoxy in academic philosophy and still get to accuse those speaking for the most vulnerable of “suppressing dissent”.

Ronson
Ronson
26 days ago
Reply to  oxan

can you remind me, what happened to rebecca tuvel? was she also part of the “high orthodoxy” in academic philosophy? and were the people bullying and cancelling her the “most vulnerable”?

Felix
Felix
26 days ago
Reply to  oxan

It’s bizarre, isn’t it? Anti-trans philosophers are defending long-held orthodoxy about gender and sex, with their views pretty much cemented into government policy in the US and UK, and yet they’re still recast as poor, put-upon “heterodox” scholars who just can’t get a word in edgewise. We must hear from all heterodox scholars, of course, which is why anti-vaccine proponents are regularly heard at medical conferences, creationists feature prominently in biology departments, and the Electric Universe is taken Very Seriously Indeed. That is, after all, what a “healthy” academy looks like.

On the Market Too
On the Market Too
26 days ago
Reply to  Felix

Correlations with power can vary across different contexts. A correlation with power in a generic national sense does not entail that the correlation holds within the academy or academic philosophy, which is the relevant context here.

Felix
Felix
25 days ago

I think pointing out that anti-trans commentary is correlated “with power in a generic national sense” is indeed relevant if one wants to claim that such commentary is “heterodox” or “dissenting.” After all, anti-vaccine views are “heterodox” and “dissenting” in exactly the same sense: they are regarded a certain way within the context of relevant fields, such as medicine, and yet nevertheless correlated “with power in a generic national sense.” The allyship between anti-trans philosophy and state power is apparently not consequential, if we conveniently narrow the context down to make philosophers defending traditional gender orthodoxy out into powerless heretics, and not figures being cited by the courts and legislatures or writing in newspapers.

Reichenbach
Reichenbach
26 days ago

Even if there are many philosophers in a given area who are also activists/political actors, I don’t see why they can’t be expected to keep the two domains separate. Scholarship and activism/political work should be kept sharply separate even if a given person does both.

CMP
CMP
26 days ago

The citation condition of our field, noted in the first footnote, is completely demoralizing. How are we to defend the existence of Philosophy departments that fund research given these practices? Perhaps AI will assist us in reaching beyond our small professional and journal/publishers circles to find hidden treasures. The problem, however, is much more complex, since pressures to publish many times means having to leave ones areas of specialization (a kind of deskilling) in favor of unexplored and thus unrecognized philosophical areas of inquiry.

Meme
Meme
26 days ago

“Academic philosophy is generally healthy in most respects relevant to the work of the Commission.” – Fine and Rosen

comment image

Dr. M. An adjunct
Dr. M. An adjunct
26 days ago
Reply to  Meme

The report concerns specifically politicization of teaching and research, not the overall state of academic philosophy. Dunking with memes is nice and all, but perhaps we should aim to contribute instead to the actual discussion? As much fun as it is to mock senior scholars from the comfort of an anonymous comment, an understandable temptation.

norms are not cheap explanations!
norms are not cheap explanations!
26 days ago

Diogenes also contributed to the actual discussion

Meme
Meme
25 days ago

I’m not mocking anyone, and no, I don’t agree with the tacit implication that every comment on a blog post has to contribute to discussion. Sometimes it’s okay to just goof around. (But if you insist: it might not look rigorous to outsiders that the authors of the reports on the (healthy) state of philosophy are themselves philosophers.)

Nicolas Delon
Nicolas Delon
25 days ago

First time here?

krell_154
krell_154
6 days ago
Reply to  Nicolas Delon

you missed the chance to use that meme

EuroAmerican
EuroAmerican
26 days ago

I find the Philosophy Report disappointing. The authors do not justify their overall assessment properly. Other disciplinary reports have looked at patterns of topic choice in graduate work, analyzed the speeches at conventions, looked at the kind of work that has received prizes etc. Nothing of that sort can be found in this report. Maybe, they are right that philosophy is largely not subject to a problematic kind of politization. But it would have been important to back this claim up by empirical evidence. I miss an analysis of publication patterns in value theory journals, for instance. Can the dominance of certain positions be explained by scholarly superiority? Normative theory can, of course, be excellent work but it is prone to orthodoxies that cannot be justified scholarly.

Philosophy professors usually belong to a certain class: they are among the highly-educated and their position puts them into the (upper) middle class. Can we really simply assume that this homogeneity does not affect normative theory in problematic ways, especially since the majority also share a social background and have similar demographics (white, male)? And is philosophy the exception when it comes to discussing class in class (https://www.chronicle.com/article/colleges-teach-gender-and-race-they-ignore-class)?

Or looking at the problem from the other side: some believe that there is a intellectual “taboo on discussing what makes a good hierarchy” in the West (https://aeon.co/essays/hierarchies-have-a-place-even-in-societies-built-on-equality). It seems that the authors believe that philosophy is an exception here. That might be the case but they should give evidence for it.

These are questions that should, imo, be discussed by such a report. Instead they argue that it is not a problem that you find only a few conservative voices in philosophy. But, as the overall report makes clear, this should not be seen as a problem anyways. Here are further issues I have:

  • There might be no studies that explain the gender gap among philosophy professors in the US. But there is an excellent study that was commissioned by the Canadian Philosophical Association. Since this topic is mentioned and a long footnote is dedicated to it, I would expect an engagement with such a study: https://www.acpcpa.ca/blogs/gender-ratio-in-philosophy-an-inferential-statistical-model-of-possible-determinants
  • Why do they dedicate half of the report to discussing the “misuse of science” among a certain creed of Continental philosophy, when, as they say themselves, this problem is outside the problem the Report is concerned with?

To sum up, the Philosophy Report reflects badly on the entire endeavor. It now really looks like as if a bunch philosophers wants to assert the superior status of philosophy within the humanities. We have been talking about the more feeble parts of the humanities for a long time. This is not news.

Moti Gorin
Moti Gorin
26 days ago

“Rather, I am just saying that Fine and Rosen overlooked one source of what they characterize as a “distorted” scholarly ecosystem which they find “surprising” and “puzzling”.”

If your diagnosis were correct, and people being mean to each other on the internet explains, at least in part, the censoriousness and anti-intellectualism Fine and Rosen (partially) document, I would think we’d have seen more censoriousness and anti-intellectualism coming from both sides of this issue, from academic philosophers, journal editors, etc. But we have not seen much of that. Or we’d see syllabi that totally exclude gender critical work but also syllabi that include only gender critical work. We don’t see that, either.

norms are not cheap explanations!
norms are not cheap explanations!
26 days ago
Reply to  Moti Gorin

Why?

(A genuine question. I don’t see why the hypothesized social mechanism would be expected to manifest in a population the way you describe, as opposed to many other ways.)

Moti Gorin
Moti Gorin
25 days ago

Weinberg writes: “People who have been called deluded perverts or transphobic Nazis by each other in political discourse online are unlikely to convince themselves of their opponent’s ability to engage in good faith debate elsewhere. And perhaps they shouldn’t. And if they shouldn’t, then some of the actions Fine and Rosen identify as problematic (e.g., non-co-platforming) may be rational (even if, in some ways, they are still regrettable).”

If I’ve understood him, Weinberg is claiming that the “actions Fine and Rosen identify as problematic” are due at least in part to philosophers being nasty to one another online, and he attributes nasty behavior to both GC philosophers and TRA philosophers. But the censorious and anti-intellectual actions Fine and Rosen describe are not actions done by GC philosophers. You are of course correct that people can and do respond in all sorts of ways and so it’s not as if some law has been violated when GC philosophers don’t respond in exactly the same way that TRA philosophers do, but it wouldn’t be unreasonable to expect that if online nastiness partly explains censoriousness and anti-intellectualism, and if both sides are guilty of online nastiness (as Weinberg asserts), we’d see some of the behaviors documented by Fine and Rosen from GC philosophers. But we don’t. Weinberg writes as if the Fine and Rosen report is critical of the behavior of everyone involved, which it is not, since the report is focused on the subversion of scholarly norms for political purposes, and GC philosophers are not guilty of that.

Felix
Felix
25 days ago
Reply to  Moti Gorin

Authorship of pseudoscience does indeed seem to count as “subversion of scholarly norms for political purposes,” and anti-trans philosophers (yourself included) are very much guilty of that. On a more mundane level, it’s not as though anti-trans philosophers are unfailingly polite and never rude or disparaging; see some of Arif Ahmed and Kathleen Stock’s correspondence (disclosed in the course of these proceedings) and how they talk about other philosophers.

Such “online nastiness” might be conceptualized as a problem, but I think it’s important to note that the issues here aren’t merely of tone and professional conduct. It’s not as though the anti-trans project would be made less deserving of criticism and pushback were its chief proponents to adopt a different tone. Indeed, it seems that taking pains to emphasize how polite and civil they are serves them well in obscuring the incivility of what they advocate for. It shifts the focus away from the content of their work and its consequences and on to their posture, which, they maintain, is impeccable.

norms are not cheap explanations!
norms are not cheap explanations!
25 days ago
Reply to  Moti Gorin

Sorry, but I still think this is just a specious inference. (But I appreciate the elaboration.)

Paraphrasing your post:If online nastiness partly explains censoriousness and anti-intellectual, and if both sides are guilty of online nastiness, then *all else equal*, perhaps we’d see some of the behaviors documented by Fine and Rosen from GC philosophers.

But nothing in Weinberg’s presentation suggests to me that the ceteris paribus clause I’ve made explicit there is a reasonable added premise. The speculation in the original presentation is satisfied provided that unspecified mediators (further considerations about the population structure, social dynamics within the population, and so on) suffice to produce the effect (i.e., fail to interrupt it), given the speculated cause. What makes the speculation prima facie compelling is that, one suspects, *many different theories* of such mediators, with conditions filled in corresponding to the relevant social data, would suffice to produce the effect. (Those theories may all produce different outcomes, but the measurement of those outcomes in terms of this particular effect is highly degenerate.)

It’s fine to doubt that last suspicion. Social science is hard work! But your particular reason for the doubt seems to be you favoring one rather specific theory: the one that dispenses with mediating causes. On examination, this strikes me as an untenable view, given the general rule of thumb that these social systems are complex, non-linear systems. Hence, I think the overall inference is specious.

Moti Gorin
Moti Gorin
25 days ago

Weinberg presented a speculative hypothesis; I offered something similar in response. I was not submitting a paper to a journal or submitting an application for a grant. Nobody here is doing science.

norms are not cheap explanations!
norms are not cheap explanations!
25 days ago
Reply to  Moti Gorin

Weinberg offered a thoughtful presentation of a social scientific hypothesis. You offered something much more flippant (which is fine, but was also something whose content surprised me). So I asked to hear more, and in your elaboration you gave an argument that sounds implausible on a cursory glance at how we are primed to think about causal structure in complex social systems. That’s all that’s happened.

Nick Laskowski
Nick Laskowski
25 days ago

I’m a metaethicist by training but I’ve been actively contributing to the social philosophy research community (i.e. publishing, refereeing, conferencing, mentoring, etc.) for about six or so years at this point. Indeed, I’m teaching a grad seminar in social philosophy right now that focuses mostly on issues surrounding the philosophy of gender and sex. And would you believe it? We’re reading Bogardus’s recent book-length defense of his biology-based view of sex right along side new books from Briggs and George, Cosker-Rowland, and Richardson, all of which contain, if you can believe it, explicit arguments against sex-based views of gender. So when the authors of the report write: 

“Scholarship that questions [orthodox] assumptions is routinely met with the sort of opposition that is designed, not to challenge objectionable positions on substantive grounds, but to suppress discussion”, 

and when the authors note that their Google searches (!) for syllabi containing heterodox work on the philosophy of gender and sex turns up “exactly zero” results, 

I find wondering: What is the wisdom of having a couple of philosophers (esteemed as they are – Rosen is my philosophical grandfather and Fine is a philosophical household name) who don’t do social philosophy reporting on the current disciplinary health of social philosophy, based largely on what appears to be their selective impressions of a few high-profile cases of bad behavior from half a decade ago involving many individuals who clearly spend too much time online?

Yes, Tuvel was treated poorly. No, social philosophy has not, in my experience, at least, “render[ed] certain ideas undiscussable”. 

Meme
Meme
25 days ago
Reply to  Nick Laskowski

This example makes it hard for me to generalize beyond your experience. Are there other examples you had in mind, perhaps from your engagements with other scholars in the subfield? (Asking as an outsider to that subfield and this debate.)

Nick Laskowski
Nick Laskowski
24 days ago
Reply to  Meme

As someone else with whom I was spoke about the report rightly pointed out, there’s no systematic empirical evidence regarding social philosophy’s research climate available to us. But again, as someone who simply engages with the literature in the usual way, attends conferences in the usual way, referees in the usual way, mentors in the usual way, I have only ever seen “heterodox” views engaged with in the usual way. Again, I think it’s highly telling that _all_ of the major new books in philosophy of gender, sex, and sexual orientation engage with sex-based views in the boring scholarly ways of which we’re all familiar, including:

Jenkins (2023), Ontology and Oppression
Cull (2024), What Gender Should Be
Briggs and George, (2023) What Even Is Gender?
Richardson (2025), The End of Binaries
Cosker-Rowland (2025), Gender Identity
Andler (2025), Sexual Orientation and Identity

That’s a downright envious level of explicit and sustained engagement with a family of views defended by, as Rosen and Fine tell it, “Scholars […] barred from conferences and edited collections and effectively excluded from publication in mainstream journals”. 

Moreover, inspired by your question, I went back and thought about a number of social philosophy workshops and conferences that I’ve attended recently, along with dozens upon dozens of other scholars, including (titles paraphrased): 

Gender & Normativity Workshop, University of Tampere
International Social Ontology Society, Trinity
Workshop on gender, University of Barcelona
BSET, University of Glasgow
RoME, University of Colorado at Boulder
Human Kinds Workshop, KU Leuven
Social Philosophy Conference, Essen Institute for Advanced Study

And as you might have guessed it: Sex-based views of gender were discussed in all of them, in painstaking, analytic philosophical detail.

Again, all of this is anecdotal. And it’s true that Rosen and Fine do discuss real cases of extra-scholarly efforts to combat ideas in a way that is unusual in philosophy generally. But the situation in social philosophy is unusual in a way, isn’t it? I can’t shake the feeling that the report would have looked very different had they focused on anecdota from, I don’t know, ordinary scholars who aren’t contributors to Supreme Court briefs, co-authoring US DHHS reports, running websites where people can anonymously report on trans people, and engaging in internet culture war noise generally. 

Nick Laskowski
Nick Laskowski
24 days ago
Reply to  Nick Laskowski

Object to the substance of what I’ve said by all means, but yeesh, please ignore the missing words, extraneous words (‘was’ in the first sentence), typos (‘envious’), etc. across my posts.

Alex Byrne
Alex Byrne
23 days ago
Reply to  Nick Laskowski

I was surprised to see this list of books characterized as “engag[ing] with sex-based views in the boring scholarly ways of which we’re all familiar.” Taking them in order:

1. Jenkins (2023), Ontology and Oppression

An OUP book. Contains no citations to any gender-critical work (much of which is relevant to Jenkins’ project).

2. Cull (2024), What Gender Should Be

“Much ink has been spilled on the inadequacy of contemporary gender critical thought and I will not recite such arguments here.” No citations to GC thought or the ink spilled by its critics.

3. Briggs and George (2023), What Even Is Gender?

Reilly-Cooper, Stock, and Byrne are described as “transphobic authors.” Not the sort of language one would expect to find in an academic book (presumably none of the reviewers raised an objection). B&G, play the ball, not the man!

4. Richardson (2025), The End of Binaries

“Let us end by thinking, again, about the role of intellectuals like Stock, Lawford-Smith, and Byrne. The standard criticisms suggest that they do bad metaphysics or that they inappropriately justify their political programs on the basis of metaphysics. … it may be true that some of these philosophers are personally immoral or support harmful political policies …” 

Stock, Lawford-Smith, and Byrne are the only philosophers mentioned. Why Kevin thinks I have a “political program,” I have no idea. Another OUP book—their standards for books in this field are astonishingly low. In-group peer review is part of the problem.

5. Cosker-Rowland (2025), Gender Identity

“… in March 2023 there was a rally outside the Victorian Parliament in Melbourne at which neo-­Nazis and gender critical feminists campaigned against trans rights and held up banners proclaiming that trans women are perverts and paedophiles.” 

Any reader would know that Lawford-Smith works at Melbourne, and can draw their own conclusions. In fact, the two groups did not campaign together and the feminists held up no such banners. The feminists’ rally, including banners and placards, can be seen in one of Cosker-­Rowland’s own citations. Many months after publication OUP stealth-edited this passage in the online version of the book, correcting the false claim but managing to introduce further errors. 

Also, Gender Identity does not manage to clear a minimal “scholarly” bar, as I point out in my review (invited and rejected without explanation by NDPR and subsequently published by PPA).

6. Andler (2025), Sexual Orientation and Identity

No complaints! Andler engages with Stock and Lawford-Smith in the usual boring respectful way. Good for him. Depressing to find Fausto-Sterling uncritically cited, but whatever.

Overall score: 1/6. Must do better.

Nick Laskowski
Nick Laskowski
23 days ago
Reply to  Alex Byrne

I was surprised to see that you were surprised by my characterization. Recall that I was addressing, especially, Rosen and Fine’s claim that “heterodox” work in philosophy of sex and gender isn’t challenged “on substantive grounds” and the suggestion that such work is ignored because it is “effectively excluded from publication in mainstream journals”. As support, I provided a list of six books off the top of my head that engage gender-critical philosophy and sex-based views of gender. Let’s have at it again, in reverse order:

6. Andler’s book

Glad to hear that you have no complaints. 

5. Cosker-Rowland
Engages with “heterodox” work throughout the entire book. Here’s some citations: 

Stock: 8; 68 n. 37; 117; 130–137; 146; 153 n. 16; 154; 159 n. 31; 211; 216; 229 n. 24; 273–274; 278–295; 317 n. 40

Lawford-Smith: 1 n. 3; 8; 117; 130–137; 146; 211; 216; 291–294

You: 3 n. 8; 17 n. 7; 32 n. 39; 278 n. 2; 298–300; 317 n. 40

Leng: 8; 117; 138–141; 146

You disagreeing with Cosker-Rowland’s characterization of one example in a 300+ page book of ordinary analytic arguments establishes very little, I’d say. 

4. Richardson (2025), The End of Binaries
I’m pleased to see you acknowledging that Richardson engages with you, Stock, and Lawford-Smith. Let’s put some of the page numbers up, shall we?

Stock: 31; 32; 33; 34; 38; 41; 44; 48; 58; 197; 198

Lawford-Smith: 28; 31; 33; 34; 38; 41; 44; 46; 48

You: 33; 34; 48; 56

Leng: 41; 42; 43

Now you say you have “no idea” why Richardson thinks you have a “political program”. But your views have obvious normative relevance, and you did co-author an HHS report on pediatric dysphoria that served as a framework for a federal crackdown on pediatric gender-affirming care by the Trump administration. You disagreeing with Richardson’s characterization of you as someone supporting harmful policies, again, doesn’t show that his book isn’t business as usual.

3. Briggs and George (2023), What Even Is Gender?
Cites the usual suspects accordingly:

Stock: 26; 28; 89

You: 28; 154

Bogardus: 168 n. 3

Reilly-Cooper: 28; 79; 95 n. 11; 116; 117

Allen: 95 n. 11

Ditum: 27

Bindel: 82

Raymond: 100

Blanchard: 100; 127 n. 1

You taking issue with being characterized as “transphobic” (along with Stock and Riley-Cooper), in the context of a debate with obvious normative (and political) relevance, when you (and Stock, not sure about Riley-Cooper) engage in both scholarship _and_ activism (see above), again, does not show what you seem to think it shows. 

2. Cull (2024), What Gender Should Be
I don’t have this book on hand at the moment, but sex-based views are discussed in Chapter 8, I believe. You might be right that you’re not cited, and instead Cull argues against paradigmatic sex-based views. Frustrating, perhaps, but you’ve been in this game long enough to know that this is quite a common way to engage with a family of views. I, too, wish I were directly cited more often. 

1. Jenkins (2023), Ontology and Oppression
This is your best case. Even though I think Jenkins has the resources to justify not even discussing paradigms of “heterodox” views, I’ll spot you that this wasn’t the best example I could draw off the top of my head. Perhaps I can make this one up to those still keeping score by pointing out that I myself have cited Byrne, Bogardus, and Stock (in several mainstream journals, no less – some “top 5” journals even). 

Updated scoreboard: 5/6? 

Felix
Felix
23 days ago
Reply to  Nick Laskowski

I think Nick addresses Alex’s concerns regarding the literature rather well, so I’ll instead focus on this as some of these claims are misleading or lacking the context needed to more fully appreciate what they are about:

[Byrne, above, quoting Cosker-Rowland (2025)]: “… in March 2023 there was a rally outside the Victorian Parliament in Melbourne at which neo-­Nazis and gender critical feminists campaigned against trans rights and held up banners proclaiming that trans women are perverts and paedophiles.”

Any reader would know that Lawford-Smith works at Melbourne, and can draw their own conclusions. In fact, the two groups did not campaign together and the feminists held up no such banners. The feminists’ rally, including banners and placards, can be seen in one of Cosker-­Rowland’s own citations.

The Australian organizer of the rally in Melbourne (Jones) fully understood how the sign that the neo-Nazis carried with them connected them to the rally’s cause. And this is not surprising, because similar such rallies have involved speakers calling for “decent” men to “eradicate these monsters from society;” claims that queer and trans people are “groomers,” together with mentions of “pedophilia;” and apparently fond reminiscences of a past where one could use slurs without facing criticism or challenge.

It’s also worth noting that the British organizer of that rally (Keen, who is also fond of “groomer” rhetoric) has repeatedly emphasized that she is “not a feminist.” So while some of the rally’s attendees may want to describe themselves as such (and perhaps Lawford-Smith would describe herself that way), it may not be appropriate to describe the rally as such. Indeed, from Keen’s perspective, it appears that she does not regard these rallies as feminist at all.
As for Lawford-Smith, she has said that she felt “safe” next to the sieg-heiling men, although apparently has not reflected on why she would be safe alongside them at an anti-trans rally while the opposition protestors would not be.
Interestingly, there was a follow-up rally at the same location a year later. (It is not clear whether Lawford-Smith was present for this one.) The follow-up once again featured a neo-Nazi presence and, this time, it sounds like they opened the rally (here someone describes one of the neo-Nazis as “an okay guy” who “gave a lovely introduction to the women speaking”).
Based on this, I don’t think the characterization given by Cosker-Rowland (which Alex quotes) is inaccurate. It is, however, lacking in detail. I hope that what’s been shared above can remedy that.

Alex Byrne
Alex Byrne
23 days ago
Reply to  Nick Laskowski

Hi Nick

Thanks. I was responding to your claim that the books on your list (a) engaged with GC work; did so in the (b) “boring” and (c) “scholarly” ways with which “we’re all familiar.” I took “boring” to exclude name-calling, insinuations of consorting with neo-Nazis, suggestions of “immorality,” etc. I showed that five of the six books fail on either (a) or (b). Noting that some do not fail on (a) does not address my objection.

I also pointed out some failures of (c). As I wrote in my review of Cosker-Rowland’s book:

“Oxford University Press’s blurb promises that the book engages ‘a wide range of gender-­critical feminist philosophers’ arguments,’ which is a welcome change, but this is spoiled by persistent misreadings, miscitations, and omitted citations. The chapters on gender-­affirming healthcare should have been reviewed by someone with knowledge of the literature. OUP should note that quality control in this area of philosophy is not working.”

Similar examples from your list are not difficult to find. 

On Cull, you seem to think that I was “frustrated” at not being cited. I never mentioned my work and that is a projection on your part. My point was about basic academic norms. If you’re going to say that that much ink has been spilled by the materialists showing that the dualists are wrong, then the very least you can do is to give some citations so readers can make up their own minds. Philosophy of sex/gender should be held to the same minimal standard. Incidentally, I see Cull’s practice of refusing to cite any GC work continues in the recent book “Trans Philosophy: The Basics.”

On Richardson and the HHS Review, I don’t think contributing to a sober assessment of a medical practice is thereby to have a “political project.” Besides, the timing is probably off (the Review and Richardson’s book both came out in 2025). The Review is irrelevant to the charge of “transphobia” in Briggs and George 2023. In any case, surely you’re not suggesting that this sort of attack is acceptable in an academic work of philosophy! No wonder many philosophers (including graduate students) are reluctant to work in this area.

I know you have engaged in the usual boring way with GC work yourself, but I am afraid you are an exception.

Felix
Felix
23 days ago
Reply to  Alex Byrne

On Richardson and the HHS Review, I don’t think contributing to a sober assessment of a medical practice is thereby to have a “political project.”

Anti-vaccine proponents might well characterize themselves conducting a similar review on vaccine safety and efficacy as “a sober assessment of a medical practice,” but presumably we wouldn’t have any trouble recognizing it as “a political project” of the anti-vaccine movement? Why are we here supposed to withhold judgment for a report authored by members of the anti-trans movement? Several critics have described it as such, and not just because of its authorship, but its substantive content.

However, even if the authors did not intend for their work to be viewed as “a political project,” it is apparent that it is indeed helpful to one, which is why conservative lobby groups like the Alliance Defending Freedom and the Heritage Foundation have praised it and why politicians in the Trump administration, like Stephen Miller, have cited it approvingly to call the care under review “barbaric” and to further justify trans-hostile policymaking.

It’s actually rather strange that, at this point, there are still anti-trans philosophers clumsily feigning confusion as to how their work could be characterized as part of “a political project”—even as they have repeatedly involved themselves in actions that are decidedly political.

Besides, the timing is probably off (the Review and Richardson’s book both came out in 2025). The Review is irrelevant to the charge of “transphobia” in Briggs and George 2023. In any case, surely you’re not suggesting that this sort of attack is acceptable in an academic work of philosophy! 

Why would it not be acceptable? Someone linked to this nice piece by Jennifer Saul in the comments to another thread, and I think it captures exactly how we should approach the work of so-called “gender critical” writers. That those writers feel indignant at us characterizing them “anti-trans” or “trans exclusionary” or “transphobic” does not seem to be a good reason not to do so. In fact, it seems necessary we are to accurately describe the harms that their work is intended to legitimize—a point I’ve made previously.

Perhaps the argument is that it’s “rude” or “impolite;” that it conveys that there is something morally objectionable about the anti-trans position. But that’s exactly it: Some philosophers hold, as a substantive view, that the anti-trans position is morally objectionable. How are they to talk about this, to spell out an argument for why they think this, if every attempt to do so is met with indignant accusations (“this sort of attack”) that one has breached some code of professional civility and politeness? It seems possible for scholars to hold morally objectionable views; I don’t see why it would be beyond the pale for other scholars to then say so.

Meme
Meme
23 days ago
Reply to  Nick Laskowski

That’s very helpful, thanks. I notice that you say, in all of these conferences and articles and the like, that the sex-based views are “engaged with.” Does this mean, perhaps among other things, that the same venues do not usually include scholars *defending* sex-based views? I ask because that itself would seem like a big oversight (at best), given how prominent those views appear to be in the broader public, and maybe the result of something like “cancel culture” (at worst). To be clear, that’s not to deny your response to the charge that scholars only *engage* with such views through cancellation and the like. I think you’ve sufficiently rebutted that idea.

Moti Gorin
Moti Gorin
23 days ago
Reply to  Meme

Out of curiosity I quickly looked at the events listed. Some of them feature speakers who, if they engaged with GC philosophy at all, are very unlikely to have given it a fair or even accurate hearing (at least if their published work is indicative of what they present at conferences/workshops). I could not find any gender critical speakers listed, though some events don’t list all their speakers online, and I did not dig around too deeply. So, it’s possible there were some GC defenders (I wouldn’t bet on it) but in any case it’s far from obvious that the list of events itself provides evidence that GC philosophy was discussed “in painstaking, analytic philosophical detail.”

Nick Laskowski
Nick Laskowski
23 days ago
Reply to  Moti Gorin

This is becoming tedious.

What I’ve been trying to emphasize is that, if you look at philosophy of gender and sex from the perspective of ordinary scholars who don’t also engage in extra scholarly political activism of the sort that you, Byrne, Stock, and Lawford-Smith engage in routinely, philosophy of gender and sex isn’t all that different from other philosophical sub-fields. That’s been my experience, as someone who approached the field with the usual curiosity to learn about the topic from those who have spent their careers contributing to it and the hope that I might one day also help advance our collective understanding of the issues by contributing to the collective conversation. I’m sure it doesn’t look that way to you. But then again, in addition to ordinary scholarship, you’ve also:

– Co-authored the 2025 U.S. HHS report for the Trump Administration

– Co-authored a Supreme Court briefing on excluding trans folks from sport

– Served as a panelist and presenter at events organized by advocacy groups like the Society for Evidence-Based Gender Medicine

– Provided media consulting for state ballots outlawing gender-related surgeries

For everyone else reading these exchanges with an interest in getting a feel for social philosophy’s research climate, I say: Talk to the scholars without a political axe to grind, who won’t all-of-a-sudden start playing dumb when you suggest that their take on the field might not generalize to the rest of us who aren’t walking around with axes.

Moti Gorin
Moti Gorin
23 days ago
Reply to  Nick Laskowski

“if you look at philosophy of gender and sex from the perspective of ordinary scholars who don’t also engage in extra scholarly political activism of the sort that you, Byrne, Stock, and Lawford-Smith engage in routinely, philosophy of gender and sex isn’t all that different from other philosophical sub-fields.”

This may be true if you limit “ordinary scholars” to those who agree with you on the first-order issues, since they don’t face the kind of censoriousness within the field documented by Fine and Rosen. I’m curious if you know any scholars who are gender critical and who share your view that this area of philosophy “isn’t all that different from other sub-fields.” Who might you have in mind? Can you offer a name or two? Similarly, can you answer Meme’s question above re: whether defenders of the gender critical view participated in the events you listed?

On to the list of my crimes:

1.    HHS review: yes, I co-authored this review, which came to the same conclusions regarding the state of the evidence and the risk/benefit ratio of pediatric medical transition as reports done by health authorities in Sweden, the UK, and Finland. It is not unusual for academics or other experts to co-author government reports. I did so because I believed (and continue to believe) I had something valuable to contribute and that, on balance, the review itself would be a valuable contribution. The review, along with peer reviews/responses and our replies, can be found here: https://opa.hhs.gov/gender-dysphoria-report. I would direct people’s attention to the most critical responses, those by the American Psychiatric Association, Rider et al, and Dowshen et al, along with our replies, if you want to get a sense for the level of scholarship and thinking prevalent among leading gender clinicians and major medical groups on this issue.
 
2.    “Co-authored a Supreme Court briefing on excluding trans folks from sport”: I did not co-author any brief. I did sign a brief, but not one that was about “excluding trans folks from sport.” The brief I signed was about whether it is justified to exclude males from girls’/women’s sport (it argued that it is justified). (I would not have signed any brief that argued for excluding people from sport or from anything else on the basis of their trans identity.) This mischaracterization on your part speaks to a comment I made above about how I found it unlikely that some of the people who spoke at some of the events you listed would have given gender critical philosophy “a fair or even accurate” hearing. It is also worth noting here that another group of philosophers submitted a brief to the Supreme Court on a different sex/gender-related case (Skrmetti). Again, nothing that unusual about academics submitting such briefs, which count on your view as “extra scholarly political activism.” https://yaledailynews.com/articles/yale-professors-file-briefs-amici-curiae-in-supreme-court-case-challenging-bans-on-gender-affirming-healthcare-for-trans-minors
 
3.    “Served as a panelist and presenter at events organized by advocacy groups like the Society for Evidence-Based Gender Medicine”: Yes, I’ve spoken at SEGM twice now and will be speaking at their next conference, which takes place next week in Washington, DC. SEGM advocates for and directly supports high-quality research on pediatric gender dysphoria (e.g. funding systematic evidence reviews), and I’ve learned a lot from the leading researchers and clinicians they bring in for their conferences, often from European countries with far saner healthcare systems than our own here in the US. It is not unusual for academics to participate in such conferences. (If I were invited to give a talk at WPATH, I assume you wouldn’t blink.)
 
4.    “Provided media consulting for state ballots outlawing gender-related surgeries”: There is a proposition in Colorado that seeks to restrict transition surgeries to adults. The intent of the proposition is clear, but the language is unclear. A reporter for the Colorado Sun contacted me to ask what I thought the proposition was about and, more specifically, if the unclarity might inadvertently have negative impacts on a wider range of surgeries (eg surgery for gynecomastia). I explained to him how I understood the proposition. He briefly quoted me, along with other people, including other bioethicists in Colorado. Here is the article, so that those who are interested can read it and judge for themselves whether my quote constitutes having “provided media consulting for state ballots outlawing gender-related surgeries” (italics mine).  https://coloradosun.com/2026/10/20/proposition-135-what-surgeries-banned/
 
You say, “Talk to the scholars without a political axe to grind, who won’t all-of-a-sudden start playing dumb when you suggest that their take on the field might not generalize to the rest of us who aren’t walking around with axes.” This is good advice, so long as you make sure to talk to scholars who actually defend gender critical views, so as to avoid the kind of selection bias that apparently has blinded some philosophers to just how unusual this area of philosophy really is.

Felix
Felix
22 days ago
Reply to  Moti Gorin

This mischaracterization on your part speaks to a comment I made above about how I found it unlikely that some of the people who spoke at some of the events you listed would have given gender critical philosophy “a fair or even accurate” hearing.

Presumably it’s possible to give GC views “a fair [and] accurate” hearing” and still come to a negative conclusion about them? For instance, you claim the point Nick makes above is a “mischaracterization.” You and others have said this before. There’s already been a discussion elsewhere on the DN about why that characterization is a “fair and accurate” summation of what it is GC commenters and activists have advocated for. You have, in fact, signed “a brief that argued for excluding people from sport … on the basis of their trans identity.” Equivocating by shifting to a different sense of “inclusion”/”exclusion” does not make Nick’s point above a mischaracterization of your actions; rather, it makes for a sleight of hand on your part.

As for SEGM, for those who might not be aware, this organization exists in the same vein as the ACPeds. It is part of a small cluster of organizations whose members have called for the repathologization of trans identity and “100% desistance, and as early as possible.” Saying that these groups are far from neutral, that they are anti-trans, would be a “fair and accurate” summation. Saying that they merely exist to “advocate for and directly support high-quality research on pediatric gender dysphoria” would not be; that sort of characterization would be incomplete, at best.

A lot is made in your comment about what is and isn’t “unusual.” For instance, you say that “it is not unusual for academics or other experts to co-author government reports.” This is true. It is, however, unusual for those reports to be written by members of groups, such as the above, that clearly take a negative view of the population that the report is about. We would regard it as “unusual,” for example, if a group of “race realist” scholars wrote a government report on the racial makeup of the population, where they fulminate about “dysgenics” and advocate for “racial hygiene.” The details actually matter, and retreating to the position that it is not “unusual for academics … to co-author government reports” obscures the relevant details: what the report was about, who wrote it, and what their substantive views on the population in question are.

The reference to gynecomastia reminds me of this discussion. It is apparent that these bans, which organizations like the above advocate for, have to carve out exemptions to allow for interventions that aren’t perceived as transgressing cisheterornormative boundaries. Thus, a cis man receiving treatment for enlarged breast tissue is permitted to do so because the intervention does not violate those normative expectations. But that’s just what Nick noted above: that “your views have obvious normative relevance.” Obscuring that relevance through vagueness, where details are elided by overly general statements about what is and isn’t “unusual” for scholars to do, does no good.

Moti Gorin
Moti Gorin
22 days ago
Reply to  Felix

I provided a link to the HHS review above and I suggested that those interested should first direct their attention to the most critical responses, as well as to our replies (which are all included on the page I linked to). The criticisms of the American Psychiatric Association, and those of nearly two dozen leading gender clinicians who critiqued the review in the peer-reviewed literature, and our replies to those criticisms, are far more likely to give readers a sense of what problems, if any, the review might have, than ad hominems on a blog. The other peer reviews are worth reading, too (eg that of the heads of the Belgian Centre for Evidence-Based Medicine, who I suspect know more about what makes for a quality scientific review than anonymous blog posters do).

I believe I’ve posted this on Daily Nous before (Felix, you have a seemingly encyclopedic knowledge of the comment sections of this blog so you can probably verify), but here is Nathan Robinson’s (hardly a right winger) piece on what the SPLC is today, with some very amusing bits about their “hate group” designation, which seems these days to be little more than a fundraising tactic. (There are risks to defaming people, though–they paid Maajid Nawaz over $3 million, a mere drop in their $1 billion bucket). https://www.currentaffairs.org/news/2019/03/the-southern-poverty-law-center-is-everything-thats-wrong-with-liberalism.

Lastly, here is the brief I signed: https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/24/24-43/374986/20250918112750820_24-38%20and%2024-43%20Amici%20Brief.pdf

It is plainly false that I co-authored or signed a brief that argued for excluding people from sports on the basis of their trans identity. It’s odd and frankly slightly disconcerting that you continue to assert that I did sign such a brief, when everything is public, written in a language you and everyone else here knows, etc. Then again, I guess you bear no costs, given your anonymity.

This is the last time I will reply to you, Felix, at least here on this blog while you smear me and others anonymously.

Felix
Felix
21 days ago
Reply to  Moti Gorin

I’m sorry that you feel that you are being “smeared” for a simple description of actions that you did, in fact, take and continue to proudly promote. It does not appear to occur to you that others might view those actions, and the work resulting from them, and the impacts of that work, and “fairly and accurately” come away with the conclusion that you are part of an anti-trans political project, one that has had considerable success among state institutions and has produced tangible harms.

As I said previously, we are expected to show endless scholarly deference here, to constantly give the benefit of the doubt, and to avoid plainly stating what anti-trans scholars are doing, lest they feel that they are being “smeared” or “demonized” by descriptions of their actions. There’s a tendency for such scholars to exploit the good will of their colleagues, to insist that we be charitable to a fault and assume that what they are doing is not “unusual,” that the organizations they work with and for are merely advocates of “high quality research,” and that we engage with their work as though it had no normative relevance or political consequence. In other words, to coddle them. I see no reason to do so, at least not at this point, where the benefit of the doubt has well and truly been exhausted.

I would also encourage those who might be curious to read the report, and note how it is unusual not just because of its authorship (all authors are affiliated with one or more anti-trans lobby groups, and some of the authors have no relevant expertise in the subject), but because of its content. There’s a reason the AAP likened it to anti-vaccine advocacy work (“As we have seen with immunizations, bypassing medical expertise and scientific evidence has real consequences for the health of America’s children”) and why the report holds currency in this particular health department. More broadly, there’s an interesting pattern to the kind of reports this department is receptive to. And I think we all know why, although saying so might get you accused of “smearing” the authors, the secretary they write for, or, heaven forbid, the administration relying on their work to legitimize its actions.

Craig Burley
Craig Burley
12 days ago
Reply to  Moti Gorin

Moti you said “I did sign a brief, but not one that was about “excluding trans folks from sport.” The brief I signed was about whether it is justified to exclude males from girls’/women’s sport (it argued that it is justified). (I would not have signed any brief that argued for excluding people from sport or from anything else on the basis of their trans identity.) ”

Why did the lawyers citing this brief you submitted to the Court (I don’t care if you “wrote” it, you in your personal capacity submitted it) *say* at oral argument that it provided comprehensive reasoning for excluding trans women from sports? Those were YOUR LAWYERS why did they argue that it advocated what you claim it did not?

Moti Gorin
Moti Gorin
12 days ago
Reply to  Craig Burley

I didn’t listen to or read the oral arguments so I am not familiar with the particular claims you describe. But in any case, the brief argued that excluding males from women’s sport is justified. That it follows from this that excluding trans girls/women from girls’/women’s sport is justified does not show that the brief argued for excluding trans girls/women from girls’/women’s sport on the basis of their gender identity. So, just speculating: perhaps what the lawyers meant was that by showing that excluding males from girls’/women’s sport is justified the brief thereby showed that excluding trans girls/women is justified.

Craig Burley
Craig Burley
12 days ago
Reply to  Moti Gorin

That was incredible weaksauce. Are you freaking kidding me? Was that a joke?

THESE WERE YOUR LAWYERS APPEARING FOR YOU IN A CASE BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF THE ENTIRE UNITED STATES THAT YOU DEMANDED TO BE HEARD IN

Why did they say the brief argued for what you are specifically denying to us that it argued for? How did this frankly incredible direct contradiction arise!?

Moti Gorin
Moti Gorin
12 days ago
Reply to  Craig Burley

Sorry, I’m not sure what you are talking about (all caps notwithstanding). I was not a party in this case. I signed an amicus brief, along with dozens of others who signed other briefs, on all sides of the issue. I have no lawyers, no lawyers appeared for me, nor did I demand to be heard in a case. Again, I signed a brief arguing that it is justified to exclude males from women’s/girls’ sport. From this it indeed follows that it is justified to exclude trans women/girls–and again, perhaps this is what the lawyers you refer to meant, assuming you accurately represent their words (though I don’t know because I didn’t follow the case closely). But, again again, the amicus brief I signed plainly did not argue for excluding people on the basis of their “gender identity.” And again again again, I would not have signed any brief that did so argue.

Felix
Felix
25 days ago

The sub-report acknowledges the increasingly hostile environment that queer and trans people find themselves in (pages 10-11), but fails to make mention of the active role that anti-trans commenters, including so-called “gender critical” philosophers, have played in legitimizing this exact state of affairs. For example, authoring reports (on subjects well outside their expertise) to justify the extremist policy of trans-hostile governments; submitting amicus briefs to the Supreme Court, and having that very court cite them in support of wide-ranging judicial decisions bearing upon the rights of trans people—something that anti-trans philosophers are apparently proud of.

Every time it is pointed out that these commenters are actively involved in a project that is causing immiserization and suffering, we see this retreat behind “the norms of our discipline,” accompanied by platitudes centered on academic freedom, and a total denial of any responsibility to the colleagues who are further marginalized as a result of the anti-trans philosophers’ work, such as it is.

In fact, the situation is inverted, as in this sub-report, and defenders of traditional, dominant conceptions of sex and gender are somehow recast as “heterodox scholars,” brave heretics unfairly maligned merely for their “dissenting” views, and not active participants in fortifying a normative gender system that is itself now at the center of the state’s agenda—the subject of Executive Orders, legislative changes, and judicial decisions that echo the language of “gender critical” philosophers and, as we’ve seen, even cite them approvingly.

There’s a demand that we show endless scholarly deference here, and I think that’s long since proven unwarranted. We need to be able to make visible the role that these commenters are playing, to talk about the harms that they are legitimizing, and the people who are rendered most vulnerable in the environment where this all occurs. There’s a risk in this sub-report that, for all the posturing about “open criticism,” it nevertheless ends up being another case of philosophers (the sub-report’s authors) failing to understand how intellectual work engages with the world, and how that engagement might itself become subject to scrutiny, especially in a case such as this, where actual harms have materialized and the commenters who’ve done the most to justify that harm have, as always, retreated to self-exonerating claims that they were always merely doing dispassionate “heterodox” research—and really aren’t they the real victims here for having endured so much?

Moti Gorin
Moti Gorin
25 days ago
Reply to  Felix

This is bizarre. For years, there has been a steady stream of articles, both in the peer reviewed literature and in the popular media, doing exactly what you claim needs to be done, that is, claiming that critics of the policies promoted (very successfully, it is important to note, at least for a time) by maximalist trans activism are causing all manner of harm. It is impossible to look into these issues and not immediately trip over piles of such articles. If you are jonesing for this sort of content, it is very easy to find.

But perhaps you think there should be even more. In that case, you could write articles and submit them for publication. History suggests you won’t have much trouble finding an outlet—peer review in this area tends to be extremely gentle to those who share your views. You could even directly engage with the work of GC philosophers, raise objections, etc. We publish under our own names—again, easy to find.

Felix
Felix
24 days ago
Reply to  Moti Gorin
...critics of the policies promoted (very successfully, it is important to note, at least for a time) by maximalist trans activism are causing all manner of harm.

This statement is illustrative of a larger problem; there is so much to unpack just here, and Brandolini’s law applies. The first issue is that anti-trans commenters have certainly not limited themselves to critiquing “policies promoted … by maximalist trans activism.” Indeed, many of their attacks are focused on policies that were, up until recently, regarded as “moderate.” Now, however, these same policies are being rewritten as “maximalist,” seemingly in an effort to make the anti-trans “GC” position appear moderate rather than extremist.

In any case, I don’t think we need more articles documenting the harms of anti-trans activism (although we could do with more of those in the popular media, where such reporting is scarce), but we do need the professional community to take those harms seriously rather than coddling those who are legitimizing them.

Meme
Meme
25 days ago
Reply to  Felix

“submitting amicus briefs to the Supreme Court, and having that very court cite them in support of wide-ranging judicial decisions bearing upon the rights of trans people”

Is your view that the amicus briefs actually swayed the opinion of anyone on the Court? My sense is that the gender critical justices would have always gone one way, the trans inclusive justices would have always gone the other, and any citations of humanities scholarship would just be post hoc rationalizing at best. But maybe I’m just very cynical about the influence of that scholarship on practical/policy issues; I suspect it’s often flimsy to non-existent, and that we’re flattering ourselves to suppose otherwise. Is there empirical literature supporting a stronger impact?

Felix
Felix
24 days ago
Reply to  Meme

That’s a good question. I don’t think that the amicus briefs actually swayed opinion on the court, but more so that they provided the intellectual legitimization that the majority wanted to make its decision appear rational. In that respect, maybe your cynicism is warranted. Or we need to rethink what “influence” means when talking about the influence of scholarship on practical/policy issues.

Michel
Michel
23 days ago
Reply to  Felix

Hear hear!

Jessie Ewesmont
Jessie Ewesmont
25 days ago

Rosen and Fine are some of the greatest metaphysicians to ever live. I think everyone would be better off if they directed the majority of their energies towards metaphysics and logic and very little to other tasks or fields they’re less familiar with.

Noah Gordon
Noah Gordon
25 days ago
Meme
Meme
24 days ago
Reply to  Noah Gordon

Oh… my.

Reichenbach
Reichenbach
24 days ago
Reply to  Noah Gordon

Fine is not wrong on that score.

Reichenbach
Reichenbach
24 days ago
Reply to  Reichenbach

Would love to read Fine’s take on poptimism.

Hey Nonny Mouse
Hey Nonny Mouse
24 days ago

I don’t personally know a single politically conservative working philosopher. The lack of conservatives in philosophy requires explanation and our explanations should be tested. There is certainly a common public perception that conservative opinions are not welcome in the humanities.

Ben
Ben
24 days ago

Are you sure? It may depend on what you mean by “conservative.” If you mean “adherent of free market policies and a generally small state” or “person who has fairly traditional values and is uncomfortable with fast change,” then I think there may be more than you think. If you mean “supporter of the American republican party,” then you may be right, but the obvious reason is that it is very hard for anyone who cares about truth and general decency to support the current republican party.

Hey Nonny Mouse
Hey Nonny Mouse
24 days ago
Reply to  Ben

I’m sure that of the philosophers whose politics I know, all are firmly on the left. When I say “conservatives”, I mean people with a conservative ideology (which I will leave vague). I do not mean Republicans, since there are plenty of reasons for rejecting the GOP that have nothing to do with whether one is progressive or conservative.

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