“The Return of the Dire Wolf” announced Time magazine—not quite correctly, it turns out—in its article on the creation of three creatures genetically engineered into existence by the firm Colossal Biosciences.

Still, the biotechnology that led to the creation of those wolves is impressive. It opens a lot of possibilities, and of course raises a lot of questions, both about our understanding of what this technology actually does and our sense of how it should (and shouldn’t) be used. Those questions are taken up by several philosophers in this edition of Philosophers On.

Philosophers On is an occasional series of group posts on issues of current interest, with the aim of showing what the careful thinking characteristic of philosophers (and occasionally scholars in related fields) can bring to popular ongoing conversations. The contributions that the authors make to these posts are not fully worked out position papers, but rather brief thoughts that can serve as prompts for further reflection and discussion.

The guest editor of this post is Benjamin Hale (University of Colorado at Boulder). The authors are: Avram Hiller (Porland State University), Jay Odenbaugh (Lewis & Clark College), Clare Palmer and Corinne Persinger (Texas A&M), Yasha Rohwer (Oregon Institute of Technology), and Derek Turner (Connecticut College). Thanks to all of them for contributing to this post.

Philosophers On The Science & Ethics of Resurrecting Extinct Species

CONTENTS

Hunting Down the Consequences
by Avram Hiller

Going Extinct Twice: On the Reasons for Resurrecting Dire Wolves
by Jay Odenbaugh

Function over Purity: Could this Be the Future of Conservation?
by Corinne Persinger and Clare Palmer

Do We Need “Dire Wolves”?
by Yasha Rohwer

Game of Clones
by Derek Turner

Hunting Down the Consequences
by Avram Hiller

A for-profit company, Colossal, recently announced that it has bred three dire wolves named Romulus, Remus, and Khaleesi. Thus, according to Colossal, the dire wolf is now a de-extinct species. This raises lots of scientific and ethical questions. Where to begin?

As others have pointed out, Colossal did not in fact create dire wolves. Rather, it bred wolves with mostly gray wolf DNA with a small amount of dire wolf thrown in. And even if Colossal had succeeded in creating dire wolves, there are good reasons to question whether de-extinction of species is an appropriate ecological goal.

However, often neglected in species-promotion initiatives is concern for the welfare of individual non-human animals. For instance, the US Fish and Wildlife Service is issuing permits for the killing of up to 470,000 barred owls in the hopes that the culling will help prevent the extinction of the northern spotted owl. The FWS environmental impact statement notes that less than 1% of barred owls will be killed, and thus the plan does not have a significant negative effect on barred owls (as a species). But no weight is given to the significant negative consequences that will befall the hundreds of thousands of individual barred owls who may be killed.

So what are the potential consequences on individual animal welfare of efforts like Colossal’s? Here are several potential concerns.

Romulus, Remus, and Khaleesi will live out their lives in captivity. Have they themselves been harmed? A 161-page document details Colossal’s care program. The wolves live in a 2,000 acre habitat preserve, and are given medical care and a carefully planned diet. (Colossal’s document also discusses the treatment of the surrogate dog who carried the wolf embryos to term.) While the enclosure gives the wolves less room than the typical wolf range, the wolves will benefit significantly from dependable food and medical care not had by wolves in the wild.

One commentator says that they will “hurt for these wolves, creatures wholly unaware that they were created to be trophies”. There are complex philosophical issues regarding the ethics of bringing an individual into the world for one’s own aims—issues that I can’t discuss here in any detail. Briefly, my own judgment is that (A) those three particular wolves will lead decent, net-positive lives; (B) being brought into existence for another’s purpose is not a bad thing if one is also given a good-enough life; and (C) insofar as Colossal’s creation of these wolves is indeed ethically suspect, it pales in comparison to the 92 billion land animals (and billions more fish and invertebrates) brought into existence and killed every year for food and research. Romulus, Remus, and Khaleesi benefit from having skilled publicists, but there are billions of unknown and unnamed animals of a similar level of sentience who deserve equal concern.

Colossal’s detailed care plan should not distract us from other serious ethical concerns that they do not adequately address. As T.J. Kasperbauer  and Heather Browning both argue, the process of developing de-extinction technologies will cause significant suffering to many animals who end up with genetic deformities. It is unclear how many animals will suffer in this way, but because success rates are extremely small, companies like Colossal must start with very large numbers in order to create even just a few healthy, mature animals. It is also unclear whether the suffering experienced by these animals outweighs the positive aspects of their coming into existence in the first place. Either way, this is indeed a significant concern for de-extinction efforts.

What will happen to potential future lab-created animals after they are released into the wild? Both Kasperbauer and Browning raise concerns that they will suffer if so, because there will be no good way to prepare them for re-introduction. De-extinction efforts should take this seriously as they reach the stage where re-introduction is a possibility.

One of the main stated aims of de-extinction is to change ecosystems back to some historical (and, it is hoped, sustainable) baseline. Whether this is an appropriate goal may be disputed, but regardless, if de-extinction plans come to fruition, it will have consequences for many other animals. It will be impossible to track the net effects on individual animal welfare. But this epistemic limitation doesn’t entail that we shouldn’t care. As many have recently argued, lots of animals suffer in the wild, and we should at least take care to limit that suffering, all else being equal.

Frankly, my own suspicion, in part based upon Colossal’s flashy website and media blitz, is that de-extinction programs are not serious attempts at environmental preservation. It is much better, if one is concerned about biodiversity, to work on habitat loss now, as Ronald Sandler argues, rather than striving to create a mythic Fennario.

One might thus think that Colossal is merely a hi-tech vanity project by individuals with more money than they know what to do with. But judging from the pictures of the beautiful white wolves in a Time Magazine cover puff piece, there will undoubtedly be interest in Colossal’s animals from zoos and those seeking prized additions to their private menageries. (My seven-year old child insisted that I specifically mention in this piece how adorable the wolf pups are.) Colossal stands to be paid large sums of money for the animals they breed. And this of course raises significant ethical issues that demand more attention than I can give here.

While all these concerns don’t entail that de-extinction efforts are never permissible, the potential ecological (and other) benefits of de-extinction programs, whatever they may be, must be weighed against the potentially large negative effects—both direct and indirect—of the development of these technologies on individual animals.

Last, it behooves me to note that there is little to no existing regulatory oversight for de-extinction efforts. Given considerable public interest in regulating what private entities can do with genetic technologies, public natural areas, and individual animals, now is the time for open discussions of the ethics and legality of these technologies. I hope such discussions take the welfare interests of individual animals seriously.

[note: slight edits were made to this piece shortly after its initial publication.]

Going Extinct Twice: On the Reasons for Resurrecting Dire Wolves
by Jay Odenbaugh

Let’s first consider what we have been told about the de-extinction of dire wolves (Aenocyon dirus) by Colossal Biosciences. Dire wolves went extinct about 10,000-13,000 yrs ago. There is an active debate amongst scientists over the exact causes. However, as megaherbivores went extinct, dire wolves lacked prey to consume. The loss of these megaherbivores is thought to be due to climate change, interspecific competition, and human hunting. To resurrect the dire wolf, Colossal Biosciences used cloning and gene-editing techniques to create three wolves Romulus, Remus, and Khalessi. On their website, they write:

On October 1, 2024, for the first time in human history, Colossal successfully restored a once-eradicated species through the science of de-extinction. After a 10,000+ year absence, our team is proud to return the dire wolf to its rightful place in the ecosystem. Colossal’s innovations in science, technology and conservation made it possible to accomplish something that’s never been done before: the revival of a species from its longstanding population of zero.

Dire wolf DNA was extracted from an ancient tooth in Ohio and ear bone in Idaho. They edited twenty sites in fourteen gray wolf genes to create dire wolf characteristics (e.g., size, larger teeth, jaw, etc.). From there, the edited nuclei were removed and placed in a denucleated gray wolf egg. The embryos were placed into the wombs of two domestic hound mixes. Given the size of these wolves, a large dog would be needed to give birth to them. After 65 days of gestation and c-section, Romulus and Remus were born. The same process produced Khaleesi.

There are a variety of arguments offered for resurrecting “extinct” species (see this discussion). Of course, it is worth noting that if they are brought back, then in some sense they were never extinct. Nevertheless, let’s consider the reasons for resurrecting dire wolves.

One reason stems from considerations of restorative justice. Humans may have contributed to dire wolf extinction in the past. We have an obligation to make amends for those harms. Therefore, we should resurrect them. The main criticism of this argument is that we make amends for past harms only if we bring back the very species harmed. But in this case, it appears Colossal Biosciences merely modified gray wolves to create a dire wolf “lookalike.” Consider what Beth Shapiro says in a recent news article:

You can use the phylogenetic [evolutionary relationships] species concept to determine what you’re going to call a species, which is what you are implying… We are using the morphological species concept and saying, if they look like this animal, then they are the animal.

But morphological or phenetic species concepts are considered inadequate. For example, you cannot recognize cryptic species with such a concept. Various leopard frog species are morphologically the same but differ in vocalization, mating behavior, etc.

Another possible reason in support of resurrecting dire wolves is that if we resurrect an extinct taxon (or create a new subspecies or species), then we are conserving biodiversity. We have an obligation to conserve biodiversity. Therefore, we should resurrect extinct taxa. As a far as we know, Romulus, Remus, and Khaleesi are on some ecological preserve in an undisclosed location. Consider what Shapiro says in a recent issue of Time:

“I think they are the luckiest animals ever,” says Shapiro. “They will live their entire life on this protected ecological reserve, where they have all sorts of space. These animals were hand reared. They’re not capable of living in the wild, and we want to study them for their lives and understand how these edits might have modified things that we can’t predict. They’re not going to be able to get a splinter without us finding out.”

Arguably, conservation requires that we protect taxa in habitats like that in which they lived 10,000 years ago, which is absent in the case of dire wolves. In a preserve, they cannot express their predatory tendencies since they are no megaherbivores to consume. Thus, these three dire wolves which will never reproduce, hunt, and the like do not seem very lucky. Additionally, this sort of argument would imply conservation is cheap. We should use synthetic biology to create as a many new taxa as possible and that would be effective conservation.

There are a variety of arguments against resurrecting dire wolves as well. First, as we have seen, one might object to what Colossal Biosciences has done since they created a “fake.” At best, they modified an existing species to look like an extinct one.

Second, when we resurrect a species, it is likely that individual animals will suffer in the process. For example, several years a bucardo was revived but it died shortly thereafter due to lung defects. We do not know that any dire wolves suffered a similar fate. However, this is in part because Colossal Bioscience has only told some of the details of what occurred in creating the three wolves.

Third, one might object that we should not resurrect dire wolves because it involves an ethical vice—arrogance. Rather, we should proceed with humility since the expected consequences resurrection science is so uncertain. However, one might worry that this requires rejecting cloning and gene editing across the board. These technologies have remarkable potential for human well-being and conservation alike.

Fourth, one might object that this is a poor allocation of resources for conservation. We should focus on threatened and endangered species rather than spend enormous amounts of money to create lookalikes. This supposes that Colossal Bioscience is not using their resources to aid conservation. According to their own information, they are using these technologies to help threatened and endangered species with problems like genetic bottlenecks.

Fifth, de-extinction encourages the belief that we can bring back extinct species whenever we want to do so. Extinction is not forever. However, even if you think Colossal Biosciences succeeded in resurrecting the dire wolf, there are serious limitations to this technology. For example, DNA degrades over time and after about 10,000 years you cannot use it to resurrect species. This false belief has harmful effects on ordinary conservation.

Sixth, suppose for the sake of argument Colossal Bioscience did create three dire wolves. If they compose a distinct species from the gray wolf, then they are both endangered and presumably invasive. Moreover, if they all die, then dire wolves were brought back only to go “extinct again.” What could be worse than going extinct once? Going extinct twice. This should give all of us pause in supporting projects like this.

Finally, projects like this are being done by private companies with capital. As best we can tell, there has been no peer-review research, replicability, or oversight on any of this. I am loathe to make the comparison, but in this way, it truly resembles a certain unnamed Michael Crighton novel.

Function over Purity: Could this Be the Future of Conservation?
by Corinne Persinger and Clare Palmer

The recent announcement by Colossal Biosciences of success in bringing the dire wolf back from extinction was met with excitement—and disbelief. No-one doubted that the creation of these animals was technologically impressive. But has Colossal produced a dire wolf? There was widespread skepticism. “No, the dire wolf has not been brought back from extinction” (New Scientist) “Dire wolf debate raises concerns about scientific overhype” (Science and Engineering News).

This skepticism is justified. Colossal’s own definition of “de-extinction” describes it as “the process of generating an organism that both resembles and is genetically similar to an extinct species”.  [Emphasis ours]. Beth Shapiro (2015: 137), one of the pioneers of Colossal’s projects, notes that (for example) the epigenome of the dire wolf cannot be replicated through the de-extinction process. The animals produced certainly resemble dire wolves visually and have genetic similarities to dire wolves. But they are not dire wolves.

Do dire wolves fit better with the idea of “functional de-extinction”, emphasized by Colossal on its website? Functionally de-extinct animals, according to Colossal,  make ecosystem contributions that “enrich biodiversity, replenish vital ecological roles and bolster ecosystem resiliency” as well as thrive “in today’s environment of climate change, dwindling resources, disease and human interference.” However, this doesn’t appear to help the case for the dire wolves. The environments where they once existed are long gone, and it’s not clear what “vital ecological role” they could have that could not also be occupied by the wolves that already exist—were wolves not persecuted almost everywhere.

Still, even though dire wolves are a poor example, we think it’s a positive move that the de-extinction program emphasizes ecological function, or “ecological resurrection” as Shapiro puts it (2015: 131), over genetic purity. Broader acceptance of this message—that being “thylacine-ish”, for instance, is good enough, if the animals can thrive as individuals and carry out important ecological functions—could be a crucial reframing of conservation goals, especially in a time of rapid ecological change.

A focus on function over genetic purity hasn’t, historically, been a very popular view; genetic purity has generally been emphasized in legislation and practice. Impurity in the form of hybridization, in particular, has long been negatively evaluated by conservationists, with costly and invasive measures taken to eradicate some hybrid or admixed populations. For instance, in order to protect the genetic purity of endangered free-living red wolves in the only remaining (experimental) population in North Carolina, the 2023 Revised Recovery Plan for the Red Wolf has prioritized the sterilization of 10% and lethal removal of 5% of the local coyote population to ensure they do not hybridize with red wolves; the implementation of this management protocol alone is estimated to cost almost $6 million (USFWS 2023: 12-13, 25). Litters are tested to confirm they are not the result of a red wolf-coyote pair; if evidence is found that this is the case, it has been recommended that the pups be killed (Rabon and Bartel 2013: 9). Welfare concerns aside, the loss of such litters in the service of genetic purity is significant for an endangered population struggling to establish itself in the wild. (There have been at least four identified hybrid litters since 2021 (Red Wolf Recovery Plan Public Information Meeting, 2023)). Further complicating the subject of genetic purity, there is evidence that the red wolf population already contains some level of coyote introgression from historical hybridization events (Sacks et al. 2021).

Why should genetic purity—understood as not being mixed with other species’ genes—be so valuable? It can’t be because genetic purity is intrinsically (that is: non-instrumentally) valuable. This would seem to imply that mixing between gene pools is bad. But hybridization is a natural phenomenon that occurs frequently in a wide range of organisms, and has played a significant role in the evolution of many species (Draper et al. 2021). A more plausible defense of genetic purity is that it has instrumental value; its preservation can be important to meet other conservation goals. For instance, hybridization can lead to outbreeding depression, where hybrid offspring are less fit than their parents; additionally, it may lead to the extinction of rare or endangered species through introgression (Simberloff 1996). That is, if some threshold of genomic change occurs through a hybridization event(s), the species can cease to exist, regardless of the actual impact on organisms’ fitness; this is more of an ontological question of preserving the right kind (for a more complete discussion of these issues see Rohwer and Marris 2015).

However, while we may be justifiably concerned about some losses of genetic purity for these reasons, on other occasions an emphasis on genetic purity can lead to inflexibility and prevent environmental change. That’s why the messaging around the dire wolf case in particular, and de-extinction more generally, is so interesting: it notably de-emphasizes the genetic purity of species in favor of ecological function. Such a change in focus may be particularly apt in an age of rapidly changing environmental baselines. Concerns with maintaining genetic purity are intrinsically linked with a positive evaluation of historical states, the preservation of which may become infeasible and unsustainable in the years to come. In contrast, prioritizing the restoration of ecological functions or processes offers a broader, more flexible foundation for conservation values. The present moment is a crucial time for dialogue concerning which priorities are appropriate for guiding the future of conservation practice.

And this takes us back to wolves. Dire wolves are not the only animals living in Texas with endangered DNA and an ambiguous species identity. Scientists have recently identified high levels (around ~60%) of red wolf genetic ancestry in wild canines living in the Gulf Coast region—which have come to be referred to as “ghost wolves” (vonHoldt et al. 2021: 5448). These are ancestors of wolf-coyote hybrids from over 50 years ago, before the last red wolves were taken into a captive breeding program in the 70’s. The ghost wolves contain genetic diversity from the historic red wolf population that is not represented in the captive breeding program, and some argue these admixed canids should play a more central role in red wolf restoration (Heppenheimer et al. 2018).\

Unsurprisingly, Colossal is mixed up here as well. Along with the dire wolf, the company has recently cloned four ghost wolves, claiming that it is “setting a new precedent in conservation science, where lost diversity can be recovered, and the definition of a species may include the hybrid echoes of its past” (“Restoring the Ancestral Red Wolf Through Genetic Rescue”). But some backpedaling from this pro-hybrid stance follows: the plan is to use gene editing technology to “enhance Red Wolf traits and eliminate coyote introgression” in the cloned animals (Ibid.). While purity may be unattainable, this still implies that as-pure-as-possible is the goal. So there’s some inconsistency here about the value of genetic purity, an inconsistency that perhaps reflects more general uncertainty in the conservation community. But nonetheless, Colossal’s agenda may be beneficial for conservation, insofar as it forces us to critically reconsider long held assumptions and conservation priorities—in particular, the value of genetic purity—in light of a changing technological and environmental context.

References
Draper D., Laguna, E., & Marques, I. (2021). “Demystifying Negative Connotations of Hybridization for Less Biased Conservation Policies”. Frontiers in Ecology and Evolution, 9. https://doi.org/10.3389/fevo.2021.637100
Heppenheimer, E., Brzeski, K. E., Wooten, R., Waddell, W., Rutledge, L. Y., Chamberlain, M. J., Stahler, D. R., Hinton, J. W., & VonHoldt, B. M. (2018). “Rediscovery of Red Wolf Ghost Alleles in a Canid Population Along the American Gulf Coast.” Genes, 9(12). https://doi.org/10.3390/genes912061
Rabon, D., & Bartel, R. (2013). “Red Wolf Adaptive Management Plan FY13-FY15”. USFWS.
Rohwer, Y., & Emma Marris (2015). “Is There a Prima Facie Duty to Preserve Genetic Integrity in Conservation Biology?”, Ethics, Policy & Environment, 18:3, 233-247, DOI:10.1080/21550085.2015.1111629
Sacks, B. N., Mitchell, K. J., Quinn, C. B., Hennelly, L. M., Sinding, M.-H. S., Statham, M. J., Preckler-Quisquater, S., Fain, S. R., Kistler, L., Vanderzwan, S. L., Meachen, J. A., Ostrander, A., & Frantz, L. A. F. (2021). “Pleistocene origins, western ghost lineages, and the emerging phylogeographic history of the red wolf and coyote”. Molecular Ecology, 30, 4292–4304. https://doi.org/10.1111/mec.16048
Shapiro, B. (2015). How to clone a mammoth: The science of de-extinction. Princeton University Press.
Simberloff, D. (1996). “Hybridization between native and introduced wildlife species: importance for conservation”. Wild. Biol. 2:143-150.
Sinding M-HS, Gopalakrishan S, Vieira FG, Samaniego Castruita JA, Raundrup K, Heide Jørgensen MP, et al. (2018). “Population genomics of grey wolves and wolf-like canids in North America”. PLoS Genet 14(11): e1007745. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pgen.1007745
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. (2023). “Red Wolf Recovery Plan: Public Information Meeting”, [PowerPoint presentation]. https://www.fws.gov/media/red-wolf-recovery-programfall-2022-update508-compliantpdf
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. (2023). “Revised Recovery Plan for the Red Wolf (Canis rufus)”, Third Revision. Southeast Region.
vonHoldt, B. M., Brzeski, K. E., Aardema, M. L., Schell, C. J., Rutledge, L. Y., Fain, S. R., Shutt, A. C., Linderholm, A., & Murphy, W. J. (2022). “Persistence and expansion of cryptic endangered red wolf genomic ancestry along the American Gulf coast.” Molecular Ecology, 31, 5440–5454. https://doi.org/10.1111/mec.16200

Do We Need “Dire Wolves”?
by Yasha Rohwer

Colossal, a for-profit biotech company, recently announced on their website that they had “successfully restored a once-eradicated species through the science of de-extinction” “for the first time in human history.” The species in question is the dire wolf (Aenocyon dirus), which went extinct more than 10,000 years ago. This announcement has provoked considerable skepticism, with many arguing that simply modifying the DNA of grey wolves to include some dire wolf genes does not make for a dire wolf. Furthermore, it is unclear if the three individuals the company has produced are enough to constitute “the restoration” of a species. But I am not here to discuss species concepts or if the wolves created by Colossal fit any of them. Rather, I want to discuss the goal of de-extinction, according to most scientists: creating functional proxies.

Despite the sensationalism in some reporting and on the Colossal website, most experts agree that it is not species that are being revived (extinction is forever); rather it is ecological functions that are to be revived via the creation of proxies. Colossal, too, seems to care about functions since they claim on their website that their team is “proud to return the dire wolf to its rightful place in the ecosystem”—even claiming that the dire wolf is an “essential apex predator”.

The International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) assembled a task force to study biotechnologies that could create functional proxies. In their 2016 report, after noting that “the term ‘de-extinction’ is misleading” (see, for example, the dire wolf cover of Time Magazine that has the word “extinct” crossed out above a picture of one of the genetically modified wolves) the task force claims that “the legitimate objective for the creation of a proxy of an extinct species is the production of a functional equivalent able to restore ecological functions or processes that might have been lost as a result of the extinction of the original species”. By these criteria we can ask: has Colossal successfully brought back a dire wolf proxy? And if so, will it restore lost functions?

The three wolves that Colossal have created will never get a chance to perform lost functions or be part of lost processes in any kind of wild system. They are likely to live a pampered life in captivity, living the “Ritz Carlton lifestyle”, according to Beth Shapiro, the chief science officer at Colossal. This seems to suggest that de-extinction, understood as a restoration of lost function, hasn’t yet happened. However, perhaps we could bring back the dire wolf’s functional role, if there were more proxies created and they were allowed to leave the Ritz.

Even if these wolves were allowed to roam freely, it is unclear that they could restore lost functions. After all, some of the megafauna that they once preyed upon—including giant ground sloths and camels—are long gone. And the ecosystems would have disappeared or radically reconfigured once the megafauna disappeared. Furthermore, it is unclear that they would even know how to hunt. They have no pack of mature, experienced dire wolves to learn from.

But has the apex predator and the related functions involved in fulfilling that role really been lost? Grey wolves, resourceful and adaptive, filled that role once the dire wolf disappeared—they even prey on bison. If restoring function is the goal, creating dire wolf proxies doesn’t seem necessary. Rather, we should work on allowing grey wolves to extend their ranges back to the entire area where they were intentionally eradicated by humans. Claims of the dire wolf being an essential apex predator seem way overblown.

Of course, there are other ways, apart from restoring function, to try to justify the activity of de-extinction. For example, the technology Colossal is developing could play an important role in helping conserve existent species that are at risk of extinction. Moreover, de-extinction technologies allow practitioners to think critically about different approaches and goals in restoration. For example, why only try to restore to 1491–why not restore to 13,000 BC?

De-extinction also brings important questions about the value of the environment to the forefront of restoration. De-extinction could be legitimate, according to the IUCN, if it restores lost functions. But this implies that other organisms, even if they were not created via fancy biotechnology, might also make good functional proxies, including relatively new arrivals that are often thought of as invasive species or problematic. Horses and donkeys in North America are almost certainly functionally similar to the wild horses the continent lost in the Pleistocene. If bringing back lost functions is legitimate, then we should recognize and value certain organisms that are new to systems that can provide those functions.

The dire wolves around the La Brea tar pits ate a lot of extinct species of horses, which raises interesting and likely highly contentious possibilities given ongoing debates about how to manage wild horses in the United States. In one scenario, “dire wolves” restore the function of predating on equids while feral domesticated horses restore the function of being predated on by really big canines.

Why are functions so great anyway? Is it because they contribute to biodiversity? If so, can the addition of a new function be considered a good thing? For example, feral donkeys dig wells in the deserts of the southwest of the United states and this benefits many native species. It is unclear that the “dire wolf” has any functional role to play, given that the systems that once lived in have radically changed. Furthermore, it is unclear that the function it performed is not already being performed or could be performed by the grey wolf. However, if functions are a legitimate goal, then perhaps we should be more welcoming of new arrivals to systems—they may not have been present historically, but they can help replicate lost functions and perhaps even provide new and valuable functions.

Game of Clones
by Derek Turner

In her 2015 book, How to Clone a Mammoth: The Science of De-Extinction, Beth Shapiro—the lead researcher on the dire wolf project with Colossal Biosciences—anticipated the complaint that Romulus, Remus, and Khaleesi are not really dire wolves. “Crucially,” Shapiro wrote, “I don’t care that it’s not the same thing as the original …” (2015, p. 205).

Shapiro argued that “the goal of de-extinction is to restore or revive ecosystems, to reinstate interactions between species that no longer exist because one or more of those species are extinct” (2015, p. 205). The goal is not to bring back extinct species, but rather to restore lost ecological interactions. For that, you do not really need to bring back extinct species. As Shapiro puts it, “we can engineer species that are alive today so that they can act as proxies for extinct species” (2015, p. 205). Thus, it makes no difference whether Romulus, Remus, and Khaleesi are really dire wolves. What matters is whether they could serve as ecological proxies for the extinct dire wolves.

Around the same time, I argued that one can helpfully think of species reintroductions—such as the reintroduction of gray wolves to Yellowstone in the 1990s—as local extinction reversals (Turner 2014). One might even think of the introduced wolves as proxies for the wolves that would be living there today, had people not extirpated their ancestors. Whatever ecological reasons might favor species reintroduction in this sort of case could also favor using biotechnology to create proxies for reintroduction in other, relevantly similar cases involving global (as opposed to merely local) extinction. This way of framing things, like Shapiro’s, does not require that the proxies belong to the same species as the species for which they are serving as proxies.

There are other considerations—especially having to do with animal welfare and resource allocation—that might override this “restorationist argument” in most, and maybe all cases. But I think we should leave open the possibility, however dim, that maybe, just maybe, there could be cases where the restorationist argument carries some weight. This openness distinguishes my view from those of more principled critics such as Minteer (2015) and Katz (2022).

The most serious problem with what Colossal Biosciences has done is that it does not meet Shapiro’s own standard for justifiable de-extinction research. No one is planning to use Romulus, Remus, and Khaleesi as ecological proxies for dire wolves. At the end of the Pleistocene, as the glaciers withdrew, North America lost 38 genera of large mammals, including many of the animals that the dire wolves were probably eating. The entire ecosystem that the dire wolves participated in and helped constitute is gone. There is no ecological niche for them to occupy today. Nor is there any serious ecological reason to try to create ensembles of proxies for Pleistocene megafauna. The Colossal pups will probably live out their lives in captivity. The project has nothing to do with serious ecological restoration. It has everything to do with the nostalgia and Game of Thrones fandom of wealthy investors.

Because the restorationist argument does not fly in this case, proponents of the dire wolf project must reach for other arguments. There is a lot of talk, for example, about how the research might have indirect payoffs for conservation biology, even if there’s no good reason for the genetic modification of gray wolves. There is also a lot of talk about atoning for humanity’s prehistoric sins. (See Welchman 2021 for a careful analysis of this argument.) One glaring problem with that line of reasoning, however, is that the empirical questions about what caused the end-Pleistocene megafaunal extinctions in North America remain very much under investigation, and the relative contribution of human activity isn’t clear (Meltzer 2015; Steeves 2021).

Those who promote de-extinction are keen to point to some sort of environmental rationale for what they are doing. They seem to crave environmental respectability. At the same time, the field of “de-extinction” research has organized itself around flagship species—the woolly mammoth, and now the dire wolf–for which the environmental rationale is weakest. The selection of the dire wolf as a target species makes the entire field seem ecologically frivolous. It doesn’t have to be so frivolous, but it is.

References
Katz, E. (2022), “Considering De-Extinction: Zombie Arguments and the Walking (And Flying and Swimming) Dead,” Ethics, Policy and Environment 25(2): 81-103.
Meltzer, D. (2015), “Pleistocene Overkill and North American Mammalian Extinctions,” Annual Review of Anthropology 44: 33-53.
Minteer, B. (2019), The Fall of the Wild: Extinction, De-Extinction and the Ethics of Conservation. New York: Columbia University Press.
Shapiro, B (2015), How to Clone a Mammoth: The Science of De-Extinction. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Steeves, P. (2021), The Indigenous Paleolithic of the Western Hemisphere. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press.
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