“There are indeed consequences when we punch down or pretend that what is, in fact, a hostile attack, is merely ‘inquiry for inquiry’s sake.’ Aside from the emotional wounds we inflict on actual people, philosophical discourse matters beyond that. It did matter in this case.”
The following is a guest post by Talia Mae Bettcher, Professor of Philosophy at California State University, Los Angeles, and author of the forthcoming Beyond Personhood: An Essay in Trans Philosophy.
It is a follow-up to her “When Tables Speak: On the Existence of Trans Philosophy“.
While Tables Burn:
On the (Non) Existence of Trans People and the Failure of Philosophy
by Talia Bettcher
Every trans person I know—and I know many—is terrified. Parents of trans children are terrified. Many in the United States have escape plans or are quickly making them, some have already fled the country. They understand that the goal of Trump’s recent Executive Actions and whatever else is still to come is to eliminate trans people from civil life and possibly from social life altogether. We’re not sure. But the ferocity, speed, and direction of these actions have left us reeling:
- “Protecting Women from Gender Ideology Extremism and Restoring Biological Truth to the Federal Government” (all U.S. government ID reflects sex assigned at birth, trans women to be housed in male prisons, male and female are the only sexes),
- “Prioritizing Military Excellence and Readiness” (all trans people disqualified from military service on the grounds that being trans is inconsistent with a “commitment to an honorable, truthful, and disciplined lifestyle”),
- “Protecting Children from Chemical and Surgical Mutilation” (prohibits gender affirming care from anyone under nineteen, including puberty blockers),
- “Ending Radical Indoctrination in K-12 Schooling” (prohibits teachers from even using a student’s preferred name and pronouns, prevents students from using bathrooms and participating in athletics).
- A federal facilities bathroom ban in a memo from the Federal Office of Personnel Management.
- The erasure of trans people from the census and all trans related research from the CDC as well as the prohibition of CDC scientists publishing anything trans-related in any journal whatsoever.
It won’t stop. It will only get worse. These are the opening salvos in a systematic, comprehensive plan to make trans lives impossible.
If you think otherwise, you simply haven’t been paying attention.
This essay is an angry reflection on the relationship between the profession of philosophy and where we are now. (While this is a sequel to the essay in which I wrote, “I don’t mean to be mean,” I confess that I do not possess such self-discipline here. As we Canadians like to say, now that our very sovereignty is under attack, “sorry, not sorry”).
1. Trump and Gender-Critical Philosophy
I still remember when Kathleen Stock started publishing her articles in Medium in 2018. She caused quite a stir. She railed at the alleged presumption in philosophy that trans women were women, rebelling against what she said was verboten. I found this odd, since it was only around 2016 that trans-inclusive accounts of the concept woman by nontrans feminists began to emerge. Before that almost all of them, with very few exceptions, had been thoroughly trans marginalizing. (And even afterwards, certain leading feminist philosophers who had endorsed thoroughly trans-exclusionary accounts, such as Linda Alcoff (2006), continued to stand by them, as far as I know). I was puzzled.
Later, as gender critical literature proliferated, I was dumbfounded—dumbfounded by the poverty of the scholarship (and especially by the publication of that scholarship, given its poverty). Consider, for instance, that both Stock and Lawford-Smith, in their arguments that trans women should not be allowed in sex-segregated space glaringly omit the most relevant study suggesting that trans-inclusive bathroom policies lead to no increase in violence or privacy violations (Hasenbush et al 2019). More disturbingly, Lawford-Smith simply dismisses gender identity as “merely philosophical”—discounting its history in sexology, psychology, and psychiatry while then accepting as the gospel truth, with no arguments whatsoever, the highly controversial theories of Ray Blanchard (1985) (Lawford-Smith 2022, 106-7). She even uses this theory to suggest that trans women can’t really be sexually subordinated, since, apparently, we want it (Lawford-Smith 2023, 60).
Crucially, however, these philosophers have had a real political impact. Both played a role in the defeat of a proposed reform to the UK’s Gender Recognition Act which would have shifted the criteria for a Gender Recognition Certificate from a medical diagnosis of gender dysphoria to that of self-identification, despite the best efforts of trans ally feminist philosophers such as Finlayson, Jenkins, and Worsdale (2018) during the heated consultation period. In the wake of the defeat of the reform, unsurprisingly, anti-trans sentiment and legislation has been on the rise in the UK.
And now we have Trump. And clearly, the view underlying much of the White House executive orders is a gender critical position. It defends the view that the gender terms ‘man’ and ‘woman’ track biological sex. And the proffered motivation is to defend women from men who would infiltrate their spaces and harm them. (It’s also supposedly to protect children from a dangerous ideology—another gender critical talking point). Let’s contrast, for instance, the opening passage from the “Protecting Women” Executive Action with some passages from Stock’s essay “The Importance of Referring to Human Sex in Language” (2022).
This is the Executive Action:
Across the country, ideologues who deny the biological reality of sex have increasingly used legal and other socially coercive means to permit men to self-identify as women and gain access to intimate single-sex spaces and activities designed for women, from women’s domestic abuse shelters to women’s workplace showers. This is wrong. Efforts to eradicate the biological reality of sex fundamentally attack women by depriving them of their dignity, safety, and well-being. The erasure of sex in language and policy has a corrosive impact not just on women but on the validity of the entire American system. Basing Federal policy on truth is critical to scientific inquiry, public safety, morale, and trust in government itself.
This is Stock:
For centuries, the English language concepts of woman and man have been understood as referring only to adult female and male humans respectively. . . Yet we live in a cultural moment when adjustments to the traditional understandings of womanhood, manhood, girlhood, and boyhood are being urged upon language users,. . . We are told by progressive-styled organisations and leaders that, quite literally, transgender women (henceforth, “trans women”) are women, and transgender men (henceforth, “trans men”) are men. Since on ordinary understandings, trans women are by definition biologically male and trans men biologically female, this looks like a radical shift in usage (2022, 25).
This is Stock later on:
Women, as such, have certain distinctive needs in virtues of their sex . . . For instance: why should single-sex spaces exist, for women and girls who need to undress outside the home: in gyms, hostels, dormitories, or prisons? Partly because women and girls are on average smaller, weaker and slower than the human males who have a sometimes-aggressive sexual interest in them. Single-sex spaces are a way of safeguarding them in this vulnerable situation (2022, 42).
Of course, neither Stock nor Lawford-Smith wrote these Executive Actions. May Mailman did. She’s currently the Deputy Assistant to the President and Senior Policy Strategist (and has been a legal advisor for Trump in the past). She was also previously the Director of the Independent Women’s Law Center and is currently a Senior Fellow at the Independent Women’s Forum. Both the Center and the Forum promote cultural feminism for conservative women (i.e., “feminism” that is anti-trans, anti-immigrant, and anti-DEI). However, it seems evident that, at the very least, gender-critical feminist discourse is being accessed and utilized by these conservative thinkers.
One might wonder, therefore, whether it was at all disconcerting to gender critical philosophers to be on the same side as a man who has crowed about ending Roe v. Wade and who has sworn he will protect women whether they want him to or not. One might also wonder whether it was disconcerting for gender critical feminists to have their position endorsed by a man who is rounding up undocumented immigrants, deporting them from the country, or sending them to Guantanamo—a man who has erased all consideration of race and ethnicity from CDC public-facing documents and CDC research, is forbidding the teaching of anti-racism in K-12 and is on a general mission to eradicate any efforts towards diversity, equity, and inclusion.
Wondering, is unnecessary, however. Unnecessary, certainly in the case of Lawford-Smith, who on X, re-posted Elon Musk’s celebration of “Protecting Women” Executive Action (Jan 20) and another’s which reads “Can this week possibly get any better?” (Jan 28) after “Protecting Children” was issued. Most noticeable, however, is her own post which reads, “It’s a strange feeling wanting to cheer (United States vanquishing gender [identity] ideology) and cry (Australia giving a final ‘no’ to lesbian public assembly rights) at the same time” (Jan 20). Put aside trans people for a moment and consider the apparent lack of concern for anybody else in the United States who might be suffering or at risk under the Trump administration or the threat that that administration now poses to the world. Lawford-Smith may be crying. But not for that. (This is hardly surprising, of course, since Lawford-Smith’s feminism is expressly anti-intersectional (2022)).
The fact is, gender critical “feminism” is a deeply conservative position which harms nontrans women and trans people alike. Here’s an argument. Consider two possibilities. On the one hand, gender critical feminists say that the demand to respect trans identities and to include trans women in women’s spaces is harmful to (nontrans) women. So, the danger is transgender ideology—an ideology that, they claim, threatens to further the oppression of (nontrans woman) by allowing violent men to claim they are women and then access segregated spaces for women. On the other hand, trans inclusive feminists say that gender critical feminism endorses the oppression of trans people, and that this oppression also leads to bad effects for nontrans women, too. More thoroughgoing intersectional forms of trans feminism say that these bad effects extend more broadly, to people of color, to immigrants, and so forth. Look around at what is happening and ask: which theory best explains the current situation with the greatest efficiency?
So, no, I don’t wonder about gender-critical feminists. I do wonder, however, about those radical, controversial, rebel philosophers—the ones who, during those philosophy gender wars a few years back, bucked against that oppressive transgender hegemon—a hegemonic behemoth, in fact, comprised of vulnerable assistant professors and scared grad students—now that they are in company with men like Elon Musk (doing Nazi salutes on stage, no less). And I wonder about those two-siderists now that we are in the thick of it. Looking back on it all, how do you feel? Does it seem different now? Turns out the “hegemon” was really just a moral principle that said, “Please don’t harm the marginalized.”
How do things get turned so upside down? How do well-established philosophers get to represent themselves like down-trodden martyrs? Poor Stock, OBE. Silenced Lawford-Smith, published twice by OUP. Alex Byrne, MIT. Meanwhile, trans philosophers cling for dear life in the profession—shrugging off microaggressions, marginalizations by allies, searching for sympathetic dissertation advisors, eking out work. And now, it turns out, cling for dear life, period—fearing to travel, having no safe place to use restrooms, being on the lookout for violence, and afraid of what is to come. A ban on all gender-affirming care? Dead-name reversion? Legal punishment for fraud? The terror is real. And somehow, they represent the dread transgender empire, come to dominate us all? Is there something wrong with the profession of philosophy that it can be that perverted and, well, sociopathic?
2. Philosophy and Gender-Critical Feminism (Or, A Little Theory To Make My Rage More Palatable)
When I wrote “When Tables Speak: On the Existence of Trans Philosophy” (2018), I was exasperated by the way Stock cynically pretended to be some neutral philosopher come to think through matters rightly—matters that had somehow never been thought through before (but that had actually been thought through for at least the preceding fifty years). Most of what I had to say then concerned her ignorance of the literature. But I was trying to get at something deeper, something in the title, something in the thought that the question of whether trans identities were presumptively valid was equivalent to the question of whether tables existed. I got close to it when I wrote:
I’m afraid there’s a tendency among some philosophers to suppose that philosophical investigations into race, gender, disability, trans issues, and so forth are no different methodologically from investigations into the question whether tables really exist. One difference, however, is that while tables aren’t part of the philosophical conversation, trans people, disabled people, people of color, are part of the conversation. Or at least, we think we are.
And I think I am closer to being able to say it now.
It is a common assumption in philosophy that absolutely everything is up for grabs. That is why Graham Priest writes in his paper, “Philosophy is precisely that intellectual inquiry in which anything is open to critical challenge and scrutiny” (2006, 202). And I do believe that there is something right about that. What I am now inclined to doubt, however, is that it follows straightforwardly from this that any one philosopher can open a critical challenge to absolutely anything. Of course, in one sense they quite plainly can. Nobody can stop them. And nobody should, in the sense of denying them freedom of speech. What I am wondering, however, is whether there might be issues a certain philosopher ought not raise because to do so would be unethical. It could still be a question, of course, whether the mighty mandate of the search for truth for truth’s sake outweighed this ethical concern. But might there be ethical limits on a specific inquiry—even for philosophers? Certainly, in the sciences and social sciences there are ethical guidelines for research on human subjects. There are, however, none in the case of philosophy. And I suspect that the reason for this is that our discussions are so abstract that philosophizing about marginalized people seems really no different than philosophizing about the composition problem. But shouldn’t there be such guidelines?
While there are several ethical considerations that we ought to take seriously, I shall discuss only one here. This is one that also, notably, helps us better understand the issues around sex-segregation of such concern to gender-criticals—a point to which I will circle back at the end of the section.
I will start with a thought experiment that is based loosely on an actual occurrence that a colleague shared with me.
Suppose that in discussing the composition problem, instead of using a table as an example, I chose to use the penis of an actual living philosopher working in the profession. (Because I would never do such a terrible thing, I will use the arbitrary initial “A” instead). Imagine now, we are to philosophize whether A’s penis exists or whether there are merely some particles arranged penis-wise. Obviously, this is inappropriate. More importantly, however, it would make it difficult for A to enter into the conversation. He would be vulnerable since the topic of conversation would concern the very existence of his penis—or, at least, what it would mean to say that his penis existed with respect to the (his?) particles arranged penis-wise. It would set up a sort of power imbalance.
Of course, the issue doesn’t concern any one individual. It concerns groups of individuals. But individuals in the profession can likewise be made vulnerable through the same mechanism. Suppose, for instance, that some philosopher raised the hypothesis that all gender critical feminists are pedophiles (noting, say, their excessive interest in the sexual features of children). This philosopher needn’t defend such a position. They need only raise it in a thought experiment. Once raised, however, it could well lead to a literature in which the question—or at least, the question qua example—whether gender critical feminists were all pedophiles—gained currency. Imagine, for instance, a literature in metaphilosophy precipitated precisely by this discussion in which the question of whether gender critical feminists were all pedophiles was used—even just as an example, never mind a legitimate philosophical question. (It could become a genuine question once it gained a foothold in the literature and philosophers forgot the origin of the discussion). In such a scenario, vulnerability would be induced, should a gender critical feminist wish to enter the conversation, and a power-differential would be set in place.
These are both improbable examples. But they illustrate something important about boundaries and vulnerability that matter very much for trans people. Consider Lawford-Smith’s unquestioning endorsement of Blanchard’s theory, according to which one group of trans women are, in fact, men who transition merely because the thought of being a woman turns them on erotically. Once that topic is on the table, trans women must now enter a conversation, should they choose to enter it, in which their sex lives and motivations for transition are up for public discussion. Consider the vulnerability induced in having to philosophize intimate details of one’s life—the asymmetry, the power differential. One is automatically on one’s heels.
To be clear, it doesn’t really matter whether the topic is sexually explicit or not. So long as the topic is personal, intimate, one has, as it were, been pushed into the center of the party. It’s like spilling spaghetti all over oneself and then having to carry on a philosophical conversation while pulling noodles from one’s hair. (Except that the topic is precisely about the fact that one is pulling noodles from one’s hair). That’s how it feels every time I have a conversation with a nontrans person about whether trans identities are presumptively valid.
Something funny happens when an asymmetry in vulnerability is created—namely, it becomes more difficult for the vulnerable to speak, and to have what they say, if they can say it, taken seriously at all. This is all the more so once one is assumed to have no boundaries at all. And this is because, if one has no boundaries, one has nothing to hold back in reserve. Which means one has nothing to share. Which means one has no internal depth. Which means one becomes merely surface deep, nonhuman, a one-dimensional thought-experiment. And while anyone can, in principle, be made vulnerable, it is invariably the marginalized who are, due to the pre-existing power-differentials subject to it. In this way “vulnerabilization” becomes a bullying tactic and a way of more deeply entrenching the power disparity.
Notably these boundaries matter also when it comes to sex-segregation in intimate spaces—the core issue behind the executive actions and gender critical feminism, to which I would now like to return. (Here I sketch an argument very quickly that requires much more detail—however, I do think that connecting the dots is important). Lawford-Smith, arguing against Sally Haslanger’s definition of woman (which very roughly says a woman is somebody who is subordinated on the basis of being presumed to be biological female), points out that gender norms track actual biological sex, not presumed sex. So, when an individual presumed to be female is determined to be really male, they are no longer subordinated on that basis. They are subject to norms of masculinity, not femininity. Lawford-Smith, then, assures us that what is discovered is the real, true biological sex.
However, as trans people know, in everyday life what happens during such a discovery involves “private parts.” We are proven to be “really male” or “really female” by having our genitals grabbed or exposed, or at least through euphemized discussion about intimate details about what is between our legs. That is to say, in such cases, moral boundaries are central. And moral boundaries are not biological. Private parts are not biological. Both moral boundaries and the privacy of parts are cultural. Consider the odd difference in moral boundaries concerning visual access to female nipples and male nipples that help constitute morally tiered nakedness (toplessness/bottomlessness) for females but not males. Consider the sexist asymmetries whereby male access to female nakedness constitutes invasion of privacy against the female (she covers her body) while, when reversed, constitutes a decency offense against the female (she covers her eyes), such that she is the violated one either way. It is just such boundaries that are presupposed in concerns about trans women spying on nontrans women or exposing themselves in intimate space.
What seems clear to me is that when trans women are placed in space segregated for males it is precisely to say that we are to be constituted with male boundaries, rather than female ones. Of course, this won’t change the stark realities of sexual harassment, physical violence, and sexual assault (see Jenness et al 2019, for instance). It is also, however, to reaffirm precisely the sexist asymmetries mentioned above whereby females are constituted as the violated ones regardless of whether they are the viewers or the viewed. In this respect, to do so is, in fact, to perpetuate sexist structures that might, in fact, be constituted otherwise. It is therefore no surprise to me that gender critical philosophers turn out to be ultimately anti-feminist in their stance. They appeal to sexist structures, all in the name of feminism, to ultimately reinscribe those structures, to justify their transphobia and consequently leave trans women vulnerable to very violence from which they would protect others.
3. Back to Rage (“Rage is so masculine, Talia, your male privilege is showing”)
Let’s return to the Executive Actions. What scares me most is the underlying philosophy behind them. Take, most obviously, “Protecting Children.” A claim one might have made is that people under a certain age are not capable of making decisions about their bodies with respect to gender affirming care—taking puberty blockers—in consultation with their parents and physicians. (The arguments for such a claim are very weak, but never mind). But that is not the claim made in this Executive Action. Rather the claim is that children (including 18-year-olds) are to be protected from chemical and surgical mutilation. If gender affirming care is just mutilation, then why should anybody be allowed to have it? (Anticipate another Executive Action to seize upon that point soon).
However, behind all of this lurks the most devastating assumption of all—namely, that trans people don’t even exist. And let me be clear. There are many ways in which trans people might feel their existence to have been denied. One way is for our identities to be invalidated. For instance, to treat a trans woman as nothing but a man would be to deny her existence as a trans woman and, no doubt, that trans woman would likely feel this to be a denial of her existence. The Executive Actions, of course, take the stand that trans women are just confused men, that trans men are just confused women, and that nonbinary people are just confused men and women, and so, does deny our existence in this way.
What I mean runs even deeper than this, however. What I mean is that the Executive Actions deny that there is such a thing as gender dysphoria or gender identity—at least in any kind of serious, scientific sense. In this way, there are no trans people. Consider, first, section three of “Protecting Children”:
Ending Reliance on Junk Science. (a) The blatant harm done to children by chemical and surgical mutilation cloaks itself in medical necessity, spurred by guidance from the World Professional Association for Transgender Health (WPATH), which lacks scientific integrity.
WPATH is rejected as unscientific. Why? There is a consensus of support from the leading medical associations and no basis for this rejection whatsoever. (Note, however, the similarity in baseless dismissal that we found previously in the work of Lawford-Smith). Now consider, in “Ending Radical Indoctrination”:
Parents trust America’s schools to provide their children with a rigorous education and to instill a patriotic admiration for our incredible Nation and the values for which we stand. In recent years, however, parents have witnessed schools indoctrinate their children in radical, anti-American ideologies while deliberately blocking parental oversight. Such an environment operates as an echo chamber, in which students are forced to accept these ideologies without question or critical examination. In many cases, innocent children are compelled to adopt identities as either victims or oppressors solely based on their skin color and other immutable characteristics. In other instances, young men and women are made to question whether they were born in the wrong body and whether to view their parents and their reality as enemies to be blamed.
Here the possibility that children might experience gender dysphoria is ignored altogether. Rather, should a child question whether they were born in the wrong body, it must be due to a radical anti-American ideology at play. It couldn’t actually be gender dysphoria. No. There is only gender ideology. There are no trans people, you see. There is only far left extremism, faux science, and presumably men trying to sneak into women’s bathrooms and to beat them up in sporting events.
I suspect one of the reasons that trans people are so terrified is that we all intuitively understand what I have just tried to draw out in painful detail—namely, that these actions presuppose that we never existed in the first place. There was never an us. We had never even had trans experiences. We were always figments of our own imaginations. Descartes be damned.
It brings me back to the nineties, when I came out as trans as a grad student at UCLA. The first person I came out to was Rogers Albritton. He was partially supportive, but he did wonder whether “transsexuality” (as it was called at the time) even existed on the grounds that it depended on Cartesian dualism (he said). Or something like that. And I remember thinking—but failing to reply because I was stunned and powerless as a grad student—that certainly trans people do exist, regardless of how we theorize it.
With that in mind, let me conclude with an argument for the existence of trans people—an argument that we exist in this most basic sense (an argument that trans people themselves know well).
Put aside whatever theory you like about—gender identity, dysphoria, whatever you want to call it. Put it aside. Because there exists something that makes trans people transition. I mean, ask yourself. Why on earth would anybody transition? In this world? Risk family? Risk friends? Risk employment? Risk education? Risk safety? Risk healthcare? Risk love? Who would go through disorientation and mindfuck? Who would dare make one’s life virtually unlivable? Who would pay good money for that?
To sneak into a bathroom and peep at women? Not worth it. To get a sexual thrill? Not worth it? To follow the dictates of some ideology? Not worth it. And not convincing, either. Not to those of us who didn’t even have the conceptual resources at first to make sense of what was even going on, no concepts, no theory, no words to light the way.
And now that the Trump administration is bent on destroying trans people, you have to ask yourself—why are these people still here? Why are they still persisting, rather than desisting? Why aren’t they all detransitioning? Why are they still fighting for who they are? For a fucking lark? Whatever this thing is in us, it is not something to be trivialized or dismissed. And it will not die easily. Because we will fight. And the fact that we do so is the most powerful argument we exist. QED.
But now listen to me, philosophers, when I remind you of that long-forgotten word “empathy.” And I say that there are indeed consequences when we punch down or pretend that what is, in fact, a hostile attack, is merely “inquiry for inquiry’s sake.” Aside from the emotional wounds we inflict on actual people, philosophical discourse matters beyond that. It did matter in this case. And when I read these executive actions, all I can do is hear the self-righteous gender critical philosophers, the smug rebel philosophers who so resented the request to not be mean, the two-siderists who thought we were talking about the problem of universals. I just feel rage. And I wonder what all of you will decide to do now, besides gaping like fools, while we tables are burning—ablaze from the very fires you helped set.
Thanks to Mark Balaguer, Jay Conway, PJ DiPietro, Ann Garry, Jake Hale, Kate Manne, Cyprus Marques, Amy Marvin, and Andrea Pitts for their helpful comments.
References
Alcoff, Linda. 2006. Visible Identities: Race, Gender, and the Self. Oxford: Oxford University Press
Bettcher, Talia. 2018. “When Tables Speak: On the Existence of Trans Philosophy.” Daily Nous (blog). May 30, 2018. http://dailynous.com/2018/05/30/tables-speak-existence-trans-philosophy-guest-talia-mae-bettcher/.
Blanchard, Ray. 1985. “Typology of Male-to-Female Transsexualism.” Archives of Sexual Behavior 34 (4): 247-261.
Finlayson, L., K. Jenkins, and R. Worsdale, R.. 2018. “I’m not transphobic, but . . .”: A feminist case against the feminist case against trans inclusivity. Verso Books. https://www.versobooks.com/blogs/4090-i-m-not-transphobic-but-a-feministcase-against-the-feminist-case-against-trans-inclusivity.
Hasenbush, A., A. R. Flores, and J. L. Herman. 2019. “Gender Identity Nondiscrimination Laws in Public Accommodations: A Review of Evidence Regarding Safety and Privacy in Public Restrooms, Locker Rooms, and Changing Rooms.” Sexuality Research and Social Policy 16: 70–83.
Haslanger, Sally. 2012a [2000]. “Gender and Race: (What) Are They? (What) Do We Want Them to Be?” In Resisting Reality: Social Construction and Social Critique, by Sally Haslanger, 221-47. Oxford University Press.
Jenness, Valerie, Lori Sexton, and Jennifer Summer. 2019. “Sexual Victimization Against Transgender Women in Prison: Consent and Coercion in Context.” Criminology 57: 603-631.
Lawford-Smith, Holly. 2022. Gender-critical feminism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
–––. 2023. Sex matters: Essays in gender-critical philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Priest, Graham. 2006. “What is Philosophy?” Philosophy 81 (316): 189–207.
Stock, Kathleen. 2022. “The importance of referring to human sex in language.” Law and Contemporary Problems 85 (1): 25-45.
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UPDATE (2/21/25): Comments are now closed.
Thanks for this, Talia. A very forceful argument.
https://thecritic.co.uk/the-thoughtlessness-of-guilt-by-association/
I think the agreement between Trump and so-called “gender critical” commentators is probably a lot more substantial than that. Although, the thoughtlessness here might actually be in “gender critical” commentators not thinking through the implications of their anti-trans commentary, especially as it relates to gender broadly. Put otherwise, what they promulgate isn’t limited to trans folk in its impacts. That’s not to say that we should only care about the matter if its impacts are more wide-ranging; trans folk deserve our care and solidarity as they are the primary targets of both this commentary and the contemptible legislation it inspires. But it is still worth noting that the impacts are wide-ranging. This CoE report gestures at that, as does this article from UN Women.
The association fallacy is “x is A and y is A, so since x is B, y is also B.” It is only a fallacy if A and B are uncorrelated.
One of the main arguments of Bettchen seems to be that “anti-trans” (A) and “reactionary politics” (B) aren’t uncorrelated at all.
You can’t cheer on B, receive money from B, speak at B events, publish in B newspapers, and still legitimately cry “guilt by association” when someone calls you B.
The Sokal essay does not appeal to the argument form of the association fallacy, so your point is irrelevant.
In any case, your suggestion of how the association fallacy works has absurd consequences that I doubt you want to accept. Note that gender critical feminists think that gender identity is a harmful thing that we would be better off without. By contrast, trans activists and gender conservatives both agree that gender identity is an important feature of human experience and that it should not be abolished (where they disagree, is on whether gender identity should be tied to biological sex). Let’s call the anti-gender abolition position that they share “A”. Gender conservatives also tend to endorse norms of toxic masculinity. Let’s call these norms “B”. Finally, as gender conservatives far outnumber people who endorse the trans activist position worldwide, observe that there is a robust correlation worldwide between endorsing A and endorsing B. Thus, according to your argument form, given this correlation, it would NOT be the association fallacy to argue that, since gender conservatives endorse norms of toxic masculinity, trans activists also endorse norms of toxic masculinity. This is obviously the wrong result. What is shows is that presence of absence of a correlation between A and B is not at all a plausible criteria for identifying cases of the association fallacy.
There are many assumptions there that critics of “gender critical” commentators are going to find questionable. For instance, I wouldn’t characterise them as abolitionists; they have a gender system they are arguing for, one that in many respects closely resembles that of those you’ve called “gender conservatives.” Some are, however, eliminationists, but only with regard to trans folk, whom they see as a “huge problem” for their “sane world.” As Talia points out in her essay, this sort of rhetoric is common among prominent “gender critical” thinkers, but it’s also echoed in the commentary of those you’ve called “gender conservatives.”
This is not a fair characterization of GCF. In any case, this is all beside the point. How does any of this answer the logical point I made about Julian’s correlation proposal being a bad way to explicate the association fallacy.
This is much too confused to get at what you think I did wrong. Mostly, you appear to equivocate seems “gender identity” and “gendered norms”, most clearly in the following:
“trans activists and gender conservatives both agree that gender identity is an important feature of human experience”
Everything else you say seems to follow from this equivocation.
There is obviously a level of description at which their views coincide. Whether we use ‘gender identity’ or another term for that description doesn’t really matter for the point being made. In any case, the logical point I was making about the flaw in how you characterized the association fallacy is fairly straight forward and is independent of any specific example used to demonstrates it. x’s and y’s may share position A. x’s may significantly outnumber y’s and also be highly likely to endorse position B. Hence, there might be a moderate or strong correlation between accepting A and accepting B. Yet this correlation does not warrant the inference that y’s are morally suspect in endorsing A because endorsing A is correlated with endorsing B, and B is a morally suspect position.
“There is obviously a level of description at which their views coincide.”
There emphatically is not. At least provide that description.
I won’t let you distract from this outright lie by nitpicking the definition of correlation. It won’t change that the above schema is valid for A=anti-trans, B=reactionism anyway.
“Anti-gender eliminationism” is a neutral description. Gender eliminativists argue that gender, in all its manifestations, should be eliminated. Both gender conservatives and mainstream trans activism are opposed to this idea.
On the other point, you gave a general account of the association fallacy that, according to you, demonstrates that the guilt by association move that trans activist often use against GCF is not an instance of the association fallacy. I then gave a straightforward counterexample to your general account of the association fallacy. Rather then directly refuting that counterexample, or conceding that your account of the association fallacy is flawed, you instead simply dismissed the whole discussion as “nitpicking”. That strikes me as not arguing in good faith here. Hence, I don’t think there is much point in us continuing this discussion.
I think Julian’s point is that the characterisation you started with is flawed, or at the very least requires us to accept premises that we’re likely to consider questionable. For instance, as I mentioned in my previous comment, I don’t think “gender critical” commentators can reliably be considered “abolitionists” or even, as you’ve substituted the term now, “eliminativists.” Because they don’t reliably argue that “gender, in all its manifestations, should be eliminated.” Forstater provides an example as to why.
This isn’t an accident; it’s a common inconsistency interwoven into “GC” commentary, which, on the one hand, has to hold that “We Can Always Tell” is a deep truth of the human condition, enabling us to identify the exact biological facts they say are important and which putatively hold primacy in how spaces are organised. And, on the other, the recognition that the system doesn’t actually work that way—that it’s only tenable if people conform to traditional gendered expectations with regard to how they look, talk, act, and so on.
This can’t reliably be called “eliminativism,” at least not in the sense in which you’ve used the word (i.e., as gender being eliminated “in all its manifestations”). At the very least, it suggests that what they want to eliminate is only a subset of those “manifestations.” Or, perhaps, they are using the word “gender” to mean something else.
““Anti-gender eliminationism” is a neutral description. Gender eliminativists argue that gender, in all its manifestations, should be eliminated. Both gender conservatives and mainstream trans activism are opposed to this idea.”
Yes, you equivocate gender norms and gender identity, we’ve already been over this. Of course you can give a neutral definition if you equivocate two distinct positions.
Reactionary conservatives endorse gender norms and deny gender identity; trans-inclusive feminists reject gender norms and affirm gender identity; “GC”s purport* to reject gender norms and deny gender identity. Only the first and third have meaningful overlap.
*but actually don’t
Lots more to say, but I’ll engage one part. The reason it’s inappropriate to use a specific philosopher’s penis as an example when you’re theorizing about composite objects is that doing so is embarrassing and uncomfortable for that philosopher and we don’t need to use his penis as an example to theorize about the topic. It’s an important topic, and we should definitely theorize about it, but not in unnecessarily embarrassing and uncomfortable ways. Sex and gender are important topics, and we should definitely theorize about them. But, to do it, we HAVE to ask, “Are trans women really women, or are they men who have a mistaken self-understanding?” (and similar questions). This question (and similar questions) may be embarrassing or uncomfortable for trans people, but we’re not causing unnecessary embarrassment and discomfort. There’s no way to theorize about the topic without asking some version of that question. So, it’s morally OK to ask the question about trans people, but not a specific philosopher’s penis. But, obviously, everyone should take due care not to cause needless embarrassment and discomfort during their discussions about the nature of sex and gender.
Despite our intuitions, mereology need not be particularly principled. In a world full of weird brute facts, we might need to ask whether some things compose some other thing on a case by case basis, including A’s penis.
On the other hand, we might think that we can theorize about sex and gender without HAVING to ask “are trans women really women,” maybe in light of the decades of literature that the author points toward in the 2018 post, in the same way that we might think we can move the debate about sex and gender past Aristotle, without asking “are non-trans women really women or just defective men?”
Or you might just think that it’s stupid to think we can easily draw lines between whose embarrassment and discomfort about what is necessary to pursue philosophy and whose isn’t.
I’m familiar with the composition debate and the brutalist position. If composition is brute, that applies to lots of composite objects. Even on that view, there’s nothing special, or of special theoretical interest, about a specific philosopher’s penis. So, again, using it as an example causes unnecessary embarrassment and discomfort.
Of course you CAN discuss sex and gender without asking and answering, “Are trans women really women?” but not in an intellectually responsible way–at least, not at this stage when both prominent figures in the sex and gender literature and philosophers generally disagree intensely about this question.
I’m not drawing lines between whose embarrassment and discomfort is important.
Well, there’s at least nothing special about one specific philosopher’s penis.
I don’t know whether it’s true that you have to ask that question. An alternative would be how Bettcher frames the inquiry:
I think it’s fairly uncontroversial (among philosophers thinking carefully about this, at least) that not all trans people are intentionally misreporting their experiences or their conception of themselves. They’re experiencing something that drives them to identify as trans. But we still need to ask: Is that conception correct? Are those experiences indicating what trans people think they are? Many people with anorexia conceive of themselves as fat. They’re not lying or faking. Something is driving them to think that. But, it’s fairly uncontroversial that rail-thin anorexics are not fat. They have a false self-conception. Their experiences are not indicating what anorexics think they are. Same for people with Body Integrity Dysphoria (BID) who think that the hand attached to their body is not really theirs. They’re not lying or faking. Something is driving them to think that. But, it’s fairly uncontroversial that people with BID who think their hand isn’t theirs are wrong. They have a false self-conception. So, nothing Bettcher says in the quote you highlight makes it unnecessary to ask whether trans people have a correct self-conception or whether their experiences indicate what trans people think they do. Their self-conception is not infallible nor is their interpretation of their very real experiences.
Dysmorphia isn’t dysphoria, as Sara points out here (https://web.archive.org/web/20210204195512/https://twitter.com/saraaspringer/status/1357417395070128128). That said, the intention behind your post overall seems to be to pathologize trans lives. We tried that already—decades of it. So when you’re pondering what “we still need to ask,” maybe ask why you’re advocating a return to what we know doesn’t work, whether the questions you are asking have already been considered, and why we’re continuously entertaining them as though they are novel or original.
But one needn’t pathologize trans people (nor support awful Trumpian EOs or laws) to ask Eric’s question: Is their self-conception correct?
Likewise to ask the related question: Must everyone else defer to their self-conception even if many or most of them find it incorrect?
A large part of Talia’s piece recognises that the question here centralizes the trans persons self-conception as needing explanation. It does not ask that question with a view to gaining insights into gender self-conception broadly—after all, you have such a conception as well, but yours is just assumed to follow “correctly”—but with a view to understand what has gone “wrong” that would lead to such a self-conception.
In other words, the whole endeavour is engineered with a normative premise at its core: that to have such and such a self-conception demands explanation in ways that not having that self-conception (i.e. having a cisheteronormative self-conception) does not. That IS pathologizing, insofar as what needs to be explained is a particular self-conception, not self-conception generally.
Moreover, the idea that it is just self-conception seems a bit iffy, in that it sounds like that itself is given as an “explanation”. That, presented with a phenomena like transness, the “explanation” becomes “that is their self-conception”. Which of course sets the stage for asking the question Eric is seemingly alluding to: “Oh, well, what went wrong then that lead to this self-conception forming?”
I don’t think anyone disagrees that self-conception has a role, but it’s a role in a larger theory of sexual and gender development—it’s not the “explanation” for nontrans identities. Why would it be the “explanation” for trans ones?
Part of what I think Bettcher is complaining about is how completely unsophisticated this way of framing the issue is.
There are lots of trans people. They are evidently able to live long, healthy lives full of mutually supportive and fulfilling relationships, do good philosophy (or other difficult intellectual and physical tasks), etc etc. (I am one such.) In other words, trans people are obviously, empirically capable of living human lives that tick off all plausible boxes for a life full of “flourishing” or “well-being”. Note that this is generally *not* observed in cases of extreme body dysmorphia, psychosis, personality disorders, and so on.
Once that is recognized to be the state of things, it should be obvious that “Are these people maybe just on Neptune mentally, about this one isolated thing?” is just not an interesting framing. It’s not that it’s offensive or cruel, though obviously it is those things as well – it’s that it’s not philosophically interesting. Much more interesting, and responsive to the actual state of things: “Okay, we have these people who are evidently of sound mind but who radically challenge our pre-existing systems for linguistically and socially categorizing people on the basis of sexual features. Does this mean we have to change those systems? What does this mean about the epistemology and metaphysics behind those systems?” And so on. Note that this more sophisticated framing does NOT rule out the answer, “We should change nothing and considerations of philosophical theory choice force us to deny what these people are saying.” But the new framing no longer tees this up as an obvious, proximate answer to the whole problem, and it doesn’t “put trans people on their heels” as Bettcher aptly puts it.
Many people with a penis say it is *correct* to say of them that they are a woman. I want to know, “Are they right? Are they really a woman, or do they merely think they are?”
Obviously, to ask that question, I don’t need to think trans people are “on Neptune mentally.” I don’t need to deny they’re capable of living good lives, having healthy relationships, being of sound mind, etc. I don’t need to hate them, disrespect them, or want them to suffer.
Now, you’re welcome to call me and my question “unsophisticated,” report to me that you don’t find it interesting, accuse me of cruelty, attribute all sorts of nefarious motives to me, and insult me in any other way you like. I don’t care, lol. I know my question is perfectly well-formed. I find it interesting and important, and I know many others do, too. (If you’re bored or find this question uninteresting, you’re free to move on.) I know I bear no ill will toward trans people. So, insult me all you like. I’m going to keep asking the question precisely as I asked it: “When a trans woman says they’re a woman, are they correct?” Deal with it.
I’ll try to explain why you’re getting the reaction you’re getting.
As others have said, you really need to say more about what you mean by “correct”.
Above you mentioned that anorexic people are incorrect about a bodily quality. That’s true. It is however rather difficult to say something similar about trans people. They typically are very knowledgeable about their anatomy (including reproductive capacity, chromosomes, and especially hormones). So that can’t be it. Anorexia is highly disanalogous.
So when someone uses “women” to mean something like denoting an anatomical-reproductive type and calls a trans man a woman, while he denies that he is one while affirming all the true claims about his anatomy, the dispute seems to be merely verbal. (Note again the stark disanalogy to body dysmorphia.)
The only way to be “correct” in a verbal dispute is in a meta-semantic normative sense. Here, it is about how the words “man” and “woman” (etc) *ought* to be employed.
Thus, your question comes down to an ethical question, turning on such matters as justice, solidarity, freedom and all the other matters that have been raised to you.
But you seem to insist on construing it as an issue of pure ontology that does *not* answer to such matters. This is, given the dialectic I just laid out, charitably described as “unsophisticated”.
I broadly agree with this, although I think it’s worth noting that much of the discussion does deal with approaches to conceptualising gender/sex. This is often where “gender critical” commentators invoke “material reality.” However, the objective materialities aren’t in dispute, and I’d argue that even many “GC” commentators generally understand sex as constituted by many things, many of which can vary and need not be “aligned” in material reality. But they are of the view that they ought to be.
This view undergirds most of their commentary. It’s why they will gerrymander a description or characterisation of sex that they believe gets them immutability (usually one tied to gamete production or the like) and then still go on to make much more wide-ranging claims about what supposedly cannot be changed. And when those claims are criticised or challenged with reference to the terrain they’re ultimately about, they can always point back to the gerrymandered map from before, the one that putatively establishes the terrain’s absolute and unchanging nature, to deflect such criticism.
In that context, it’s understandable that much of that criticism looks to the normative premises that have snuck into the argument. Because at the end of the day, despite so often talking of “material realty,” they seem less interested in what’s actually the case and more in articulating a view of how things ought to have aligned.
I think you’re wrong to suggest that you can’t have a “pure ontology” of gender that doesn’t answer to normative questions.
I could say: Gender is a socially defined concept. I can reasonably ascribe to a view that socially defined concepts have an actual definition (perhaps by way of some complex intersubjective system). Under such a view, it would be possible to be wrong about one’s gender without answering to questions about what gender “ought” to mean.
I agree, but the question then becomes what is the “correct” view or definition of Gender. The feminist literature has developed a handful of competing notions here, and the debate about them centers (correctly) on the ethical consequences of each.
Felix, I neither claimed nor relied on the claim that dysmorphia is identical to dysphoria. The point was that a person’s sincere self-conception based on real experiences can be mistaken. Everyone should agree–even trans people. So, Bettcher’s point that real experiences are driving trans people to identify as trans doesn’t settle the question, “Is their sincere self-identification (or self-conception) based on real experiences *correct*?”
Nothing about what I said “pathologizes” trans people unless suggesting they *might* be mistaken in their self-conception pathologizes them. If that qualifies as “pathologizing,” then I am happy to say I am pathologizing them (in your idiosyncratic sense), but there’s nothing wrong with doing so.
I believe I address that in another comment.
I also have no way of understanding what you even mean by “correct” here? “Correct” about what? There’s potentially a level of question-begging there. Or maybe not. In any case, it’s hard to determine what “correct” could mean here.
To be frank, if “we still need to ask” whether that self conception is correct we really need you to establish on what epistemic authority you might countermand or falsify that self conception, on what basis you claim to fully understand trans women’s self conception sufficiently to falsify it.
Because so much of this is riddled with unquestioned standpoint bias, and “common sense” overruling the subjectivity and personhood of the other in lieu of any sort of rigor.
If gender is a cultural construct in dispute, is there any basis on which to claim authority over its meaning against the claims of trans people to our self concept that is not itself a political assertion? Your “just asking questions” begs many more questions
It is the other side that has the burden of establishing its epistemic authority.
I can have all sorts of conceptions about myself. I can conceive of myself as being generous, intelligent, funny, a great driver, open-minded, and remarkable ethical. I can conceive of myself as having a full head of hair, being in good physical shape, being the reincarnation of Napoleon, actually being Napoleon in this lifetime, being a sergeant in the military, having a legal right to drive anyone else’s car, or having unfailingly accurate prophetic dreams.
None of these self-conceptions, or any other self-conception I or anyone else can have, is guaranteed to be accurate merely because I have it, or because I have it consistently.
If someone declines to take any of my self-conceptions as guaranteeing its truth, it would be wrong of me to protest that that person thereby claims to fully understand my self-conception. A skeptic needs no understanding of my self-conception. All that is needed is reason to doubt that self-conceptions are necessarily reliable, and we all have plenty of that.
Conversely, if I were to demand that others take my self-conceptions (on any topic) as undoubtable evidence that I have the properties I think I have, I would be the one assuming remarkable epistemic authority.
I have a remarkably durable self-conception of being attracted only to certain people, and certain categories of people. I would not substitute anyone else’s judgment for my own on that point. Much better comparison.
Now, _those_ kinds of self-conceptions — conceptions about having certain preferences — I think belong to a different category.
If all we have to accept is that someone who states and gives behavioral evidence a certain set of preferences in fact has those preferences, and _not_ any properties beyond the having of certain preferences, then I think it’s reasonable for us to accept the person’s claim to have those preferences.
Isn’t this just an example of exactly what Mal is referring to there with regard to “unquestioned standpoint bias, and ‘common sense’ overruling the subjectivity and personhood of the other in lieu of any sort of rigor”? I mean, the selection of the examples itself suggests it—it’s, in effect, “Imagine some ridiculous ideas I could have about myself; isn’t that just ridiculous? Now, about this self-conception…”
Hopefully you can see that, framed that way, we are already led to a presumptive answer and to the further question, “What went wrong that led one to form this self-conception?” But if we’re asking that we’ve already concluded that the self-conception itself tells of its wrongness. On what basis?
No. I included a combination of plausible and implausible self-conceptions. Many of us think of ourselves as I can conceive of myself as generous, intelligent, funny, great drivers, and open-minded. And many of us are correct in thinking those things about ourselves.
The point here is that, in general, we do not take people’s self-conceptions to be authoritative sources of information about them. There are some *very* unusual cases where mere introspection gives us authoritative access to objective facts about us, but these seem to be limited to current desires, sensations, etc. Even then, that authoritativeness is not absolute. If I have seen someone eat steamed broccoli several times, and request steamed broccoli at restaurants without even looking at the menu, and say, “Oh, this steamed broccoli is the most delicious thing” over and over, I would be reasonable to doubt that person’s self-conception as a person who has always hated broccoli. Even purely subjective self-conceptions can be fallible, and self-conceptions on matters that go beyond preferences, desires, and sensations are generally far less authoritative.
Since my aim was to point out that self-conceptions are generally not authoritative, it should be no surprise that I gave some examples of self-conceptions that are not only non-authoritative but blatantly dubious. But I am open to an argument showing that some other, relevant range of self-conceptions is to be plausibly taken as authoritative. That burden lies with those who, unlike me, find self-conceptions to be a very solid — and perhaps even unquestionable — source of information about people.
I don’t think self-conception is a good term for this. Regardless, millions of people have durable self-conceptions related to sexual orientation and gender. It’s an empirical fact I see no reason to ignore. This does not imply people cannot be confused about other things, or even sexuality or gender. It does mean people usually know, with about as much certainty as they know anything, about their own gender and sexuality. The burden is quite plainly on people who argue all of this is illusory. That’s before we get to the larger topic: vicious, unethical treatment of LBGT people, seemingly fully consistent with or even influenced directly by recent GC ideology.
Laura, am I right that you are defending this mode of reasoning?
P1. Millions of people have durable beliefs that they have some property P.
C. Therefore, anyone who doubts or denies that those millions of people in fact have property P plainly has the burden of proof.
No, that’s a different argument.
I’m happy for anyone to compare what you said immediately above what I asked about, and to judge whether it’s an instance of the template I indicated.
Your template was about beliefs and properties, but I didn’t think I was saying anything subtle like that. I just think millions of people are gay, for example, and it’s obvious to them and to others. Some may report confusion but for the most part, no. So it would be weird to deny this and say being gay is an illusion, or there are no actually gay people. Still, it does happen occasionally; people try to impose religious retraining.
Isn’t it possible for someone to say something false about themselves because of a linguistic mistake rather than because of a lack of self-knowledge?
Sure, we can believe false things about ourselves for many reasons
Actually, their self-conception is infallible, at least in the Cartesian sense. It is indubitable, even if you allege it to be an illusion. If you’re going to be a fallibilist, then there exists no conclusive justification and no rational certainty for any of our beliefs or theses. In this debate, we are presumably in this space of reasons and the giving of reasons for our beliefs.
Your position suggests a disjunctivist approach to this debate: identify the hallucination or illusion in the other, even if by analogy, then you have successfully bracketed (as in disqualified) that viewpoint from an alleged community of conceptual correctness.
That obviously doesn’t work for the other example of a debate that implicates one of the participants (are gender critical philosophers pedophiles?), which is directly analogous to how many gender critical philosophers have talked about trans people. And even if it did work, it is clearly not an exclusive reason to avoid discussing A’s penis. The reason given above is also a perfectly good reason not to discuss it.
‘Sex and gender are important topics, and we should definitely theorize about them. But, to do it, we HAVE to ask, “Are trans women really women, or are they men who have a mistaken self-understanding?” (and similar questions).’
There comes a point when claims like this look very uncomfortably like mere excuses for injustice. Consider this alternative:
‘Race and ethnicity are important topics, and we should definitely theorize about them. But, to do it, we HAVE to ask, “Are Black people really people, or are they beasts who have a mistaken self-understanding?” (and similar questions).’
Theorizing about a kind of person cannot be allowed to slide into pathologizing that kind of person. Alarmist warnings of perverted men donning dresses so they can creepily pee in the same rooms as *real women* ™ are only the more vicious version of ‘look at these poor men who don’t realize they’re men!’ Increasingly, it seems that Gender Critical Feminism’s end game is a transgender version of drapetomania.
I also worry about this pathologizing, and I often think of it in terms of the comparison you offer. At the same time, I wonder if the comparison is apt. To deny personhood to someone because of their race is obviously egregious. To deny (wo)manhood to someone because of their biological sex also seems wrong to me, but it’s way murkier. To be totally clear, here are some things that are not murky: trans people deserve respect, they deserve to be treated as full persons, they deserve to pursue the kind of life they find most valuable, etc etc. But as for the strictly metaphysical question of whether a trans (wo)man is a (wo)man—I just often have no clue (not least because I have no clue what a woman is in the first place). Both the identity and its negation simply never strike me as obvious or beyond criticism, despite how (it seems to me) both sides present their respective view. I’m sure it’s like this for others. Maybe that makes me a bad person, no different from unconvinced racists of yesteryear (and today-year, I suppose). But I don’t know what else to do: I’ve heard the testimonies, I’ve listened to the arguments, the evidence is before me, and it just doesn’t compel me in either direction. Am I supposed to somehow choose to believe? Is that what trans rights advocates are requesting of allies? Or do claims like “trans (wo)men are (wo)men” mainly have a less literal function—meaning something like “we ought to treat people as the gender with which they identify”?
I don’t think anything hinges on us having first settled the conceptual/theoretical question of what sex/gender is. That is an ongoing discussion, in many senses. But we don’t need a fully fledged theory of what it is—one that would probably require interdisciplinary linkages to flesh out a complete theory of sexual and gender development—to agree on basic questions of the human rights of sexual and gender minorities? I think, in that respect, instead of viewing it as an urging to belief, it is better understood as an invitation to question—we have this phenomena that we don’t fully understand; it naturally gives rise to variation and diversity, although the mechanisms by which it does that are not fully elucidated, but we value that diversity as a good, as a natural component of human diversity. That itself is a stance that allows for open-endedness on the theoretical questions that we might be interested in answering regarding the nature of sex/gender, while nevertheless rejecting the pathologizing attitudes that sexual and gender diversity has traditionally been subject to. That’s just one view though; others may disagree.
One proposal: it is morally acceptable for philosophers to ask questions of plausible philosophical relevance, of serious sociopolitical interest to millions of people, whose answer is controversial among philosophers and laypeople alike (perhaps as an unfortunate matter of widespread error or misunderstanding contingent to our circumstances), in venues which try reasonably hard to minimize anticipated harms, when the question is asked with sincerity and without malice. I offer these as jointly sufficient, though perhaps not necessary. It would then seem morally acceptable to ask, e.g., whether trans (wo)men are (wo)men in, say, academic journals specializing in political philosophy, ethics, metaphysics, language, etc. If the conditions are also necessary, then it would also seem morally unacceptable to ask such a question in, say, public or even some academic conferences, classrooms with vulnerable students, or in the presence of those known to identify as trans. Anyway, just a thought.
Suppose that Sue’s mother was an important public figure: Margaret Thatcher, say. And suppose that Jim is writing a book about Thatcher’s life and politics. It seems legitimate for Jim to be able to say some critical things about Thatcher’s views, policies, and actions.
Of course, Thatcher’s funeral is no place to utter those criticisms. I don’t think anyone is saying otherwise. But Jim’s book about Thatcher, or a seminar on key figures in British politics, clearly is.
Is the idea here that *all* the places where we do philosophy — the books, the journal articles, the seminar rooms, this blog, everywhere — is akin to a funeral where fundamental questions about being transgender are concerned, so that it would be grossly inconsiderate to take certain positions seriously, or at least to allow room for them in the discussion, and that deference to a certain fundamental view is the only option?
If that is the idea, then if we were to accept it, then it would seem to follow that transgender-related topics are simply not an apt topic for philosophical discussion at all, and that we should stop treating them as such. Where only one fundamental point of view is permitted, how can there be philosophy?
Otherwise, it’s as though Margaret Thatcher’s daughter asks that historians stop saying critical things about her mother, anywhere; and then, when they comply with her wishes, points to the fact that no historian has said anything negative about Margaret Thatcher as establishing something positive. You can’t have it both ways. Whereof one cannot speak…
Rather than a person, I think a better analogy would be to a set of ideas, like that of “race realism”. Proponents of such views would like nothing more than to be taken seriously. Must we take them seriously? If we don’t, if we decide that they are not worth being taken seriously, how should we react when they reply with, “Well, how can there be philosophy / science then?” I don’t know. Maybe we shrug and tell them where to go, politely of course.
I don’t think we are necessarily obligated to take all positions seriously. If a Young Earth Creationist submits a grant application, where creationism is fundamental to the grant proposal, I expect the scientists reviewing the grant to reject it and ignore appeals along the lines of “How can there be science then?” or “Why aren’t you allowing room for this in the discussion; is deference to a certain fundamental view the only option?”
There are situations where we’re forced to take these positions seriously, but not necessarily because the positions themselves have anything worthwhile to them, but because powerful individuals or institutions take them seriously enough to shape their decision-making in ways that are, as another commenter put it, abhorrent, awful, and cruel.
In a certain sense, then, you’re right: Anyone can take up any line of inquiry or thought they so wish. That in no way prevents us from not taking them seriously or taking them seriously only insofar as their ideas have an outsized impact on our lives—outsized in the sense that their impact is not commensurate with merit or quality of the ideas themselves. As always, we must exercise judgment; that’s inescapable.
Felix, the point is that if it is not permissible to investigate and discuss whether P within science or philosophy, then we cannot point to the absence of scientific or philosophical work that denies P as evidence that P is true.
All sorts of scientists have presented arguments showing that young earth creationism is at odds with the evidence. They won the day not by shaming young earth creationists into silence, but rather by inviting young earth creationists to present their best responses to the anti-YEC arguments, and patiently showing that the YEC thesis is implausible. This was left to a free and open discussion in which people were not excluded because of their views.
If the scientists had refrained from engaging with YEC arguments and had instead insisted that the creationist picture of the world is so socially odious, or so personally harmful to various people, that people should feel ashamed from bringing up YEC arguments or even addressing the question objectively, then we would have no good grounds, as philosophers or scientists for rejecting the YEC perspective. Fortunately, they did not do that.
On the topic of race realism, we have two options: either we permit rational discussion on the topic and seek (if we oppose race realism) to refute the race realists through rational argumentation, or we declare the whole topic out of bounds, from which it seems to follow that we miss the chance to sort out, scientifically and philosophically, which position is right.
Maybe in some cases it’s worth giving that up in order to prevent certain conversations. But you can’t have it both ways.
I think you’ve somewhat missed the point I’m arguing. I don’t deny that they invited young earth creationists to present their best evidence, considered that evidence, and showed that the creationist thesis is implausible, particularly in light of what we’ve learned through various sciences.
Despite this, there remain young earth creationists. And many of them claim to be unfairly maligned and “excluded because of their views”. How seriously should we take this assertion? We’ve done as you suggest we should, and yet we’re still faced with persons who insist that we take their position seriously long after we believe it to have been refuted.
You are right, I think, that we can’t just declare the subject “out of bounds”—it’s not clear to me how that would even work; we can’t stop people from being creationists. But that again doesn’t seem like it’s here or there with regard to how we respond and whether we take the position as seriously as creationists demand we do.
With regard to “race realism”, there are those who seek “to refute the race realists through rational argumentation”. Their work is important and worthwhile. But I think most of them don’t consider this the only response we should have to “race realism” and the picture of the world it’s part of, particularly where the views they’re seeking to refute are held by some in power.
To summarize what I said before:
It is possible to welcome free and open discussion on a topic. If all sides have had a fair chance to present their best arguments and evidence, respond to the opposing arguments and evidence, etc., and then people rationally assess all this and reach a consensus on the issue, then we can point to that consensus as vindicated by a fair and rational process.
It is also possible to decide, for any reason, that we ought not have a free and open discussion on the topic. We might decide not to allow any discussion of the topic, or we might decide to allow only one side to present its views or be taken seriously. In that case, we cannot point to the resulting consensus as vindicated by a fair and rational process.
Justin, to be frank, none of that addresses what I am saying. You can go through that process and still come away with individuals insistent that their views be taken seriously long after you consider them to have been refuted as a result of careful examination and following them having had a fair chance to present their best arguments and evidence for consideration. I’m not sure what sort of world you’re imagining where that process, as important as it is, results in bad ideas disappearing as a matter of necessity, but it’s not this world. In this world, anti-vaccine views, refuted “by a fair and rational process”, still persist and are held to by those with power over healthcare policy. We are forced to take them seriously not because anti-vaccine views have merit or because the best arguments and evidence for them are convincing, but because, despite the “fair and rational process” that leads us to repudiate them, they remain influential—even to the point of now potentially shaping policy.
I didn’t say that, if we allow for a fair and open discussion of an issue, everyone will reach consensus on an issue. Obviously, that is unlikeIy to happen.
What I said, once again, is that if we don’t allow for a fair and open discussion of an issue, then we cannot point to any consensus reached on that issue as vindicated by a fair and rational process.
To put it even more simply: if we don’t allow for a fair and rational process in reaching a decision on some matter, then we don’t get to say that we reached that decision through a fair and rational process. That is awfully close to self-evident, if it isn’t already self-evident.
Which is neither here nor there with regard to what we are to do in situations where pointing to a decision reached through a fair and rational process has no effect on those who insist that that process continue or else it is not fair and rational.
It’s not a question of allowing for such a process to take place—going back to the example of anti-vaccine views, it has taken place. Proponents of such views nevertheless insist that the decision reached, and the apparent conclusion that further consideration of their claims isn’t warranted, is itself evidence that the process isn’t fair and rational, and that they are thus unfairly maligned and “excluded because of their views”. That’s precisely what leads them to say, “How can there be philosophy/science then?”
Being attuned to this rhetoric is important because not everyone posturing as a Brave Truth-Teller unfairly “excluded because of their views” has views worth taking seriously. And them gesturing at a “fair and rational process”, which they insist does not obtain unless we continue to take them seriously, is part of that rhetorical package.
And that, in turn, is neither here nor there with regard to the simple point I’m making.
The point I’m making is that if you don’t allow for a fair, open, and reasoned process in coming to some judgment, then the judgment that’s reached through some other process lacks the necessary authority. You can choose to silence, or partly silence, one side of the issue as the judgment is formed, or you can choose to allow a fair discussion and get a result that people are warranted in accepting on the basis of that fair decision-making process. But you cannot have a skewed decision-making process and then get a result with any real authority. That’s all I’m saying. Again, pretty obvious stuff here.
Let’s say that somebody has been charged with a terrible crime. We can allow the trial to go through along the lines we have developed, which aim for fairness and reasonableness. We could, if we choose to, decide instead that the prosecution (or the defense) doesn’t get to make any arguments or present any evidence or objections or call any witnesses, and that the other side gets to argue its case in front of the jury. I’m sure that a good lawyer would have a great record convincing juries under those circumstances. But only a fool would knowingly take a trial conducted in that way as even slightly authoritative in determining whether the defendant was guilty or not.
I’m not ignoring the fact that, even under a fair trial, you might end up with people who pay no attention to the verdict and talk as though that trial never happened. As you say, nothing will convince such people. My comment is not concerned with them: they’re a red herring here. My comment addresses with the fact that no rational and fair person will have any reason to trust the results of any process that does not allow for fair inquiry.
And even that does not mean that having a fair inquiry is more important than its costs in every case. I haven’t said that, either. I’ve just pointed out the obvious fact that, if you don’t allow for a fair inquiry, you can’t get an authoritative or reliable result.
“I’m not ignoring the fact that, even under a fair trial, you might end up with people who pay no attention to the verdict and talk as though that trial never happened. As you say, nothing will convince such people.”
So what do we do with these people? Suppose they keep trying to re-litigate the matter by bringing up arguments that were addressed at trial?
When you tell them all this was already litigated, what do you respond when they claim that they are being silenced, that you are denying them a fair trial?
What if they regard any trial as ipso facto unfair if it doesn’t go their way?
Are you suggesting that this is the situation we’re in now, Julian?
Do you believe that fair, open, and non-coercive discussions about the nature of transgender people and all the main moral questions connected with that phenomenon has already taken place in all the relevant philosophical and scientific circles?
Do you believe, further, that all those fair, open, rational and non-coercive discussions have by now reached a consensus on all the relevant issues, such that anyone who says otherwise or disagrees with any part of what you see as the proper consensus is just ignoring clear and rationally unassailable arguments, fairly and properly arrived at?
FWIW the 2020 PhilPapers survey question on what gender is has 29% accept/lean towards biological, 22% psychological, 63% social, 4% unreal – somewhat more divided than on many questions (e.g., moral realism, the existence of God, free will, the analytic/synthetic distinction, the possibility of a priori knowledge) that we don’t normally regard as having reached unassailable consensus within our community.
And what’s that showing here? Both Felix and I were trying to point out to Justin that whether there is a “verdict” (in his metaphor) need not track whether there is a consensus.
For comparison, something like 20% of Americans think that vaccines might cause autism.
If the *medical profession* was split 30 yes/60 no/10 unsure as to whether vaccines cause autism, I would not be inclined to think that the right approach was for the majority to say that the arguments are now conclusive and so the minority should shut up. (And that’s in medicine, where the methodology is far more suited to give decisive verdicts than in philosophy.)
What I believe is that your “general point” is practically useless without answers to these questions.
I did not take a stance on any first order issue and you raising such an issue is a distraction.
Since you were the one who raised an issue with what I said, and what you said did not address what I said, then I’m not sure why what I originally said is a distraction from your response to what I said.
“proper …”
“… properly arrived at”
Do you see the issue with this as relates to my comments and Julian’s? For the anti-vaccine proponent, the conclusions reached and the decision to no longer seriously contemplate their proposals marks us out as having not “properly arrived at” the conclusion of a “fair and rational process”, and thus positions us as unfairly “exclud[ing]” them “because of their views”.
The question isn’t about whether to undertake a “fair and rational process”. The question is about what is to be done when, having reached a conclusion, someone insists that your refusal to continue to take seriously their arguments—the same arguments you had already considered—is evidence of you having not undertaken such a process and thus unfairly “exclud[ing]” them “because of their views”. At what point are you permitted to shrug and simply not take them seriously?
To be clear here, I don’t think there is an easy answer to this. As mentioned earlier, the need to exercise judgment is not optional. But at least recognizing the rhetoric helps to look beyond the superficial layer that is the claim of being, for instance, “cancelled”, or something to that effect, “because of their views”.
“The question isn’t about whether to undertake a “fair and rational process”. The question is about what is to be done when, having reached a conclusion, someone insists that your refusal to continue to take seriously their arguments—the same arguments you had already considered—is evidence of you having not undertaken such a process and thus unfairly “exclud[ing]” them “because of their views”. At what point are you permitted to shrug and simply not take them seriously?”
Well, if a fair, rational and open process — in which people haven’t been brow-beaten or intimidated into agreeing to a decision, and in which people aren’t agreeing for the sake of conformity or the pursuit of social status, but instead have considered the best arguments from the other side — has provided us with a clear basis for a verdict, and someone continues to raise objections that have already been answered, then we can simply point them to where those objections have been answered.
If they are just repeating things that have already been considered, then it’s up to them whether they want to look at the responses already given and change their minds.
If they are presenting some irrelevant or failed lines of argument, then we can explain the problems.
If they are presenting something that hasn’t been answered yet, then we should consider the merits of the new point they are making.
Again, none of this is guaranteed to change their minds. But I never said or implied otherwise.
That is often also part of the same rhetorical package. That is, it isn’t just claimed that a “fair and rational process” hasn’t been undertaken, but that the majority of the people who seemingly agree to the position being contested (e.g. that vaccines are safe and effective) are only doing so because of fear, for the sake of conformity, or for the pursuit of social status. They all “really” agree with the anti-vaccine position, “in secret”, but can’t say so publicly. They also “know”, it is claimed, that their position can’t survive a “fair and rational process”, which is why they won’t allow one to take place.
In the face of this, I’m not sure that “simply point[ing] them to where those objections have been answered” will be sufficient, because the where is the “fair and rational process” that they are denying has occurred. In fact, they may even be familiar with those objections already, and think they have good answers for them—answers that were not given a “proper” hearing.
I don’t see how one can deal with this situation without exercising judgment and saying, “No, I don’t think these ideas are worth taking seriously, and I won’t be considering them further—even if you insist that, if I don’t, I’ve compromised the ‘fair and rational process’ which you’re invoking to keep the discussion going beyond what seems reasonable to me.”
That last part (“beyond what seems reasonable”) is the hard part. And I don’t think you’re denying that as such, although I think you may be somewhat missing the point of myself and others emphasizing its necessity, or we’re otherwise talking across purposes.
Spot on.
Thank you for writing this Talia. Where you write, “it becomes more difficult for the vulnerable to speak, and to have what they say, if they can say it, taken seriously at all,” you reminded me of what Evan Urquhart has called a “credibility deficit.” Trans folk face a credibility deficit even in conversations that are about them and their lives. This itself is undesirable from a purely academic perspective, but it also becomes dangerous when paired with commentators musing openly about “humane solutions” to “the issue” and drawing on academic work to legitimate that pursuit as an extension of their “reasonable concerns.” These commentators’ “concerns,” when spelled out, often express a pathologising or stigmatising view of trans lives that, as you point out, make trans participation in the conversation difficult, at best.
‘And I say that there are indeed consequences when we punch down or pretend that what is, in fact, a hostile attack, is merely “inquiry for inquiry’s sake.” ‘ 1. To impute this to all critics of trans theory is unfair. 2. TMB exhibits, like many others, tunnel-vision when it comes to trans issues: we should only be concerned with the rights of trans people and their marginalisation. But trans inclusion comes with a price for those who are supposed to do the including: e.g. female athletes who are made to compete under unfair conditions (against athletes who benefited from going through male puberty), or female prisoners (their sentence doesn’t include running the risk of violence from trans women prisoners who have convictions for domestic violence or sexual assault. It doesn’t matter that these male prisoners only opted for the trans status while in prison, in order to get access to female prisoners). These issues need to be raised by philosophers – but also by the public – because they are highly political; specifically, they are about matters of justice.
This is simply the “gender critical” narrative reiterated: That transness “comes with a price” that demands we litigate its existence across the lifespan. For instance, you mention the unfair conditions of having “athletes who benefited from going through male puberty” competing against those who didn’t. This is a common argument among anti-trans commentators; however, those same commentators often also want to force them to go through that puberty, insisting that the medical care they need needs to be delayed until long after the effects of that puberty are rendered irreversible.
Whereas, for those who do seek such care during adulthood, a different argument is employed: It is said that they must only be trying to transition for some nefarious purpose, or some fetish. Because if it were otherwise, why didn’t it come up sooner? Why didn’t we learn of this when they were a child or adolescent?
At every stage, the gender system promoted by “gender critical” writers is designed to give ad hoc reasons for why transition-related care should be denied or why the person seeking it must be doing so for some ulterior (and usually, sexual, it’s implied) motive.
These are indeed matters of justice; it is shameful how unprincipled and arbitrary some philosophers are when it comes to thinking of the gender system they themselves are much invested in preserving.
I should add that, these executive orders (EOs), taken together, have that as an intended effect: Where one EO strives to address the concern regarding unfair advantages in competition—presumably on a similar basis to the one articulated here regarding puberty—another conspires to make that concern a reality by not just restricting medical care but characterising such care as “mutilation”, with the aim of ultimately denying it across the lifespan, even where such care may help mitigate the former concern, at least in part.
This is indeed “tunnel vision”—an apt characterization of the EOs. And it’s all going in one direction: entrenching a cisheteronormative gender system (what the EO amusingly calls “biological truth”) through, in this case, executive action.
I recommend reading the ‘Cass Review’: https://cass.independent-review.uk/home/publications/final-report/
Wasn’t this internationally dismissed as a politically (ie Tory) motivated hatchet job?
Yes, by trans activists.
And gay activists, and feminist activists, and clinicians, and researchers.
I meant professional associations such as the American Academy of Pediatrics, the British Medical Association, the Endocrine Society, and all international transgender health organizations. Most governments have dismissed the review as relevant for their legislation, as have intergovernmental organizations like the Council of Europe.
So unless “activist” includes anyone with expertise and/or a stake, I don’t think that’s correct.
This is a very misleading account of the state of play. This article in the British Medical Journal gives a very different account https://www.bmj.com/content/385/bmj.q1141
Jennifer Block is a noted anti-trans activist. Given that Miroslav dismisses critique from activists, we shouldn’t also accept praise from activists.
I have. I recommend reading Grijseels (2024), Noone et al. (preprint), McNamara et al. (2024), Horton (2024), this letter from the Feminist Gender Equality Network, as well as the outcomes of other reviews (e.g. in France, Germany, Austria, and Switzerland) that depart from Cass.
That said, I think it’s a bit of a sleight-of-hand to present the Cass Review here, as though the primary concern of “gender critical” commentators is empirical evidence. No, their concerns are normative; it doesn’t matter to them what the empirical evidence has to say about the effectiveness of such and such care procedures, they are of the view that it should not be provided.
Empirical concerns can be addressed with more and better research. The Executive Orders effectively scupper that as well! So to the extent to which they genuinely do have empirical concerns, we aren’t even allowed to address them.
However, it is, again, perhaps too generous to assume that their concerns even are empirical to begin with. Why? Because some of these commentators have stated that they believe we should be targeting “100% desistance” and that, wherever there are trans folk, even persons who are happy, there remains a “huge problem”. This is not the sort of rhetoric that conveys a disinterested approach looking to enhance health outcomes or improve care procedures. It’s the sort of rhetoric that expresses disdain at the very idea of transness.
The kinds of costs you raise that allegedly result from a world where trans women are “included” (people never seem so concerned about trans men) not only demonstrate a lack of imagination about how we can organize ourselves in order to have a more just society, they are a total non sequitur – the piece you just read is about the way the privacy-violating discussion of gender has proceeded in philosophy, and the horrible policies inspired by it.
Ask yourself: why doesn’t anyone get excited about trans men competing in the male category?
What a bizarre comment. “But trans inclusion comes with a price for those who are supposed to do the including” followed by totally uniformed and factually inaccurate talking points that could have been written by Stephen Miller. Replace “trans” with “Black” in that sentence and see how it reads. Perhaps the supporting “examples” there would be things like “the increased costs of having to drain and replace the water in the public swimming pool” each time one of them went swimming. I’ll bet you wouldn’t even want to be in the same room with someone making that arguments. But it’s basically indistinguishable from the one you made.
Aside from the fundamental dishonesty of these kinds of arguments, whatever real cost there might be — and I emphasize might — is surely de minimis compared to the societal cost of legalizing the overt discrimination and erasure from public life of a population that, while statistically small, is still millions of people in the United States alone. Sorry for the inconvenience.
The fact is that a trans woman who never goes through male puberty has absolutely no athletic advantage based on hormones. The same is true for adults who transition after a certain amount of time. And guess what, none of this is new, and the general public shouldn’t concern itself with this at all. The governing bodies that regulate organized sports have already been dealing with this for many years with relatively few issues. This whole thing is a made up issue designed to trick otherwise careful thinkers into making arguments based on ignorance and ill informed assumptions. It has worked ridiculously well.
Same for the silly prisons argument. I never see anyone provide any examples of all these men who just who “only opted for the trans status while in prison, in order to get access to female prisoners.” And not the dismissiveness of trans identity in the words “the trans status” — like it’s a option from a menu instead of a fundamental aspect of a persons humanity.
Does the prison argument withstand any degree of scrutiny? Could there be any other conceivable explanation for why one might opt for medical transition for the first time in prison? Could it be, perhaps, that for such an extremely marginalize and often poor population that prison is the first place they ever had access to stable healthcare? Of course, elitist academics aren’t marginalized and have access to stable incomes and healthcare and just blithely dismiss the very real problems of being a trans person within a society that is actively trying to eradicate them.
And it’s just plain wrong anyway. Most trans people in jails or prisons had already transitioned when they got there. Many of us will be detained in pretrial detention for “false” documents now that the Trump administration has tried to undo our transitions on paper. Legally, such people are entirely innocent under US law, but are still held in jails awaiting adjudication. I take it you think someone like me, who you would never be able to tell was trans just looking at me, should be placed in a male prison with men convicted of rape, murder, and all forms of sexual assault? I should be forced to shower, naked, in the open locker room style showers in prison with these men? You just don’t see any risk or problem with that at all? And that’s because you just assume the only reason I upended my entire life to transition was because one day I might be attacked by my own country and sent to jail on Trumped up charges of “fraudulent” documents and I could snicker and say, “My plan worked! Now I can rape women in a women’s prison!” That’s basically your argument?
The ignorance of trans lives and trans reality is appalling and anyone taking these positions knows absolutely nothing about trans people and has no business even having an opinion on the subject.
“The fact is that a trans woman who never goes through male puberty has absolutely no athletic advantage based on hormones.” That’s why many sports governing bodies will now permit them to compete in the female category – see FINA: [https://resources.fina.org/fina/document/2023/03/27/dbc3381c-91e9-4ea4-a743-84c8b06debef/Policy-on-Eligibility-for-the-Men-s-and-Women-s-Competiition-Categrories-Version-on-2023.03.24.pdf], section 4b: they may compete ‘if they can establish (…) that they have not experienced any part of male puberty beyond Tanner Stage 2 or before age 12, whichever is later.’
“The same is true for adults who transition after a certain amount of time.” There are more than 40 studies showing you are wrong.
“Same for the silly prisons argument. I never see anyone provide any examples of all these men” Well, if you’ve never seen an example, then you haven’t paid attention: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-64796926 .
“I take it you think someone like me, who you would never be able to tell was trans just looking at me, should be placed in a male prison with men convicted of rape, murder, and all forms of sexual assault?” Let’s not argue in bad faith – you impute all kinds of nasty scenarios to me. I object to trans women with a history of (sexual) violence against women being housed in the female prison estate. It does not follow that I want all TW to be housed in the male estate. There are two options: A) those without a history of violence could be housed in female prisons; B) TW could be housed in separate facilities – this is the current policy in England. Perhaps you are not a bad faith actor? If so, you need remedial lessons in philosophy.
Obvious straw men. No one thinks, for example, that violent sexual predators (whether cis or trans) should be allowed unmonitored access to other women prisoners. All incarcerated persons have a right to a safe prison environment. Trans inclusion of the sort that reasonable people defend is consistent with that.
Look at my reply to A.M. and click on the link to the BBC article.
I just did. It doesn’t say what you think it says. Not even a hint of anyone claiming or thinking that the rapist, who is the subject of the report, should be allowed “unmonitored access to other women prisoners”.
Sadly, I have to post anonymously to protect the identity of my child. Sadly, I am asked to entertain anti-trans bigotry as if it were neutral inquiry from within my professional life, a place that has harboured me and brought me many wonderful friendships. Thank you, Talia, for writing this and for protesting the contributions our shared profession makes to anti-trans ideology and anti-trans social policy. I know there are no words to convince the skeptics that trans people (especially trans girls) are real. My own child was increasingly clear about being a girl by age 5 and has not wavered in the years since. She has now lived as a girl for longer than she was addressed as a boy (something she barely remembers). Having seen her gender identity emerge form deep roots, it is clear to me that tearing it away from her would be extremely cruel. For a significant period, she fought hard to be seen as a girl — letting her peers and teachers and doctors and everyone around her know… over and over and over again, until it was eventually something she could take for granted. It is now a firm part of our social reality. If she loses medical care, her social reality will become unstable and her life will become one of constant self-advocacy again. I can only imagine how exhausting and likely traumatizing that will be for her. Some may think that living in a world that rejects her self-understanding would be a “truer” world, a “real” world. I have no doubt that she would find it an intolerably painful world. There are many children like her whose worlds are threatened by these deeply cruel EOs. I, too, noticed the resonance between these EOs and the gender critical framework. I am appalled that philosophy, a discipline and practice that I deeply love, lends any credibility to these harmful EOs.
I have trouble understanding the purpose and motivation of this post. I welcome any attempt to enlighten me.
Suppose Bettchet is right about everything. What difference would it make? Any philosopher would believe that what they are doing is worthwhile, and would bring about more good consequences than bad. Hardly any philosopher is ever going to be dissuaded from asking questions because someone else thinks it is unethical to ask them. Certainly not gender critical philosophers, who seem to feel very strongly about these questions.
Perhaps a few bystanders will be convinced that asking these questions is unethical. But that does not seem to matter either. Whether asking these questions is ethical has no relation to whether the answers provided by gender critical feminists are correct.
Perhaps the intention is some sort of boycott, but that is only going to backfire.
Instead of complaining that gender critical feminists are bad people, wouldn’t it be more productive to engage with their arguments in good faith? That might actually advance the goals of trans-inclusive feminists.
The same is true of “race realists” though. They aren’t going to be dissuaded from asking the particular questions that occupy “race realism” as a pursuit. Neither are creationists for the questions that occupy creationism, and so on. I know some will balk at those comparisons, but really the fundamental point is that we are in fact making judgments here. That’s just inescapable.
A boycott? Maybe not. But I’m not sure why you aren’t counting Talia’s piece as “engaging with their arguments in good faith”? Yes, the piece is broader than just their arguments—it also looks to the real-world consequences of their arguments—but she clearly cites and gives examples of some such arguments as found in “gender critical” literature. Has she mischaracterized any of those arguments? Well, to figure that out would require engaging with her argument.
As to the larger purpose and motivation for the post, I can’t speak for Talia but my impression is that it is to draw attention to how such arguments exclude those they are ultimately about and to discuss the real-world implications of them, as demonstrated in the executive orders that mirror, at least in part, the reasoning given by these writers.
One difference is that in the case of bad science, we have greater agreement on what sort of evidence would establish which theory is better. We haven’t got that same level of agreement for a metaphysical question like “What is a woman?”
I agree and disagree on that. In the case of “race realism”, for example, it isn’t just that it’s bad science (i.e. that we have empirical reasons to question the scientific validity of its claims), it’s that its motivations are themselves deserving of critique; that is, despite its proponents aggressively posturing as being merely interested in objective facts and the methods to obtain such facts, it’s not a line of inquiry that comes from nowhere. And it’s also not a line of inquiry that goes nowhere—key “race realist” figures (e.g. Sailer) have been invited to right-wing talk shows and podcasts to promulgate their theories, particularly as it relates to “Great Replacement”. And the supposed giants of that field aren’t averse to talking about the real-world implications of their theorising (e.g. see Lynn talking about the “decay of European civilisation resulting from dysgenic fertility and the immigration of non-European peoples”).
Therefore, although I think you are right in saying that it can be worthwhile tackling the scientific merits of their claims (and there are people who do just that), it’s also worthwhile drawing attention to the bigger picture in which those claims are embedded, and to deflate the misleading image “race realists” present of themselves as just neutral, objective investigators being unfairly maligned.
To bring it back to the earlier point, I also think it may not make a difference to them; that is, “race realists” are not going to be dissuaded from asking the particular questions that occupy “race realism” as a pursuit. There’s nothing to be done about that. As mentioned above, the need to exercise judgment is inescapable, and that they aren’t dissuaded is neither here nor here with regard to whether we ought to take them seriously in a given situation. Taylor alludes to this in their comment as well.
I don’t see why there is a need to publicly exercise judgment. There are lots of philosophers that I disagree with whom I think are bad philosophers, but it would be counterproductive to argue that they are bad philosophers in public.
In cases of strong ethical disagreements such as the present case it is almost inescapable that you think your opponents are unethical. So such a claim is kind of unsurprising and uninteresting (which is not to say anything about its correctness). Everything hinges on the underlying disagreement.
I’m not sure I understand. To comment on the matter is to exercise judgment on the underlying disagreement. (Unless, perhaps, it’s a comment about commenting on the matter?) In any case, this essay does do that: the underlying disagreement is touched upon in various respects (the uncritical reliance on Blanchardian theory, the denial of legitimacy of trans lives, the sexist structures on which much of GC writing appears to depend, and so on). You may disagree on each of those points, or you may not, but I don’t think you can credibly claim that they aren’t dealing with “the underlying disagreement”?
Further to that, the essay tackles the real-world consequences of that disagreement as it ties into legislative efforts and executive action. Maybe you see that as a separate matter, but given the circumstances, the author’s point seems clear: the work of anti-trans writers provides legitimation to those efforts and action, such that such writers cannot plausibly distance themselves from it, especially when the rationale given for such action mirrors their own reasoning, as given in their own work.
I did not intend to criticise the essay for not directly engaging with the underlying disagreement (although I think it does little of that). I’m just asking what the indirect arguments are supposed to achieve. Who is it trying to convince and how will this change the field?
Clarification: I didn’t mean to say that Bettcher mischaracterised arguments. I meant to draw a contrast between directly responding to arguments (by laying them out clearly and pointing out their flaws) and indirectly attacking the arguments in the way this piece does.
I understand the motivation to draw attention to harmful real-world consequences of philosophical activities. What I’m puzzled by is mainly the section arguing that asking gender-critical questions is unethical. It seems this is preaching to the choir. And counterproductive.
But Talia does lay out some of those arguments? It’s very clearly part of the piece. She can’t criticise these commentators for their uncritical reliance on Blanchardian theory without making reference to the arguments and the arguers reliant on that theoretical framework?
I’m genuinely confused though at what is confusing about her piece. The ethical argument centers on understanding that “gender critical” framing necessarily establishes a disparity that makes it difficult, if not impossible, for trans people to contribute to the conversation that “gender critical” commentators are supposedly interested in having.
Sure, I suppose you could argue that characterizing it as “unethical” goes too far (in my opinion, it doesn’t; but I can see how one could argue that). Would “unhelpful” work better in that case? Because even if we’re just talking about intellectual progress, inquiry, research, and so on, it does seem that Talia would, at minimum, have established that it’s unhelpful to that end to build a research program that is about trans people but which is inaccessible to trans people, unless they accept the power disparity that they might well think warrants questioning.
first, I’m not sure the post needs to motivated by anything other than anger at the state of things, but in any case, you don’t need to convince everyone of what you think is right to change things – if that were true, nothing would change. and if we (the rest of us) collectively look at the way gender critical theorists have framed this discussion and choose to reject it / marginalize their approach for moral reasons, that’s not a boycott. And finally, to remark that it wouldn’t matter if we made such a collective agreement to reject the framing of gender in the current debate for moral reasons, and that good faith engagement with a privacy-violating, unethical framework would actually be more productive, so deeply and uncharitably misses the point of the essay it’s surprising! Why not just write what you really think, eg “I don’t think there’s anything inherently problematic with the way gender critical theorists have framed the discussion around gender or how it has influenced policy, it’s actually a fair question who is right whether trans people exist or not” instead of feigning cluelessness about why this matters.
I don’t “feign cluelessness”. I’m genuinely interested to know why people think it’s useful (or otherwise justified) to call out philosophers for asking immoral questions.
It is truly a mystery why anyone would or should make a public stand against what they believe is wrong which seriously affects them and people they care about, I can see your point now.
It is often hard to convince people that they are acting harmfully. That doesn’t make it hard to understand why someone would want to point it out when they think that someone is doing something harmful.
In this particular case, pointing out that the consequences of gender-critical philosophy are harmful requires engaging them head-on. The gender-critical philosophers presumably believe that many of Trump’s policies are a *good* thing. So pointing out the consequences does nothing without pointing out the problems with their views.
That said, I understand the motivation to point out that Trump’s policies may be linked to gender-critical philosophy, but not so much the motivation behind the ethical argument. (See my response to Felix.)
If one believes (for which there’d be plenty of reasons) that the “GC” arguments are no more than post-hoc justifications of antecedently held biases, then an ethical argument that targets the biases would be much more effective than engaging the arguments.
Clueless says, “Instead of complaining that gender critical feminists are bad people, wouldn’t it be more productive to engage with their arguments in good faith? That might actually advance the goals of trans-inclusive feminists.” Oh, the irony…
p.s. I have a hunch that she does what you require in her forthcoming book about precisely this topic.
It seems people interpret my comment as criticism, which is probably my fault. I’m really just asking what people think is achieved by making Bettcher’s ethical argument. There are lots of true things that affect you deeply and that are still not worth arguing for or even counterproductive. I believe that this is such a case, but I want to know why others disagree.
Reading through the comments and post here, I’m left wondering: why is it that philosophers writing on abortion and infanticide are able to communicate in mostly non-hostile ways (there’s not an outrage piece every other month), but that philosophers working on gender can’t? Is there something philosophers working on gender can learn from them?
This question is partly answered for you in the piece you just read, that is, in the present discussion not all parties involved in the philosophical discussion are on equal footing – some are made vulnerable by the way the discussion is currently framed. and it’s also impossible, as the piece points out, to pull apart the theoretical discussion from its real world implications which have serious effects for the lives of those who participate in this discussion. it’s a highly political discussion for the participants, which is very dissimilar from the others you mentioned. Abortion is of course a highly political issue, but it would only be analogous if some portion of the discussants were fetuses.
Pro-life people can theoretically have important personal stakes in abortion without being themselves fetuses – they may, for instance, have an adult daughter who wants to get an abortion, in which case they’ll feel terror that their grandchild is at risk of being murdered depending on the outcome of the civic debate. But I don’t think that pro-life philosophers who occupy such a position should use their professions of terror and personal vulnerability to try to sway anyone in an academic philosophical setting. Instead, they should just give standard arguments.
This is an interesting point of comparison because there does seem to be some similarity in the arguments of anti-trans commentators and those seeking to restrict access to reproductive healthcare, including abortion. For instance, both groups view certain forms of care (affirming care and reproductive healthcare) as illegitimate; that is, as not addressing a legitimate care need. They likewise both focus on regret. But the point isn’t to gauge actual frequencies of regret, but to make it clear that, if this is something you pursue, you ultimately ought to come to regret it.
‘Abortion would only be analogous if some portion of the discussion were fetuses.’
This always comes up. Fetuses are not the only entities for whom abortion is a matter of life or death and fundamental equality. Lack of access to abortion threatens the lives of vis women, trans men and non-binary folks. In my view, it undermines the equal status of all women (whether or not they can get pregnant) and everyone who can get pregnant.
Insofar as the debate on abortion has proceeded without issues, this might be because many people had a false sense of security about continued access to abortion.
This is a reply to this specific comment and not meant to distract attention from the topic of the post. I absolutely agree with Bettcher’s challenge to the assumption that philosophers should question everything. What is happening to trans people in the US is horrifying, and philosophers should not hide behind this idea that what they do is a pure search for the truth disconnected from ethical concerns.
In the beginning of philosophical abortion discussions it was often quite hostile, but we forget after 50 years or so.
I really like the idea that philosophy, like empirical research, should abide by a set of ethical guidelines delineating what forms of research it is/is not ok to pursue. There is a deep (and often infuriating) irony in a profession that prides itself on expertise in ethics simultaneously exempting their activities from ethical constraints.
You make a compelling case (for those still in need of convincing) that philosophers may wield the pursuit of truth in ways that do harm. (and yes, not ALL philosophers . . . But enough to make philosophy a very alienating place to inhabit for many people, including as is ably pointed out here, trans philosophers).
just imagine how this would very likely play out.
Imagine there had been a philosophical “IRB” process in ancient Athens. “Sorry, Socrates, but you are not permitted to ask these questions. Doing so might lead the youth astray. It’s for the greater good, hope you understand!”
To me this rings a lot like: “more selective censorship from zealots and non-academic politicised careerist bureaucrats, please!”
Well, I really really *don’t* like this idea.
Just wait until you consider the effects of the executive orders then!
One can very obviously consistently oppose both the executive orders *and* other overt acts of censorship.
One needs to exercise judgment, lest one become a dril tweet.
I’m not a US citizen, nor do I live there. As Marketeer pointed out, one can consistently oppose both some government’s authoritarian orders and other overt acts of censorship. I’m also not an expert on US politics, but I very much doubt that the so-called ‘gender-critical’ philosophers gave legitimacy, or support, to current US policies in any politically significant sense. What I find more troubling *within the academy* is ideas like that of Shelley Park that reinforce the all-too-common picture of academics as self-censoring soft-authoritarians insulated from the rest of society, whose voice and expertise has very little social value.
As Jenny Saul argues, the term “gender critical” may be misleading; these are anti-trans commentators. Did they have a role in giving “legitimacy, or support, to current US policies in any politically significance sense”? That depends on what you mean. Did they draft the policies? No. Does their project legitimate them? Yes. Do they support the policies? It appears so. Did their anti-trans commentary contribute to the wider reactionary push for such policies? Yes. I’d argue that that’s politically significant, and in a way that addresses your concern about being “insulated from the rest of society”—as much of their commentary has been in widely visible outlets, giving them a substantial platform.
GC argument and theory was regularly cited by legislators and politicians as they stripped rights away from trans people, permitted employment discrimination, harassed hospitals and clinicians, and prevented parents from making choices about their kids’ care. Have yet to see the GC pushback. Is it because the pushback has been poorly publicized or because it didn’t happen? I’m open to being proven wrong. Eagerly awaiting GC campaigns against breast augmentation for minors (describing adults who do this as captured by harmful delusions about their identity is optional), or recommending sanctions and bans for those who harass girls and women in sport for their “masculine” appearance, or insisting a hotel employee in Dothan, Alabama should not have been fired for wearing pink nail polish outside the workplace and the EEOC should help him.
Thanks Laura.
I’m a bit queasy about the claim that “GC argument and theory was regularly cited by legislators and politicians”. Could you please give specific examples? (I’m not great at Googling, but I couldn’t find anything significant. E.g. the White House executive order makes no mention of them, nor do articles I’ve found in major conservative media outlets.)
Regarding your “Eagerly awaiting” bit: let me just say that I share your outrage at breast augmentation for minors (didn’t even know it was a thing–thanks for making me aware), among other things. But people cannot be expected to make a public fuss about everything they disapprove of, and the question when this kind of selectiveness is hypocritical strikes me as nuanced and not with an obvious answer in this case.
It is worth asking though. Why is a young cis man seeking treatment for the discomfort he feels due to enlarged breast tissue not something we’d generally expect the same commenters “to make a public fuss about”? You’re right, I think, that it’s not necessarily hypocritical. However, it does possibly tell us that their position isn’t one of opposing treatment as treatment; they seem to be fine with it so long as its use falls within the bounds of certain normative expectations. A cis man seeking such treatment doesn’t contravene those expectations, perhaps explaining why they see nothing worth making a fuss about.
It is worth asking. One obvious difference is that breast tissue reduction for a male does not compromise function whereas it does for a female, which effects the risk/benefit profiles of the interventions. If that’s what explains the difference in level of concern, then the difference is not hypocritical.
What do you mean by “compromise function”? I do think that could be part of it, although it seems plausible that what is really being said is that it “compromises” function that one ought to have. It contravenes those expectations about how bodies ought to be. Is this hypocritical? Not necessarily. Although it does at least bring those expectations into focus such that we can examine them and how they bring to bear on these commenters differing attitudes and even their assessment of risk/benefit.
I’m referring to lactation.
Is that a function one ought to have and/or ought to feel bad about not having?
No? It’s not?
I am horrified by what is happening to trans people in the US under Trump. But I find the causal story here confusing. Does the author believe that Trump’s election and the current trans backlash was caused by academics and supporters of trans rights being *too welcoming* of disagreement on trans issues? I would think that the truth is closer to the reverse, and that the correct lesson to take from recent events is much more dispiriting: not that progressive academics should have pushed even harder on trans issues, but that they pushed too hard.
I don’t think it’s a causal claim at all. as i read it, the textual evidence presents compelling case that when the trump administration was reaching for the language and arguments to justify their anti trans executive orders, they took it from well known gender critical work. the idea is that the philosophical community and its established platforms (eg OUP) have provided policy makers with the tools to write trans people out of existence. as for the reverse, the idea that “they pushed too hard” on trans issues – i don’t know where you have lived and worked for the last 10-15 years, perhaps a special place where trans people experience no discrimination from the state, healthcare institutions, the university, from faculty, from advisors, but most places haven’t been like that. the idea that, if only the trans philosophers had not pushed so hard for trans inclusive philosophy, if only trans activists had not pushed so hard for trans rights, is just hard not to laugh at. i’m sorry if I’m missing your point, but I just don’t see how that could be right.
Given that Trump and allies spent large amounts of money (hundreds of millions of dollars worth of advertising) to create the anti trans backlash his campaign ran to power on it seems very strange to argue that it was a surplus of trans domineering that was at the root of it
There’s also an issue of how we push. Academics can be good at laying out cases as simply and clearly as possible.
There is no such thing as having pushed too hard for trans rights. No matter how hard or little you push for trans rights it always is too much and will be proclaimed as such for trans exclusionary “feminists”.
Trans voices and perspectives have been drowned out by a barrage of negatively framed content in the press for the last several years. They aren’t in a position to be “welcoming,” much less “too welcoming” of disagreement—“disagreement” is simply the norm, with some of the same self-martyring (as Talia puts it) “gender critical” philosophers having columns to espouse their “disagreement” and loudly ponder questions that they know their hypothetical interlocutors can’t answer with anywhere near the same platform and reach.
Excellent piece. The comment thread is, as usual, dominated by sophistical egotists who are absolutely sure that they need to jump into every conversation with their most recent distinction. I’ll be spending my time organizing against these attacks on my friends and family rather than feeding the trolls.
If we don’t philosophically engage with trans philosophy, we’re ignoring them, marginalizing them, not taking them seriously, etc. If we do, we’re being insensitive, “sophistical egotists who are absolutely sure we need to jump into every conversation.” Will someone type up a guide so I can know when I’m allowed to critically engage trans philosophy and when I should shut up and do as I’m told?
Do you usually engage with areas in philosophy by staking out a very strong position on a question that is regarded as ill-posed in that area, insist that the arguments you came up with yesterday be taken seriously without taking account of decades of scholarship, and then get offended or cry “censorship” when people don’t want to debate you?
Because my advice (also in general) is: don’t do that. It’s a road to frustration.
The SEP (usually a good starting point to avoid the above) has an excellent article on trans philosophy that outlines the current debates in the field.
really puts into perspective the state of things when someone in the field is willing to express this pathetic view and 40+ silent others are willing to support it. if you genuinely think the only two options are ignore trans philosophy or fall in line, you have already decided not to listen and offer a charitable reading of not only the above piece, but any of bettcher’s work or those who are working from the starting point that trans people exist. but your other popular post on this thread which reframes the violation of privacy that makes the discussion of gender asymmetrical for trans philosophers instead an issue of embarrassment and discomfort already showed that. it’s a shame to know that at least some of the upvoters or yourself occupy a paid position in a philosophy dept but lack one of the basic tools of the trade, namely the ability to understand and correctly represent a view before offering a critique. why not just say what you really think, eg i don’t think trans people exist, rather than cloak it in all these bizarre points like we HAVE to ask if trans women exist, or stomping your foot about being told to shut up and do what you’re told?
I don’t care what they say . . . I LOVE YOU, DAILY NOUS COMMENTS SECTION!
Thank you Talia. This is powerful. When the tables are burning, rage is justified!
Thank you, Talia, for this clear and powerful piece.
Thank you, Talia, for writing this, and Justin, for posting this.
I hear this question as a question for all of us, not just for “gender critical” philosophers: “I wonder what all of you will decide to do now, besides gaping like fools, while we tables are burning.”
What will we do to protect the safety, rights, and dignity of trans people?
I find this account implausible. To see this, suppose there had never been any gender critical feminists, never been any work on trans philosophy by Alex Byrne or Kathleen Stock or Holly Lawford-Smith. Suppose the academy had been uniformly and unquestioningly supportive of the theses and methods of trans-activism as it was happening between say 2015-2022. Do we really think that the current political backlash against trans people wouldn’t be happening in that scenario? I don’t think so. I think the backlash would have in fact been even stronger (though not by much given the severity of the backlash now), as academia would’ve been seen even more as a hotbed of ideology than it actually was.
Authoritarian regimes often rely on collaborators in academia. They serve a useful function, allowing authoritarians to gesture at them as “Brave Heterodox Thinkers”, as modern-day Galileos, speaking up against the ideological “youth-defilers” dominating the academy. And collaborator academics benefit from this too, in the sense that, as Talia points out, the aesthetics of self-martyrdom grant them column inches in the press, speaking events, book deals, interviews, and all the trappings of celebrity that otherwise tends to elude academics doing careful work.
Regarding your thesis though, I think it’s incorrect for that reason. That is, the normalization of anti-trans rhetoric through the press has often been spearheaded by explicitly “gender critical” writers. That is their role in proceedings. While one might argue that some kind of reactionary backlash would inevitably have occurred, it was helped in no small part by those commentators who now are either jubilant that their rhetoric has borne such potent fruit or are seeking some form of self-exoneration, downplaying the role such rhetoric has had in fuelling the backlash that is now claimed inevitable.
I didn’t take her thesis to be ‘gender-critical philosophers are responsible for the current administration’s stance on trans-issues’. Rather, I think her point is that the writings of gender-critical philosophers are giving fuel and academic cover for anti-trans politics.
Brilliant and powerful. I’ll be assigning this in my classes.
Debates on cultural war issues in the US are now so polarized between the radical left and the radical right that people feel pressure to just pick a side and struggle to take principled ‘middle ground’ positions. On this particular cultural war issue, here is a principled middle ground position set out by Andrew Sullivan that is worth considering for those who are fed up with the lies, distortions, and overblown rhetoric of the standard left-wing and right-wing takes.
Sullivan’s position isn’t a “middle-ground” one; it’s straightforwardly conservative and grounded in misinformation. For instance, he accepts as “true” the claim that impressionable children are being “maimed and sterilized” and echoes misinformation about “removal of all safeguards”, claiming that these “crude bans” (in the EOs) arise only because “moderate alternatives” were rejected.
This is false. It is, to put it frankly, a lie—one that aligns with the older homophobic (and of course also transphobic) view that LGBTQ people are “recruiting” or “grooming” or “indoctrinating” children into their “lifestyle”.
This is not at all how affirming care works. In the first instance, not everyone seeks out the same care procedures. Not everyone receiving care has the same needs. Nor is there a fixed pathway along which care must proceed, with x, y, and then z procedures undertaken. In the second, such care advocates exploration and self-acceptance. If, through that open-ended process, one finds that they are not transgender, that too is regarded as a good outcome; that is, the approach doesn’t direct anyone to a particular outcome, unlike conversion therapy approaches. The open-endedness of such an approach is a necessity following from its recognition of diversity in sexuality and gender.
In this context, Sullivan’s attempted exoneration of the right, claiming they never wanted these bans, is absurd. Yes, they did. Because, to a large (and clearly powerful) segment of the right, diversity in sexuality and gender is seen as morally repugnant, and where signs of such diversity emerge it is the role of state or the family or both to set the child “right”, which means to force them to fit a certain traditional normative mould with respect to their sexuality and gender. An affirming approach, even in mental health care—which is what Sullivan apparently advocates for more of—is anathema to them simply by virtue of it allowing for more variation and diversity than they are willing to tolerate.
I agree with your criticism of Sullivan’s statement that the right didn’t want crude bans. However, I disagree with the rest of your critique which strawman’s Sullivan position on homosexual children (he is homosexual himself) and spreads misinformation about ‘gender affirming care’. On the former, he explains his views at length here: https://archive.ph/JZqnV
Sullivan is spreading misinformation. Affirming care is of relevance to all LGBTQ youth, not just trans youth. Like many GC writers he doesn’t understand what he is criticizing and ends up engaging in the “both-side s-ing” that Talia criticises in her essay.
This is, in a way, emblematic of the larger problem: folks like Sullivan will gloss anti-trans rhetoric about affirming care as “reasonable concerns” and then justify the draconian legislative moves against that care as occurring because we weren’t sufficiently deferential to those “reasonable concerns”. But those “concerns” are anchored in misunderstanding—sometimes quite fundamental misunderstanding—that the only way to honestly address them is to point that out. For some reason, to Sullivan, that doesn’t count as “addressing” them. Oh well.
This response does not engage with the arguments that Sullivan presents in the essay of his I linked to and substantially misrepresents his position.
I’m at a loss as to why you think we should be taking Sullivan seriously at all. He doesn’t know what he is talking about. “Engaging with his arguments” just amounts to pointing out that he is misrepresenting affirming care, either out of ignorance or deliberately. We know he is misrepresenting it because we have actual literature to refer to, as I did above. This is, again, emblematic of the problem: You have favourably cited someone who doesn’t know what they are talking about, and now we have to have a conversation about whether they are to be taken seriously or not. And if we conclude that they aren’t, that their “reasonable concerns” are anchored in some fundamental misunderstanding, then we become the problem, in Sullivan’s narrative, the reason for this policymaking succeeding.
It amazes me how often philosophers can’t distinguish between serious discussion and the sort of silliness that Sullivan offers.
Sullivan is not talking about “affirming care” in some broad sense that includes supportive psychotherapy. He doesn’t mention anything about “affirming.” He is very clear about what his target is: “sex reassignment for children” ie medical transition. And on that, what he says is accurate.
Is it your view that “GC” writers and organizations are therefore supportive of things like social transition? Do you think the EOs allow for that? Do you think the intention is to allow for that?
Who is the intended audience of this post? Pre-theoretically, most people don’t just agree with Stock, Lawford-Smith, Byrne et al; they regard sex-realism as obviously correct. Theoretically, sex-realism is the clear default position (https://philosophersmag.com/unexceptional-sex/). The attempt in this post to resurrect the fiction that trans activism commands the intellectual high ground is tedious.
“Sex realism” sounds about as credible as “race realism”. The latter depends on racist structures; as Talia points out in the piece, the former is contingent on sexist ones. You may well be right that it’s the “default position”, so-called “common sense”. Philosophers tend to question common sense though. Or at least they did.
Also tedious: (i) Purely formal analogies with race that neglect the central role of sex in evolutionary biological theory. (ii) Self-satisfied indifference towards violations of common sense. (iii) Poor reading comprehension (my use of the modifier “theoretically” should have been a clue that I was not equating being the default position with being common sense).
In this debate, it is always suspect if you have to rely on analogies, particularly to race. This is just another attempt to vilify your opponent. Stick to the matter at hand: sex and gender.
Why is it suspect to use analogies? Especially for this particular argument whereby someone is appealing to widespread views about how human beings are biologically classified: if you want to show that large numbers of people can be seriously mistaken in their views about the biological classification of human beings, a very salient recent example is that of views on race.
If this as unhelpful analogy, you can simply address with argument rather than dismissing it with suspicious psychologizing. Daniel at least gestured towards the former with (i) above.
So how does reproduction work?
Do you think that the claims “gender critical” commentators make are limited just to how reproduction works or are they intended to have larger purchase on how we live our lives?
This line of argument has an interesting history though, having surfaced in commentary opposing marriage equality and just generally in opposition to any positive view of LGBTQ lives. It seems like a non sequitur to me, at best.
Is “sex realism” the position that sex is real, or the position that sex is binary and cannot be indeterminate?
Because I think that biological sex is real. I also think that even though most humans at any particular time have a determinate sex, there are real (and valid) people whose sexes are indeterminate (and no, I don’t think that the mere fact that their sex is indeterminate means their condition is a “disease”).
I think what confuses me is when people infer from that a distinction admits of indeterminate cases, that the distinction must be meaningless or baseless, and its categories false. But I’m hard pressed to think of very many distinctions that are determinate. Most categories admit of vague, borderline cases. Are we going to say that positions don’t exist, because there are particles with indeterminate positions? That species don’t exist, because there are organisms whose species classifications are indeterminate? That acidity doesn’t exist, because there are substances whose acidity are indeterminate? It’s vague when a mountain becomes a hill, and when day becomes night, but I think those are all real categories.
I think you’re right, Joe. I’d just add that how we construct the distinctions matter for the categories we derive and their usefulness.
Although I’m not sure who would be claiming that distinctions are meaningless? I don’t think I’ve heard anyone claim that, but maybe you mean something else and I’ve misunderstood.
I’m not sure if this connects with your claim or not, but for the record, according to the 2020 PhilPaper survey, only 29% of philosophers believe *gender* is biological (while 21.5% believe it is psychological, 63% believe it is social, 4% believe it is unreal, and 14.8% think it is ‘other.’) So if by ‘sex realism’ you mean that biology determines whether or not a person is a woman, that doesn’t seem to be the default position among philosophers (who are, presumably, the intended audience of this post on a philosophy blog.)
https://dailynous.com/2021/11/01/what-philosophers-believe-results-from-the-2020-philpapers-survey/
The presumption is perhaps something like “the intellectual high ground can be held by claims that the majority of people pre-theoretically reject.” That presumption strikes me as true. For instance, if RFK Jr. manages to convince the majority that vaccines are no good, I will not be inclined to think the intellectual high ground has similarly shifted to vaccine opposition. So I’m not sure we should worry too much about the post relying on this presupposition.
Did you mean to say ‘strikes me as not true’? Oh, wait, I think I understand your point now, it just confused me for a bit.
Do you mean “sex essentialism” here? I don’t know whether most people regard that “as obviously correct” or not, but it’s definitely not the only approach to conceptualising sex. (Some recent work that might be of interest to some, particularly as it relates to work in biology: https://doi.org/10.1093/icb/icad027, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cell.2024.02.008, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.yhbeh.2023.105445.)
That said, “gender critical” commentators don’t just argue that “sex is real,” but that it—or rather, what they take it to be—should hold primacy over “gender” (or what they take “gender” to be). But what they take it to be, when spelled out, often involves them equivocating, or something along those lines.
That is, they’ll talk about sex in a broad way, as many things, because only by doing that are they are able to plausibly argue that it holds the particular social significance they claim it does. But when it’s pointed out that many of the things they are referring to (when talking in this broad way) aren’t immutable and/or would fall under “gender” (as they take it to be), they shift to a different definition, where “sex” just is gamete production or the like.
This definition, while having the benefit of a more scientific posturing, can’t carry the other arguments they want to make though. If that’s all there is to sex, then they have to explain why they insist that all the other things they previously thought were “sex” (when talking broadly) have to be aligned in the way they say they have to be. But that’d bring into focus the normative ideas undergirding their views, making it harder to argue that they’re “just saying” that “sex is real” or that they’re just echoing “what biology says,” etc.
This crystallizes it PERFECTLY, thank you.
Thank you, Talia. Excellent, well wrought, piece. All those who hide behind “philosophy” to bully trans and other marginalized people know exactly who they are. I suppose they like the vision of the boot in the human face.
As a relative outsider to this area looking in, it seems abundantly clear to me that advocating for any of a particular set of stances on this issue invites extreme censure and vilification, possible loss of status within the field, disrespect, hostility, animosity, and vitriol. Until or unless that changes, I will continue my current practice of regarding philosophical “research” in this area with extreme suspicion and hanging my head in shame that fellow “philosophers” not only tolerate this but actively *call for* it.
It is a very difficult time. Particularly for transpeople, very sad.
But, can we all be kind to our fellow philosophers? I am really confident that nobody in this thread is unreasonable or stupid. Can we just try to be kind and less intense about each other? Academics are a minority as a whole, and deserve more mutual support.
Is the suggestion, then, that nobody should do research in this area until it’s not controversial anymore? (Do you think the same applies to other controversial areas of research?) Or when you say it’s shameful that people call for “it,” do you mean “it” is the censure/vilification/etc.?
I can’t tell if you think (e.g.) you’re hanging your head in shame about my recent paper on gender in Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, or just about the extreme censure, vilification, possible loss of status, etc. that I’ve opened myself up to by publishing it (none of which has eventuated, but whatever, perhaps it’s all just around the corner).
If it’s the latter, then I can see your point, but it seems a little unfair to (on the basis of that point) go on to label what we do “research” (with square quotes) and to call us “philosophers” (with scare quotes). I take myself to be a square-quoteless philosopher doing scare-quoteless research! Couldn’t you just judge the work on its merits, not on the furor that allegedly surrounds it?
Sorry, I managed to twice write “square quotes” where I meant to write “scare quotes.” My usage of “square quotes” (here in scare quotes to indicate I ought to have used “scare quotes” [here in scare quotes to indicate I am mentioning, not using, the phrase] and also to indicate that I am mentioning rather than using the phrase [although it is not clear how one would use the phrase]) was a mistake, not some kind of pun, in case anyone was wondering. I am however open to suggestions as to how they might be read as a pun, thus absolving me of my typos.
Professor Bettcher is correct and forceful as always. For my part, I don’t understand how people can suggest that the “gender critical” position can be endorsed *with no animus or ill-will* against trans people. This can only be true on a ridiculous conception of what it is to regard someone with respect.
Being *good friends* with a trans person and paying attention to what they say makes the odiousness of the “gender critical” position obvious. So the people who endorse this position “without ill-will” must just mean that there is no premise in their reasoning that says “I hate trans people.” But that’s not all respect requires.
This is like someone saying the debate over the moral status of animals has no bearing on whether one regards animals respectfully (“I bear them no ill-will, I just think it’s permissible to torture them to death for my pleasure”). And someone who claims to be a good friend to trans people while entertaining these positions is like someone who claims no inconsistency between loving animals and murdering them – such a person is in the grips of vicious practical contradiction.l
“Being *good friends* with a trans person and paying attention to what they say makes the odiousness of the “gender critical” position obvious.”
This should be emphasized. It’s obvious from the way that trans-exclusionary feminists like Byrne, Lawford-Smith, and Stock talk about trans people that they don’t have any close personal relationships with trans people in their lives. In fact, much of their work reads as though they’ve only read about trans people on the internet.
“But it’s not necessary to say something true about abortion to have had one, nor to say something true about war to have been an enemy combatant, and so on…”
No, but the truth is much harder to come by without the right kind of access to those sources of evidence.
Sincere question, asked in ignorance: is the gender critical view that trans (wo)men are not (wo)men, that trans people don’t deserve certain rights afforded to women, or both? More to the point, is someone who holds the first view but not the second still a gender critic?
Sincere (really!) answer: for all I can tell “GC” can mean different things for different purposes.
The “respectable” (academic) version presents itself as a feminist philosophy that criticizes (and/or seeks to abolish) normative gender roles. That’s the view you find expressed in open letters, complaints about academic freedom, etc
However, some feminist philosophers are engaged in criticizing gender norms but welcome how trans people contribute to this project; Louise Antony and Catharine McKinnon are examples. They wouldn’t call themselves “GC” though.
All who self-describe as “GC” claim that “trans wo(men) are not (wo)men”. To get to this from the foregoing, you need to add a second claim, namely that “gender identity” is identical with (or the individual expression of) gendered norms. JTD in this thread is an example.
Thats the “GC” you find in academic publications: critique of gendered norms where gender identity is explained in terms of these norms.
To get to “trans people don’t deserve certain rights afforded to women” you need a third claim, namely that some of the gendered norms we currently have are either ok as they are (eg separate bathrooms) or achievements of feminism (eg women-only awards) and thus should not be critiqued or abolished. Usually this third claim runs under “sex realism”, the claim that the sexes have different needs that are determined by distinct anatomies and that ought to be responded to differently by society.
All prominent GC are also “sex realists”, so although you could draw the distinction, it doesn’t do any explanatory work. (“GC”s aren’t drawing such boundaries themselves.)
(As many have pointed out, letting reproductive anatomy take center stage is just so much more gender, so hardly “critical” at all. That’s the origin of the significant overlap with conservatism.)
Then, of course, there’s also the non-respectable version of the view, the one you find in UK tabloids. Here, “gender critical” means critical of “gender ideology” which is a grab-bag of reactionary fears that may include trans-inclusion in any form, but sometimes also broader inclusive projects (e.g. language aimed away from the male default). Since the academic “GC”s often write in these same tabloids, it is murky.
tl;dr everyone who calls themselves “GC” agrees with both your claims. It is theoretically possible to separate them, but the separation does no explanatory work.
Thank you, that’s very helpful! I think that I follow everything you mentioned except for one part: the move from critiquing gender norms to endorsing “trans women/men aren’t women/men.” You said that this follows once the gender norm critics endorse a further claim: that gender identity is identical to or expressed by gender norms. But if someone critiques gender norms, and those are identical to/expressive of gender identity, then they would (I think?) be critical of gender identity. So then why do they endorse “trans women/men aren’t women/men,” rather than reject any claims about womanhood/manhood? (Or is gender identity something other than these latter notions?) I think I see the bigger picture, but the logic isn’t clicking for me just yet. I really do appreciate the help.
(Or, follow up: is it that they endorse “trans women/men aren’t women/men” because they critique gender identity *understood as* the idea that your gender can be determined by how you identify rather than by biological sex or something? But then I guess I don’t see why they’d think that, if they’re critical of gender norms. Now I’m thinking that this comes down to my confusion of terminology or something…)
Thanks, that’s a useful clarification.
“Or is gender identity something other than these latter notions?”
As I understand the position, the answer is “yes”. The “GC” view is that whether someone is a (wo)man has nothing to do with gender identity.
The argument is this roughly (i) how much one follows gendered norms (stuff like “women wear dresses” or “real men don’t cry”) is not determinative of “how much” of a (wo)man one is; these norms are further harmful; and we’d be better off without them. That is the basic criticism of gender that is part of mainstream feminism.
The “GC” argument against trans people adds to this that (ii) what trans people call “gender identity” (the subjective sense of one’s gender) is one’s subjective experience of gendered norms or an endorsement of these norms or an expression of one’s adherence to these norms. That is a core misunderstanding that “GC”s bring into the debate, and is rejected by mainstream feminism. (It is of course fallacious: “GC”s — falsely — attribute to trans people the view that adhering to gendered norms makes one more of one gender.)
So put (i) and (ii) together and you get the corollary that one’s gender identity is not determinative of whether one is a (wo)man.
When it then comes to the question of what it is that makes one a (wo)man, the third claim (“sex realism”) is added. According to “sex realists”, it is one’s reproductive anatomy that makes one a (wo)man.
Ahhh, okay I see the connection now. Thanks for clarifying!
Would you mind explaining what mainstream feminists mean by “the subjective sense of one’s gender”? And how it differs from the account that gender identity is “one’s subjective experience of gendered norms”?
They mean the mental state that makes trans people desire transition and cis people not desire transition. They (correctly) observe that this mental state is orthogonal to how gender (non-)conforming one is, i.e. independent of how one responds to gendered norms. Some cis people are very non-conforming but do not desire transition; some trans people do transition but are then very non-conforming.
I suspect you want to know what that mental state *is*. That is a live debate and an interesting question to explore. Florence Ashley makes a good contribution here (also useful references): https://academic.oup.com/mind/article-abstract/132/528/1053/7216806
Thank you for your response. I’ve struggled for the past two days on how to respond and I think it’s because this account is devoid of all content. It doesn’t offer any explication as to what ‘gender’ means in the expression “the subjective sense of one’s gender.” It’s tantamount to saying that gender identity is the feeling that makes some people say they’re a man, others to say they’re a woman, and others to say they’re neither.
I have no doubt that this feeling or mental state is a complex one that involves a range of desires and beliefs. But I can’t escape the inclination that some of the beliefs constituting this mental state will have a structure similar to “I believe that a man/woman is x” or “I believe that men/women act in such and such a way” or “I believe that people who do x, or look like y, are men/women.” It’s here that the internalization of gendered norms are inescapable for any account of the concept of man/woman that relies on a mental state.
Maybe the Ashley article will disabuse me of this inclination. I appreciate your recommendation.
Bogardus and I discussed Ashley’s contribution here: https://journalofcontroversialideas.org/article/4/1/268
The problem described in note 12 of the Byrne/Bogardus reminds me of so much of the medical and bioethics literature on pediatric medical transition.
The problem described in footnote 1 reminds me of most “GC” scholarship.
I think the Ashley article will indeed help. Your struggle is entirely understandable, since I wasn’t trying to give an “account”. I merely gave a description of a referent. That referent is the subject of active study.
We don’t need a full “account” of such a referent to say things like: it exists, it has social and moral consequences, and it is independent of certain other things.
Consider, for instance, “pain”. We don’t have a full account of the subjectivity of pain (we might have partial neuro-physiological accounts), but it clearly exist, it is socially and morally significant, and it is independent of other things (e.g. of whether one shows outward signs of it).
“It’s here that the internalization of gendered norms are inescapable for any account of the concept of man/woman that relies on a mental state.”
Perhaps the following will help: one’s gender identity causes or motivates one to put or see oneself in particular relations to particular gendered norms. This is surely true. So it is surely true that this mental state plays a causal role for one’s relation to gendered norms.
But this does not mean that gender identity is reducible to these norms or fully explainable in their terms. This is because one (whether cis or trans) has agency about which relation one takes; one can reject, revolt, fulfill, warp, subvert, etc., these norms.
These relations are (part of) what Ashley describes as one’s individual gender subjectivity, but because of this agency and variability, they cannot be taken as constitutive of one’s gender identity. This, for the record, is what is crucially missed in the (politely so described) response by B and B.
“Perhaps the following will help: one’s gender identity causes or motivates one to put or see oneself in particular relations to particular gendered norms. This is surely true. So it is surely true that this mental state plays a causal role for one’s relation to gendered norms. But this does not mean that gender identity is reducible to these norms or fully explainable in their terms. This is because one (whether cis or trans) has agency about which relation one takes; one can reject, revolt, fulfill, warp, subvert, etc., these norms.”
I take it that on the view you sketch here, in a world without gender norms there would be no gender identity, either, nothing toward or against which one could be caused or motivated to be. Some people may still be caused or motivated to be drawn to dolls more than to trucks or whatever, but this cause or motivation wouldn’t be gender identity because dolls and trucks wouldn’t be embedded within the system of gender (or sex)-specific norms.
If that’s right, then gender abolitionism poses a serious threat to gender identity and conceptions of gender that depend on gender identity. Perhaps this explains some of the disagreement between different factions.
I do think this is one aspect of the difficulty. lt is a difficulty because it reveals an internal incoherence in the “GC” position. The claim is that if there were no gendered norms, there wouldn’t be gender identity.
This claim assumes that the “gendered experiences” in a broadly Ashlean account are *exhausted* by one’s relation to the norms. Neither me nor Ashley claimed this. The claim is rather that one’s gender identity motivates/causes how one responds to the norms. (And that, conversely, how one does respond to them might be subjective evidence for one’s gender identity.)
To be fair, it is not quite clear what this gender-norm-less utopia looks like.
1. Intuitively, perhaps, it would be a world in which one’s sex is no more significant (beyond reproduction) than, say, one’s hair color. In this world, transition is no more significant than dying one’s hair. But then it might be done for merely aesthetic reasons. If so, perhaps we must include one’s aesthetic sense of self (how one likes oneself to appear) among the “gendered experiences”. (This is speculation.)
1a. If in in this utopia, we would perhaps name the mental state that brings forth transition something else than “gender identity”. So the abolition of gender identity would be merely verbal.
2. “GC” philosophers will likely disagree with my first description of their utopia. They seem to claim that in this utopia, it will *still* be significant (beyond reproduction) what one’s sex is. E.g. for access to bathrooms. (This is why “gender-critical” is a misnomer, but that’s another topic).
2a. As long as there is such significance, there will be such a thing as gendered experiences (call them “sexed experiences” if you must) that, at least on an Ashlean account, could contribute to a gender identity (call it something else if you must).
There’s no way out of this dilemma, which reveals the incoherence of the “GC” position. Besides,it seems largely pointless to speculate what an utopian gender-norm-less wold would look like, how people would act in it, etc. It seems moreover cruel to subject currently living people to violence because in one’s utopian ideal there are no such people.
But on both horns, abolishing gender norms and affirming gender identity is consistent. (Which is the theoretical position I was elaborating in response to J Y).
Ok, so in the presence of norms, gender identity causes/motivates some relations/responses to those norms. But, you say, gender identity is not exhausted by these relations/responses. In a world with no gender (sex) norms, gender identity (perhaps with a different name) remains, though it would stand in no relation to gender norms (which have been abolished).
I’m trying to understand your reasons for thinking this last claim is true, ie why we should think that gender identity (perhaps with a different name) would persist in the absence of the relevant norms. Or are you just spelling out a possibility that you think avoids the “gender identity reduces to/requires/assumes/is dependent upon gender (sex) norms” charge?
Perhaps it would be better if you explained why you *do* think it would disappear: the scientific evidence on gender identity formation (largely from studies into differences of sex development) does not really suggest that identification with gender norms plays any role in the determination of gender identity, so it would be odd if abolishing the first had any effect on the second.
I’m responding to the charge that on a broadly Ashlean account, gender identity would disappear if gender norms were to disappear. That charge rests on the assumption that gender identity is nothing more than how one responds to these norms.
First, I say that the Ashlean account does not include that claim.
Thus, to make the charge, one must give some reason to accept the claim.
Second, therefore, I say that this claim cannot be made out by intuitions about what a world without gender norms would look like. In the absence of gendered norms, we might still observe behavior that we would (from our viewpoint) describe as transition and explain (from our viewpoint) using the terminology of gender identity. E.g. people taking exogenous hormones.
Thus, to make out the claim, one would need to set up the gender-norm-less world to be one in which either (a) nobody wants to take exogenous hormones or (b) people cannot take exogenous hormones.
There is no support, empirical or theoretical, for (a). And (b) is just incoherent, since, say, “males cannot take estrogen” is a gendered norm.
Third, then, I am saying that this incoherence runs through the entire “GC” project. One cannot abolish gender and making sex socially relevant because the latter just is more gender. That’s the seminal feminist point that they ignore.
“ Consider, for instance, “pain”. We don’t have a full account of the subjectivity of pain (we might have partial neuro-physiological accounts), but it clearly exist, it is socially and morally significant, and it is independent of other things (e.g. of whether one shows outward signs of it).”
This is extremely controversial as a matter of philosophy of mind. Many functional (e.g. Dennettian) accounts of pain would strongly resist the idea that pain is meaningful entirely separately from publicly-accessible data, and would regard introspective testimony of pain as salient public evidence but by no means incorrigible.
I guess what is “controversial as a matter of philosophy of mind” is not always controversial as a matter of fact. This is entirely besides the point, but feel free to substitute “eg whether one has a bodily injury” or whatever.
Coincidentally, this is a good example for where the gender identity “debate” goes off the rails.
The clinical definition of pain is “whatever the experiencing person says it is, existing whenever the experiencing person says it does” (seriously, google it). This definition was adopted not after working out objections to Mad Pain and Martian Pain, but in response to too many people living with untreated pain after being denied treatment due to a lack of (convincing) outward signs.
This situation would not be improved (quite the opposite) if philosophers came and insisted that we need an ironclad “account” of pain before we acknowledge it at all; or that before we adopt the clinical definition we must settle the problem of introspection; or that we have refuted the clinical definition from first principles.
We can of course discuss accounts of pain for our own edification, or in the hopes of some eventual benefit (if phil mind theorizing leads to a theory that leads to a device that determines pain — excellent!). But when we try to interfere in the clinical practice on grounds of these accounts, then something has gone awry.
In the case of pain the absurdity is obvious to anyone. No clinician would listen to this. Indeed, no clinician is in fact listening to analogous claims made by some philosophers about gender identity. I don’t think “GC” would face nearly as much scrutiny if they hadn’t tried to make them listen.
Julian said: “one’s gender identity causes or motivates one to put or see oneself in particular relations to particular gendered norms.”
Is it that gender identity is the mental state that causes me to feel, for instance, at ease with typically masculine gender presentations and, therefore, I can conclude that I am a man based on this gender identity? Or is it the mental state that directly causes me to identify as a man, which thereby could explain my comfort with typically masculine presentations?
In both cases, it’s the internalization of gendered norms that gets one from an inner sense to the metaphysical claim that “I am a man.” If it’s the former, then the inference that I am a man is a non sequitur since this mental state is often found in tom boys or butch women. If it’s the latter, then the directness is an illusion since “identifying as x” is always a function of one’s conceptual understanding of x.
It’s the latter, but I don’t see the illusion. Couple of things:
– I don’t understand how “I am a man” is a metaphysical claim. It does not seem to be functionally different from “I am gay” or “I am American” which aren’t metaphysical claims.
– That “identifying as x is always a function of one’s conceptual understanding of x” seems to be requiring too much. It would seem to suffice that one can identify x’es (which is a long way off from having a conceptual understanding) and identifies oneself as an x.
– You seem to presuppose that one’s “conceptual understanding of ‘man’” would be in terms of gendered norms, but I don’t think that’s necessarily the case.
I should add that identifying as a man is neither sufficient nor necessary for being comfortable with typically masculine presentations. We don’t seem to disagree on this, I just wanted to have it said.
This strikes me as just false. Why couldn’t one assert that the gender-critical approach to gender is closer to correct than the trans approach (as if there were a singular approaches to either), and also assert that:
Trans people should not be discriminated against in the workplace, should have access to the bathrooms of their choosing, should wear what they want without recrimination, should not be deadnamed, should be allowed in the military, should be allowed (currently) to compete in the sports category appropriate to their declared gender, etc. The underlying moral principle being, people should be largely left alone in how to live their lives.
Most, if not all, of the philosophical questions about gender are separable from political questions about how one is to be treated – unless part of the respect due trans people is that one must agree with the trans position on gender.
So to Meme’s last question below, why not?
One couldn’t do that because the “gender critical approach” tends to preclude all that (i.e., “gender critical” commentators tend to argue against those things). This is why the term “gender critical” is probably unhelpful here.
I think it would be absurd to say that Bettcher is trying to argue against freedom of speech or inquiry as such. What I see in the comment thread are some people who are defending something like “asking questions about gender in the case of trans individuals is important enough that we should defer to people who are doing so”. But that isn’t the only thing that Stock et al are doing. They are actively engaging in public philosophy, calling out specific laws and political projects and groups for the sake of delegitimizing their goals. Part of the way they seem to be doing so is by appealing to the common sense, which is also an uninformed common sense, that people take about gender binaries matching to biological sex, and the word “biology” becomes a stand in for another normative frameworks like theology or culture, where gender binaries are assumed rather than proven. Bettcher is calling out this bad faith reasoning, and I think is doing so effectively. They are asking whether -these- philosophers should be turned to more than others to guide discourse around gender debates as they apply to trans people. It’s not that one has to say “the harms of raising gender questions are serious that one should refrain from raising them” (one could argue this, I guess, and this seems to be what most objections assume is the argument), but I take Bettcher to be saying something like “these specific public intellectuals are raising objections that are in bad faith and whose intention is to provide the presumption of neutrality, legitimacy and objectivity around specific political projects that are harmful to trans people.”
But one could object—I am just your average every day philosopher! I perhaps don’t know what I think ultimately, but my intuitions are that some level of gender critique ought to be permissible within philosophy, if only because I occasionally raise casual objections to the idea of non-binary or trans gender identities, and want to continue to do so without fear of being called out as harming people! And this has nothing to do with my own normative commitments to, say, my daughter’s (binary) sports team or my (binary) theological commitments or my (binary) stag-and-doe party I’ll be attending with my (binary) friends this weekend! The fact that such normative presuppositions are widespread makes the problem worse, not better.
That is to say, Bettcher is calling out people who wish to insist that such neutrality is readily available to all who practice philosophy, and that those who defend GCF reflexively may be doing so in reflection of their own normative commitments rather than being good stewards of neutrality. Or, heaven forbid, taking the discussion as an occasion to evaluate their own normative commitments and question whether those commitments are coloring the default position they are drawing. The frustration that they are expressing has everything to do with the fact that this reflexive defense is wide spread and that the arguments it produces are directly informing the verbiage of public policy and, just as they provide cover for GCF’s “free inquiry” that is actually a normative/policy preference, they are currently providing political cover for EOs that target and harm trans people.
So—rather than defending GCF out of a non-involved opinion, get involved, state your normative commitments and defend them. Then weigh that against the harms being caused. For me, the catastrophic psychological and physical harm suffered by trans people far outweighs the need to protect the cultural anxieties around who should wear a bridal gowns and play on a youth sports team. And that’s not even getting into the fact that those same “neutral” gendered activities may themselves be harmful to a large number of people who participate in them. When it comes to bad faith, what makes my head spin is how well documented it is that straight men and not trans people have caused overwhelming harm in the context of youth and college sports, the corporate world and entertainment industry, academia (even in those same philosophy departments that lay host to so much fairness and neutrality as we all know), that straight men are much more likely to be violent and abusive in their marriages, and yes, that straight men find all sorts of ways to invade and exploit women’s privacy from revenge porn to cameras in bathrooms, and yet, it’s precisely the actions that are prevalent among straight men that are being scapegoated on trans people and justifying their persecution. The anger here is very well justified, and proponents of free inquiry should take a hard look in the mirror as to what their normative presumptions really are. Also read, teach, or otherwise get to know a trans philosopher, poet, artist, etc. every once in a while.
I cannot agree with this enough. Gender critical philosophers have been approvingly cited by legislators who seek to enforce gender stereotypes tied to biological sex in the law. This does not, at least to my knowledge, ever cause those GC philosophers to object publicly, no, you are mis-using and misconstruing our arguments because we object to gender stereotyping. Nor have they acknowledged the cruelty and harm resulting from such measures, and explained how their views should lead to some other practical outcomes. Nowadays, based on the supposedly common sense biological claim that boys always have unfair advantages, cis girls in sport who look too masculine are openly harassed and mocked by grown adults, while trans girls are legislated out of participation they had been involved in for years without anyone even noticing. I will now have to share bathrooms with *men*, in a startling way that will remind me of the time when a man criminally invaded that space to threaten women, because so many confused people thought we did a genetic test at the bathroom door instead of a social sorting.
Two points, one narrow and one broad:
Professor Bettcher asks why the Trump EO rejected WPATH for lacking scientific integrity. There are several reasons for this. The main reason can be found in the documents unsealed in Boe v Marshall. The documents include internal WPATH emails, which provide smoking gun evidence that their Standards of Care, Version 8 (SoC8) were written in large part for legal and political rather than clinical purposes. The emails show how WPATH commissioned researchers from Johns Hopkins University to conduct systematic reviews of the evidence underpinning pediatric medical transition but then suppressed the publication of this work when the results weren’t favorable to their predetermined policy objectives; how WPATH sought to exercise control over the work of the Hopkins researchers; how authors of SoC8 had undisclosed COIs; how authors conspired with (in their words) “social justice lawyers” to manipulate the language in the guideline for narrow legal purposes, including in cases where the authors themselves served as expert witnesses who anticipated citing SoC8 in court; etc. See below for discussion of the WPATH scandal.
https://www.bmj.com/content/387/bmj.q2227
https://www.economist.com/united-states/2024/06/27/research-into-trans-medicine-has-been-manipulated
https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/23/23-477/328275/20241015131826340_2024.10.15%20-%20Ala.%20Amicus%20Br.%20iso%20TN%20FINAL.pdf
A second reason is that WPATH guidelines, along with many other guidelines for transgender healthcare, were recently evaluated in a systematic review by a team of researchers at the University of York, who found them lacking in “developmental rigour and transparency” and to have engaged in circular citation practices with Endocrine Society guidelines. Only two guidelines—Swedish and Finnish—were recommended by a majority of guideline reviewers. Those guidelines depart significantly from WPATH’s in their recommendations. That systematic review is here:
https://adc.bmj.com/content/109/Suppl_2/s65
The EO is correct that WPATH lacks scientific integrity. Their guidelines should play no role in clinical practice. They are a danger to vulnerable kids.
As to the broader issues raised, like Daniel Kodsi above I am unsure about who the audience for this post is supposed to be, but for different reasons. We already know how philosophers likely will respond to the framing of the issues in the post. Probably, those who reject the GC positions will continue refusing to engage GC philosophers on the merits; will continue flouting scholarly norms with respect to citation practices (for some examples, see this paper by Alex Byrne and me: https://philpapers.org/archive/BYRADS.pdf); will continue smearing GC philosophers as useful idiots to fascists at best or happy collaborators at worst; will continue calling them bigots; will continue putting pressure on editors, publishers, and other gatekeepers to ignore or reject their work. Mark Lance distilled the strategy quite effectively back in 2019: “Those who treat this like an intellectual game should not be engaged with. They should be told to [unprintable here].” (brackets in original)
https://www.insidehighered.com/views/2019/07/30/philosophers-should-recognize-serious-risks-trans-people-face-opinion
Now, it seems to me that if I were opposed to the GC position, I would have to conclude in 2025 that the [unprintable here] strategy has been a disaster for my cause, and I probably would try a different one. What, then, should philosophers who disagree with the EOs or the GC positions do? There’s not much more they can do to strengthen their hand in the academy, certainly not now that they’ve lost the support of the federal government. But Trump’s EOs (which are vicious and cruel in style and, on some issues, substance, too) on sports and pediatric medicine and single-sex spaces are, in fact, popular. Some, like the EO on women’s sports and pediatric medical transition, clearly reflect the views of the majority of voters, and even the majority of Democrats (on sports it’s something like 80/20 overall).
So, perhaps the philosophers who object to these EOs or to whatever philosophical views they think underpin the EOs could try to formulate arguments that speak to ordinary people about their concerns. In other words, they could try to explain, in simple terms, why it’s false that males are stronger, faster, larger than females, or else why fairness in sports is not compromised by these differences, or else why fairness matters less than some other thing or things, such as the benefits to trans women of participating in women’s sports (nobody seems to object to trans men in men’s sports). Explain, in simple terms that ordinary people who have never read philosophy and have no real interest in it (ie the vast majority) why the rage of female athletes, or of women who object to nude males in changing rooms, saunas, etc., or of women with serious sexual trauma who find themselves imprisoned with males, or of parents who are reluctant to allow their physically healthy 15 year old daughters to get their breasts surgically removed in the absence of good evidence of medical benefit; or of young people who have themselves detransitioned and were seriously medically harmed and now face lifelong medical complications–explain why these things shouldn’t matter to them, or should matter less to them than the things you, the opponents of the EOs or GC philosophy, care about. That’s what I would try to do rather than trying, in circa 2018 style, once again to motivate my professional colleagues to shame or silence or ignore my opponents under the pretense of advocating for “ethical” research. If anything, I would think it unethical to double down on a strategy that has so utterly failed those whose interests I claim to be representing.
Well said Moti! As many will know, some trans activists are now recognizing how counterproductive their strategy has been and calling for a drastic rethink of how they advocate on this issue: https://archive.ph/QKrr9
The State of Alabama brief is terrible, but also funny. The brief cites Cheung et al. (2024). That article was written in response to McNamara et al. (2024), arguing that McNamara et al. had been written as if “tailored for the courtroom” and with the “primary purpose” being “to support litigation.” The authors complain that, within a day of McNamara et al. being published, it was cited as evidence in a legal proceeding. Yet within a day of its publication, Cheung et al. was cited as evidence in a legal proceeding—in the State of Alabama brief. Almost as if it had been “tailored for the courtroom”?
I didn’t share the Alabama brief because I thought it was good or bad, but because it includes a number of rather shocking quotes from the subpoenaed WPATH emails, which speak directly to the OP’s question concerning the Trump EO’s characterization of WPATH as lacking scientific integrity. The McNamara et al white paper, Cheung et al, the more recent McDeavitt et al critique of McNamara…different issues that don’t pertain directly to the problems with WPATH.
The Trump administration’s doesn’t have a problem with WPATH because of scientific integrity, but because they see WPATH as being too trans-supportive. It’s the same “problem” they have with the American Academy of Pediatrics and other organisations, which also filed an amicus brief for the same case.
The EO doesn’t mention AAP.
In the last paragraph, you write “explain why these things shouldn’t matter to them, or should matter less to them than the things you … care about.” The deployment of selective sympathy here is remarkable and remarkably self-serving. I don’t think there’s a better response to it than this:
And this pretty much applies to your entire response; you know the executive orders will cause harm. You know that legislative efforts in a similar vein will cause harm. But it is harm you’re willing to excuse because it principally affects trans people, who aren’t deserving, apparently, of the same sympathy—who “matter less to [you].”
You misread what I wrote. I did not claim or imply, nor do I believe, that this group matters less than that group.
Your block quote about detransitioners is deeply confused. First, no reasonable person claims that massive dysphoria is “no big deal.” Of course it is. The central disagreement centers on what to do about it given the state of the evidence. As for the harms done to detransioners, these have nothing to do with their dysphoria.
The central disagreement that anti-trans commentators have with respect to such care isn’t empirical; it’s normative. As I said in another comment, it’s a sleight-of-hand for you to present this as being merely about “the state of then evidence,” when several anti-trans (“gender critical”) writers and lobby groups—including Our Duty, whose US arm also submitted an amicus brief in the case mentioned above—have stated plainly that, in their view, we must target “100% desistance”, with a push for bans on care other than approaches that are conversion-oriented.
That said, to the extent that you want to pretend that your concerns are empirical (i.e. about “the state of the evidence”), these and other executive orders should be especially worrying for you, as they will affect research capability in ways that make it more difficult to improve the evidence base and thereby address your supposed concerns over the state of the evidence. I’m sure you are extremely worried.
I am worried about the executive orders. If I have any luck, a co-author and I will find a home for an op-ed we’re working on, where we describe some of these worries. They have less to do with research capability (in fact the EO calls for HHS to “increase the quality of the data”) and more to do with things like exploring the benefits/harms of grandfather clauses for kids already on hormones, providing funding for psychosocial interventions, funding for more therapists, etc.
Also, what I said was, “ The central disagreement centers on what to do about it given the state of the evidence.” That is, I am well aware that the central disagreement is not entirely empirical.
Which is neither here nor there with regard to my comment, Moti. After all, there should be more funding “for psychosocial interventions, funding for more therapists, etc.” No one disagrees on that. But if your aim is “100% desistance”—and, as we’ve seen, that is the aim of at least some anti-trans commentators—then it’s worth asking what that funding is intended to do, if not realise that aim? And how will you realise that if not by doing away with an affirming approach (which would also apply to MH care) and replacing it with one aimed at conversion and suppression?
You said, “The central disagreement that anti-trans commentators have with respect to such care isn’t empirical; it’s normative. As I said in another comment, it’s a sleight-of-hand for you to present this as being merely about “the state of then evidence.”
I never presented this, here or anywhere, as being merely about the state of the evidence. It’s true that the evidence is very poor, but I fully recognize that nothing follows directly from this vis a vis policy. In fact I wrote a paper that discusses this in some detail.
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/hast.1583
Moti, your paper is about “autonomy-based arguments,” principally those made by Florence Ashley. It does not appear to address Felix’s point, which is that “gender critical” commentators are largely not motivated by empirical concerns at all, even though they often present “the state of the evidence” as justification for various policy efforts.
For instance, in your piece, you emphasise the importance of systematic reviews and “grad[ing] the evidence according to … standardised methods.” I don’t think anyone disagrees on this. However, evidence appraisals /ratings need to be contextualised and understood; otherwise, there’s the risk of misrepresenting whole areas of care.
For example, the 2019 Cochrane review for epilepsy surgery says, “most studies provided moderate or weak evidence.” In another paragraph, “We judged evidence from the nine RCTs to be of moderate to very low quality.” In most situations, those who work in a given area of care can give some reasonable explanations as to why those ratings occur: e.g., a paucity of RCTs together with significant heterogeneity in the few that exist, some of that arising due to the nature of the condition or the treatment, as well as a lack of long-term outcome data, especially for a wider range of outcome variables.
In most situations, that would be considered an argument for collecting more data, intensifying research efforts, and improving the evidence base. Here though, in the context of the sort of care that’s relevant to the health and well-being of trans folk, the research rationale gives way to the normative one—”GC” commentators don’t want people receiving these treatments; they don’t consider the care needs they address to be legitimate; and, to be frank, they often regard the population most likely to need such care (trans folk) with disdain.
When someone like Joyce says, “every one of those people is, basically, a huge problem to a sane world,” and when they make clear that this applies regardless of the person’s happiness or their satisfaction with the care they receive, it becomes difficult to take seriously claims that their policy proposals are being driven principally by concerns about “the state of the evidence.” When lobby groups like Our Duty claim that “it should be the objective of any advanced civilisation presented with this problem to target 100% desistance, and as early as possible,” we can’t pretend to be mystified or uncertain about what they mean.
We also shouldn’t be naive and assume that improving the evidence base—something that will become increasingly difficult to do as governments, like Trump’s, undermine research efforts in areas they perceive as “DEI”—will be sufficient to address their supposed “reasonable concerns.” They’re after a “sane world,” no matter “the state of the evidence.”
Above, Felix said, “it’s a sleight-of-hand for you [Moti] to present this as being merely about “the state of then evidence.”” I objected that I’ve presented nothing of the sort and I linked to one of my papers that discusses this issue in a way that demonstrates I’m under no illusion that the controversies reduce to empirical disagreements alone. As for Our Duty and Helen Joyce, I am not them.
Your construal of the upshot of systematic reviews is incomplete. One upshot may be “we need better evidence.” But SRs play a crucial role in evidence-based medicine by underpinning clinical practice guidelines, which themselves provide guidance to clinicians in the form of treatment recommendations. These recommendations come in varying degrees of strength. The content and strength of recommendations is determined in large part by the content and strength of the evidence base, as determined by the SRs. So, often a SR will (and should) do more than motivate additional, better research. SRs also lead to changes in clinical practice by informing clinical recommendations. In fact this is why we’ve seen changes in the UK, Sweden, Finland–they changed their approach in light of the SRs they commissioned, which revealed that the clinical evidence underpinning pediatric medical transition is extremely shoddy. If an intervention is risky and we have no good evidence that it is effective in improving the relevant health outcomes, then we have reason to stop offering that intervention. It’s basic risk/benefit analysis, a core component of effective and ethical medical care.
You are right that it’s relevant to “the content and strength of recommendations.” But is it your view that a particular line of treatment cannot be offered if a systematic review finds, as in the case of epilepsy surgery above, that “most studies provided moderate or weak evidence”? There are many treatments to which that would apply, in many areas of area, which continue to be offered and for which there isn’t a call to ban them outright, even though “the state of the evidence” would seem to call for it, at least by the standards that “GC” commentators have adopted.
You mention certain reviews leading to policy changes; specifically, reviews in the UK, Sweden, and Finland. You don’t mention reviews undertaken in France, Germany, and other parts of the world where very different policy conclusions were reached. I don’t think it would be accurate to present one set of policy conclusions as having simply taken account of “the state of the evidence” and the others as not having done that. Reviews don’t act on themselves; their recommendations need to be translated to policy and practice—a process involving considerations that go beyond the review itself. Otherwise, there is, again, the risk of misrepresenting whole areas of care.
Regarding your comment about Joyce and Our Duty, of course you aren’t them. They are, however, “gender critical,” and I don’t think they are unrepresentative of the prevailing view among those who consider themselves “gender critical.” Which is why I mentioned them.
Are peoplpe who consider themselves gender critical different from those who consider themselves “gender critical”? What are the quotation mark intended to convey?
You ask, “But is it your view that a particular line of treatment cannot be offered if a systematic review finds, as in the case of epilepsy surgery above, that “most studies provided moderate or weak evidence”?” No, that is not my view. I know nothing about research on epilepsy so can’t comment on that specifically (aside from noting that there is a big difference between “moderate” and “weak” in evidence-based medicine). But, more generally, it is possible to generate strong recommendations from weak/uncertain evidence. These are known as “discordant” recommendations and you can read about them in the EBM literature. In short, there are certain conditions that must be met, mainly having to do with risk/benefit ratio. When it comes to endocrinological/surgical interventions for the treatment of gender dysphoria in youth, those conditions are not met.
Re: France, Germany, other parts of the world. Certainly it’s true that not every country has come to the same conclusion as UK, Sweden, Finland (yet). But these other countries did not commission, nor in some cases do they even cite, extant systematic reviews of the evidence, which is a requirement for high-quality guideline construction. Reviews of policy, reviews of best practices, consensus-based guidelines, etc. are not systematic reviews. In my last comment, I wanted to explain the role that SRs can (and should) play in guideline development and clinical recommendations, independent of the sort of theoretical contributions you brought up, which, as I said above, presented an incomplete picture of SRs.
Much more to say on these issues, of course, but I don’t think this comment thread is the place for it, at least not for me. So, thanks for the discussion.
Moti, I am aware of this; that’s why I raised the example of epilepsy surgery: to highlight that clinical recommendations and policy conclusions need not (and should not) go by a naive understanding of evidence ratings from standardised instruments. You keep skirting around the issue here, which is that GC commentators do rely on such an understanding to promulgate the view that this area of care should be subjected to severe restrictions or even banned. You know that this isn’t sufficient because treatments based on lower quality evidence can still be clinically recommended and aren’t necessarily always banned by policy. In other words, you know that the GC argument vis-à-vis “the state of the evidence” is insufficient, but you don’t appear to care that it is, so long as it gets the job done, policy-wise.
I also just noticed that, in your previous comment, you said, “If an intervention is risky and we have no good evidence that it is effective in improving the relevant health outcomes, then we have reason to stop offering that intervention.” But there’s a difference between “no good evidence” and “moderate” quality evidence. This has seemingly become a common occurrence in GC commentary: Even where the quality of evidence is considered “moderate,” it is nevertheless cast as being “no good evidence,” leaving us in a position where the evidentiary standards are permitted to shift to wherever the GC commentator needs them to be to justify their intended policy outcome.
That said, I think you are missing an even more fundamental issue, which many commenters here have noted: the extent to which it’s the normative premises actually doing the work. To illustrate this, imagine there is a group of people who are opposed to brain surgery as such—call them “brain critical” or “anti-brain.” They see all brain surgery as medically unnecessary and and necessarily harmful. A prominent anti-brain writer, economist Jelena Hoyce, claims that every person who undergoes brain surgery is “damaged” by it and that they, by virtue of having undergone it, represent a “huge problem” to a “sane world”—and, she emphasises, they remain a “problem” regardless of whether they are happy following the surgery and irrespective of their post-operative outcomes. Even if a temporal lobectomy results in good seizure outcomes, it’s “mutilation,” claim anti-brain commentators, and there’s “no good evidence” for it being beneficial, so it should be banned, together with all brain surgery.
In that context, do you think us explaining that there is evidence for it being beneficial, that that evidence is of such and such quality, and offering plausible ways forward to address the empirical or methodological concerns they raise with respect to “the state of the evidence” would be sufficient to dissuade them from their clearly stated policy objectives (banning brain surgery)?
What’s missing there, and here with regard to your comments, is an appreciation of what’s actually doing the work in the arguments. Whether brain critical or gender critical, the normative premises are fundamental to the position being articulated, and while you’ve certainly gestured at them (I’m not claiming you’ve outright ignored that they are there), you’ve stopped short of actually engaging with how they undergird the GC project and interface with its proponents’ approach to empirical work.
I don’t gave very strong views on the first order trans issues, but I feel confident in saying that we should not conduct brain surgery on minors absent *extremely* compelling evidence that is a good idea. I am quite surprised that this is controversial.
I’m not sure I understand what you’re getting at, David. What counts as “extremely compelling evidence”? What rating instruments have “extremely compelling” as an option for evidence quality? Or is “evidence” being used in some other sense? Do you think treatments that fall short of having “extremely compelling evidence” should be banned?
It’s difficult to seriously engage with GC philosophers on public policy issues because there is little serious discussion to engage with. Mostly just talking points, one-sided arguments, armchair psychology, ill-informed opinionating, and the like. The work of these philosophers on important issues like prison safety, proper guidelines for treating gender dysphoria in adults and minors, etc., is more political than philosophical. Then there is the debate about the meaning of words like “man” or “female”. Part of the problem with engaging there is that the GCs help themselves to highly debatable claims drawn from the philosophy of language, metaphysics, and epistemology. One could write a book or two on only one of those underlying claims, but not everyone has that as part of their research program. Of course, if I were to write an article arguing that trans men are men, I would also have to help myself to a lot of debatable claims drawn from the philosophy of language, metaphysics and epistemology (the correct ones of course, lol). But frankly I don’t find that whole debate to be very relevant to the important policy issues.
Have you read Moti’s papers on these issues?
You write: “It’s difficult to seriously engage with GC philosophers on public policy issues because there is little serious discussion to engage with. Mostly just talking points, one-sided arguments, armchair psychology, ill-informed opinionating, and the like.”
All that you complain about applies to yourself – but not to Moti’s post. I quote from an earlier post by you [https://dailynous.com/2025/02/10/while-tables-burn-on-the-non-existence-of-trans-people-and-the-failure-of-philosophy-guest-post/#comment-469414]: “Obvious straw men. No one thinks, for example, that violent sexual predators (whether cis or trans) should be allowed unmonitored access to other women prisoners.” You are both philosophically (‘straw men’) and politically uninformed. See here: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-64796926 . It looks like you are one of those ‘ill-informed, opinionated armchair psychologists’.
I’m puzzled as to why you think the story you linked to conflicts with the claim that you take to be “politically uninformed”. Nowhere in that story was there any suggestion that the convicted rapist should be allowed “unmonitored access to other women prisoners”. Nor was anyone quoted as saying that she should be, or even portrayed as thinking as much.
It’s difficult to seriously engage with anti-GC (TRA) philosophers on public policy issues because there is little serious discussion to engage with. Mostly just talking points, one-sided arguments, armchair psychology, ill-informed opinionating, and the like. The work of these philosophers on important issues like prison safety, proper guidelines for treating gender dysphoria in adults and minors, etc., is more political than philosophical.
I can’t know your motives but I wonder why I, an opponent of GC ideology who has but lightly scratched into the underlying scholarship, am familiar with many publications and public commentary that does precisely what you asked for above, while you, who apparently do professional work in this area, are not. You might disagree with those who argue against trans girls having crucial advantages in sport, or that participation is a more important goal in K12, but you surely know they make the case, frequently, a long with opposition legislators trying to forestall harm. You surely know trans boys are being excluded from boys sports ever since the widely publicized example of Mack Beggs, wrestler from Texas. You also know more teenaged girls have surgery for breast augmentation than for removal, yet despite all the GC talk about gender stereotypes leading to physical mutilation, I have yet to hear a public GC campaign against this practice. If parents aren’t forced to agree with one, why would they be forced to agree with the other? If you know 80% of the public accepts some basic GC claims about biology determining social reality and identity, and policies and laws from the NCAA to local schools to the EEOC are now in line with GC views, why doesn’t the objective of GC philosophy shift to protecting gender nonconformity unfairly caught up in the landslide? Trans women never harassed me in a ladies’ room but a cis man did. How do the GC laws protect me better, now that men are legally required to use that room with me and I won’t know the difference, at least not initially? Where is the GC concern for my trauma?
I think one thing that’s not really being expressed in these comments is that there’s a distinction between publishing philosophical work on a topic and people policing whether you can ask or question claims made as about the topic.
No one is saying that you can’t think carefully about the notion of gender and whether someone can self-identity their gender. In fact, it’s a question that I think most wonder about, but it’s also a question many trans-people are equally going to question. “Am I really how I feel inside? Or am I just making it up?
The point I take of this post is that we should take care about with who, when, and on what platforms we engage in asking these questions. They’re important questions that matter to us, but it’s probably imprudent of us to deal with them in the ways these philosophers did, and there’s a lesson to be learned about this.
To say that the issue is “Am I really how I feel inside?” is to assume that the issue is not “what do these words mean?” In fact, I think that the issue is different for different people, which leads to people talking past each other and offering evidence that people they disagree with don’t consider relevant to the issue.
This is a problem in almost all discourse, people meaning different things without directly addressing one another.
It seems to me that there are clear points of disagreement in this that don’t boil down to difference of language use, like:
Should people be permitted to use bathrooms that don’t like up with their biological sex, but does line up with their gender identity?
It’s hard to see that debate as just being a matter of language.
Yes, no moral fact is going to boil down to non-moral facts, either about language or about the individual.
It’s also I think about responsibilities that people have as academics in the workplace: if transgender colleagues are bullied and mocked for being transgender by gender-critical colleagues (as Holly Lawford Smith was doing just the other week on Twitter: https://x.com/aytchellesse/status/1881924109065662919) or if they make serious factual misrepresentations in their work (as Kathleen Stock did in Material Girls when she falsely claimed that the government consultation on self-ID in the UK was partly about changing the single-sex exemptions under the Equality Act, which were explicitly excluded from the consultation process) then academics should stand up for their professional colleagues in the first case and for the truth in the second case.
“The fact that we do so [fight] is the most powerful argument that we exist.” Wow, Talia. Thank you for this powerful piece that you absolutely should not have to write. It is small comfort that the gender critical feminists and smug rebel philosophers will eventually burn with the rest of us amidst this hellscape they have absolutely helped to create. With you in rage.
Nobody denies that it is really important to trans people to get recognised as what they feel they are. Given all the trouble they have to go through to achieve that, it must be more than just a whim. So there clearly “exists something that makes trans people transition”. But that doesn’t settle the question what it is that does that. On the face of it, it makes no sense for a biological male to claim that they are in fact a woman, just as it makes no sense for a human to claim that they are in fact a cat. And yet there are people who do claim just that. This requires an explanation. Gender dysphoria is real, but so is, apparently, species dysphoria. Some people really are convinced that they are cats. Those people are probably even more marginalised and vulnerable than trans people. Would it therefore be unethical for us to question whether they really are what they sincerely believe they are, namely cats? If we asked what it could possibly mean to say that they are cats? Would we be harming them and helping to set fires that future right-extreme administrations might turn into a blaze?
As for Trump seemingly endorsing the gender-critical position of Stock and Lawford-Smith, does that make me uncomfortable? Yes, definitely. Trump is a despicable human being, lacking compassion, empathy and common human decency, and his policies will harm a lot of people, including trans people, and none of them deserve the harm inflicted on them by a cruel and unthinking idiot like Trump. But to suggest that this is the fault of gender-critical feminists is ludicrous. Trump has no idea about gender-critical feminism. He is as anti-intellectual as it gets. His actions are not informed by theory, but by his ego. He wants to be seen as someone who takes action. Trans people are easy targets, that’s all. Trump is also filled with rage and very good at vilifying all those who disagree with him or dare to criticise him. How would trans-inclusive philosophers feel if somebody suggested that he learned that from them?
You are missing the point in a fundamental way. No one is suggesting that Trump has any idea what “gender critical” even means. They are arguing that “gender critical” (i.e. anti-trans) rhetoric, as promulgated by “gender critical” writers, contributed to the wider reactionary push that Trump has capitalized on in his election campaign and, subsequently, acted on in the early days of his second administration. None of this requires that Trump be clued in on what exactly these writers are saying or the precise justifications they give. It only requires that, as you put it, he take action. The legitimation and justification of that action have been provided for him by the conditions set, in no small part, by that rhetoric. He can do it “unthinking[ly],” as you put it, because the “thinking” has already been done for him, the “targets” have been identified for him. He need only act.
Now the question is one of opposition, of resisting these moves he’s made. Where are “GC,” anti-trans commentators on that front? They are either no where to be seen, glad that Trump has taken the actions he has taken, or pondering how to go about their own self-exoneration. They can’t meaningfully resist the conditions that enabled Trump to do what he did, because they had a hand in those conditions. Butler had it right in 2021:
No, you are missing the point in a fundamental way. Rather than blaming gender critical feminists for contributing to the wider reactionary push that Trump has capitalized on in his election campaign you should be pointing the finger at trans activists who have been a case study in how not to do activism for a minority community. During a time when Americans became even more accepting of homosexuals (including effeminate gays and butch lesbians) their receptiveness towards the claims and demands of trans activists has diminished as can be seen in several recent opinion polls. The reason for this is the hopelessly counterproductive tactics deployed by trans activists. Rather than following the highly successful tactics the gay rights movement used in the 2010’s, they have done the opposite. The gay rights movement was patient and gentle with those initially reluctant to accept its message, clear and consistent in its messaging, focused on core rights rather than fringe issues, willing to acknowledge costs to other communities, and focused on concrete gains instead of ideological purity or performative displays. By contrast, trans activism has typically taken an arrogant posture that belittles and censors anyone who questions any of its claims, been muddled and inconsistent in its messaging, preoccupied with fringe issues over core rights, unwilling to acknowledge costs to other communities, and preoccupied with ideological purity and performative displays.
The half dozen trans people I know, who all come from outside the Anglosphere, are furious with the American-led trans activism, which they believe has monopolized global attention on this issue while acting against their interests. Some thoughtful trans activists in the US are also starting to acknowledge these problems (https://archive.ph/QKrr9) but sadly many are doubling down rather earnestly reflecting on a decade of failed activism.
The point you make in your last paragraph is important. It is a shame that the way issues are debated and politicized in America takes on such an outsize importance in other countries, when a more local approach to activism is both more constructive and authentic to the people it serves.
Having said that, litigating how activism should proceed in the United States itself is a separate matter. Bettcher’s post is instructive on this point. She asks us to consider who might usefully, constructively speak about philosophical topics that touch upon the lives of vulnerable people — to, in that sense, empathize with them. Bearing that in mind, I’m not sure that telling a group of people how to do their activism, or blaming them exclusively for what appear to be the results of that activism, is useful, constructive, or empathetic.
It is also not entirely truthful. The enormous amount of attention that this issue got during the previous election was the Republicans’ doing. It had very little do with anything any trans person or group of activists did, let alone with what most of the American electorate wanted to hear about — namely, the economy. If we are seeing more people express an opinion about trans issues in public polls, and expressing opinions that are negative, it is a result of this campaign’s decisions.
What you’re attempting to do here is a combination of self-exoneration (of “GC” commenters) and victim-blaming. That is, you are downplaying the role that anti-trans writers and activists have served in this reactionary movement, while shifting the blame on to their targets, whom you seem to imply are deserving of what now comes their way.
Additionally, you are promulgating an almost insultingly inaccurate narrative about the larger struggle for LGBT rights. The “counterproductive tactics deployed by trans activists” might as well be the “counterproductive tactics deployed by gay activists.” Those not attempting historical revisionism will likely recognize the accusations and insinuations hurled at trans folk as familiar, almost cliche:
And on and on it goes.
Instead of giving unsolicited advice to “trans activists”, who are ostensibly doing it all wrong, maybe “GC” writers/activists should reflect on their own role in proceedings; in particular, how much of their commentary mirrors anti-gay rhetoric from decades past, and what this means for their project and how it ties in with other anti-rights projects currently being advanced.
Interesting framing in your first paragraph: 1.”self-exoneration (of “GC” commenters)”,
2.”anti-trans writers”,
3.”this reactionary movement”
1. self-exonoration for what? TMB is assuming what needs to be established first: “clearly, the view underlying much of the White House executive orders is a gender critical position.” It may resemble or overlap with such a position in some respects – crudely, but that doesn’t mean the White House was influenced by philosophers. I doubt that Trump and his cronies think about the metaphysics of ‘woman’. Trump and his cronies are thorougly anti-intellectual. They will not touch a philosophy journal with a barge pole. Their ideas are the ideas of the far and religious right (hence the ban on abortions). Trump & Co. will not ask themselves: ‘What is a woman’. They believe they know the answer. No need for (philosophical) inquiry.
2. “anti-trans writers” – that is just smearing colleagues. Anti-trans activists do exist, yes, but TMB and you should not impute this to colleagues who challenge trans theory. They are not motivated by being ‘anti-trans’.
3. “this reactionary movement”. The alt right is indeed reactionary – they oppose any reform. But this doesn’t mean that philosophers who question trans theory are ‘reactionary’. Furthermore, you, as a philosopher, are assuming that you are on the ‘right side of history’ or on the ‘progressive’ side. That is a little premature. Let’s wait and see.
Miroslav, I answered a version of your first point (1) above. No one is claiming that Trump’s White House was “influenced by philosophers” in the sense in which you seem to mean it. No one is claiming that they are interested in reading the contents of “a philosophy journal”. Much of “GC” commentary isn’t in philosophy journals—it’s in the public, and in virtue of that, has had a role in shaping the conditions necessary to enable the actions his administration has taken.
Regarding your second point (2), I disagree. That is what they are. We should stop calling them “gender critical” altogether. Someone linked to this post from Jenny Saul earlier. Saul is right:
Regarding your third point (3) and the general theme of your comment overall, it reads as self-exoneration. Yes, they are reactionary. But for some reason their ego cannot abide the thought that they be seen as such. They have a need to imagine some distance between themselves and the hard right—they’re intellectuals, philosophers; they write in journals; they think deeply about metaphysical questions, and so on.
This, I would argue, is anti-intellectual; it’s a refusal to see the world as it is; a retreat to the comfortable notion that these are just ideas that the “GC” philosopher is just pondering in the confines of journal pages; it’s not a living reality. As lives are cut short, we can afford to just “wait and see” what the results of this thought experiment will be. We need not act in the world—although when we do act we can always later retreat to the notion that we’re merely all about “advancing a line of research”.
Apologies if I seem cynical about it, but I don’t think “GC” writers can advance their ideas in public (not just in paywalled philosopher journals, but in large outlets), insist that the stakes are high, that politicians must act, and then when politicians do act, pretend that they were being timorous all along or feign surprise that their rhetoric has permeated and shaped the wider culture. It’s disingenuous and we should have no tolerance for it.
“Anti-trans activists do exist, yes, but TMB and you should not impute this to colleagues who challenge trans theory. They are not motivated by being ‘anti-trans’.”
This is just demonstrably false. In this very post, Bettcher quotes one of these colleagues as cheering for anti-trans politics.
This is embarrassing. Cats? Maybe there are one or two people in the world who seriously, genuinely believe they are cats despite being humans. And I will go ahead and say I think it unlikely that they are totally functional and healthy in all areas of their lives. There are millions and millions of trans people with healthy families and productive careers and meaningful lives. The comparison you suggest is intellectually sloppy, shockingly lazy, contemptibly uninformed, and exactly the sort of thing we are complaining about.
You may want to learn about the therian and otherkin communities. And you only damage your own cause when you say “I think it unlikely that they are totally functional and healthy in all areas of their lives”.
Therians and otherkin often adopt behaviors that align more closely with their non-human species identities, and even surgically modify their bodies to more closely align with those identities. So you may want to reconsider your condemnation.
So are you saying that it’s not possible for a biological human to actually be a cat? Why not?
In the legislature, when debating a new law passed to prevent trans kids from receiving affirming care, anti-trans people said kids are now being given litter boxes in school. This was taken as a reason to put a stop to gender “confusion” and enforce biological norms. Perhaps they could answer your question.
Or perhaps you could?
Why would I when it’s not my argument? The cat analogy is a little played out due to the litter box panic, but Jessica Alba once starred in a TV show about super soldiers whose DNA had been fused with cat genes, so maybe never say never?
for the record, i would like to state that i consider this post to be harassment, and justin’s agreeing to publish it to be an incredible lapse in judgement. the blog is part of our workplace in an extended (global & virtual) sense. since when has it been acceptable, according to the norms of our discipline, to publish ad hominem attacks on named colleagues simply because they advance a line in their research that threatens one’s self-conception? since when is it acceptable to police named colleagues’ social media accounts and report their contents back to the profession, as though this is iran and you are the morality police? this is deranged, as are all the people supporting it in the comments. to those people: maybe next time you see a male professor use his identity as a shield behind which to vilify people who disagree with him, you could tell him to stop being a bully, rather than telling him his lengthy rants are brilliant and you’ll be teaching them next semester.
The notion that it should be unacceptable to comment in a public forum on someone else’s political speech (from a different public forum) is absurd on its face.
The pretense that “GC”s merely “advance a line in their research” with no connections to anti-trans activism and, therefore, not political speech is more absurd still.
This goes to show how “GC”s tolerate neither political counterspeech to their political activism nor philosophical responses to their academic works. This sort of performative self-victimization has been the driving force of their push into media, politics, and academia from the very beginning. It is time we recognize it for the farce that it is.
As a non-philosopher who reads and occasionally comments on this blog, I’d like to point out that, while the blog’s masthead says “news for & about the philosophy profession,” this blog is not part of your workplace. This blog is a public forum: anyone with an Internet connection may read it and post comments on it.
did you know that courts have found private facebook accounts to be the workplace for the purposes of workplace harassment, because a sufficient number of colleagues are gathered there? i’m not saying that there is a legal issue here, i’m saying this personal attack is unprofessional as shit and almost never how the blog has previously been used.
This evinces an issue with labor laws in your country, not with the content of this post or the fact that it has been published on this platform.
The post is also not a personal attack, nor is it harrassment. Your work, and the activism you have done and that has been done on this work’s basis, are given as examples of things that contribute to the problems it describes. All Bettcher does is list some of your arguments and claims, with appropriate citations, and shows the policies and lines of thought they have been used to support. Is this not THE standard of our profession?
Not clear this is a public forum. Justin selects the posts. Whether he still approves comments would also matter to whether it is a public forum.
I was not using the phrase “public forum” in the strict legal sense but in a looser or more colloquial way to indicate, among other things, that the blog’s audience or readership is not restricted to philosophers. Still, point taken.
Holly, this is absurd. You aren’t merely “advanc[ing] a line of research” in your work; you stood at the steps of Victoria’s parliament and spoke at Keen’s 2023 anti-trans rally—a rally notable for the visibility of the far right, who carried with them a sign that even the rally’s Australian organizer (Jones) understood connected them with the rally’s cause. Was that rally “part of [your] workplace in an extended sense”? You can’t expect to engage in this sort of behavior and then retreat behind the “norms of our discipline”, as if those norms somehow preclude criticism of that behavior, particularly as its intertwined with the “line of research” you claim to be advancing.
the feminist rally in relation to which the leader of the victorian liberal party ended up having to pay out $300,000 AUD for defamation because he associated one of his MPs with the far-right for attending it, is that the rally you mean?
The one where you stated that you felt safe in the presence of the sieg-heiling men that joined you at parliament’s steps. I’m sure they were there to “advance” a “line of research” too. Who is to say otherwise? Certainly not us philosophers—that’d be unprofessional.
“since when is it acceptable to police named colleagues’ social media accounts and report their contents back to the profession…?”
When you explicitly use your highly-visible public social media account as a platform for your activism?
Fascinating. Ad hominem attacks are unacceptable here in your workplace and the people with whom you disagree are all deranged.
For the whole time, I have been feeling empathetic without siding with/against anyone (in particular, without thinking badly of those referenced to in the article). Until I see this post of yours. I am nobody and can’t sway anyone, but I want to say that your posts seem to be using threats against people very efficiently and with ease. It makes me less empathetic.
god forbid a woman should differentiate herself from a doormat.
“gender-critical” philosophers: We need to follow the arguments where they lead and not worry about hurting anyone’s feelings. Labeling all trans women systematically as sexual predators and perverts, on the basis of no evidence whatsoever, is just part of this venerable art of Socratic philosophizing.
also “gender-critical” philosophers: If anyone ever makes the slightest suggestion that my spewing hate and harassment on social media, publicly and under my own name, is at all related to my philosophical positions, it’s basically sexual predation.
strawman much 😂
A suggestion for the comments section: I think it is fine to post general nonsense here anonymously, but if you attack a named individual, you should do it under your real first and last name.
I’m sympathetic to this suggestion, but what counts as an attack? I would be very surprised if there were a consensus about this here.
(As a side note, I think that early career people and others without job security have prudential reasons to not use their real name when discussing controversial topics here. The reason has to do with their reliance on the opinions of other, more secure colleagues in order to have a future in the profession. I don’t like the pseudonym thing either, but I get stuck on this point. Now, if we could all agree on what counts as an attack, then maybe this point would be moot in this particular case. But given the lack of agreement, it seems to me relevant.)
Here are some examples of critiques that are not personal attacks:
“This argument is circular.” “This argument begs the question.” “This premise lacks empirical support.” “This premise is false.” “This policy is harmful.” “This policy is unjust.”
Here are some examples of personal attacks:
“This person has bad motives.” “This person behaves badly on social media.” “This person does not believe in the argument they are making.” “This person is hypocritical.”
Can we agree on those examples?
Yep, these are helpful, and most of us can probably agree on almost all of them. They are worth keeping in mind.
Still, and maybe I’m wrong (I’d be curious to know), but I would guess that there is disagreement on the social media thing in this case. That’s something like what I had in mind in my initial comment.
Obviously there are times (most of the time, probably) when, say, mentioning someone’s bad tweets is a personal attack. These fall under your description of “This person behaves badly on social media.”
But it seems to me that someone’s social media posts could be brought up under other descriptions. They could be relevant to an argument in some cases. For example, if one is arguing that a particular philosophical position is connected to a particular political position, and it turns out that someone who has both positions seems to in fact connect them (as evidenced by some tweets), is this not relevant to the argument? Is it a personal attack to mention the tweets in this context? Or maybe the objection is to making this sort of argument altogether?
That’s maybe not the most careful description of this particular case, so set aside its accuracy for the moment. The point is just that even if one agrees that “This person behaves badly on social media” claims are usually out of place, social media posts as such might not be. (See also the points on this made above by commenters in response to Lawford-Smith).
Interesting. But I wonder if you’d be willing to extend the no anonymity policy to other unrelated cases of reporting/discussing (alleged) bad behavior of living, working philosophers (e.g. famous male philosophers accused of sexual misconduct, impropriety, etc.).
Narrator: … and the answer was “no.”
Why though? If the named individual’s project involves them attacking gender minorities in public view, should we expect someone who is part of that minority community to have to address their attacks using their “real first and last name”, knowing that the named individual also has a large following from whom they might also expect to face attacks directed at them personally? I’m not saying that they shouldn’t necessarily, but as Esteban mentions, there may be prudential reasons why they might wish not to. This is, of course, part of the point in Talia’s guest post.
Trans philosopher wrote:
“In other words, trans people are obviously, empirically capable of living human lives that tick off all plausible boxes for a life full of “flourishing” or “well-being”. Note that this is **generally *not* observed in cases of extreme body dysmorphia, psychosis, personality disorders, and so on.”** [emphasis added]
and
“Much more interesting, and responsive to the actual state of things: “Okay, we have these people who are evidently **of sound mind** but who radically challenge our pre-existing systems for linguistically and socially categorizing people on the basis of sexual features.” [emphasis added]
These claims are ableist and actually reproduce some of the central and intransigent ways that philosophy and philosophers subjugate disabled people, including disabled philosophers–e.g. we have a naturally poorer quality of life, are naturally unfortunate, defective etc. The continuing exclusion of disabled philosophers from the profession is causally linked to these sorts of ableist tropes in philosophy. (If you want the full-blown argument in this regard, read some of the work that I and other disabled philosophers of disability have produced.)
Furthermore, the formulation of trans people/philosophers as recognizably nondisabled and thereby distinct from disabled people/philosophers (which the claims imply) renders disabled trans people/philosophers nonexistent. I recommend that readers of this comment explore the work of disabled trans and nonbinary philosophers who defy this assumption. An excellent place to start would be their contributions to _The Bloomsbury Guide to Philosophy of Disability_ (Tremain ed.) which can be found here: The Bloomsbury Guide to Philosophy of Disability: : Shelley Lynn Tremain: Bloomsbury Academic
I have been saddened and frustrated to see how much uncritical support that the claims that I cite have gotten from supporters of Talia Bettcher’s essay. For I do not see these claims as in any way, or at least necessarily, following from the essay.
I posted Talia’s essay on Bluesky and in the BIOPOLITICAL PHILOSOPHY Facebook group that I administer. So, I am supportive of the essay overall. Nevertheless, I want to point out that Talia Bettcher’s use of the term ‘dumbfounded’ is ableist and oralist insofar as it equates speech/speaking and intelligence.
On Bluesky yesterday, Jonathan Wolff wrote: “Modest contribution. I’ve stopped throwing about the terms ‘mad’, ‘insane’, ‘irrational’, ‘stupid’ (at least when I remember) to label things I disagree with. Partly because it’s lazy, but mostly, having read Stacey Clifford Simplican’s The Capacity Contract, I’ve realised it’s discriminatory.”
The term ‘dumbfounded’ should be added to the list of terms that are demeaning in the ways that Simplican (and others) powerfully explains.
This is incredible.
If transness is conceived as not reducible to or not coextensive with disability, I don’t see how, with such a conception in mind, it necessarily follows that someone cannot be both trans and disabled. That they are different concepts does not seem to me to imply that a person who is both disabled and trans could not exist (where ‘exist’ could mean ‘exist in this conceptual space’ or ‘exist actually’). Do I misunderstand you?
Yes, you have misunderstood me.
To Justin Weinberg: I just want to say thanks for posting this essay. The discussion has been very enlightening and, in some ways, reveals the contours of the debate more clearly than an academic article can (for better and worse).
Frankly, I’m just pleased that my penis has been featured in Daily Nous!
Seems to me this begs the question against the particles-arranged-penis-wise view.
Following Thomasson, I’m a deflationist about penises. It is a conceptual truth that if there are particles arranged penis-wise, then there’s a penis.
you could also use baker, and have both particles arranged penis-wise and the aggregate of those particles that is the ordinary object the penis! multiple metaphysical routes to penis-hood.
Thank you for the essay. The easily predictable consequence of sloppy gender critical arguments is now coming to pass in the US, causing actual serious harm and suffering. One might have expected a least a disavowal and pretense of dismay from gender critical philosophers, for the sake of civility. But this is always what they were arguing for: by pretending that gender doesn’t exist and has no connection to bodies, they justify enforcement of arbitrary gender rules falsely founded on the notion that biological sex determines all.
For example, gender critical views lead directly to results like this man being unjustly fired from his job because, while he confirmed to traditional masculine norms during work hours, when not at work he was discovered to be wearing *pink nail polish, capri joggers, and box braids*. https://apnews.com/article/eeoc-trump-gender-identity-discrimination-alabama-73a065c8aa5e0060472e1cac1ecd8212
You know, exactly the kind of thing GC philosophers often attack trans people for insofar as it supposedly reduces *women* to faulty stereotypes. The fact that a man ends up suffering the harm for resisting stereotypes is not even acknowledged, much less taken up as a serious concern to be prevented, to be carefully argued against and denounced.
The US EEOC was going to prosecute this case, to prevent gender discrimination in the workplace. But now such acts in defense of justice are verboten thanks to confused, inconsistent, misguided, harmful gender critical ideology. Next it will be coming to the bathroom in my kids’ schools, where trans and *any* gender non conforming kids are now openly harassed without consequences because, as the GC people tell us, these kids are “deluded” anyway, acting like biological sex isn’t the only determinative factor in their social identity. This was always the end game – some of us could always see that, for others in this profession of philosophy it took longer, and others will never admit it despite all the cruelty and harm done.
Thank you for this post, Talia, and for your work in general!
The argument here seems to be an emotional appeal to philosophers to step forward and oppose the policies and actions of the current administration, and to hold so called gender-critical philosophers especially accountable because their arguments can be seen as supportive of these abhorrent policies. I would agree that there are many things the current administration is doing and many ways they are going about it that are awful and cruel. But, the problem I am finding it difficult to just let pass here is that none of this emotional appeal really says anything about the truth or validity of the arguments of these gender critical theorists, nor really makes any case for the validity or truthfulness of gender theorists either. So, of course we should be sensitive and compassionate about the people and lives affected and should never lose sight of how our arguments have consequences, but philosophically the argument here is shallow, even if emotionally appealing. No philosophical case is made for how politically one should balance the rights of different groups; no philosophical case is made for standpoint epistemology over other more objective seeking approaches; No moral case is made for self-expression and gender identity as prima facia something to override considerations of community or normativity; no argument is made for how sex and gender are the same or different, or which is primary, or how and why the naturalistic approaches to these questions are not true; and so on. Now the current context may not be the place to make these arguments, or maybe these arguments are just assumed by everyone here, but, it is important to call it as it is and see the article presented here as an emotional politial appeal for a liberatory understanding of individual self-expression
rather than a philosophical case
The things you list that this piece of writing should accomplish strike me as a bit unrealistic. It’s a blog post. Its primary claim is that philosophers working in this area should practice more empathy towards the vulnerable population it stands to — and does — impact, given the work’s political effects. It provides ample references and citations for those who wish to learn more about the issues you raise, and does not presume to be “philosophy” in the register that you seem to imply it should. Its point is a perfectly valid one of methodology, and one that, if you read through this post’s comment section, you’ll see is sorely needed. I think that’s more than enough.
To what extent is this true of most gender critical writing and activism though? Its reliance on emotionally laden rhetoric in large press outlets. Its use of cheap sloganeering (“We Can Always Tell”). Its invocation of images that its proponents think should invoke disgust (“men in dresses”). Its accusations and insinuations that its opponents are “groomers” or in some other way intrinsically predatory. If philosophers can give all that shallowness an uncritical pass and not finger-waggingly say “Be Rational; Present a Philosophical Case,” then I think an angry guest post from someone whose community is under attack due to, in no small part, the role such writing and activism has hate in normalizing anti-trans hate in the wider culture can definitely be given a pass.
Alternatively, as Bettcher discusses in the post, so far as this concerns the philosophy profession, maybe the profession could consider why it has given all that a pass or even, in some cases and with some individuals, gone to bat for those writers and activists, defending them as “Just Asking Questions”, despite the often shallow nature of the Very Serious Answers they came up with to those questions.
“Now the current context may not be the place to make these arguments, …”
In light of this specific line, I am confused as to who your comment is even for. That’s the answer. To draw the analogy to race realism again, if a government were to institute policies that are founded on something like “Great Replacement” theory, we wouldn’t expect those opposed to such policies, especially those principally affected by them, to present a “philosophical case” or a “scientific case” or to debate the finer points of “race realist” claims about “national IQ” etc in every forum. Anger would be an appropriate response; an emotional appeal to academics to look at what lending undue seriousness to these theorists has contributed to would be an appropriate response.
That said, I think it’s arguable that calling on the profession to reflect on itself can be characterized as “emotional” in the first place. Although I suspect that, for some, the fact that this call is coming from a trans person will lead them to render it as emotional from the get-go. The demand to present something resembling an intellectual case–as the situation escalates from urgency to urgency for the persons calling for the profession to, at the bare minimum, reflect on itself, if not act in a manner commensurate with the urgency–seems like a colossal failure to read the room. And, as the author points out, it wouldn’t be the first time such a failure has enabled certain rhetoric to pass uncritically into and shape the wider culture in which these, as you rightly call them, abhorrent, awful, and cruel policies policies are situated.
Thanks, Talia, for this powerfully written and argued piece.
Too many philosophers engage in the discipline as though it’s a parlour game among friends (do trans-people exist? are some immigrants less evolved?), and then get defensive when the very real implications of their game-playing, which almost always fall on others, become apparent. Or blame it on the victims for their ‘activism.’
Could you please provide a source for ‘do trans-people exist?’ Which philosopher posed this question and where?
I think the idea is supposed to be that if gender is determined by sex, then the concept of being trans (namely, being a gender other than one determined by your sex) is incoherent. Many critics say that. But if being trans is an incoherent concept, then no one satisfies it, and thus (I believe the inference goes) no one is trans—i.e., trans people do not exist. Of course, the last claim is ambiguous. No one denies that there are existing human beings who claim to be trans. Some just deny that those existing people are—while still existing—correct. I do find the phrase “you don’t think that trans people exist!”misleading and probably politicized. Still, that’s probably what it means.)
“There are people who call themselves trans, but there is no such thing as being trans” is one of the parlor games.
Yes – and it’s precisely for this reason that many gender critical people talk about “trans identified” people rather than trans people. (Which, for that matter, is exactly why conservative Christian groups like Focus on the Family talk of ‘gay-identified’ people: what they want to imply is that there are no gay people as such, but rather people who choose to engage in sinful sexual behaviour.)
But in general this is logically coherent (without prejudice as to whether it is correct). e.g.: Many Christians believe that some people are saved and others are not; many among them think they themselves are saved. I think Christianity (qua metaphysical thesis) is probably false. As such, I think there are people who call themselves saved, but there is no such thing as being saved.
Hence, you believe there are no saved people.
Not sure of the game aspect here. People who call themselves trans are trans. It is difficult to argue for any independent criterion for being trans beyond the self identification. This is part of how the debate happens. Do we accept self-identification as ontologically constitutive or not. Do we require some independent markers or facts to ascribe the category of trans to a person. Is it possible to be wrong about one’s self-identification.
What are the independent criteria for being gay beyond self-identification?
There are many concepts where this same epistemic structure would hold. I didnt mean to imply in any way that there arent trans people. quite the opposite. but was trying to push the parlor game idea aside and point to the epistemic fork in the road. As for being gay, sure the same argument could be possibly proposed. The search for independent criteria though goes on even there. Thats where the idea of ‘born that way’ appears in opposition to it being a choice or set of behaviors. Its also where various scientists search for brain structure and such to indicate that it is really a thing. Is it a stipulation or a discovery. And, importantly no one would deny that someone is trans per se, what they deny is that they actually are a member of the class of the opposite sex. Being gay doesn’t have that same attributional problem
“And, importantly no one would deny that someone is trans per se, what they deny is that they actually are a member of the class of the opposite sex.”
This is just false — people frequently deny that there is such a thing as being ‘trans’.
This is a bit of an aside, but just wanted to comment on where you say “It’s also where various scientists search for brain structure and such to indicate that it is really a thing.”
Although such work is useful and important, it’s sometimes used to draw conclusions that go beyond what the methods are actually capable of telling us. This can lead to some dubious applications. For instance, consider the question, “is a person lying?” A company sprung up around the idea that they could use these methods to answer that question, and in a way that was meaningful to courts and other institutions, public and private, where detecting deceit is crucial. It was largely bullshit.
The hurdles to realising the company’s ambitious promises weren’t just technological either; it’s not that the methods weren’t mature enough to put to that sort of use at the time of the company’s founding and now the situation is different thanks to technical improvements. No, it’s a deeper question of whether they could be put to that sort of use at all.
To bring it back to the subject here, such methods are useful in advancing our understanding of the neural bases of, in this case, gender difference. However, they can’t tell us whether “it is really a thing.” It seems like a category error to even expect that of them as their application in research settings presumes that, in a certain sense, there is “really a thing” whose neural bases can be elucidated, with the aim of adding to the bigger picture that is our understanding of gender and sexuality. In that way, these methods are useful and important, but they can’t be used to settle questions like “is it really a thing?”
Related to that, I think Julian’s comment here is also relevant.
The game aspect is that the people who say that they don’t deny the existence of trans people because they accept the existence of people who say they are trans are the same people who say that there is no such thing as being trans because self-identifying as something doesn’t make it so. That’s almost _literally_ a parlor trick! A verbal sleight of hand.
As for the theoretical matter, I’ve been discussing it at length in here. https://dailynous.com/2025/02/10/while-tables-burn-on-the-non-existence-of-trans-people-and-the-failure-of-philosophy-guest-post/#comment-469459
not to beat a dead horse here, I don’t think the issue is the self-identification as ‘trans’ but the assertion in this self-identification of being a member of a certain class that those critical people believe has independent criterion –however fuzzy– of admission. In my reading of gender critical theorists there isn’t any denial of the existence or rights to live a full life free of discrimination or abuse of anyone who is trans; what is denied is that the assertion that the distinction between a transperson and and a nontransperson of a certain sex or gender is not a distinction and is unimportant in all contexts. So while Trump and the MAGA maniacs are over-reacting and extreme and scary, and we need to make sure people are respected and cared for, I dont think it fair to use this to push aside some important issues raised by the so called gender critical philosophers.
There is currently a widely publicized case being argued in the UK where various GC writers are insistent on calling the doctor, a trans woman, involved in the case (as respondent, I believe?) a man. There are other aspects of the case (and how it’s being reported) that warrant concern, but I think it becomes especially difficult to argue that “there isn’t any denial of the existence or rights to live a full life free of discrimination or abuse of anyone who is trans” when you have examples of this sort of performative cruelty. Likewise, when certain GC commenters call for the “elimination” of “the practice of transgenderism,” for “morally mandating” it out of existence, and so on, you don’t really get the picture that they’re much concerned with a trans persons rights to live a full life free of discrimination or abuse.
The judge in the employment Tribunal permitted the claimant, Sandie Peggie, who is suing her employer (NHS Fife), to use her preferred pronouns. “Representatives of Peggie said that using female pronouns would suggest pre-judgment in a case that revolved around sex and gender.
Kemp decided to allow both sides to use the pronouns they preferred. He said he appreciated this meant that “some of the evidence [is] liable to be painful and distressing” to Upton. https://archive.is/Bwx4k#selection-1647.0-1651.182
To be clear, I was referring to commentary outside the courtroom, including that of certain press outlets and online commenters.
I was responding to the (implicated) claim that “GC” philosophers do not debate the question “whether trans people exist” by noting that saying “there are people who call themselves trans, but there is no such thing as being trans” is taking a stance on this question.
You brought in the matter of self-identification, with no palpaple relation to this issue.
David Wallace, equally off topic, points out that “there are people who say there are X but there is no such thing as X” is a consistent position, as if this had been disputed by anyone.
I don’t think this whole discussion is about anything anymore.
On this new matter you have raised, the so-called “gender critical philosophers” are openly cheering these “extreme and scary” policies.
It’s unfair to use GC theories to hurt people, as we see happening all over the US. For example, this hospital which never did surgeries on those under 18 but which now has suspended even the provision of hormone therapy to teenagers, lest it lose reimbursements from Medicaid: https://www.denverpost.com/2025/02/05/childrens-hospital-colorado-stops-gender-affirming-care/
We don’t have to guess whether GC feminists consider this a misuse of their arguments. We can simply see whether they celebrate or protest such developments. If they abhor the cruelty, now is a great time to say so publicly.
Just to clarify: the hospital suspended the provision of blockers and cross-sex hormones for the treatment of gender dysphoria in youth. They did not suspend the provision of blockers or hormones to youth for other indications. Even among skeptics/critics of pediatric medical transition, there are disagreements about whether the suspension, or the manner in which it was carried out, was good, bad, cruel, etc.
I suppose we should be thankful that there are these “disagreements” on how cruel they should be. Some say a little, some say a lot. The debate rages on.
I did not say that there are disagreements over how cruel the suspensions should be. There are (to my knowledge) no such disagreements.
I’m writing under my real full name while you are not, so I would ask that you not put words in my mouth that might give others the impression that I hold odious views I do not hold. You’ve done this more than once.
No such disagreements? So you’re all agreed on exactly how cruel they should be? Comforting!
Ben Burgis has posted a response to Bettcher at https://benburgis.substack.com/p/philosophers-probably-shouldnt-respond.
One part:
“The comparison to ethical guidelines for scientific research is deeply misleading. Philosophers are already bound by ethical guidelines at various academic institutions when they do actual research (which even philosophers sometimes do, as, for example, when “experimental philosophers” do studies on how many non-philosophers share some intuition often appealed to in philosophical debates, or when medical ethicists who work in philosophy departments do research on how widespread some possibly unethical medical practice is). What Bettcher is talking about isn’t instituting ethical guidelines for “research on” human subjects at all. She’s talking about ethical guidelines regulating views philosophers express about human subjects.”
To adopt the tone that many here have adopted in the comments, “I am confused as to who this piece is for.”
On a more serious note, this got a chuckle out of me: “At the moment, philosophy departments are overwhelmingly socially progressive…”
I think a lot of professional philosophers overwhelmingly regard themselves as socially progressive; they’ll overwhelmingly, as Burgis does in this piece, decry the “abhorrent” moves of the vulgar Trump, with ample finger-wagging to spare for the cronies surrounding him; and then they’ll overwhelmingly return to arguing procedural matters that, while certainly important, should be the least of their concerns—while the tables burn.
Some will go further and take a position on the issues that is, in many respects, identical to that of the administration they’ve decried as abhorrent, but balk at any suggestion that their views could be construed as such by (as we’ve seen some try in this thread) emphasizing the difference in, again, procedures (and maybe, to a certain extent, aesthetics): The administration is vulgar, uncouth, and doesn’t take the time to read philosophy journals, whereas we here are Very Serious Thinkers, advancing a line of research. How dare you suggest that the fruits of all that might be a set of views that is in any way shared by a deeply regressive government! Don’t you know that philosophy departments are overwhelmingly socially progressive?
I think it’s unfortunate that Unsure misrepresented my critical remarks about Trans Philosopher’s claims above. The criticisms could, alternatively, have been recognized as a call for more effective, anti-ableist ways that Trans Philosopher (and oppositional philosophers more generally) could motivate their claims, ways that do not reinstate the (transphobic, ableist, sexist, and racist) assumptions that underpin the status quo of mainstream philosophy and feminist philosophy.
If one looks at the histories of feminist and lesbian and gay movements (in particular before BTQI were acknowledged), one can identify the ways in which the centres of these movements have attempted to gain legitimacy by appeals to normality, in effect, moving the goalposts that their oppressors themselves erected. “We’re OK,” “we’re normal,” “we’re healthy,” “we’re hard-working,” “we’re consumers,” “we’re not one of them,” “we’re not like that,” etc. That’s, in a nutshell, what Trans Philosopher’s claim did and what I am calling out as a conceptually and politically ineffective and, hence, inadequate strategy.
A more effective strategic direction for oppositional thinkers and organizers to go is to unrelentingly undermine the notion of normality and its cohorts themselves, in all the innumerable ways that they are mobilized. *How* does normal gender function in the context of this Daily Nous discussion? *How* have disabled people been positioned as the Other to normality (and normal gender) in this discussion? *How* is normality reproduced in the discourses of gender critical feminism? In other words, “how” questions are the tool that I (contra Trans Philosopher) think we need, certainly much more than we need a new definition of what counts as normal and healthy, as Trans Philosopher’s claims suggest.
The emphasis on “how” questions derives from Michel Foucault: the first disabled philosopher of disability whose pathbreaking contributions to the emergence of queer theory and the problematization of gender and sexuality are largely ignored in philosophy, including in feminist philosophical work on sex and gender.
The ineffective strategy that I have pointed out derives from the (analytic) philosopher’s preoccupation with questions about “what” and “why.” Indeed, it’s a truly unfortunate development of feminist philosophy that the discourse on gender has come to be dominated by a handful of analytic feminist philosophers who largely talk amongst themselves about “what” gender is and “what” it is not (e.g., is it an identity or not an identity? Is it sometimes a pathology? Is it a product of sex?) rather than “how” gender is, how it came to be, how it functions, etc. For the latter discussions of gender, we need Foucault, and we need historical approaches, that is, historically and culturally sensitive approaches such as genealogy rather than the ahistorical and decontextualized analyses that currently dominate the fields of feminist philosophy, feminist theory, trans philosophy, and mainstream work on disability.
I agree that being normal is not, in itself, a good, and should not be made out to be one.
Regarding the issues philosophers should look at, Western society seems to be divided by the issue of how to classify people as “men” and “women”. This in turn seems to rest on a disagreement over what it is to be a man or a woman.
Hey Nonny Mouse wrote: “I agree that being normal is not, in itself, a good, and should not be made out to be one.”
>Normality (or the alleged human characteristic of “being normal”) is not essentially a good, but rather a technology of power relations (that is, a technology of “government,” in the sense that Foucault used the term).
Hey Nonny Mouse wrote: “Regarding the issues philosophers should look at, Western society seems to be divided by the issue of how to classify people as “men” and “women”. This in turn seems to rest on a disagreement over what it is to be a man or a woman.”
> How did this “disagreement” come to be a problem in the first place? How did identifying (or classifying) differences between “men” and “women” come to be a concern of the utmost importance? These sorts of (“how”) questions are directed at what Foucault referred to as inquiry into the “problematization” of phenomena. Foucault’s studies of the problems of abnormality, deviance, perversion, and madness (among other things) were not intended to provide normative responses to the phenomena that these problems comprise but rather were designed to show how these phenomena became thinkable, that is, emerged as problems to which solutions came to be sought. Following Foucault, inquiry into the problematization of a given state of affairs attempts to uncover how the different solutions to a problem have been constructed, as well as how these different solutions resulted from the problematization of that given state of affairs in the first place.
This response is worth reading:
https://benburgis.substack.com/p/philosophers-probably-shouldnt-respond?utm_source=substack&publication_id=1243449&post_id=157105119&utm_medium=email&utm_content=share&utm_campaign=email-share&action=share&triggerShare=true&isFreemail=true&r=1eqdal&triedRedirect=true
I agree that: (1) Gender critical feminists and their allies are wrong to think their arguments about gender merely pursue truth and don’t inflict grave harm.
(2) So is anyone who thinks it is morally fine to pursue any line of inquiry whatsoever; it isn’t, the potential harm matters. Consider: which ethnic group members are statistically most likely to commit some horrible act?
(3) Nothing about (1) and (2) implies that the speech or anything else of those who pursue such morally problematic inquiries ought to be restrained or banned. They shouldn’t pursue it; we shouldn’t harm or muzzle them if they do. Both are independent points.
(4) The harm that so-called arguments about gender and trans folks inflicts has increased dramatically in recent days.
(5) Those trans are the truly vulnerable and truly victimized in this story, much more so than the allegedly no-platformed gender critical scholars.
Yes, hear hear, all true.
BUT, absolutely NONE of this implies ANYTHING about the MOTIVES or CHARACTER of the people who have publicly pursued the arguments that (I agree!) immorally caused harm to trans folks. There are a number of good intentions they could well have had, and it is wrong to impute less innocent motives to them just because it makes them easier to hate and shun. Or for any other reason. Rage is not self-vindicating, and it certainly doesn’t vindicate vilifying others when the evidence underdetermines it. Such vilification is itself a culpable act of bad faith. Besides, talking about the harm they culpably inflict makes a strong enough case on its own. Stick to what you can show.
I think one needs to demonstrate the harm caused by certain inquiries. I find so much of these arguments sophistic and circular. If something is harmful, then sure one should try to avoid harming anyone. Goes without saying. But, isnt this precisely what is being debated? The harm often claimed by trans advocates and gender theorists is connected with their assumption of the truth of precisely the position being challenged by the gender critical thinkers. I think it important to also distinguish two types of harm blurred together. On the one hand the obvious harm of bullying, violence, and discrimination. These are a reality in the world and everyone, including trans persons should be protected. But these sorts of harms arent the same as the harms gender critical thinkers supposedly cause. Those harms are only harms if one believes and has certainty that the metaphysical and ideological claims of gender/ trans theorists are true. For example, excluding persons with penises from women’s safe spaces is only harm if one accepts the premise that a person with a penis could be a woman constituted solely by their self-identification. If one doesn’t accept the premise then the harm becomes the harm one feels when one is disagreed with, or challenged, or when one is frustrated because the world isn’t what we want it to be.
But thats not why trans activists argue trans women being excluded from women’s spaces is an active harm. Lets try to be a bit more charitable here, though I can grant maybe trans activists haven’t phrased things well, in which case I will answer to this.
As far as i understand it, the argument goes that excluding trans women from women’s spaces often feels humiliating and degrading for the trans woman, who often in most cases will have some level of lived experience as a trans woman in the world, and if she is especially lucky, will have been accepted as a woman by most those she encounters (especially if she passes). Excluding trans women then from women spaces as a total solution to these issues then would be regarded as humiliating and a form of bullying and harm causing.
If all that was at stake was merely rejecting an identity (in which case, why would trans people even be arguing about this anyway?) we would expect them to put up their hands and move on with their lives once somebody said they didn’t agree. And yet we know that saying something like “Trans women are really just men with penises” has deeper consequences and is usually regarded as intrinsically humiliating and degrading for a person who is spending a considerable amount of time, energy and effort to transition.
As another note, most of us know that no matter how much we “wish it to be a certain way” that things like gender neutral stalls or spaces do not exist as a default. So the trans woman must often under a Gender Criticals standpoint subject herself to the discomfort and often humiliating process of using male restrooms and changing rooms for the explicit purpose of preventing female discomfort in the locker room. And if this is the case… well, why does female discomfort seem to override the discomfort of trans women forced into male spaces as a result of exclusion? By the lights of your argument, i could just say that Gender Criticals only experience harm from trans women in women’s restrooms if they accept the premise that only people with vaginas are women; otherwise, the harm at stake is mere disagreement or frustration with the world not “being the way they want it to be”.
Similarly, many Gender Critical arguments do hinge on the assumption that trans women are fundamentally predators until proven otherwise… if the purpose of female “safe spaces” is to protect them from predatory males, then it follows that excluding trans women as a whole from those spaces would also imply that those same trans women are also “predatory males”.
As another hinge of these issues, trans philosophers have taken great pains to show how the denial of trans women and men’s identification in fact does tend to correlate with violent injustices committed against them. I understand where you are coming from, but the point of the article is to show how Gender Critical talking points, whether they like it or not, can be associated with negative violent effects against transgender people. The recent executive order labeled “DEFENDING WOMEN FROM GENDER IDEOLOGY EXTREMISM AND RESTORING BIOLOGICAL TRUTH TO THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT” Should be evidence enough, i would think, of how this kind of rhetoric supports both government and socially oriented acts of violence against transgender people.
Also, can we really describe Gender Critical philosophy as a form of inquiry? im inclined to think it isn’t much of an inquiry at all, seeing as how basic exploration of the questions of gender never seem to be the issue at stake (in which case most of us would probably welcome gender critical philosophers) but a certain ideology espoused by Gender Criticals (I mean its in the name… Gender Critical. Not Gender Curious or Gender lets Explore Together)
I don’t think one can meaningfully say that they oppose “the obvious harm of bullying, violence, and discrimination” and then say that they don’t understand how “GC” rhetoric either leads to, enables, or legitimizes that harm. It has to, because of the specific claims being made—that trans people are “groomers”, that they are a “monsters” whom “decent” men must “eradicate”, that “morally mandating it [transness] out of existence” is a worthwhile pursuit, that we should strive for the “elimination” of “the practice of transgenderism”. This rhetoric is extreme and its consequences clear: the removal of trans people from public life. And how will that be achieved if not through bullying, violence, discrimination, and other harmful measures?