Author Gender in Elite Philosophy Journals (guest post) (updated)
What percentage of the authors in elite philosophy journals are women?
That’s the question Eric Schwitzgebel (UC Riverside) takes up in the following guest post.
(A version of this post first appeared at Professor Schwitzgebel’s blog, The Splintered Mind.)
Author Gender in Elite Philosophy Journals
by Eric Schwitzgebel
In some ways, the gender situation has been improving in philosophy. Women now constitute about 40% of graduating majors in philosophy in the U.S., up from about 32% in the 1980s-2010s. There is, I think, substantially more awareness of gender issues and the desirability of gender diversity than there was fifteen years ago. And yet, at the highest levels of impact and prestige, philosophy remains overwhelmingly male.
One measure of this is authorship in elite philosophy journals. For this post, I examined the past two years’ tables of contents of Philosophical Review, Mind, Journal of Philosophy, and Noûs—widely considered to be the most elite general philosophy journals in mainstream Anglophone philosophy. (Some rankings put Philosophy & Phenomenological Research alongside these four.) I estimated the gender of each author of each article, commentary, or response (excluding book reviews and editorial prefaces), based on gender-typical name, gender-typical photo, pronoun use, and/or personal knowledge, generally using at least two criteria. Of 291 included authors, there were only two who were either non-binary or defied classification—in both cases, based on an expressed preference for they/them pronouns. There’s always a risk of mistake, but for the most part I expect that my gender classifications accurately reflect how the authors identify and are perceived, with at most a 1-2% error rate.
Overall, I found:
Authorship Rates In Four Elite Philosophy Journals (Past Two Years):
Women: 46 authorships
Men: 243 authorships
Nonbinary/unclassified: 2 authorships
Percent women: 16%
Women now earn about 30% of PhDs in the United States and constitute almost 30% of American Philosophical Association members who report their gender, so authorship in these journals is substantially more gender-skewed than faculty in the US. Of course, many authors are neither located nor received their PhD in the US, so these percentages aren’t strictly comparable. However, PhD and faculty percentages are broadly similar in the United Kingdom and, impressionistically, in other high-income Anglophone countries. (I’m less sure outside the English-speaking world, but researchers in non-Anglophone countries author only a small percentage of articles in elite Anglophone journals; see here for an analysis of the insularity of Anglophone philosophy.)
Now, one possible explanation of this skew is that women are more likely to specialize in ethics than in other areas of philosophy (see these ten-year-old data), and these four journals publish relatively little ethics. To explore this possibility, I did two things:
First, I coded each article in the big four journals as either “ethics” or “non-ethics”, based on the title or the abstract (if the title was ambiguous). I included political philosophy, social philosophy, metaethics, and history of ethics as ethics. (Of course, there were some gray-area cases and judgment calls.)
Second, I added two journals to my list: Ethics and Philosophy & Public Affairs, generally considered the two most elite ethics journals (though after the editorial turmoil at PPA last year, it’s not clear whether this will remain true of PPA).
In the big four, I classified 60/291 (21%) authorships as ethics. (Perhaps this is a slight underrepresentation of ethics in these journals, relative to the proportion of research faculty in the Anglophone world who specialize in ethics?) In these journals, I found that indeed women have a higher percentage of ethics authorships than non-ethics authorships:
Authorship by Gender in Big 4 Philosophy Journals Ethics vs. Non-Ethics
Ethics: 17/60 (28% women)
Non-ethics: 29/231 (13% women)
[Fisher’s exact 2-tail, p = .005]
If we juice up the sample size by adding in Ethics and PPA, we get the following:
Authorship by Gender in 6 Elite Philosophy Journals Ethics vs. Non-Ethics
Ethics: 40/142 (29% women)
Non-ethics: 29/231 (13% women)
[Fisher’s exact 2-tail, p < .001]
Strikingly, women appear to be more than twice as likely to author ethics articles than non-ethics articles.
Ten years ago, I did some similar analyses, comparing ethics vs. non-ethics authorships in two-year bins every 20 years from 1955 to 2015. In those samples, too, I found women to author only a small percentage of articles in elite journals overall (13% in 2014-2015) and to be more likely to author in ethics, so the trends are historically consistent.
UPDATE (4/29/25): Some readers have taken issue with Schwitzgebel’s identification of “the most elite” philosophy journals. There are some who object that this kind of fine-grained ranking of philosophy journals is absurd. There are others who think Schwitzgebel is not using the proper ranking, and who reminded me of this post about a meta-ranking of philosophy journals, according to which the top four in the meta-ranking are Noûs, Philosophical Studies, Philosophy & Phenomenological Research, and Synthese and the top four according to a survey conducted by the creator of the meta-ranking, Boudewijn de Bruin (Groningen), are Noûs, Philosophy & Phenomenological Research, Mind, and Philosophical Review. This table, from de Bruin’s article about the meta-rankings, shows how generalist journals rank in terms of a few areas of specialization, including ethics, and so may be of particular interest when assessing issues at the intersection of subject matter and author gender.
I am a woman who works mainly in areas that these journals publish a fair amount in. I rarely submit to these journals not because I don’t think my work is good enough, but because I simply think of all four of them as quite conservative in approach (in different ways, each with its own identity) in a way that doesn’t match my own approach. (I think of Phil Review as the least conservative of the four and have repeatedly submitted there and gotten very helpful comments, and will likely submit there again.) I think of PPR as much friendlier to my approach and submit there more often (and have published there). I don’t think I’m alone in these assessments or in my own work not quite lining up with what they seem to be interested in. I think women working in LEMMing areas are often doing things that is slightly more out of the box and so may be self selecting away from submitting to these journals and/or being rejected by them more often (if I’m right about their identities which I very much think I am).
Hannah Arendt, Susan Sontag, Simone de Beauvoir, Simone Weil, et al. If you wanted to find intellectual women thinkers, you can.
This is puzzling reply.
It’s a questioning of the question Eric is investigating
No.
If it was meant to be a reply to Eric, it would have made more sense as a top-level comment rather than as a response to someone else’s comment making a different point. If you want people to understand your comment, you might delete it and re-post it in the intended place.
It might also be helpful to have given a bit more explanation of how you think this is responsive to what Eric is investigating. He’s not looking to see whether “intellectual women thinkers” exist – he is well aware of their existence! Instead, he is interested in a different question – in a particular genre of philosophical publication, how many women are published?
You literally replied to an intellectual woman so I think our collective search may indeed be over.
It’s interesting to see the different approaches to “philosophy” – some as cultural production/maintenance and some as actual philosophy. I feel like feminists are epistemology refugees from the philosophy department.
By way of comparison with the sciences, Nature recently published data on this:
https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-025-00891-w
(TL;DR: it doesn’t look good for philosophy)
That article finds several branches of physics at around 15-16% women, and several branches of health sciences around 50-53% women. It looks like that study also involved a large number of journals in every field, rather than a small number of particularly prestigious ones – I expect in every field, there will be clusters of journals that are much higher than the disciplinary average, and clusters of journals that are much lower than the disciplinary average. (That study notes some differences by home institution of authors, but doesn’t talk about differences by journal.)
I don’t know if this is controversial, but it’s not meant to be: what if you control for pregnancy, maternity leave, time off work for newly-born children, and other factors that would affect women’s publication rate, but not men’s.
My wife, for example, has spent somewhere around six years (about 30% of my publishing career), with more pressing concerns than publication.
So, while recognizing that these considerations don’t apply to everyone, I still wonder if it’s a substantial effect that could be measured, and that could account some *some* (i.e., not all) of the variance Eric notes in his studies.
what were you doing during those six years?
odd response.
It is relevant. For women who get pregnant, they are not at a moral obligation universally to be the one who take several years off work to engage in childcare. It is possible for men to make such sacrifices to their career, and if employers are not offering paternal leave to new fathers then that is part of the problem.
Regardless, this discrepancy better explains career gaps and income discrepancies. While still affiliated with a university, women can still work on and submit manuscripts. Not having the time and energy to do so still raises the question of what their partners are doing to support them. It also doesn’t explain the discipline discrepancy between ethics and non-ethics.
This is nonsense, and as a woman who has given birth and breastfed more than a couple of babies, I hate it. My husband cannot get pregnant. He cannot breastfeed. That is not HIS FAULT. Because I am a woman, a mother, that labor is mine and no one else’s. To act as if there is no unique contribution that women make to the process of childbearing and those early months of infant care, nothing that men could not just as easily do, is the height of stupidly and offensive, to boot.
There are probably large differences in publishing patterns across career-stage, and hence across journals. Thus, perhaps the gender disparity you point out in top journals reflects the gender disparity at the stage of tenured or full professor. I’m not suggesting that only tenured and full professors submit to the Big Four or anything absurd like that, but I’d be very surprised if more established professors did not make up a larger proportion of submissions to top journals as compared to less well-regarded journals.
All of this is to say: Sure, maybe 30% of philosophers are women and only 13% of top publications are written by women, but we have every reason to think that the philosophers submitting to the top journals are skewed in the direction of established professors, where we know gender disparities are greatest. Hence the relevant comparison isn’t 13% to 30%. That 13% figure should be compared with the % of women in the pool of submitted articles, which might be much lower than 30% for all I suspect.
I have occasionally heard from editors that women constitute a similarly small proportion’s of submissions to their journals. I have no knowledge about how it breaks down by rank, though. Sometimes senior philosophers prefer invited submissions over the standard anonymous review process that these four journals normally use.
Across a number of different journals, my experience has been that the majority of submissions, by some margin, come from more junior people (and increasingly so in more recent years).
This is interesting data. However, I would have thought we should focus on the fairness of journal refereeing processes [increasing genuine blind review] rather than the outcomes of demographic groups.
I would say “in addition to” rather than “rather than”. These tell us different things. Differential outcomes are worth knowing about whether or not they reflect anything unfair or unjust.
Thanks. I guess I agree but Eric’s post quite clearly suggests that the differential outcomes are problematic. That assumption seems to me mistaken unless they reflect unfairness in the method of choosing papers to publish.
The outcome-procedure dichotomy is incomplete here. Maybe the procedure is perfectly fair but too few women consider submitting to those journals because, say, they were discouraged from doing so or women who want to work in the area are not sufficiently supported or mentored. I don’t know, but if factors like these explained lower submission rates then they might also explain lower publication rates even given a perfectly fair procedure and might be worth addressing. Again, I don’t know, but pointing to the procedure strikes me as overly narrow.
In 2010, The Journal of Philosophy implemented triple-anonymous review as an explicit attempt to counteract gender bias in the process of selecting papers. In the past 10 years, our journal also shifted from reviewing mostly in-house (that is, by members of our editorial board) to mostly by external referees. From what I can tell, neither of these changes moved the needle — no more than 20% of accepted papers have been by female-identifying authors.
Thanks, Alyssa. Having adopted these (excellent) reviewing practices and seen no change, do you (or the editors) regard the 20% figure as a problem *for the journal*?
Thanks very much for asking. I’ll provide a personal response later today.
So, to my knowledge, the editors don’t seek a particular gender distribution. We might first want to make sure that the distribution of accepted papers roughly matches the distribution of submitted papers. The perception that submitting to our journal, or another one like it, is not worth doing — this troubles me a lot, and it’s a problem that we’ve been working on for some time. My (our) work on this front is far from done. I can’t imagine resting on our laurels until authors such as Non conformer, above, have confidence that our editors and reviewers are likely to read their work with sensitivity and interest, as well as with respect for the author’s time.
Thanks.
I suppose this data needs to be considered in light of a few other factors. For example, how many women are in TT (or pre-TT) positions where their Department’s publication standards explicitly expect them to publish in these top journals for tenure? (Given what I know of a few dept’s standards, it seems quite likely that only the top 10 or even top 5 Leiterrific Departments would have this expectation… and even for the TT women at such Departments, they might be eager to move to another Dept within the next 5-6 years, so why bother satisfying one’s present Dept’s overly demanding standards?) Since these journals are notoriously hyper-selective, and some of them can take 6-12 months just to return an initial verdict, there are good reasons why women (and many men) would avoid submitting to these journals: landing a paper at other widely respected journals might serve their (tenure) purposes just as well, and it might be (or at least feel) more achievable if those journals’ rejection rates aren’t quite so high.
Second, many women might be being coached, or encouraged, not to waste their time submitting to such journals… this could be because others share their discouraging stories of trying to do so; or they have seen that doing so can take 1.5 years to get an eventual rejection. (It could also be that landing the TT job at the top Departments the hardest part, and if after a few years you are well-regarded in your Dept, you are effectively told that their tenure standards really don’t require publishing in such journals even though it would help one’s case if one can do so… indeed, it could be that many men as well as women are coached in this way in some Depts, to try to retain people they think they are likely to tenure anyway.)
Could part of the disparity may be explained by differences in publishing strategies or the actual writing? women may be more likely to approach publishing from a bottom-up perspective… aiming to build a record of solid work rather than prioritizing prestige-driven placements… and may also tend to write in ways that are more cautious or less assertively authoritative, which could affect perceptions of fit for top journals.
This is key! The last paper I wrote was rejected by an anonymous reviewer who provided only a short paragraph of feedback. In this paragraph, they (very probably a “he”) stated that my results weren’t “striking enough.” I am now rewriting the paper “as if I were a male” to see if this leads to a publication.
Women philosophers: reviewers are mostly male, mostly old. Never forget that.
What does it mean to write a paper as if one is male? I’m genuinely curious. And what it is about men that inclines them to demand more “striking” results than women?
While I’m not the commenter – writing with confidence, authority, assertiveness has been hard for me, personally. When you already have a sense of belonging in the space, you don’t feel like you need to hedge, proceed with caution, oracknowledge competing perspectives. Seeking authority vs demanding authority can be challenging and i’ve found myself in the former, not the latter. I don’t want to speak for other women, but i’ve noticed this in my own experience.
while there are obviously very assertive women (and some may be overcompensatingly so), and while I can’t speaker for the commentator, I personally find it difficult writing without tons of hedges. I am not sure how it relates to confidence. I guess I am confident in the content, but not confident in social roles “announcing” the content assertively.
People did read to the end right? I take it that the result is that there is not really much of a gender disparity, once you account for more women doing work in ethics and the subject distribution of journals. IIRC women are about 30% of the philosophy professoriate, so these results are entire non-surprising and non-problematic (which is not to say they’re not worth laying out).
Reading the replies here will give you a pretty good feel of what the actual problem is and why I’m not optimistic about a solution. Regardless of what data is presented, there will always be enough ways to interpret it that we never steer too far from whatever course of action we wanted to take anyways.
This isn’t a unique problem to philosophy, but it’s ironic how easy it is to see in discussions of philosophy.
Your post seems applicable to both those who think the representation mismatch is a problem and those who don’t
Some context worth mentioning when looking at differences between representation % and citation % is that citation patterns tend to follow power law or log-normal distributions, rather than normal (‘bell-curve’) distributions.
In the blog’s follow-up post and Eric’s writings elsewhere, a major (but not necessarily exhaustive) justification for the goal of increasing the representation of underrepresented groups is that it increases the diversity of perspectives (and similar notions).
One reading of “perspectives” is in terms that cash out in philosophically substantive ways. Under this interpretation, this justification seemingly faces a dilemma: one either claims that demographic groups are significantly different in philosophically substantive ways or they aren’t.
On one horn, claiming that demographic groups are significantly different in philosophically substantive ways raises worries about essentialism. For example, it seemingly relies upon there being a women’s way (at least statistically) of doing metaphysics that is different from the men’s way of doing metaphysics. This would render demographic preferences to be as relatively innocuous as viewpoint/school/methodological preferences (e.g., it extends whatever acceptability attaches to “This is and should remain an analytic department” to “This is and should remain a men’s department”).
On the other horn, claiming that demographic groups are *not* significantly different in philosophically substantive ways renders increasing the representation of underrepresented groups an ineffective means of pursuing philosophically substantive diversity. After all, if philosophically substantive diversity is a worthwhile goal, then we should be trying to increase the representation of minority positions taken in the PhilPapers survey, not underrepresented demographics.
Therefore, if diversity of perspectives is interpreted as cashing out in philosophically substantive ways, then it is either a problematic or an uncompelling justification for increasing the representation of underrepresented demographic groups.
(It’s worth noting that diversity is a relative newcomer to justifications for increasing representation, which got much more propulsion from its amenability to Supreme Court justices than from its force in philosophical arguments.)
If I grant group Y and group X differ statistically with respect to their approach to metaphysics, what exactly is the essentialism worry? The thought is that my explanation for this difference would advert to essences? What if I think the explanation is (e.g.) socialization? No essences required! Can I grasp the first horn of the dilemma without any fear?
Also, I’m a little unsure what you mean by saying that this horn of the dilemma “extends whatever acceptability attaches to ‘This is and should remain an analytic department’ to ‘This is and should remain a men’s department’.” I do not understand how that follows. If I think it’s good to be an analytic department and terrible to be a Continental department, and if I think both analytic and Continental are viewpoint/school/methodological positions, then am I committed to the view that “this is and should remain an analytic department” is just as acceptable as “this is and should remain a Continental department?” If I am, I am thereby incoherent, and I ought to give up at least one of the things I believe. Apparently I can’t give up the third (the “just as acceptable…” claim) because you say it follows from the second (analytic and Continental are viewpoint/school/methodological positions). But I don’t see how it follows from the second.
Or, to put it another way, you seem to be saying that if something is a viewpoint/school/methodological difference it must be something about which we cannot have preferences which differ from the preference we have for every other viewpoint/school/methodology. All viewpoints/schools/methodologies are equally good. Is that what you believe? I’m inclined to reject that (not with respect to analytic and Continental – I think both are great and am just using them as the example).
Hi Daniel,
Thanks for the thorough reply!
Regarding the first horn of the dilemma and whether claiming that demographic groups are significantly different in a philosophically substantive way raises worries about essentialism, I agree with your objection that it need not raise worries about essentialism (per se). A more precise term is needed here. The precise term would regard tying demographic groups to traits and include a spectrum in the tie’s strength, such that the tie stemming from a difference in essence would be at one end of the spectrum. The implicature of raising the issue of the tie would be that the tie is problematic; however, that can be contested. I would think that some people would reject the claim that there’s “a women’s way (at least statistically) of doing metaphysics that is different from the men’s way of doing metaphysics” such that the tie is significant, even if the tie stems “merely” from culture or socialization. For instance, it seems objectionable to claim that there’s a Hispanic way of doing metaphysics. While this issue need not involve any of Eric’s commitments, with respect to an objection to Eric’s position, a constraint upon rebuttals is that it must retain that the underrepresentation of demographic groups is problematic. The more one accepts the claim that demographic groups are significantly different in a philosophically substantive way, the less problematic underrepresentation becomes (at least prima facie). This may clarify the “analytic department” part. If the top journals underrepresent continental philosophy, this is *not* highly objectionable. The more demographic groups are significantly different in philosophically substantive ways, the more the underrepresentation of demographic groups is coextensive with unproblematic (or at least, less problematic) underrepresentation, such as an underrepresentation of continental philosophy.
I am still not seeing why I would be tempted to endorse this claim:
Consider: the more epistemology and metaphysics are significantly different in philosophically interesting ways (or: the more ancient Greek and classical Indian philosophy are significantly different in philosophically interesting ways), the more the underrepresentation of epistemologists (or: people who specialize in ancient Greece) is coextensive with unproblematic (or at least, less problematic) underrepresentation, such as an underrepresentation of Continental philosophy.
The only way I can make my claims work is if we read a lot into “or at least, less problematic.” I am happy to grant that it’s less problematic in the same way I am willing to grant that a $4 million house is less expensive than a $4.2 million house. But just like the housed comparative claim don’t really help us figure out whether both houses are expensive (they are), the philosophy comparative claims don’t really help us figure out whether the philosophy practices in question are problematic.
My own view is that it would be problematic if we got less epistemology than metaphysics or less ancient Greek philosophy than classical Indian philosophy; I’d prefer more or less maximum diversity. (Thus it’s hard for me to think of an example of philosophy I wouldn’t miss out on if we didn’t have enough of it – I don’t think Continental philosophy is in this category, for instance.)
Perhaps I’m missing something. I do know that many people disagree about Continental philosophy (or, for that matter, Continental philosophers disagree about analytic philosophy). So, these people would say that lack of diversity via the loss of Continental philosophy in top journals is not bad. Indeed, it’s actively good. But is anyone tempted to say this about philosophy written by women? Since you’re anonymous, I imagine you should feel free to say this if you believe it, but I take it you don’t think there’s such thing as philosophy written by women as a substantive category here in the first place, so I don’t think you’d endorse that claim. I certainly don’t endorse the claim. Does anyone simultaneously think philosophy written by women is potentially a distinct category and that it would be bad to have more of it?
I think you might be overthinking this.
I take the point to be that if a journal is demographically out of step with its discipline, then it’s losing out on some good work being done. The rough and ready assumption is that different demographic groups produce high quality work at roughly the same rate, so skewed demographic representation is a proportionate skew in quality.
An extremal case would be a journal where 95% of the papers are produced by a demographic making up 5% of the discipline. There’d be good reason to say that this journal is out of step with the debates of its discipline. Again, presuming that the relevant demographics produce high quality work at the same rates. This seems to be a situation that a generalist journal would want to avoid, for entirely prudential reasons.
At the danger of overthinking it myself, there is a non-problematic version of your first horn. Even without engaging in essentialization oneself, one may acknowledge that some groups are *being essentialized* by society at large. That is, some people occupy distinct social positions from which they make distinct experiences. Not because they share an essence but because others assume (falsely) that they share an essence and treat them differently based on the assumption. I think this is a mainstream view in feminist philosophy.
Combined with the above, the view seems to be this: social position may affect one’s viewpoint, but it doesn’t affect the quality of one’s work.
As a woman in philosophy, I’m not surprised – these are the dinosaur journals, and dinosaurs are the bastions of the past. I see lots of women doing different work: more interdisciplinary, more applied, more turned towards real-life issues. With such issues, you need not even try these journals (I never have, and my “career” has worked out fine). I think we should have a honest conversation about what we consider “elite”. There seems to be a lingering expectation that if women come into a field, they have to do exactly what men did it in, rather than having the right (maybe even the duty?) to change that field. This is problematic.
This is one of those important phenomena where people will fixate on causes that support their political orientation and ignore causes that do not. There are certainly gendered differences in interest, approaches, and writing style, and subsequent access to the dinosaur journals. Family leave/pregnancy likely also play some role, as does the possible dearth of supportive partners in pregnancy.
Also, in my anecdotal experience, women are socialized to be highly agreeable and thus have a harder time saying no to extra service burdens. I very much hope this will change, and that we can mentor young woman PhD students away from this (and male students towards being sure that they do their fair share).
Carolyn Dicey Jennings’ data on hiring practices re: gender may be relevant as well. The field has generally been trying to correct for historical biases by prioritizing women in the TT hiring process, which does mean that the publication numbers are unlikely to be equal. We should accept that this is a likely long-term consequence of the general policy, if only because it further incentivizes male PhD students to publish like mad.
You might consider that it’s not that we are “socialized to be highly agreeable and thus have a harder time saying no to extra service burdens” but rather, at least in my department and literally every other one I know of, that men are simply refusing to do their fair share of work, and that our commitment to that work has nothing to do with our agreeableness or difficulty saying no, and everything to do with the fact that we care about the basic functioning, fairness, etc. of our workplace communities. If I didn’t do the service work I did, no one would do it, or someone would do the worst, most half-assed job of it. I’ve witnessed what happens when men who don’t care about the service requirements of their jobs become chairs, directors of graduate studies, placement directors, sit on important university committees, run graduate admissions, etc. My willingness to step in is absolutely NOT agreeable (and I make that very clear to my colleagues). Other people are simply not doing their jobs. Mostly white men are not doing their jobs.
There needs to be more policing, by all, to ensure that faculty are meeting their service requirements for the jobs they hold. And it is also true that Women may take on more service requirements out of the worry that someone else would do a worse job. The role that both of these considerations play in women’s publication numbers is important, especially in proportion to men’s ability to publish.
Beware of any proposal that starts with ‘there needs to be more policing’.
Two more tangential items:
(1) In scholarly publishing, there has been a large gap between female representation in general and who occupies leadership roles:
“Several studies in recent years have revealed that the scholarly publishing workforce identifies as predominantly white (up to 85%), female (up to 76%), heterosexual (83%), and without disability (89%) (Roberts, 2021), (C4DISC, n.d.). Additionally, despite the fact that publishing is a majority female profession, researchers have found that older white males more frequently advance to leadership (Taylor, Spilka, Monahan, Mulhern, & Wachter, 2020) and there is a significant gender pay gap within the profession (Page, 2020). “
https://osc.universityofcalifornia.edu/scholarly-publishing/diversity-equity-and-inclusion-in-scholarly-communication/scholarly-publishers/
(2) The American Academy of Arts and Sciences has released a Philosophy Report on departments in the US:
https://www.amacad.org/humanities-indicators/philosophy-departments-profile