The Counterfeiting of the Humanities


In 2023, I attended an annual conference on the humanities. In a conversation over lunch, a program manager for a state humanities council, whose job is to review grant applications for humanities projects in their state, asked me what I did. After I replied that I was a philosophy professor, she responded, “Oh, I didn’t know that philosophy was a humanities [discipline].”

That’s Claire Katz, professor of philosophy and associate provost at Texas A & M, in a recent article for Public Humanities, “Stolen Valor: How the Humanities ‘@ Work’ Are Hidden in Plain Sight“.

The article discusses the general lack of understanding of what the humanities are, what they do, and why they’re valuable, and focuses on something that may be both a cause and effect of this situation: the attempt to present and teach the particular skills that emerge from a humanities education without actually providing the humanities education.

Before turning directly to higher education, Katz looks at two contrasting examples of how the business world acknowledged the value of the humanities: a laudable program run by Bell Telephone in the 1950s, and the “gimmicky” Shakespeare-themed leadership seminars run by Kenneth and Carol Adelman for the past 25 years or so that “trade not only on the prestige of a humanities education… but also on the very old-fashioned role of the humanities in cultivating an effective leader.”

Of the latter, Katz writes:

They have taken what would be part of a classical liberal arts education that an individual could receive as part of their college education and they have repackaged it as a dumbed down yet very expensive program for developing effective leaders… In other words, the college education in the humanities, which was effective at training leaders but is now viewed as valueless in the university, has been replaced with the million-dollar business offering training workshops, which do not even rise to the level of being described as a diluted humanities education, to which companies pay a hefty fee to send their executives-in-training.

But the problem is not just this counterfeiting of the humanities by the business world. There is a parallel problem inside institutions of higher education, with various forms of “humanities across the curriculum” programs that have developed over the past 40 years:

Examining the university, we can see how the skills that have been separated from the humanities are included in the learning outcomes of most of the non-humanities disciplines. Never having been taught the connection these skills have to a humanities education, faculty in the academic community integrate the humanities skills into their courses or leadership programs (e.g., critical thinking, ethical decision-making, and appreciating different perspectives) without giving explicit credit to the humanities, in part because they simply do not know to do so. As a result, the connection between these skills and the humanities from which they are derived is buried. Moreover, the distinctive way that these skills develop through humanities courses remains unknown.

We might look to the “X across the curriculum” programs, which proliferated in the 1980s and 1990s as a source for this trend on our campuses. These programs, which included Writing Across the Curriculum, Ethics Across the Curriculum, and Critical Thinking Across the Curriculum, emerged out of the view that the teaching of certain skills should not be shouldered by a single discipline but rather it should be shared across the campus…

Believing that the acquisition of these skills would be reinforced if they were learned in courses across the disciplines, the proponents of the “across the disciplines” programs were admirable in their dedication to introduce these skills across the university… Unfortunately, multiple unforeseen problems emerged. Critical thinking was not uniformly defined, faculty teaching writing in their courses were themselves not confident writers, and the ethics courses that were discipline-specific were narrow in focus, in addition to not having agreement about how ethics should be defined or what the outcome of the course should be. Additionally, the “across the disciplines” approach gave rise to a sense that one need not have scholarly expertise to teach ethics, for example.

Although the proponents of the X across the curriculum programs would insist that these programs are intended to enhance or supplement a humanities education rather than replace it, the effect seems to have been the reverse.

Focusing on her home discipline of philosophy, Katz writes:

This approach excised, for example, the teaching of critical thinking from the discipline of philosophy and philosophical argument so that critical thinking was viewed as a discrete skill rather than one that is embedded in a robust humanities education where students would engage in close readings of a text, provide evidence for an interpretation, consider alternative perspectives, and analyze arguments. Severed from philosophy (not to mention rhetoric and literature), the critical thinking engaged in these other disciplines is absent of perspective taking, careful listening, and analytical thinking. This one-dimensional approach to critical thinking, especially in fields like engineering, became narrowly focused on problem-solving rather than on learning to formulate questions and identify problems. Taught in this way, critical thinking is not associated with the humanities or the role the humanities play in the cultivation of judgment. Severed from the humanities, critical thinking cannot realize its full power.

In short, “siphoning off the skills associated with a humanities education and then claiming the development of those skills as part of one’s discipline shortchanges the humanities, the other disciplines, and our students.”

The article is open-access. I encourage you to read the whole thing. Discussion welcome.

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Philosojor
Philosojor
9 months ago

Interesting how the article starts with an anecdote about a specific problem for philosophy… (people don’t know enough about it to know it is a humanities discipline), but then speaks about the problem as a general problem for the humanities.

Phoenix, son of Amyntor
Phoenix, son of Amyntor
9 months ago

Perhaps relevant here is the piece from 2018: https://www.chronicle.com/article/the-interdisciplinary-delusion/

linsantu
linsantu
9 months ago

While I agree with much of the diagnosis and critique of the counterfeiting of humanities in the article, I’m not sure if the anecdote presented at the beginning is best interpreted in this light. I have history/literature/etc colleagues constantly amazed over the fact that philosophy is in the same program with them (“philosophy is methodologically so different from us”; “I don’t get what you guys are doing at all”; etc); perhaps the manager was just similarly uncertain of the relationship between philosophy and humanities? FWIW, I think there is some truth to this commonly held intuition, and has written an article on why the “humanistic” account of philosophy does not hold (and why it should be replaced with a “normative” account) — https://philpapers.org/rec/LINPAA-10

Louis F. Cooper
Louis F. Cooper
9 months ago

For many years a well-known, now deceased political scientist taught a course that integrated works of history with works of social and political theory and was organized around major episodes and developments in the history of the West. It was not considered a humanities course but a social-sciences course; I’m pretty sure, however, that it required students to, in Prof. Katz’s words, “engage in close readings of a text, provide evidence for an interpretation, consider alternative perspectives, and analyze arguments.” Prof. Katz, to judge from the excerpts here, seems to think that these skills are unique to humanities courses or can only be truly taught properly in humanities courses. That’s weird, IMO.

Historically-oriented social scientists do close readings and analyze arguments all the time. The implicit suggestion that in order to get “the real experience,” you have to be taught, say, The Communist Manifesto by a philosopher rather than a historically-oriented social scientist (or a political theorist) strikes me as very wrong.

This remark is not going to make me popular here, but maybe if professional philosophers tried to be a little less insular and arrogant, and a little more knowledgeable about what some other disciplines (outside of the neurosciences and physics and math, I mean) actually do, they wouldn’t feel they have to be continually circling the wagons and claiming, usually implicitly rather than explicitly, that the only way to get a proper education in critical thinking and related skills is to take philosophy courses or major in philosophy. I’m sorry, but that’s nonsense.

Philosojor
Philosojor
Reply to  Louis F. Cooper
9 months ago

I think the problem is more of an existential one for departments and working philosophers: “how do we justify our existence in the face of changing academic programs, do we do anything distinctive?”. Maybe we do, but I agree with you, that isn’t the point for most students in an intro to philosophy class or a critical thinking class. They are there to get some skills that, yes, they could get in other classes. But, philosophers are usually really good at teaching critical thinking because they have to take formal logic classes and are not mathematicians themselves (usually). I took the point to be that philosophers could respond to this existential problem a litter better by reconceptualizing Critical Thinking as belonging properly to Philosophy, and they should make other efforts too.

I didn’t get the sense that this kind of thing is exclusive to the humanities. So humanities scholars need to do more to advertise better and social scientists just keep on keeping on.

P.s. I am thinking of E.O. Wright. Is that who you have in mind?

Last edited 9 months ago by Philosojor
Louis F. Cooper
Louis F. Cooper
Reply to  Philosojor
9 months ago

I was not thinking specifically of Erik Olin Wright but I think he is (or rather, was) one example. The person I’m referring to in the first paragraph is Samuel Beer. Btw, my comment may be a little unfair to Prof. Katz, but this is a blog comment section, and if you can’t be a bit provocative here where can you be.

Felix
Felix
Reply to  Philosojor
9 months ago

Building on Louis’ point, I think, is this piece from Stephen Mumford. There is a danger in positioning philosophy as uniquely situated to support the development of critical thinking.* It can lead to a sort of hubris, where philosophers take it upon themselves to tackle and solve problems that other disciplines have long been grappling with, but without caring for or engaging with the relevant history of work that’s already grappled with it—just apply “critical thinking” and go, so to speak. The result is often a fairly shallow and decontextualized analysis that doesn’t do much for actually solving the problem. This even happens within philosophy, when some philosophers decide they’re going to “sort out” problems their colleagues have been working on, but aren’t bothered so much by what scholarship there already exists.

Maybe that itself represents a significant lapse in critical thinking—after all, are you really doing critical thinking if your analysis is surface level and your engagement with the relevant body of work is poor? But I think it’s born out of, at least in part, an attitude that invokes the idea of critical thinking quite strongly. Or maybe, it represents this sort of cowboy critical thinking, where one wings it and maybe, in the course of doing so, comes up with something cogent or at least decent if unpolished. Maybe that’s the hope even. I don’t know.

*It’s a bit of a footnote in this discussion, but deserves to be centered more: Your point about feeling the need to justify a program’s existence, such as by telling a story about what it offers that’s distinctive from other programs. I think it’s not necessarily the skills as such that are distinctive, so much as the problems. The problems themselves deserve attention, and so we need programs dedicated to them, wholly apart from whatever skill benefits they confer to those taking the program. However, I recognize that this argument isn’t going to be pleasing to “outside” decision-makers; it doesn’t give a nice “marketable” answer. So I understand the temptation to position philosophy as exceptionally well-situated to support the development of critical thinking skills. With that at least, there’s something tangible to grab on to; a justification that’s easily understood and amenable to a neoliberal logic where one’s “offerings” must yield some sort of marketable returns for customers. So long as we recognize that that’s bullshit we have to say because of how things are right now, and we don’t take it more seriously than it warrants, then maybe that’s fine too.

David Wallace
David Wallace
Reply to  Louis F. Cooper
9 months ago

“maybe if professional philosophers tried to be a little less insular and arrogant, and a little more knowledgeable about what some other disciplines (outside of the neurosciences and physics and math, I mean) actually do…”

Those insular philosophers! How lazy they are, only taking the time to gain expertise in three fields outside their own; why, the typical classicist or historian has a deep grounding in quantum field theory, algebraic topology, and cognitive science *as well as* a thorough understanding of the rest of the Humanities.

In seriousness: all manner of bad things happen because people in one discipline don’t understand, and don’t respect, what is going on in another discipline; it is a notoriously difficult problem to solve, both because no-one can know everything and because internal disciplinary pressures encourage specialization. But I think philosophers are unusually good, rather than unusually bad, at gaining understanding outside their own territory: history, literature and philosophy are all (though with many exceptions) fairly bad at understanding each other, but philosophers in general have much better understanding of the sciences. I don’t know if you intended this, but your comment suggests that it’s only knowledge of other more humanistic disciplines that could make philosophers less insular; that would itself be a form of insularity.

(The nexus between political theory, history, and political science also has many scholars who are unusually good at gaining understanding outside their own territory, and I for one have zero objection to those people teaching the sort of material you describe; quite the reverse, in fact.)

Louis F. Cooper
Louis F. Cooper
Reply to  David Wallace
9 months ago

“I don’t know if you intended this, but your comment suggests that it’s only knowledge of other more humanistic disciplines that could make philosophers less insular….”

I did not intend that.

p.s. A commission report from some years ago, Open the Social Sciences (Stanford Univ. Press, 1996), which addressed among other things how internal disciplinary barriers within the social sciences could be lowered or eliminated, had some suggestions at the end (e.g., all professors should be affiliated with or appointed in more than one department) that might apply more broadly to the problem of overcoming or dealing with insularity in general. I assume documents of this sort usually get put on a shelf and ignored, but if this one is still in print or otherwise available it might be worth a look.

David Wallace
David Wallace
Reply to  Louis F. Cooper
9 months ago

That sounds interesting; I’ll take a look.

We use secondary appointments that way a bit in Pittsburgh; probably not as much as we should.

Austin
Austin
Reply to  Louis F. Cooper
9 months ago

You have replied with a single example of a course that teaches critical thinking. But by and large other departments do not do that regularly. And that’s the point. If you want students to learn how to think critically then they need to actually engage with disciplines that do this and not just get it as a by-product of classes that they already conveniently take. By trying to get non-humanities courses to teach critical thinking, they generally do it poorly and also undermine the existence of the humanities.

Louis F. Cooper
Louis F. Cooper
Reply to  Austin
9 months ago

There’s probably a good deal of variation in different university settings, and I would think a lot depends on the quality of teaching. I’d suggest that if you put engaged, reasonably motivated students together with reasonably skilled teachers, especially in a small class, and they are dealing with challenging “texts,” then critical thinking likely does not need to be consciously taught and it doesn’t even need to be listed as an “outcome” on a syllabus, because it’s just going to happen as, yes, a by-product of what goes in that classroom. Now, the conditions I’ve just described may be relatively rare and in any case are definitely not universal, so different approaches would likely have to be taken depending on the conditions that exist. But I don’t think that even an approach very consciously focused on critical thinking has to be restricted to the humanities. You disagree, and that’s ok, because we’re not going to resolve this in this comment thread.

Felix
Felix
Reply to  Austin
9 months ago

There’s a tension in your reply here, I think. Because content knowledge is extremely relevant to engaging in good critical thinking, there probably isn’t a set of “disciplines that do this” and disciplines that do not. What I mean is: the sort of critical thinking you do in, say, medicine is going to depend a great deal on having relevant content knowledge (e.g., about epidemiology, and a range of other subjects). Having taken a course that explicitly claims “critical thinking” as an outcome won’t necessarily equip those taking it to engage in good critical thinking about medicine, especially for arguments that depend on having content knowledge as background.

Maybe I’m wrong about this, but I just don’t see the value of trying to treat “critical thinking” as a discrete thing, a course outcome, in any discipline. I’d much rather focus on the problems and have critical thinking embedded throughout (or arising from?) consideration and analysis of them, without trying to make a point of “teaching critical thinking” at all. And I’d much rather we argue for the existence of the humanities by showing that the content of them enriches humanity, rather than by arguing that they are particularly good in getting people to think critically, whatever that means.

grant
grant
9 months ago

I work at a STEM oriented state university. I am only speaking from my observation, but what Professor Katz writes feels so real.

Yes, so many other disciplines have “critical thinking” and “ethical reasoning” as their leaning outcomes, business, engineering, physics… you name it. Why? Partly because most students will not go to graduate school, and you want to teach them “real-life” skills. What sort of skills does, say, physics teach you that are applicable to real-life problem solving? Well, eh, critical thinking? Also, anything to do with social issues counts as “ethics” for many people in other disciplines.

A consequence is that people regard humanities as things they (in STEM) cannot do. So, most people on my campus think of humanities as anything “creative”–creative writing, arts, etc. “Theories”, “arguments” are not among the terms when they think of humanities.

Unfortunately, this understanding of humanities is also popular among students. Many of our philosophy majors come to philosophy partly because they do not like “dry” theories in other disciplines or just do not like math. They like arts but not logic, and they enjoy writing poems but not argumentative papers.

praymont
praymont
9 months ago

They left out the latest craze — AI Across the Curriculum.

Armando Ruiz
Armando Ruiz
9 months ago

Reading the comments I am frustrated by the apparent use of “critical thinking” with various implied meanings without clear definitions. This is a common problem when critical thinking is discussed, so perhaps it would bring clarity to the issue to explore labels to these versions.

Critical thinking as analysis
Critical thinking as interpretation
Critical thinking as formal or rhetorical logic
Critical thinking as applying knowledge to new situations
Critical thinking as problem solving
Critical thinking as creative or novel thinking
Critical thinking as theorizing

These are just to name a few. Perhaps these are all aspects of critical thinking, perhaps some are not. I would lean toward defining critical thinking with some features of questioning assumptions and thinking beyond conventions. Though skills of analysis, interpretation and a handle on logic may be prerequisite.

In so far as every discipline teaches conventional content to it’s students, students have the opportunity to question, criticize and develop new perspectives with research. This aspect of novelty or navigating uncharted terrain I believe is the core feature of critical thinking and can be emphasized in any discipline. Whether as a software engineer with a new problem, a historian interpreting a new primary source, or a doctor with a complex patient.

But does philosophy have a unique spin on it? I think so, by teaching and demanding uniquely explicit standards of logical rigor and conceptual clarity. However, while I would agree that many other disciplines approximate these standards, most do not treat them as such. Though those in interdisciplinary work (physics, cognitive science, psychology, literature, history, economics, etc.) can produced groundbreaking philosophical ideas when they do.

To discuss the relation or ownership of critical thinking to philosophy is to discuss the central conundrum of the role of philosophy as a major. Unless you do academic philosophy, philosophical training serves as a foundation or supplement to another content-driven discipline. Philosophy is a discipline focused on the form of thought, not so much the content. But having studied in various disciplines, I have found in the focus on the form of thought, philosophy is second to none.