Trans-Exclusionary Philosopher Seeks to Exclude Trans Philosopher
Jonathan Pike, a professor of philosophy at Open University who defends trans-exclusionary (aka “gender critical”) views has submitted a formal complaint about the appointment of his colleague, professor of philosophy Sophie Grace Chappell, a trans woman, to the Research Excellence Framework (REF) 2029 subpanel for philosophy, according to a report in Times Higher Ed.
[SoiL Thornton, “Resting Halt”]
Professor Pike, who founded a “Gender Critical Research Network” at his university, is objecting to Professor Chappell’s inclusion on the REF Panel because of harsh posts she made on social media about “gender critical” views. According to Times Higher Ed, he is worried about her being biased against views like his, and he “raised concerns about whether the philosophy panel would assess all kinds of outputs on their merits, regardless of their political or ideological position.”
The idea seems to be that we should infer from Chappell’s comments on social media, in which she expressed negative views about particular philosophical positions, that she can not be trusted to fulfill her responsibilities as a member of the REF subpanel.
One concern about this idea is that it seems to be a rather incautious leap from judgments about a person’s political expression in a non-academic environment to conclusions about their professional conduct (the kind of leap that people make, say, in arguing that Holly Lawford-Smith (Melbourne) should be disciplined by her university for her creation of a transphobic website).
Another concern is that it appears to assume that the expression of strong negative opinions about some kinds of philosophical work is evidence of unprofessional bias against that work. But of course it needn’t be. The negative opinions may instead be conclusions reached on the basis of detailed research and analysis of that work informed by expertise in that area.
Remarkably, Pike appears to say that Chappell needn’t actually be biased for her appointment to the subpanel to be problematic. It is enough for others, perhaps moved by well-poisoning by Pike, to think she is biased. According to Times Higher Ed, Pike claimed that “Chappell’s presence may dissuade departments from submitting gender-critical studies to the exercise which determines how £2 billion a year in quality-related (QR) funding is allocated to universities.” It “may,” but it just as plausibly “may not.”
The Times Higher Ed piece includes a few examples of Professor Chappell’s comments on Twitter. Here are two:
“The GC view is a tissue of mistakes, misconceptions & misunderstandings, some of them deliberate, many of them bad-faith; combined with a willingness to stereotype, scaremonger, rumour-monger, demonise & interpret with a studied lack of charity”
“[The Gender Critical] position is a logical analogue of anti-semitism & of homophobia…We shd respond to them as respond to anti-semites and homophobes.”
The tweets are presented without much context. It’s also worth noting that Twitter/X can be a virulently transphobic place in which people with all sorts of views behave terribly. For all we know, these remarks, which seem rather tame for the platform, could be examples of having shown considerable restraint in the face of severe harassment by online activists.
Assuming that Pike’s objection to Chappell’s having a place on the panel is based on principle, and is not mere anti-trans political opportunism, his position appears to be that if a philosopher has been publicly and harshly critical of a view defended by other philosophers, they should be deprived of the opportunity to participate in influential professional assessments. Spending a few moments imagining the various well-known and highly accomplished philosophers who might be disqualified on such a basis is just one way to see the problems with this position.
It is also worth considering what Pike’s objection seems to imply about the other people on the REF philosophy subpanel, which has 10 members.* Even if, contrary to fact, Pike had given us a good reason to think that Chappell would be objectionably biased in her appraisal of some research, why think this would be go unnoticed or unchallenged by her fellow panel members? Are the other panel members too ignorant, too manipulable, too cowardly, or too corrupt to point out when an evaluative report seems biased or unfair? Why think that they would be?
The Times Higher Ed article is here.
* They are: chair Bill Child (Oxford University), deputy chair Beth Lord (University of Aberdeen), James Ladyman (University of Bristol), Pekka Väyrynen (University of Leeds), Stella Sandford (Manchester Metropolitan University), Stephen Mumford (Durham University), David Jones (University of Sheffield), Ema Sullivan-Bissett (University of Birmingham), Hallvard Lillehammer (University of Sheffield), and Sophie Grace Chappell (The Open University).
Another reason to get rid of the REF…
In the time of overheated and stupid culture wars like this, one could even understand Pike’s psychology. But this is no good ground to act on one’s worries in the way he did, it seems to me.
For one thing, there is and has always been a fair amount animosity among philosophers in pretty much every field. Should then everyone be excluded because they express, often in academic channels, negative views about competing positions? This does not seem to be the way to handle matters.
It’s interesting that Pike is targeting the only(?) trans woman on the panel, even though there are others on the panel who very likely strongly disagree with Pike’s views, and might even say so in the same manner that Chappell does.
This comment is basically an accusation. Starting with “It’s interesting that…” doesn’t nullify this. Appealing to “and might even say” is beyond the pale. Maybe there’s an appropriate way to formulate this content (e.g., “someone should look into whether…”), I don’t know; however, this isn’t it.
It’s good that actual evidence is discussed below, but the fact that this comment has the most likes (as of now) is not a good sign for this thread.
I don’t see what your objection is? Mumford (the other panel member who is “very likely [to] strongly disagree with Pike’s views”) has long been clear about his opposition to anti-trans views. And, as someone else pointed out in another comment, Pike is clearly aware of this and, from Pike’s perspective, Mumford’s work “says that the position [Pike] take[s] on fairness in sport is like the Nazis and Apartheid South Africa.”
If Pike genuinely believes this, then it seems he’d have just as much reason to complain about Mumford as he does Chappell. He doesn’t though. He directs his complaint at Chappell.
Hey Felix.
The objection is with the comment above. The things you mention were posted after that comment. That comment, as written, is basically an accusation based upon conjecture. It only works with the “say so in the same manner that Chappell does” part because, obviously, Pike’s action is not based on the claim that Chappell merely “strongly disagrees.” If the “yeah, ‘just asking questions,’ right” criticism often made is legit, that comment goes beyond what the targets of that criticism do.
Even if the conjecture later turns out to be true (whether it does, I’m not addressing), it doesn’t validate making accusations based upon conjecture. I explicitly allow for the possibility that the comment’s content could be formulated in a non-objectionable way; but, as is, it’s not.
More importantly, that the comment has the most likes (some of which were made before the comments further down were posted, and it’s hard to believe that any significant number of those likes are from people scrolling back up to like this comment based upon what they found below), it is not a good sign for this thread that readers are liking comments that are basically accusations based on conjecture.
Surely it is an important distinction that Chappell actually has said so in that manner, whereas Mumford only “might” say so! Is Pike supposed to ask that Mumford be withdrawn from the panel on the basis of something he might hypothetically say??
And the actual Bekker and Mumford apartheid passage (quoted in Pike’s review) that people are so excited about in the comments is really very mild compared to the Chappell “cult of cruelty and exclusion” comments:
This kind of structural comparison is quite standard in social and political philosophy.
Are commenters really demanding that Pike make an official complaint against Mumford’s panel membership on such a flimsy basis?
I was referring to Pike’s tweet, where he tells us that he regards Mumford as viewing his (Pike’s) position “like the Nazis and Apartheid South Africa.” So, from Pike’s perspective, Mumford holds a rather strong view. I don’t think one can sensibly call it mild at all. Certainly, Pike can’t, given how he’s characterized it in the tweet.
Regarding such comments being “quite standard,” I would agree, except that, here, they’re apparently scandalizing when they’re made by a trans woman.
Felix,
Considering how many threads you are involved in, it would certainly be understandable if you lost track of some of the timelines here. Still, is your claim above accurate that you were referring to Pike’s tweet in the post that Hypothetical is responding to? It doesn’t seem to fit the phrasing, “and might even say so in the same manner that Chappell does.” It looks like you didn’t become aware of Pike’s tweet until Wittgenstein linked to it later. That timeline may not be relevant to the immediate issue here, but it is relevant to future discourse on this blog that we should avoid accusations based on conjecture, which stands even if the conjecture turns out to be true (which, FWIW, I don’t think we have evidence of yet, since “saying so in the same manner that Chappell does” requires meeting the bar of “[The Gender Critical] position is a logical analogue of anti-semitism & of homophobia…We shd respond to them as respond to anti-semites and homophobes”), which seemingly implies not “assess[-ing] all kinds of outputs on their merits, regardless of their political or ideological position”).
I think your construal of the timeline is broadly accurate, so far as I can track it. However, I should note that my phrasing (“might even say so in the same manner that Chappell does”) was based on what I have seen Mumford say on social media in the past and on his recent work. This, together with the assumption that Pike was aware of that work given its relevance to his own area, is how you get my comment.
It was deliberately phrased that way because it’s no longer possible to view Mumford’s past comments on Twitter; like many academics, he’s left the platform altogether. I didn’t want to say that he would give precisely the same characterization, as that would require stronger evidence than was available. So, based on the evidence I had (familiarity with what he’s said in the past and his recent published work), I went with might.
I was actually surprised to see that this was considered contentious. Someone who has spoken out strongly against anti-trans views might indeed say something like that. In addition to Mumford, I know other philosophers who have spoken out strongly against anti-trans views. Some even having done so with comments definitely “in the same manner” as Chappell’s. But I didn’t point to them because they aren’t on the panel. (Pointing to them would only serve to motivate the question of whether they, having shared comments “in the same manner” as Chappell’s, are now considered unfit for a place on such a panel. That’s a separate question, imo.)
It did later turn out that Jon had piked any speculative point himself by telling us (in a tweet) exactly how he takes Mumford’s work to consider “gender critical” views, including his own views specifically. That doesn’t modify my comment though; it’s still very much a “might,” as one could always argue that the specific characterization matters and maybe Mumford would avoid that specific characterization while endorsing another that Jon finds just as offensive.
Although not warranting a modification to my comment above, Jon’s tweet did add other useful information. It told us that (1) Jon was aware that Mumford was on the panel also; (2) he was aware that Mumford had been critical of anti-trans views; and (3), from Jon’s perspective, Mumford’s criticism of such views amounted to likening Jon’s specific position to “the Nazis and Apartheid South Africa.”
You are right, however, that my response to Hypothetical above relies on information from elsewhere in the comments here, rather than addressing it as a standalone reply to my comment above. So I can see how, if Hypothetical was just replying to that comment, their question makes sense. I didn’t read it that way initially though as I was keeping in mind other comments as well. So, that’s well-spotted on your part!
Fair enough. Thanks for the thorough and thoughtful response.
Sophie Grace, like many philosophers, is very critical of many positions – and openly so. To find other harshly critical political views, for example, you just have to open Facebook and look at nearly any philosopher’s Facebook feed to see (correctly) harshly critical political views about the Trump administration. Or, less chargedly, on metaphysics blogs, you can find some people very very harshly critical of perdurantism. Sophie Grace is in many cases not saying anything she’s not written in her monograph Trans Figured. Jonathan Pike’s position would overgeneralize into absurdity and leave an empty REF panel. Pike might not like Chappell’s positions on trans issues but the metaphysician who is an endurantist might not like that there’s a rabid perdurantist on the REF panel. This is very much a luck of the draw for all of us, given that we all make a career out of defending positions other people reject.
One of the other members of the panel did in fact write a book that begins: “This is a polemical book. One of its main contentions is that contemporary analytic metaphysics, a professional activity engaged in by some extremely intelligent and morally serious people, fails to qualify as part of the enlightened pursuit of objective truth, and should be discontinued.”
https://www.physicalism.com/osr.pdf
One might imagine both perdurantists and endurantists who are unhappy with this!
You have made my point better than I did. My work is done here.
I’ve seen enough. Kick them off the panel at once, or the poor perdurantists will be dissuaded from submitting their research!
His argument is closer to that Sophie Grace’s appointment is a threat to academic freedom and viewpoint diversity itself, because Sophie Grace previously said “‘Gender critical’ is not a legitimate alternative viewpoint. It is not a reasonable option in the supermarket of ideas. It is a cult of cruelty and exclusion”. Whether that argument works is another question, but it is important to present clearly what’s actually at stake here.
Demanding the exclusion of philosophers on the basis of views they hold is an interesting defense of academic freedom.
I personally disagree with that argument as well. But as I said, it’s important to present accurately what’s actually going on. The title itself is very misleading, as if Jon Pike is excluding Sophie Grace for being a trans woman.
Why do you think does he go after her and not the others?
Does anyone else say anything explicitly hostile towards gender critical views? I’m unaware of the situation. But I could imagine if the person appointed were someone akin to Owen Jones, he would be similarly oppositional.
I can answer this. SGC said, in public comments that Justin chooses not to quote, but are quoted in the THE report:
“”Gender critical” is not a legitimate alternative view point. It is not a reasonable option in the supermarket of ideas.”
SGC also celebrated the resignation of Prof Kathleen Stock form Sussex University in October 2021
I disagree strongly with Stephen Mumford’s argument for the abolition of women’s sport. I think it is an appalling and retrogressive proposal, and I have said as much. But Mumford has not said that opposition to his view is ‘illegitimate’, not a ‘reasonable option’. (though he has, unwisely, made recourse to Nazi analogies).
SGC has. This is a relevant distinction, and is, in my view, what should disqualify SGC from evaluating GC work in the REF. It follows from the view expressed that SGC would award no stars to such work. It is not, according to SGC, merely poor work, badly argued, or philosophically weak. It is illegitimate and unreasonable. It follows that it should not be submitted. And this is the source of the ‘chilling effect’.
The issue here is (obviously) not philosophical agreement or disagreement: it is, rather, the specific claims that SGC has made about legitimacy and reasonableness.
This complaint is under review by UKRI, and it raises serious issues. They will make a decision in due course. It would be useful if those discussing it would read the THE article. For Justin to depict it as motivated by ‘anti-trans’ animus on my part degrades the conversation.
I am an enthusiastic advocate of participation in sport. I don’t think anyone should be excluded. I do think, though, that people should participate in sex categories according to their biological sex.
I’m not wholly convinced that this is a Nazi, or Nazi-adjacent view.
“For Justin to depict it as motivated by ‘anti-trans’ animus on my part degrades the conversation.”
The headline is a straightforward description of some of the relevant facts of what is happening. It is silent on your motivation. That Chappell is trans is relevant to the story, even if it is not relevant to your motivation, so in my judgment it was worth mentioning. The only other time I refer to your motivation is in the sentence beginning: “Assuming that Pike’s objection to Chappell’s having a place on the panel is based on principle, and is not mere anti-trans political opportunism…”
No it isn’t (a straightforward description of some of the relevant facts) since I am not ‘trans-exclusionary’ in any sense of that phrase. I deny some identity claims made by some trans people. I am in favour of sex categories in sport being (biological) sex categories and not gender identity categories. This is a reasonable position that I have defended at length. And the ‘only other time‘ (!) you refer to my motivation is when you suggest that my motivation is “‘anti-trans political opportunism”. That depicts my concern as an anti-trans animus.
I have, above, explained the morally relevant difference between the public views of Mumford and Chappell. I think you should attend to that difference, since it goes to the core of the issue; the difference between disagreeing with a view and regarding – and treating – it as illegitimate and outside reason.
Why do you refuse to show her the respect of using her pronouns in this comment, rather than calling her by her initials every time you need to refer to her, if you’re not driven by transphobia?
Even if you hold metaphysical views according to which Sophie Grace Chappelle is not a woman, it’s just basic human decency to call people as they wish to be called and costs you nothing.
I don’t see the problem with not gendering someone. Maybe it’s rude to use pronouns one doesn’t prefer, but this seems unproblematic. Moreover, Dembroff has argued for using “they” for others (and if I recall correctly did this to Byrne!).
This is a strange response given Jon Pike’s actual comment above, where Mumford _is_ gendered: Pike doesn’t seem to have qualms about referring to Mumford as “he”. But when he, Pike, has to refer to Chappell, suddenly he’s a proponent of not gendering and using ‘they’ for others?
Probably (but not necessarily) because he thinks Mumford’s preferred pronouns are accurate but not Chappelle’s. Nevertheless, he’s wanting to be polite. There’s nothing wrong with doing that, so far as I can see. (You could argue it’s unethical to use pronouns someone doesn’t want. But there’s not a plausible argument for thinking you actively have to use someone’s preferred pronouns.)
“But there’s not a plausible argument for thinking you actively have to use someone’s preferred pronouns.”
Just to be clear, you think this claim is not transphobic? Or you think it is and you just don’t care?
“Probably (but not necessarily) because he thinks Mumford’s preferred pronouns are accurate but not Chappelle’s.”
I notice you’re extending a lot of charity to Pike. And some to Mumford. And none to Chappell. Be that as it may, and what non-transphobic reason would there be for taking Mumford’s preferred pronouns as “accurate” and not Chappell’s?
“Nevertheless, he’s wanting to be polite.”
You seem to know Pike’s intentions better than me. If he did want to be “polite”, it would be consistent to try extending that politeness to Chappell as well.
I haven’t been charitable: I just took the obvious interpretation of Pike. (It’s possible I’m misinterpreting him, though.)
And, No, it’s not transphobic to call someone by their name instead of using a pronoun—unless you think being transphobic is morally nuetral. Again, there’s just no plausible argument for thinking you have to use pronouns instead of names.
You made a number of changes to the initial question and to what you claimed above. You claimed:
“But there’s not a plausible argument for thinking you actively have to use someone’s _preferred_ pronouns.”
Now you’re switching to claiming there’s no plausible argument for having to “use pronouns instead of names”. (Which, again, is not what Pike is doing, as I pointed out above; he does use pronouns, just not for Chappell.)
So the question stands: the original claim, pasted in this comment above, you don’t think that’s transphobic or you do and don’t care?
I thought it was pretty obvious what I meant: there’s no plausible argument for thinking you have to use someone’s preferred pronouns, and this is true even if you have used someone else’s preferred pronouns.
The answer about transphobia remains the same: No, this is not transphobic—unless you think being transphobic is morally neutral.
You would have to expand on this so that it doesn’t sound transphobic, in a morally salient way. Just in this thread, bracketing the wider literature, folks have given _plausible_ arguments, including basic respect for others.
The respect argument isn’t plausible, since not using pronouns for someone isn’t disrespectful (at least in this context). An argument that using pronouns one doesn’t prefer might have some plausibility (although, again, Dembroff denies this and does this to Byrne). But that’s a different matter.
You are – yet again – changing the argument. The plausible argument is that using one’s _preferred_ pronouns, the pronouns one has expressed an explicit preference for, is a sign of respect; and the opposite is disrespectful. You can’t deny the latter by claiming that “not using pronouns _for someone_ isn’t disrespectful“. These continued misreadings and shifts are starting to seem intentional.
I guess I don’t understand why you think I’ve changed the argument. I’ve stated what I thought a few times, and I thought the implications were pretty obvious. But apparently you didn’t see them.
My first statement was that just referring to someone by their name is fine. I don’t see how I’ve changed my argument in any way here. (Of course, this entails that referring to someone by their name and not their preferred pronoun is fine.)
Out of curiosity: do you believe that Dembroff wronged Byrne in not using his preferred pronouns?!
Next, if X is *a sign* of respect, it doesn’t follow that not doing X is *disrespectful.* That’s (part of) why the argument isn’t plausible.
“I guess I don’t understand why you think I’ve changed the argument. […] My first statement was that just referring to someone by their name is fine. I don’t see how I’ve changed my argument in any way here.”
Yes, I don’t understand, because, again, you keep changing the argument; just in this comment too. If I’m reading you correctly, you are rejecting this:
(*) There is a plausible argument for thinking you actively have to use gender-specific pronouns, full stop, rather than using gender-neutral pronouns or names.
The rejection of (*) is, roughly, Dembroff and Wodak’s argument and you keep switching back to it whenever pushed.
And I keep pointing out that (*) is irrelevant here: Pike doesn’t subscribe to Dembroff and Wodak’s argument; if he did, he’d be using gender-neutral pronouns, or a name, for Mumford. But he’s not; he _selectively_ uses gender-specific pronouns for cis folks. Dembroff and Wodak are irrelevant in Pike’s case.
Which is why my or anyone’s answer to your question
“Out of curiosity: do you believe that Dembroff wronged Byrne in not using his preferred pronouns?!”
is irrelevant and would tell us nothing about Pike’s case. Dembroff is committed to the rejection of (*), Pike is not.
.
So, again, given that Pike uses gender-specific pronouns, but selectively only to refer to cis folks’ preferred pronouns, he’s not subscribing to Dembroff and Wodak’s argument. The fact that you keep obfuscating this is the first reason I’m starting to find your exchange here disingenuous.
The second reason is your seemingly implicit definition of _plausible_. Given that one is already committed to using gender-specific pronouns, as in Pike’s case, it is both a sign of respect and respectful to refer to everyone by their preferred gender-specific pronouns – cis and trans folks included. This is a very _plausible_ argument. That you don’t find it _even plausible_ (we’re not speaking of decisive here) is what is suggestive of an underlying discrimination. It implies that you don’t even think it’s disrespectful to choose to refer to cis folks by their preferred gender-specific pronouns but not to trans folks’ preferred gender-specific pronouns.
And that’s, as it stands so far, transphobic, whether you’ve articulated and admitted that in your mind or not.
I thought what I was saying was obvious. But let me be more explicit. I’m saying this:
There is not a plausible argument for thinking you actively have to use gender-specific pronouns for X if you’ve used gender-specific pronouns for Y.
It’s not plausible to think it’s *disrespectful* to use names for one person and pronouns for another. And it’s not transphobic to do so, unless being transphobic is morally neutral.
How is that “morally neutral”? If one is going out of one’s way to avoid using pronouns for just this one specific person, I don’t think one can plausibly claim any sort of moral neutrality. It comes across as pettiness or mean-spiritedness, but definitely not neutrality.
Right, it’s sufficiently clear now. What makes it transphobic, is that X and Y are not arbitrary individuals or classes of people: Y is cis folks, X is trans folks.
I’m assuming you mean “transphobic” as a morally bad thing—not morally neutral. Can you tell me what you mean by the word, so then we can see if it applies to this case? (And also whether it’s plausible to think it’s bad.)
I just don’t see any plausible reason to think this phenomena (calling X by name and Y by pronoun) is bad.
Yes, morally salient, as has been pointed out. The _plausible_ reasons have been given. That you don’t see them as _plausible_ is part of why your response is transphobic, in a morally salient way.
Right. Can you explain what “transphobic” means, so we can evaluate whether what you’re saying is plausible?
This exchange is interesting because it underscores how “transphobia” is such an ideological club.
S.I. presumes that correct pronouns are those that are “gender-specific” and “preferred” (by the referenced individual) — and argues that Pike and others are using “gender-specific” pronouns wrongly. But of course that understanding of how to use pronouns correctly is built on a series of ideological beliefs — that gender exists while sex doesn’t (or at least that gender should be given public precedence over sex), that pronouns should not track sex (because sex doesn’t exist or should not be used to describe people), that an individual’s preferences should govern everyone’s else mode of referring to them, etc.
Quite recently it would have been uncontroversial to say that pronouns described the referenced person’s sex. For most people, of course, that remains true, while some elite subcultures (like this website and academia generally) have constructed a taboo around that usage. But cries of “transphobic!” do not explain why it is disrespectful to use pronouns as most people do or even to sidestep the issue by avoiding pronouns.
The real explanation, it seems to me, is that the elite taboo around sexed pronouns is part of a political project to abolish the public use of the concept of sex. So S.I.’s arguments seem to boil down to the claim that it is “disrespectful” to that political project not to publicly support it by using gendered (not sexed) pronouns, or even to avoid using either type of pronouns at all.
If you want to abolish sex by way of arguments about sex and gender, that’s one thing. But it seems illegitimate to substitute insults and taboo-based shaming for actual arguments.
Apart from the substantive issues with your argument here, I think it’s quite bizarre to present opposition to transphobia as “elite,” while those who are most vociferously promulgating transphobia in public life are all wealthy elites who have radicalized and made it central to their politics. Quite an “ideological club,” one could say.
Show me where I said anything about something being “correct”. The argument in this exchange has been about Pike’s very specifically selective use of preferred gender-specific pronouns: fine for cis folks, not fine for trans folks. Unclear how anything of what you’re saying here – including, inter alia, “elite taboos”, “ideologies”, “shaming”, and what have you – relates to that or where you’re pulling it from when it comes from this exchange.
“So S.I.’s arguments seem to boil down to the claim that it is “disrespectful” to that political project not to publicly support it by using gendered (not sexed) pronouns, or even to avoid using either type of pronouns at all.”
Nope. Nothing about “political projects” in my comments above, as you can verufy by reading them. Again, don’t know where you’re pulling all this from.
As for the waving around of ‘sex’, plenty of exchanges and resources elsewhere in this thread that point to the contentiousness of this category: you can engage with those subthreads if you want to talk about “abolishing sex” – that’s not the issue in this particular subthread.
I don’t think Pike has said whether he is using gender-specific pronouns or sex-specific pronouns. (If he has, please correct me.) Assuming Pike (or anyone really) used sex-specific pronouns for all people, trans and non-trans alike, would that be OK or would you characterize that as transphobic?
Transphobic, in the case of a trans person, on the basis that by sex-specific, you mean, as stated on one’s original birth certificate. And if it was you, or somebody you care about, you’d realise that.
Again, completely irrelevant to the whole exchange here. Whatever direction you want to derail this into, you can continue on your own.
Your response is interesting, because it shows how ideology is such an ideological club.
I choose to be a member of the Green party, because I agree with most of it’s ideological position. I’m not trans because I read a manifesto and decided I agree with most of it’s “ideology”. I’m not aware of any such manifesto. I didn’t choose to be trans, although I take the point that I chose to act on it. So unlike most of the other people discussing this, I have a dog in the race.
Nobody argues that left-handed people or same-sex attracted people choose an ideology, so why think that trans people choose to be, in some sense, an ideology?
As for the claim that trans people aim to prioritise gender over sex, the claim used to be that trans people are bad, or at least misguided, because by transitioning we reinforce rather than undermine the traditional binary. It seems you can’t win either way.
What is hard to cope with is the way in which the personal has become political and ideological. Like many trans people my aim is to be invisible. Being told that my being is an ideological statement that justifies deliberate unkindness bordering on aggression from others, by physical exclusion and pointed uses of language, is hurtful. It feels very much like a step backwards.
I think it’s good news that no one in this thread (and no one I’ve seen online or in person) has claimed that your “being” is an ideological statement “that justifies deliberate unkindness…, by physical exclusion and pointed uses of language.” I don’t think I’ve seen anyone say trans folk should be treated unkindly or physically excluded! (Some have defended sex segregation in sports. But that’s not exclusion in a morally significant sense–unless you believe it’s wrong to segregate sports by sex.)
No, it is a sign of decency and respect to use SGC’s name consistently rather than using those pronouns that you – the sex realist – believes are correct. There is no need to alienate people unnecessarily. The sex realist (gender-critical) position is that acceding to trans pronouns is conceding too much to trans activists.
If a writer critical of Jon Pike decided that they were only going to refer to him in writing by the first two letters of his first name and the last two letters of his surname, I think we’d all be in a good position to conclude something about that writer’s attitude toward Pike. Yet the way Pike refers to Chappell is somehow rationalized away; it’d be “conceding too much” to expect Pike to show decency to Chappell.
It’s hard not to think that the position aired, that it is more polite for an advocate of GC views to use names and studiously avoid using either pronouns appropriate to somebody’s presentation or pronouns relating to the sex on their original birth certificate, is tantamount to what seems, now, to be the GC line, that being trans is inherently deceptive. And that Pike’s objection to SGC’s inclusion on the REF panel is because he thinks that a trans woman will be inherently dishonest in assessing work by holders of GC views. It is hard to know how else to take the remark in the first piece:
“Remarkably, Pike appears to say that Chappell needn’t actually be biased for her appointment to the subpanel to be problematic.”
This looks to be along the lines of the Trump administration’s reasons for firing trans people from military service:
“It is the policy of the United States Government to establish high standards for troop readiness, lethality, cohesion, honesty, humility, uniformity, and integrity. This policy is inconsistent with the medical, surgical, and mental health constraints on individuals with gender dysphoria. This policy is also inconsistent with shifting pronoun usage or use of pronouns that inaccurately reflect an individual’s sex,” the order continues.
“Adoption of a gender identity inconsistent with an individual’s sex conflicts with a soldier’s commitment to an honorable, truthful, and disciplined lifestyle, even in one’s personal life,” the order states. “A man’s assertion that he is a woman, and his requirement that others honor this falsehood, is not consistent with the humility and selflessness required of a service member.”
(https://www.lgbtqnation.com/2025/01/donald-trump-bans-trans-people-from-serving-in-the-military-in-hateful-executive-order/)
So not using a trans person’s preferred pronouns is adjacent to asserting that they are dishonourable, untruthful, and undisciplined. Grounds upon which one might object to them sitting on a REF panel. This is not solely a matter of a local dispute, it’s set in a much wider context.
“it’s just basic human decency to call people as they wish to be called and costs you nothing.”
I’m confident that, if you thought harder about it, you would find counterexamples to your own claim here.
Especially in the context of a debate about what to call Jon Pike.
“It’s not exclusionary because trans women can play men’s sport” is exactly the same argument as “it’s not discriminatory because gay men can get married to women”, just so we’re clear.
Wow, that analogy doesn’t just break down, it doesn’t even manage to take off.
It’s not an analogy, but thanks for the kind of retort a sassy talking cat in a children’s programme would make.
Is that an ad hominem response?
Jon, you don’t merely “disagree strongly” with Mumford’s argument. Your appraisal of his argument is that he takes your position to be “like the Nazis and Apartheid South Africa.” Assuming you genuinely believe your own appraisal of Mumford’s argument, this is at least as strong an opposition to views like yours as Chappell likening them to antisemitism and homophobia. Mumford has likewise been very clear in his comments on social media that he opposes anti-trans (“GC”) views.
Are you claiming then that, even though, from your perspective, Mumford sees your position as “like the Nazis and Apartheid South Africa,” you nevertheless think that he regards work articulating a position that’s “like the Nazis and Apartheid South Africa” as legitimate? That he sees it as a “reasonable option”? Do you think Mumford merely “disagrees” with views “like the Nazis and Apartheid South Africa,” but doesn’t regard them as “illegitimate and outside reason”?
The reason people suspect that your complaints here are “motivated by ‘anti-trans’ animus” is rather simple: You have directed your complaint at the only trans woman on the panel and not at the cisgender man whose opposition to your views is, per your own appraisal of his arguments, just as strong.
The context in which this complaint is embedded matters also. People are well aware of your work with other “gender critical” commentators (e.g., Hilton) and they can see how you refer to Chappell (even in this thread). Taken together, anti-trans animus is a plausible interpretation of your actions here specifically, but also of your broader output. That others (including Chappell, Mumford, and of course many people here) take issue with that, and that they respond to it strongly as it inveighs upon the rights of others and creates conditions for their immiseration, should come as no surprise.
And that too is important to emphasize here: You are assuming that Chappell’s assessment is a thoughtless and flippant dismissal of “gender critical” commentators’ arguments, when it may well be (and very likely is) her considered view—a determination resulting from her taking such commentary seriously, evaluating its content, and finding that its arguments often operate in much the same as way as arguments that are intended to legitimate antisemitism and homophobia. Is that determination an “illegitimate” view? I don’t think so. But maybe you think only “gender critical” commentators are allowed to be critical.
There is nothing wrong with excluding those who wish to suppress ‘a legitimate alternative viewpoint’ – such suppression is contrary to academic freedom.
Academic work requires exercising judgment. There’s a reason that anti-vaccine proponents, Electric Universe theorists, creationists, flat-Earthers, and Holocaust denialists usually aren’t taken seriously in academic spaces.
Well, my friend, all the major sports federations are now taking Pike’s view seriously – the IOC was the last domino to fall.
I’m not entirely sure what that has to do with my comment, Miroslav. But I’ll try to address it in a way that’s in keeping my initial point: Institutions aren’t infallible; the decisions they make also require exercising judgment, and that judgment may be poor. For instance, the US Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has, under the leadership of RFK Jr., made many terrible judgments, and views that should not be taken seriously (e.g., opposition to vaccines) are now taken seriously and shape institutional decision-making in the HHS. It is possible for bad ideas to go far and to hold sway over policymaking or practice, wholly apart from the merits (or lack there of), and contrary to the advice of relevant subject matter experts.
Speaking narrowly, then, to the example you give: The decision you reference is contrary to the advice of many subject matter experts. The discoverer of the relevant gene that is now at the centre of the screening policy thinks that such measures are misguided. Human rights experts and legal experts have likewise raised concerns regarding the implications.
This also has consequences for the rest of us: When bad judgments become pervasive in institutional decision-making, we are forced to take the ideas underpinning them seriously. We’re forced to grapple with opposition to vaccination, not because there’s a good case for such opposition, but because, even in the absence of such a case, those ideas now hold significant sway over policies that affect us.
I am surprised you have difficulties in getting my point. There is only one word that appears both in your short text (2 sentences) and in mine (1 sentence): ‘seriously’. I am picking up on the phrase ‘taken seriously’ – and repeat it in my response. You liken the sex realist view (my preferred term, rather than ‘gender critical’) in sport to all kinds of ‘nutty’ views: flat earth, etc., views which we do not have to ‘take seriously’. I repeat: all the major sports federations are now taking Pike’s view SERIOUSLY– including the IOC. Your analogy to the HHS and RFK is laboured. Trump replaced competent people with incompetents (e.g. Linda McMahon) and/or clearly ‘nutty’ people (RFK). Do you believe that World Rugby, World Athletics, World Aquatics, World Boxing, etc. – and the IOC hold a ‘nutty’ view about eligibility in the female category? Re: SRY gene – the article you link (The Conversation) had to be amended, because Sinclair didn’t bother to read what the actual World Athletics policy is: ‘Editor’s note: this article has been amended to clarify what the SRY test reveals and to add details of potential exemptions under the World Athletics proposals.’ A group of academics from various disciplines are working at present to debunk such objections to the WA and IOC policies. Perhaps Justin will oblige and mention it in DN, when it comes out? Re: Human rights – see here, hot off the press: https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2026/04/un-expert-welcomes-international-olympic-committee-policy-protecting-female
Miroslav, if someone were to say that “sex realism” (to use your preferred term) often operates in much the same way as so-called “race realism,” you would likely balk at the comparison. But that might well be someone’s considered view. Likewise, some might conclude that “gender critical” views are “nutty” (to borrow your term), and that their normalization in institutions is yet another example of how “nutty” views have nevertheless come to hold sway in public institutions. Indeed, HHS might be a good example of this because both anti-vaccine and “gender critical” views appear to now hold considerable sway over high-level decision-making in its institutions.
Regarding the link you shared, Alsalem’s views are not shared by others. However, her comments are also not surprising to anyone familiar with her previous commentary on these matters. I’m not sure if she has ever publicly said that she is “gender critical,” but her comments have often taken the shape of “gender critical” commentary and have certainly been welcomed by those who are “gender critical,” while being criticized by many others.
I suggest readers scroll down to the end of that article in The Conversation, to the notice of edits. Andrew Sinclair did not read the policy properly before he committed pen to paper, and ignored that there is an exemption for CAIS cases. For a rebuttal of Sinclair’s previous criticism of the World Athletics policy (which is substantially mirrored in the policy of the IOC) please see my paper with Emma Hilton which is here.
Pike has previously shared articles (that he presumably agrees with) using the rhetoric of “cults” as well.
I never said his argument is defensible. I was merely saying the title itself is misleading, as if the exclusion itself is a result of transphobia. And the content also suggests it’s merely a matter of intolerance toward different views.
And it seems that he regards support for the rights of trans folk as “quasi-religious.”
He’s not on board for REF, and that’s the difference. The whole point of his argument is that someone with explicit ideological discrimination should not be appointed to REF. If he were appointed to REF, I’d imagine some similar waves of opposition.
That would I suppose tie into Will’s question.
When you retweet an article from UnHerd, the algorithm reproduces the heading. The word ‘cult’ is Kathleen’s, not mine. Unsurprisingly, I like Kathleen’s writing, and I sometimes ‘amplify’ it. But it is hers, not mine.
I say, explicitly, in my profile that RTs are not endorsements.
This is thin gruel.
Some gender critical scholars have argued that some major viewpoints, subject matters, and methods in trans-inclusionist scholarship are not legitimate and not reasonable, and that they are cultish, malpractice, and misogynistic. I wonder if Pike would say these gender critical scholars should be excluded from such a panel as well.
EDIT: I appreciate Wittgenstein’s clarifications on criticizing the article’s framing.
I don’t recall any instance like that, except maybe Kathleen Stock being appointed to OBE many years ago. But yes, that has also received waves of opposition. But I think REF is different from OBE. I think it’s important to clarify what Jon Pike’s actual argument is here, i.e., whether someone with strong ideological discrimination should serve on REF.
Then it’s not clear why he’s targeting Chappell exclusively, and not Mumford, who is also on the panel, and who has also expressed views that are directly contrary to Pike’s.
Ah, I wasn’t aware of Mumford’s position. But yes, that’s a very good point. He did mention Mumford on REF on Twitter, though not the same level of attack. I’m not sure if Mumford has said anything equally oppositional as Sophie Grace did. Still, I think Jon Pike’s question of whether someone with strong ideological discrimination should serve on REF is a genuine one, and by saying that, I do not mean to endorse his argument.
The tweet you link to appears to say that (from Pike’s perspective) Mumford’s work “says that the position [Pike] take[s] on fairness in sport is like the Nazis and Apartheid South Africa.” That certainly seems “equally oppositional,” if not more oppositional than Chappell—assuming that Pike is conveying things correctly when appraising Mumford’s work.
If that’s the case, then it’s doubly perplexing as to why Pike is targeting the only trans woman on the panel, and not someone who (from his perspective) is likening his views to “the Nazis and Apartheid South Africa.”
Again, I am only reconstructing his argument to present his actual view, and I did not mean to endorse his argument. Considering they are collegues, maybe Jon Pike has more reasons and incentives to oppose Sophie Grace personally, but these are all my guesses.
Is it only ideology about gender that counts, or also ideology about metaphysics, ideology about art, ideology about knowledge-first, and any of the other sorts of ideology that make for major disagreements in philosophy?
Let’s try some philosophical charity. It’s not about ‘expressing views that are contrary to Pike’s’. Pike’s worry is that SGC might scupper research projects that are ‘gender critical’, because of such comments from SGC: “‘Gender critical’ is not a legitimate alternative viewpoint. It is not a reasonable option in the supermarket of ideas. It is a cult of cruelty and exclusion.” Mumford has not said anything like this; he and Pike disagree about sport – so what! The question is not of disagreement. Mumford may let research he disagrees with go through. But if you believe like SGC that: “Their position is a logical analogue of anti-semitism & of homophobia…We shd respond to them as respond to anti-semites and homophobes.” then you will respond by shutting down any such research. It might help to read the actual article in the Times Higher Education: https://archive.is/17sqq#selection-925.53-925.213
You keep referring to “someone with strong ideological discrimination” which sounds bad if it “strong ideological discrimination” is interpreted as “unwarranted bias” but as Weinberg says her views about the quality of some gender critical work is not evidence of bias as they may be her considered expert evaluation of that work.
I was reconstructing Jon Pike’s argument, and “Sophie Grace has strong ideological discrimination” is one of the premises. You are free to attack that premise too, but again this bears nothing to my own position.
Fascinating. So where is a transwoman acceptable, if the aim is wholesale exclusion? Given the rubric of just asking questions and debate, is there any point of, or possibility of, agreement and getting along here? Would Prof Pike regard a staunch supporter of gender-critical feminism as equally objectionable?
So if you do philosophy, you should be barred from doing philosophy?
Makes total sense!
If expressing strongly held views on X is a basis for exclusion from the REF, then Pike would be near the top of the list — and not just his expression of philosophical or political views, but also his personal attacks on other scholars and athletes. Me included. Ironic.
I didn’t put myself forward as a candidate for the REF Philosophy sub-panel. That seems to me to be an important difference.
So, if one only privately disagreed with such positions one would be alright and unbiased?
The idea that there is a single philosopher who doesn’t have deeply held beliefs about philosophical positions is strange.
If Pike was appointed to the REF panel would they excuse themselves on the same grounds?
If I worked in analytic metaphysics (or more importantly, if I were thinking of hiring someone working in that area) I might be deterred from submitting work in that area by the presence of James Ladyman on the panel. Does Pike regard this as legitimate cause for complaint?
I think we have to be honest. Sophie Grace Chappell definitely does more than simply raised harsh objections to GC views (and rightly so). Framing this as nothing but the ordinary “people doing philosophy or raising objections” is disingenuous. But it is worth noting that James Ladyman had said things that are at least just as hostile and insulting about analytic metaphysicians! I have yet to hear a single person, let alone Pike, raise the same kind of concern. Nobody doubts that Ladyman might pollute the fairness of the game but Chappell is somehow different. Somehow, this is a particular case where the fairness of the game would be in jeopardy. Huh, I wonder why?
Does Ladyman refer to analytic metaphysics as a “cult of cruelty and exclusion” or claim that it is a “logical analog of “anti-semitism”? [Not myself a fan of Pike’s complaint but think the cases are not analogous.]
Analog. You know better than to fall for this.
Sorry, Justin. I am not following. Can you elaborate?
Yeah, sorry, that was overly compressed. What I meant is that complaints about analogies like the one Pike mentions are often examples of poor comprehension of analogies, or are attempts to take advantage of others’ poor comprehension of analogies. Here, Pike’s complaint functions as a way of conveying to others, “Chappell is saying our view is just like anti-Semitism,” thereby attempting to vilify her as unreasonable. But, as I’m sure you recognize, we don’t know from the quote alone the respect in which Chappell was saying “gender critical” views are analogous to anti-Semitism. Since it would not be unreasonable to claim that there are some specific respects in which the views are analogous, we can’t tell how unreasonable, if at all, the analogy is.
Thanks, Justin.
I suppose I think it would be odd to use the examples Chappell uses unless she takes the resemblance to be quite significant and, especially, to similarly involve a kind of animus or hatred of a group.
One doesn’t usually compare a view to anti-Semitism unless one takes the view to be way way outside the bounds of reasonable debate.
Ladyman co-authored a book that beginn: “This is a polemical book. One of its main contentions is that contemporary analytic metaphysics, a professional activity engaged in by some extremely intelligent and morally serious people, fails to qualify as part of the enlightened pursuit of objective truth, and should be discontinued.”
I don’t know if “fails to qualify as part of the enlightened pursuit of objective truth, and should be discontinued” is exactly the same as “logical analog of anti-semitism”, but it’s explicitly calling for the end to philosophical work in the field!
I think you’ve raised a very good point, i.e., whether disagreement on analytic philosophy is on par with disagreement on some obviously polemical debates with real-life implications, e.g., genders, and how that would affect REF appointment. And the degree of opposition also matters. But since the disagreement in the former is usually not as provocative as the latter, it’s hard to find an equivalent case to compare to here.
Justin, your first sentence is unfair to Pike’s real views: ‘Jonathan Pike, a professor of philosophy at Open University who defends trans-exclusionary (aka “gender critical”) views’. He works in the philosophy of sport. Pike defends the position that trans women and athletes with male DSDs do not belong in the female category in sport. This is the position of World Athletics and also of the IOC (International Olympic Committee). He is not excluding them from sport; he is excluding them from the female category, because they benefit unfairly from male physiological advantage. World Rugby changed it’s policy re trans athletes in 2020. Since then many sports federations have followed suit. The IOC is the last domino to fall.
As Jennifer Saul points out, so-called gender critical commentators may want to be characterized differently, but the important thing to centre here is what their aims are, as they themselves tell us, and what their policy proposals, endorsements, and actions result in. Exclusion is one of them. So Justin’s characterization (“trans exclusionary”) is appropriate. Saul goes further, arguing for a clearer term: anti-trans activists.
I’ve explained in the past why I think “gender critical” is a poor label for the views under discussion and why “trans-exclusionary” is a better label. That said, labeling a view “trans-exclusionary” is not thereby to condemn it. I don’t even know if or the extent to which I disagree with Pike’s views about which athletes should compete in which categories in which sports—I certainly have not looked into the matter with the care I’d need to in order to formulate a defensible view about it. So for all I know, I might end up agreeing with some trans-exclusionary policies. And if I did, I’d own it, and not hide behind a silly euphemism.
Your use of “trans-exclusionary” in the title carries an interesting undertone when it says “Trans-Exclusionary Philosopher Seeks to Exclude Trans Philosopher”, as if Jon Pike is excluding Sophie Grace for being a trans woman. Do you not think some basic integrity matters in reporting news like this?
Given that Pike is targeting only the trans woman who disagrees with his views, and not the cisgender man who also disagrees with his views, that is one plausible interpretation.
He did express his discomfort with Mumford working on REF on Twitter, although in a less oppositional way. I’ve already replied to you this might be explained by the fact that they have more confrontational exchanges given they are colleagues or Sophie Grace is more vocal on this matter which gives Jon more incentives to do so. And even if my guess doesn’t stand, it does not automatically follow your guess is right, and that possibility itself does not justify the title’s misleading framing.
Indeed, you provided the evidence that Pike was aware of someone who, from Pike’s perspective, regards his views as “like the Nazis and Apartheid South Africa,” and who also sits on the panel.
The initial reasons given for Pike complaining about Chappell were that Chappell is especially hostile to “gender critical” commentators, seeing them as like homophobes and antisemites. But Pike was aware of at least one other panel member who, from his perspective, is at least as hostile to such views, seeing them as “like the Nazis and Apartheid South Africa.” (To be clear, that’s Pike’s appraisal; that’s how he thinks Mumford sees his views, based on his reading of Mumford’s work and comments.)
So it’s not clear why he merely “expresses his discomfort with Mumford … on Twitter … in a less oppositional way,” while more vociferously complaining about Chappell’s appointment to the same panel.
In this case, basic integrity meant not passing up on that headline.
As a side note, intentions are sometimes not the only (or most important) aspect of an event.
So you think misrepresenting his intention is justified if that supports what you personally deem more important? Have you not noticed your framing in the article has already led the comment section to disengage with Jon Pike’s actual question, i.e., whether someone with strong ideological discrimination should work on REF?
OK, it is time for you to take a deep breath and step away from this website for a little while.
booooo
You admit you don’t have a good understanding of what Pike’s view is, but you think it’s fair to call it “trans-exclusionary”?
Pike’s view is not actually trans-exclusionary. His view does not exclude based on being trans at all and is inclusive of trans athletes in every sporting category. Trans and non-binary athletes are eligible to compete in every age group, in every weight class, and in both sex classes.
Calling his position “trans-exclusionary” is like calling standard boxing rules “tall-exclusionary” because some tall fighters (those who are heavy) aren’t eligible to compete in the light weight division.
I’m reminded of conversations in which someone says they’re not homophobic because they’re not scared of gays and lesbians.
P.S. What I admitted was not that I lack a good understanding of Pike’s view, but that I “have not looked into the matter with the care I’d need to in order to formulate a defensible view about it,” where “it” refers to the varied factual and normative considerations about “which athletes should compete in which categories in which sports.”
Perhaps you should, then. Almost all my work is available online and Open Access. Most of it is published in the Journal of the Philosophy of Sport, which is the leading journal in the sub discipline. My work is amongst the highest in terms of reads and citations. I write about plural values and lexical priority between them, the meaning and nature of fairness in sport, the relation between conventions, bodies and normativity in sport. On the basis of what you have said here, I want to dissent from your claim that you have a good understanding of my view. I don’t think you know a thing about it.
Are you saying it’s homophobic to not let gay heavyweights box in the light weight division?
Seriously, what are you trying to say here?
Does this line of argument not strike you as extremely disingenuous? As others have previously alluded to, it is like claiming that one isn’t being exclusionary with regard to marriage because those who are gay can technically still marry; they just have to do it like everyone else—in man–woman arrangements. Put otherwise, because those who are gay have access to the same rights vis-à-vis marriage as everyone else, there’s nothing exclusionary about it; it’s “equal rights.”
Such an argument fundamentally misses the point of what the conversation is even about. The issue is that one’s participation in society, whether it’s in marriage or, in this case, in sporting competitions, is conditioned by heteronormative (and often also heterosexist) assumptions, including assumptions about people’s bodies.
To say that Jon isn’t being exclusionary because “technically” trans folk can still compete (they just have to do it in line with assumptions Jon takes as a given) is to miss the point and to fail to understand the issues that are at stake here.
No, I don’t find this line of argument convincing at all. For the marriage analogy, there’s superficial equal treatment between straight and gay. But once you ask what the purpose of marriage is (or at least an important purpose), and most people say it’s about living a life with someone you love, then that superficial equality falls apart and it’s clear that gay people are not afforded the same value when presented with marriage only between a man and a woman.
But how does this map to the trans/sport debate? Step 1: There’s superficial equal treatment between “cis” and trans athletes since they both can participate in their appropriate sex class. Step 2: Ask what the purpose of sport is or the purpose of classifying sport by sex. The answer is to provide fair and safe competition for female athletes. Step 3: Notice how trans people are not afforded the same value when categorized by sex? I don’t see it.
I just don’t see how 3 follows in the trans/sprts case. In fact, since there are a number of trans men and non-binary (female) athletes who elect to compete in the female category, it’s pretty obvious the sex classification equally recognizes their value, even when they’re trans, because without that protected female category they wouldn’t have the opportunity to compete.
The assumption there is obviously that you’ve determined that they’re in the “appropriate sex class.” Just as the assumption in the case of marriage would be that you’ve determined what the “appropriate relationship” for marriage is. In both cases, you’re taking as a given your normative assumptions about what’s “appropriate,” and that goes beyond considerations of just “living a life with someone you love” or “fair and safe competition [in sporting events].” In short, in the case of marriage, it’s taken as a given that “someone you love” should be a woman (if you are a man) or a man (if you are a woman). In the case of sports, it’s taken as a given that “fair and safe competition [in sporting events]” just is competing in the category that matches birth-assigned sex. Those assumptions, undergirding your determination of what’s “appropriate,” need not hold. And when someone is pointing out that you’re being exclusionary, they are drawing attention to and challenging those assumptions. They are saying that you allow for participation under conditions that, in their view, cannot be justified.
Using sex class as an appropriate category is not an assumption. It’s built on mountains of evidence from sports performance and human physiology. No different than separating by age group or weight class (in some sports). These groupings are also the result of reasoning from evidence. Do you have a problem with these categories? Why not? Should they be self ID too? Why not?
We don’t group sports by eye color, political affiliation, or gender identity because we empirically find they have no bearing on providing physical advantages.
Which just begs the question in favour of your construction of what “sex class” even is; after all, that too is what’s being challenged here. It’s not merely a question of whether “sex class” is an “appropriate” basis for social organization here; it’s a question of how you are constructing sex class to begin with.
Claiming that you are constructing it on the basis of “sex” and that it is appropriate because that is what we empirically find to have a bearing on physical advantages does not help you here. Because sex encompasses many things, those things need not always “line up,” and they are not all equally important in determining advantage across every sport.
That’s why the previous IOC framework sought to adopt an evidence-based approach rather than taking as given what you appear to take as given—they knew it could be contested and that such assumptions, often normative in nature, failed to capture the complexity in a way that would allow them to ensure fairness.
Furthermore, I think we can see the mistake in Jennifer Saul‘s quote, “[TERFs] insist that they’re not trans-exclusionary because they include trans men in the category of women. This is technically accurate on a very literal-minded understanding of what it is to be trans-exclusionary. However, including people against their will in a category that they reject is not what is normally meant by inclusion.“
Does anybody really believe that last sentence? I thought that inclusion in a category meant that one meets the criteria of a particular category. Is she claiming that a criterion common to all categories is that one willfully assents to it? That’s very clearly mistaken.
There are many Americans who are quite ashamed to admit they’re American. Nonetheless, their feelings are irrelevant when it comes to whether they’re included in the category ‘American’. Same for the richest 10%; – many of them do not consider themselves rich. Out of respect, should we base income tax brackets on self ID? What about determining whether one is a minor or a senior citizen? Inclusion into most categories does not require willful assent. I would say it’s often quite disrespectful to pretend that it does.
I’m really curious about this — it relates to the trans debate, but is also a broader question with metaphysical implications (if I’m getting off topic, sorry!)…
You say, “Inclusion into most categories does not require willful assent.” So, what categories do require it? Are you only thinking of ‘clubs’ or groups that people must willingly join?
A bit of speculation on my part: I would suggest that personal identity-based categories may require it. There is a difference between including someone in a category that denies their personal identity, and including someone in a category that respects their personal identity.
This is perhaps because one’s identity, strictly speaking, is a unique category that bears on the other categories in which a person may be included.
That is, it seems entirely plausible to claim that, apart from the various empirically-determined categories in which all humans may be placed, there are categories such as “music lover” or “philosopher” where empirical determination seems insufficient. (If everyone in the philosophy community labels me as a ‘philosopher’, but I fundamentally don’t see myself as one, it seems implausible that I must be included in the category ‘philosopher’ because everyone else says so.)
There may be (probably is!) philosophical work on this, but this comment sparked my interest in the idea.
This is interesting. It appears we have conflicting intuitions about this. When I said “Inclusion into most categories does not require willful assent” I did not have any specific categories that require willful assent in mind, but I figured there had to be some. But now that you press me on it, I’m having difficulty thinking of any. Even your two examples show that self-ID is neither necessary nor sufficient for determining inclusion in those categories.
Imagine someone born into a musical family, where she is the black sheep. She only plays 3 instruments and she can only tolerate listening to Bach and Steve Reich for 4 hours a day. Her family thinks she’s a philistine and she does not consider herself a music lover. But once she’s off to college, she meets a bunch of self-described music lovers and discovers that her appreciation for and dedication to music far surpasses theirs. I think it’s accurate to say she is, and always has been, a music lover, despite her lack of selfID as one.
On the flip side, image someone from a small, music-hating community. He considers himself a music lover since he likes BOTH types of music (country AND western) and listens to it up to one hour a week. But when he goes off to college and joins the Music Lovers Club, he finds he hates 90% of what the others listen to, and he even grows tired of listening to and discussing the country music he likes well before any of the others do. I think it’s accurate to say he’s not nor ever was a music lover even though he conceives of himself as one.
Same for “philosopher”. If you regularly produce work that other philosophers consider high quality philosophy, then you’re a philosopher whether you like it or not.
Inclusion into a category depends on objective relations to the criteria inherent in the category itself. One’s self-conception as to where one stands in relation to those criteria can always be marred by false beliefs.
Hmm. Identity may not be necessary or sufficient. But what will be? What concerns me here is that the ‘objective relations to the criteria inherent in the category itself’ still need to be assessed. It seems quite plausible that the two examples you mention could both find your categorizing of their identities as inappropriate. Your response, I take it, would be to evidentially challenge their claims?
Let’s use the second case, which I’ll call Example B. Suppose B says, “No, I’m still a music lover.” Correct me if this is inaccurate, but I assume that you would reply with something like, “I’m sorry, but even though you believe that you are, evidence X, Y, Z, etc. clearly shows that you are not. You are a music hater.” We then would (I assume) get into a big discussion about what counts as appropriate evidence and what that evidence actually does show.
But how strong will that evidence actually be in light of that person’s personal experience of their identity? Who would decide this? I am skeptical that ‘objective relations’ will provide necessary and sufficient conditions in such cases, except as something like majority rule. I don’t want that to be the measure of how I should be categorized. There are many cases where someone’s personal identity claims cannot be measured empirically, and the metaphysical arguments will be highly disputed.
So I’m not sure there is a general theory of categorization criteria that we can apply here. In some cases, the methodology I’ve ascribed to you (hopefully not unfairly!) would probably be very reasonable. That is, the evidence would support your reply. But in other cases, I would be quite hesitant to make such a claim.
Self-conception is far from the only source of false beliefs. I suspect others might feel as I do. In other words, it seems that there are indeed those who would balk at your idea of category inclusion as a way to overrule someone’s identity claim. (Another clash of intuitions?)
So, I understand (I think) part of Saul’s point: It seems problematic, both logically and morally, to claim that someone must belong in a category that they do not identify with. If the person in Example B does not identify (and has *some* good reasons for doing so related to their identity) as a music hater, then it would seem at the very least presumptuous for anyone to announce to B that they are actually in that category.
The end point of such an attitude, it would seem to me, is the conclusion that B (or, to link back to the main topic, the trans person) is mentally confused or deceived somehow.* But that is the wrong path to follow, for obvious reasons (at least to me).
…how much anti-trans philosophical work is the REF going to be evaluating in the first place? Unless it’s showing up in a top journal, then it shouldn’t be submitted to the REF, which doesn’t evaluate _all_ published work.
I suppose I’m not paying careful and systematic attention, but I don’t recall seeing a rash of anti-trans work coming out of the UK and landing in nice philosophy journals. There may well be some, but surely not much.
So even if this was a problem–and it isn’t, and I fully share SGC’s assessment of anti-trans “work”–I seriously doubt it could possibly rise to the level of a problem with the evaluations.
Professor Chappell is quoted as saying, ““[The Gender Critical] position is a logical analogue of anti-semitism & of homophobia…We shd respond to them as respond to anti-semites and homophobes.”
Consider the following (imaginary) projects submitted for funding:
1. Excluding Males from Women’s Sports: A Philosophical Defense
2. Excluding Jews from Jobs in Government: A Philosophical Defense
3. Excluding Gays and Lesbians from Public Schools: A Philosophical Defense
Project 1. is the sort of project Professor Pike or others who share his views or something like his views might submit and which, given recent and current debates on this issue, seems to merit an assessment (in the spirit of open inquiry at the least). And while Chappell does not say how she thinks we should respond to antisemites and homophobes, we can safely assume she did not mean they should be responded to in the spirit of open inquiry. Plausibly, her point was that the gender critical position is beyond the pale and should be treated as such—i.e. rejected out of hand because the view is to her mind not only philosophically dubious or worse, but also morally odious, like antisemitism and homophobia.
Perhaps Pike is concerned that this attitude toward any possible gender critical project (like Project 1 above) renders Chappell unfit to serve in a position where she may be called upon to objectively assess the merits of such projects and to play a role in deciding about funding. Maybe he thinks (as he should) that Chappell could fairly assess projects whose thesis she ultimately rejects, even strongly, on philosophical grounds, but that her comparison of the gender critical view to antisemitism and homophobia would make it very unlikely or even impossible to get such projects fairly assessed and ultimately funded, since even other members of the committee may hesitate to support a project one of their distinguished colleagues regards with such deep moral contempt. Such an attitude differs from an attitude of purely philosophical or intellectual dismissiveness, which can at least in principle be overcome or at least mitigated through a fair-minded engagement with the relevant philosophical position (“I completely disagree with this position/approach but this book/paper/proposal offers a valuable contribution to ongoing debates that clearly matter to others in the profession even if I think they are misguided” is something that is easy to imagine when the project is e.g. a conceptual analysis of the latest epistemic micro-sin but less so when the topic is e.g. should Muslims or Jews or gay people be allowed to run for public office).
There are guidelines that govern the composition of REF panels and the behavior of members of those panels (it looks like they can be found here: https://2029.ref.ac.uk/panels/). I would think any serious discussion of this issue should look at how REFs work, what is expected of those who serve on them, etc. I do not know whether Pike has a legitimate complaint vis a vis REF rules, but I do know that it’s uncharitable—at best—to interpret his action as being motivated by anti-trans sentiment, as the title of this post implies, when there are in fact reasonable grounds for him to worry about fairness in the distribution of research funds. In fact there are plenty of examples of heavy-handed gatekeeping on this topic in academic philosophy and elsewhere—I’m not going to list them here as they should be familiar to those who have taken an interest over the past decade or so, but for one recent example see https://philosophersmag.com/on-being-rejected/.
And Justin again mischaracterizes the gender critical position, which takes people’s sex to be an important and sometimes decisive variable in the way we organize social life in some contexts (e.g. competitive sports), as opposed to taking people’s gender identity to be decisive in those same contexts. No gender critical philosophers I know support the inclusion of non-trans males in women’s sport while supporting the exclusion of trans women (because as everyone should know by now advocates of the gender critical position who write on sports oppose males in women’s sport, irrespective of gender identity); nor do they oppose including trans men in women’s sport (and so if you think trans men are men, then you should think the gender critical position is consistent with allowing some men in women’s sports); nor do they distinguish between trans women and males with certain DSDs for purposes of categorization in sport. By mischaracterizing Pike’s position as “trans exclusionary” Justin imputes morally objectionable attitudes and views to him that neither he nor gender critical philosophers more generally hold. I do wonder about the extent to which the misunderstanding of the gender critical position by some of its opponents may have contributed to some of its recent policy successes—“know thy enemy” is good advice but it does require some effort.
And James Ladyman wrote a book saying “This is a polemical book. One of its main contentions is that contemporary analytic metaphysics, a professional activity engaged in by some extremely intelligent and morally serious people, fails to qualify as part of the enlightened pursuit of objective truth, and should be discontinued.”
There are probably a lot more analytic metaphysicians being evaluated by this committee than gender critical theorists, and you don’t see them complaining about one member of the committee who believes they shouldn’t exist!
But notice the difference here. Ladyman says of his opponents that they are “extremely intelligent and morally serious people.” And he engages with their arguments in his book. Chappell says the exact opposite of her opponents, and uses that as an excuse to dismiss their arguments without any consideration. That difference is the problem.
I’m not sure that is a difference at all. People do engage with the arguments of anti-LGBTQ commentators, while nevertheless holding such views as contemptible, even if advanced by otherwise “extremely intelligent and morally serious people.” Indeed, it’s possible that Chappell’s assessment of anti-trans views being like antisemitism and homophobia is her taking those views seriously. No one thinks that antisemitism or homophobia are things not worth taking seriously. But the way we take them seriously matters. In short, the notion that it’s a flippant dismissal, rather than a considered one, is unsupported. And it’s clearly intended to tee up the argument that Chappell is acting (or is likely to act) unreasonably, while also dismissing (flippantly, perhaps?) the possibility that her comments come from having considered the arguments that you’re insinuating she has not considered.
It’s the background dynamics. The huge group of metaphysicians is not a vulnerable group. Ladyman can’t hurt them. I was among the targets, and I didn’t feel threatened.
Moti, as you may have already guessed, Chappell and others are likely to start by questioning the framing (and the question-begging nature) of Project 1. And consideration of its framing would be in keeping with her role in “objectively assess[ing] the merits of such projects.” Like some others who have commented here, you are assuming that Chappell’s characterization of “GC” commentary is flippant, rather than considered; that her determination is not “on the merits.” There is no reason to think this. One may examine “GC” views and arguments and conclude that, on the merits, they resemble antisemitism and homophobia. You disagree, obviously. Tough. Others get to exercise judgment, and you having exercised judgment poorly is not a reason that they should withhold from making their own determinations.
It’s also rather strange to get on one’s high horse and talk about dismissiveness, moral contempt, and a lack of fair-mindedness when the person you’re defending has gone out of his way to avoid ever referring to Chappell using the pronouns she uses. Somehow, the attitude that this evinces, and the pettiness it demonstrates, does not seem to cause any concern regarding “fair-mindedness” on your part. I suppose you think that that is just old fashioned philosophical disagreement?
I can’t see how the title of Project 1 (“Excluding Males from Women’s Sports: A Philosophical Defense”) is question-begging. I just made it up, but it was supposed to simply name a possible project providing a philosophical defense of policies that exclude male people from women’s sports, as the IOC policy now does (with one very narrow exception, I believe).How someone arrives at the judgment that we should respond to the gender critical position in the same way we respond to antisemitism or homophobia is irrelevant to the question of whether someone who would treat something like Project 1 as dead on arrival, something beyond the pale, would be violating REF guidelines, and it is irrelevant to the question of whether someone who objects to the inclusion of such a person on an REF panel is necessarily motivated by bigotry (as the title of this post implies about Pike). I do not know enough about how REFs work to take a position on the first question, but I think the second question is easy to answer: of course not.
Do you think that there are trans-inclusive formulations of the title for Project 1? Because, if not, then I assume your usage of those terms reflects a particular understanding, one that is likely to be contentious and which someone (perhaps Chappell, perhaps someone else) might challenge. And that challenge would be well within the scope of their role to “objectively assess the merits of such projects.” Such a project might well fail “on the merits.”
Regarding your defence of Pike, I think this is a flimsy excuse. Apart from his attitude toward this particular trans person, one might conclude that “gender critical” views are generally often “motivated by bigotry.” That appears to be Chappell’s conclusion. That is my conclusion. I don’t want to put words in Mumford’s mouth, but I’d suspect he might conclude the same. Apparently this is “beyond the pale” though, but I don’t see why. We can certainly still be polite about it (which is more than one can say about Pike, who can’t bear to show basic decency toward Chappell). But I don’t think we should mince words or coddle “gender critical” commentators.
If we are presented with a project proposal like Project 1, we should of course evaluate it fairly. If we think it is bad or fails, we should explain why. That explanation may articulate a view in which such a project is comparable to projects that aim to legitimate antisemitism or homophobia, but it need not do so, particularly if that would be irrelevant to the project proposal under consideration. There may be (and likely are) other reasons for which such a project proposal would fail “on the merits”—I’ve already alluded to one.
The assumption that those critical of “gender critical” views are somehow necessarily flippant in their criticism is unwarranted. It’s not “beyond the pale” to honestly examine such views and the arguments taken to support them and conclude that they are lacking in merit, and that they also carry harmful consequences which would warrant us taking them seriously in a particular way.
“Do you think that there are trans-inclusive formulations of the title for Project 1?”
I don’t know about “formulations of the title” but the title is consistent with including trans men and some nonbinary people in women’s sports. That is trans-inclusive, isn’t it?
“If we are presented with a project proposal like Project 1, we should of course evaluate it fairly. If we think it is bad or fails, we should explain why.”
Agreed.
This gambit is not as clever as you think it is.
It worked for Elis Lundholm.
I attended one of Sophie Grace Chappell’s talks. It was about moral epistemology. A member of the audience, completely out of the blue and unprompted, tried to derail the Q&A and make it about trans issues and was a huge jerk to her. Then, after the talk, when we were walking to dinner, the guy followed her and kept harassing her. She was incredibly gracious and kind to him.
While not technically ‘philosophical’, this may be the most important comment on this thread. It reminds me of just how deeply irrational our ‘sex and gender’ beliefs often are — many of the ‘arguments’ being made here (on both sides, at times) seem to start with assumptions driven by irreconcilable passionate intuitions. Commenters apparently can’t even agree on what it means to treat another human being ‘decently’. For the record, I side with Sophie Grace. But geez…
Hi Geoff,
I’m not sure what you mean. Can you say more? All I was trying to say was that I once observed Sophie Grace interacting with a non-philosopher in the crowd who brought up trans stuff out of the blue and was weirdly hostile to her. She was really nice to him and restrained in her reaction. And so I was offering one favorable data point regarding SG’s character and disposition towards someone how was hostile to her. I wasn’t saying anything more or less. But I gather from your comment that you took me to be saying something more.
Typo in the above reply to Geoff. *how* should be *who*.
Hi Scott, sorry for any lack of clarity — my comment wasn’t meant to be a criticism of yours. Rather, it was an expression of my frustration at the reminder (again!) that philosophers aren’t much better at controlling their passions/biases than that audience member you mentioned… at least if the comment threads on every trans-related story posted on DN in the last five years count as evidence.
(Also, SGC’s actions in your example are more powerful than any amount of DN philosophizing. But, that’s probably just my own bias talking. 🙂 )
Ah. I see. Thanks for clarifying Geoff!
Regrettably there is often a misalignment between characters and the quality of their views. It is not uncommon that a kind person has very bad views. I am not saying this applies to Sophie or Jon. But just saying that the issue is not about characters.
For the record, I do not side with anyone here, but I do think we should be kind and extra kind to vulnerable groups in the time of Trump regime.
Justin, it sounds like your post was based entirely on “a report in Times Higher Ed.” Is that correct?
On the basis of this report, you say: “The idea seems to be that we should infer from Chappell’s comments on social media… that she can not be trusted to fulfill her responsibilities as a member of the REF subpanel.”
This is speculation, is it not? If so, it wouldn’t be good journalism to characterize Jon’s position in this way on the basis of a report in Times Higher Ed.
My understanding is that there’s (much) more to the story than you seem to be aware of. Far more than a few comments on social media. I think I should probably leave it at that, for legal and privacy reasons. But maybe let’s use our philosopher-brains to think of possible extenuating circumstances involving two professors at the same university, and then proceed with due caution.
Have you reached out to Jon to hear his side of the story? We live in a world where that sort of thing is easy to do, and it would make for much better journalism. He’s here in the comments, so you can easily ask him directly.
——
Also, Jon is a good man who should not be smeared with labels like “anti-trans.” The sports question has nothing to do with one’s psychology; it has to do with one’s biology. He’s motivated not by animus, but by concern for safety and fairness.
If believing that some spaces and activities should be segregated by sex makes someone “exclusionary,” the label is bluster and not one we should take seriously.
I would have thought that describing someone who believes that folks of type X should be excluded from certain things as ‘X-exclusionary’ is describing them accurately.
Unless you think all trans-identifying individuals should be included in everything all the time (e.g. adult trans-identifying folks in children’s sports), then you will accurately be described as trans-exclusionary by your own lights. Those trans folks should be excluded, according to you.
“But I don’t think they should be excluded *because they’re trans*!” you may complain. Hey. Good for you. __Neither does Jon.__
This is why I say the label is bluster and not one we should take seriously.
No, but Alex might hold that a trans young person should be included in a sporting competition for young people, whereas you would hold that they shouldn’t. Can you see that maybe there’s a relevant sense in which “exclusionary” is being used here and that it might be disingenuous to pretend to be perplexed by this?
Felix, you haven’t challenged my claim that Alex would count as (trans) exclusionary by his or her own lights. As would you, I imagine.
You seem to suggest there are different senses of “exclusionary” in play here. I doubt it. I think we’re using the same sense, and disagreeing about whether and when it applies. I pointed out that, on Alex’s proposal, Alex is trans-exclusionary. And so are you, I bet.
You said, “Alex might hold that a trans young person should be included in a sporting competition for young people, whereas you would hold that they shouldn’t.”
But why would you think I would hold that a trans young person should be excluded in a sporting competition for young people?
You have convinced me. “Trans exclusionary” is not sufficient. We should go with a clearer description: anti-trans activist or anti-trans commentator. This better reflects that the goals here often proceed from a moral opposition to transness itself. The exclusionary outcomes are secondary to the more primary motivation, which is to cast trans lives as morally illegitimate, lesser in dignity, and so on.
The label “exclusionary” allows anti-trans commentators to hum and haw about how, technically, they’re not excluding anyone—trans folk can still participate in some sense. They’re technically included, in some way, even on the normative assumptions of the anti-trans commentator. But the point here is to challenge those assumptions. Characterizing such commentators as “trans exclusionary” does not clearly bring to attention those assumptions and their role in the argument, whereas characterizing them as “anti-trans” does.
Thank you for agreeing that Jon is not trans-exclusionary. 🤝
You say he is “anti-trans,” because, you say, his “more primary motivation… is to cast trans lives as morally illegitimate, lesser in dignity, and so on.”
What reasons do you have to conclude that this is true of Jon’s motivations? I know Jon pretty well, and that’s not at all my sense of the man. Do you know him well?
This sense of “exclusionary” is extremely broad and will often designate positions which are normally thought unobjectionable or even required – I am A Grade-exclusionary to folks have done poorly in a course, we are liberty-exclusionary to folks who have committed heinous crimes, employers may be pregnant-woman exclusionary when it comes to certain jobs which pose a serious danger to the fetus, etc.
I suppose we could say Pike is biological male-exclusionary when it comes to women’s sports. In this he joins the vast majority of folks.
Yes, but we know that that’s his position. The point is that his position assumes things about gender/sex that are contentious. And so the basis for his exclusionary position comes into question, not out of some flippant dismissal, but out of a philosophical disagreement over his conception of gender/sex and how he invokes it to argue for exclusionary ends.
Surely it isn’t (really) contentious that many trans women are biological males. They may be women but they remain in the biological category they share with much of the animal kingdom.
That depends on how you are constructing the categories, and that is very likely going to be contentious. So, I don’t think it’s surely the case at all.
It is a shame that this discussion has largely lost sight of the general issue and become bogged down in debates about the personalities involved, or clashes over first-order moral and political questions.
When it comes to worries about a discipline-wide review panel containing someone who is hostile to certain philosophical positions, my own view is that ensuring a well-balanced panel is the way to deal with this rather than excluding from such panels philosophers who have expressed hostility to other philosophical views. For example, I’m fine with a review panel containing a philosopher who dismisses all metaphysics as a waste of time, so long as there is also at least one member of the panel who is pro-metaphysics and will push back and at least one member who does not have strong views on meta-metaphysics and can act as a kind of tiebreaker or negotiator between the two sides.
I guess one line of pushback to my view is to argue that there is an important difference between, on the one hand, being intellectually hostile to a philosophical position, and on the other hand, holding that the philosophical position is deeply immoral and supporting political activism that targets it. For example, imagine a philosopher who says:
“Arguing for the moral permissibility of abortion is not a legitimate viewpoint. It is not a reasonable option in the supermarket of ideas … [In the way it dehumanizes the unborn] It is a logical analogue of antisemitism and of homophobia. We should respond to those holding this view as we respond to antisemites and homophobes”.
Although I strongly disagree with this hypothetical philosopher, if their academic excellence and experience make them a suitable candidate for a discipline-wide review panel then I would not oppose their being appointed to such a panel, I would just insist that the panel should be appropriately balanced with regard to philosophical views on abortion.
I’m interested to hear counterarguments that support exclusion in these kinds of cases over merely balancing the panel. However, what won’t do in these debates is inconsistency. When asked: “Should a philosopher who is openly morally and politically opposed to a certain philosophical viewpoint be appointed to a discipline-wide review panel?” you should not be answering: “ ‘yes’ when I agree with their moral and political views, ‘no’ when I disagree with their views”.
I think this is the best solution in a world where we had more resources. Something like this is done in medicine when they develop clinical practice guidelines. There are rules about how the panels should be balanced, explicit COI disclosure and management requirements, etc. But those guideline panels are tasked with answering narrow questions, eg “what should the clinical recommendations be for women with hypertension.”
It’s hard to imagine how we’d ensure the kind of balance you envision when the panel is tasked with evaluating proposals that cover any topic in philosophy. We’d need so many panelists that things would quickly get very messy. We could have subpanels, maybe, or limit the balance requirement to areas that are especially controversial or likely to be captured by activists, but even then it’s hard to see how it could be made to work without a very substantial increase in resources.
In a world with such scarce resources, the notion that this—complaining about the only trans woman on a panel—is a good use of time seems, at best, questionable. The other members of the panel are cisgender. At least one of them is also critical of “gender critical” views. Such scarce resources and yet there’s always time to fulminate against trans folk in whatever professional role they hold.
You are getting things backwards. In a world with greater resources, we would not have to focus on the question of whether or not to exclude people who are on the record stating that certain commonly-held and philosophically defensible views (for example the view held by the IOC about women’s sports) should be deplatformed, ignored, not cited, treated as being beyond the pale, analogous to antisemitism, etc., because we could balance the panel with people who weren’t similarly censorious.
I have to hand it to you, Moti, it takes some chutzpah to argue that a trans woman should be removed from a panel for holding a “commonly-held[?] and philosophically defensible” critical view on “gender critical” views, and then to publicly cry about censoriousness.
I’ve argued for no such thing. In fact I have repeatedly said that I do not know if Chappell’s position on gender critical philosophy render her unfit to serve on the panel because I don’t know enough about REF guidelines.
So, please don’t put words into my mouth, especially words that imply bigotry (“argue that a trans woman should be removed”), and especially when you don’t comment under your real or full name while I do. I know the reasons for anonymity vary widely (from personal or professional vulnerability to rank cowardice) and I don’t know your reasons, but those of us who are willing to be transparent about our identities can incur reputational costs when publicly slimed.
You’ve seemingly come in here to bat for Pike, a fellow “gender critical” commentator. I assumed that this meant you supported his complaint. If that is not the case, and I’ve misunderstood you on that specific point, then I apologize for that.
Rereading some of your comments, it appears that your defence of Pike is premised mostly on him being “mischaracterized” as “trans exclusionary.” Some other commentators have claimed this as well. I think this is best resolved by simply describing him (and yourself) as anti-trans. But your complaint there would likely be the same: that it “imputes morally objectionable attitudes and views to him [and yourself] that neither he nor gender critical philosophers more generally hold.” Specifically, in context, you say:
But this is exactly what Chappell, I, and many others would dispute. There isn’t a misunderstanding here; we do think that your views (and “that of gender critical philosophers more generally”) can sensibly be described as anti-trans and that such views are, in many respects, morally objectionable. And we take this to be a legitimate and (to use your words) “philosophically defensible” determination. You disagree with that, quite obviously, but that does not in itself make it a mischaracterization or an illegitimate view for a philosopher, including one who sits on a panel, to hold.
As I’ve emphasized previously, it’s also not a flippant determination. It comes from exactly the effort that you sensibly advise. Of course we are aware of Pike’s work, including his collaboration with other “gender critical” commentators. And of your work. Familiarity with that work, and the wider network of collaboration with anti-trans lobby orgs that facilitates and promotes it, is the basis for saying that you are an anti-trans commentator. This isn’t a “misunderstanding” arising from a cursory, effortless, and flippant reading of “gender critical” work; it’s a determination made on the basis of taking that work, and the context in which it is produced, very seriously.
Justin has independently given his reasons for using “trans exclusionary.” I think that term is fine too. Although I’ve noticed that anti-trans commentators think they’re quite clever by pulling a “well, actually” and “technically” to obfuscate the relevant sense of exclusion under discussion. For this reason, I think Saul’s suggestion (anti-trans) is much more appropriate as it brings greater visibility to what is at stake, who is affected (initially, anyway; the effects are wide-ranging and include those who are not trans), and prevents such commentators from trying to prevaricate regarding “exclusion.”
Apology accepted. Instead of linking to Wikipedia, whose entry here is ridden with serious errors and crucial omissions, you could have linked directly to the work in question. Those with an interest but not enough time to read the entire review can profit from reading the peer reviews and replies, and can judge for themselves whether anything therein is fairly characterized as “anti trans.”
https://opa.hhs.gov/gender-dysphoria-report
The claim I want to defend is not that every panel must be well balanced with respect to all philosophical viewpoints (I agree this would be an impractical standard to meet). Rather it is that when someone is appointed to a panel, and they are openly intellectually or morally hostile to some philosophical position, the panel must be balanced with respect to that position.
As I see it, for most philosophers and most philosophical positions, there will not be intellectual or moral hostility towards the other side. For example, one-boxers and two-boxers might strongly disagree but they generally do not hold each other in contempt. And, even on practical social questions like euthanasia, I think that most philosophers who take a stand in this debate do not express intellectual or moral hostility towards those who argue for the opposite viewpoint. If I am right, then achieving the balance I argue for should not be so difficult. For example, from the discussion above, it appears that there are only a few instances of the appointed REF panel members having expressed intellectual or moral hostility to a philosophical position they disagree with. Hence, there are only a few ways the panel needed to be balanced in order to be acceptable.
Wouldn’t recusal on the limited number of relevant submissions be (a) more appropriate, and (b) more practical?
It could be more appropriate, however, I think it depends on how the panel’s decision making process functions. For example, suppose you have a small panel and decisions are made by having each panelist rate each submission out of 100, from which you take average scores to produce a final ranking of submissions. In this scenario, it might be best to have norms that recuse the anti-metaphysics philosopher from scoring metaphysics submissions because there is a significant risk that they will score every such submission 0/100 and thus unfairly undermine them all.
By contrast, suppose you have a larger panel that makes decisions on submissions by discussing the pros and cons of each submission and then taking a group vote on the overall quality. In this scenario I think its fine for the anti-metaphysics philosopher to be part of the discussion. They could make their case to the other panelists about why a philosophy of science submission is far superior to a metaphysics submission and others could argue the contrary. Furthermore, they may even be willing to say things like “although I think that all metaphysics is a waste of time, I can see reasons for thinking that metaphysics submission A is of far higher quality than metaphysics submission B”. However, what I certainly wouldn’t want is a panel with several anti-metaphysics philosophers and no pro-metaphysics philosophers. That would obviously lead to unfair outcomes.
I am trying to think of a scholar whose work I have read–in any field–who, when push came to shove, would not have to confess to finding certain views illegitimate or unreasonable. I think denying that would be disingenuous. That’s just how judgment works. The fact that Pike objects to a scholar who happens to think that about a position he holds makes his objection suspect, to me. Some who does that is in the wrong business.
I think that there’s a huge difference between finding a view illegitimate and finding it unreasonable. I think that reason directs us to atheism, but I don’t think that arguments that God exists, or arguments based on the assumption that God exists, are illegitimate philosophy. I could easily regard such an argument as being worthy of publication, even though I think it’s based on errors in reasoning.
I hope I’m not just being dense, but I don’t understand how unreasonable philosophy can be legitimate. Isn’t reasonableness a criterion of legitimacy?
Well, what do you think of my proposed example of legitimate philosophy directed towards an unreasonable view? Do you think I’m being inconsistent in saying that reason directs us to atheism, but that arguments that God exists, or that assume God exists as a premise, can be perfectly legitimate philosophy?
Great point
https://buymeacoffee.com/jenniferleelawson/i-had-breast-cancer-that-fed-off-estrogen-here-a-thought-experiment
Rather than re-litigating the dispute itself, I want to point to a broader pattern: situations like this arise in philosophy more often than they should.
One constructive response is to invest in stronger, more visible communities for gender-diverse philosophers—spaces where people are supported both intellectually and professionally.
I’m nonbinary and blind, and I’ve been actively looking for Discord servers or similar communities that are welcoming to gender-diverse philosophers, including those supportive of figures like Sophie Grace Chappell.
If anyone here has recommendations, I’d genuinely appreciate it. I’m asking for myself, but also publicly, because I suspect others following this discussion would benefit from the same information.