Does the Size of the Universe Matter to Whether Anything Objectively Matters?
“The universe is old, big, and empty. In comparison, we are new and small.”

So begins an interesting and fun article on a big question of perennial popular concern by Luke Elson (University of Reading) in the latest issue of Ethics.
Observations of the vastness of the universe in comparison to tiny little us—the “cosmic disparity”—are familiar from common complaints about meaninglessness. “How could anything matter in a huge, cold, empty universe like this?” goes the cliché.
Philosophers have tended to reject inferences from the size of the universe to its lack of objective evaluative properties, as it’s unclear what one has to do with the other.
But Elson aims to defend a version of the cliché. He doesn’t argue that the size of the universe directly implies that nothing objectively matters. Rather, his position is that the universe’s immensity weakens the evidence for robust realism, the idea that “there are sui generis evaluative or other ethical properties.”
In other words, contrary to what many philosophers believe, size¹ matters².
Here’s the skeleton of Elson’s argument, which he calls the “Abductive-Evidential Argument Against Robust Realism”:
- Robust Realism gains support from its explanation of our evaluative judgments.
- The parsimony cost of its sui generis ontology counts against Robust Realism.
- The cosmic disparity. Our evaluative judgments form a very small part of the total evidence base. In a smaller cosmos, our evaluative judgments would form a larger part of the total evidence base.
- Scale matters. Insofar as a partial theory offers a good explanation or account of some part of the evidence base (or “set of facts”),this carries more theoretical weight, as that part is a larger portion of the total evidence base.
- So, the cosmic disparity weakens the evidential support for Robust Realism provided by our evaluative judgments. That support is weaker in this cosmos than it would be in a smaller cosmos. (From 1, 3, and 4.)
- The size of the universe doesn’t affect any of the other considerations for or against Robust Realism, such as the parsimony cost of its sui generis ontology.
- So, all things considered, the cosmic disparity weakens the evidence for Robust Realism. (From 5 and 6.)
For a further explanation of the argument and a defense of it against objections, read the whole paper, “The Size of the Universe Against Robust Realism“, which the journal’s editor (Doug Portmore) and publisher (University of Chicago Press) have kindly agreed to make open-access for a couple of weeks.
1. (of the universe)
2. (evidentially, to the question of objective value)
Note: The original version of this post included an “against” which should have been a “for” in the description of Elson’s position. It has now been corrected. Thanks to David Killoren for catching that.
I’m just working from the argument reconstruction here:
Is there any face value reason to think that evidence base of X scales with a distance measurement? I can think of plenty of seeming counter-examples, where the reference class of subjects is suitably small in number that there is no sense in worrying about size of the universe (except maybe an infinite universe, if the small reference class is explicitly generated via a probabilistic process).
Thanks! I do try to deal with this objection in my paper by (eg) claiming that we are doing ‘total’ metaphysics so everything is in-principle part of the evidence base, but I recognise that that is a major potential line of disagreement.
It is probably inappropriate for me to push back without a careful look at the paper, but if you’ll allow it:
I *think* my objection is that we need a way of converting “everything”(=totality) into an “evidence base”(=set of “items of evidence”). We do this all the time—i.e., construct the evidence base—literally for every empirical/inductive argument ever marshalled, and it is effectively to throw out most of totality in some principled way, in regards to the learning task at hand. (Plausibly, we even have to throw out so much of totality as to ensure that we wind up with an enumerable set! But this is probably stronger an assumption than is necessary for the objection.) Therefore, even if this is total metaphysics, there is a leap in the argument, or an implicit premise: that the procedure for constructing the evidence base of relevance for assessing robust realism—the “evidence counter”, if you like the name I’ve given myself here—is one that scales in some proportion with a distance measurement.
In other words, I think I can grant the total metaphysics project and still dig in my heels that there’s a substantive step in shaping everything into an evidence base, and it’s in that shaping that I would expect the proportionality between the evidence in question and distance scale to break.
Thanks very much for the write-up! As a regular reader of the blog it’s kind of an honour.
I’ve been brewing this paper since about 2017 and so everything but the core idea has changed quite a lot. There are pretty serious possible objections and I’m very uncertain of my own credences in this area. I don’t think I’d withdraw any of the claims in the paper, but I’m not sure…
This is analogous to the argument H. P. Lovecraft made for his “cosmicism”: the vastness of the universe entails something that looks like nihilism from a human perspective. (There might be values, purposes, meanings, but they’re utterly inhuman.)
As a sci-fi fan I actually started reading some Lovecraft because I had a sense this might be the case, but didn’t have time to chase it down. Tim Mulgan’s Purpose in the Universe describes a view not unlike your parenthetical remark, though from a more philosophy of religion angle.
“Where I seem to differ from some of my friends is in attaching little importance to physical size. I don’t feel the least humble before the vastness of the heavens. The stars may be large, but they cannot think or love; and these are qualities which impress me far more than size does. I take no credit for weighing nearly seventeen stone.” — F. P. Ramsey
Guy Kahane’s paper ‘Our Cosmic Insignificance’ is a goldmine for this kind of quote!
I’d have said that the multiplicity, chaos, distention, of the world we encounter in sense experience, and the relative simplicity of our perceptions of the good, is a point in favor of reliability of the latter.
Then again I’m not sure how big the world really is.