A year ago today, I put up a guest post by a philosophy professor writing under the pseudonym “Alex Rails”.
Rails’ post was about the ethics of sexual relationships among people in academic philosophy, couched in terms of advice for how people could virtuously navigate this tricky terrain, or, as they put it, how to be “a strong player.”
It was a controversial but widely discussed entry in a series of guest posts last summer. Some people really appreciated it. Some absolutely hated it. It generated some offense, some reflection, and some amusing social media commentary.
Rails recently got in touch with me again about a follow-up post on flirting at conferences. The problem it takes up is this: If the optimal amount of flirting at a conference is not zero, but flirting at a conference is morally risky (with possible hazards for the flirter, the flirtee, and third parties), how should flirting at conferences happen? Their post is below.
As I said with Rails’ last post, discussion is welcome, but, given the subject matter, I ask you to exercise a bit of care with your comments. The comments section is not the place to out named individuals, either for flirting well or badly, or to otherwise remark on specific people’s personal relationships.
Note that if you wish to comment using a pseudonym but you’ve commented here previously under your real name, be sure to enter both a new name and a new email address when you comment, so your identity is not inadvertently revealed (email addresses are not made public but are recorded by the commenting system). If you want to reach out to Rails personally, you can do so by email to [email protected].

How to Flirt at a Conference: a Harm Reduction Post
by “Alex Rails”
There are so many sweet philosopher couples, some of whom even work in the same department or write papers together. My last post here drew some outraged comments because I talked about being a philosopher who likes to seduce other philosophers. If flirting in a professional setting is not done, as some of the comments suggested, where do all these sweet couples come from? Did they all meet outside of work?
Not every fling becomes a relationship, and not every flirtation becomes a fling. So, given the number of philosopher-couples, it’s reasonable to conclude that there’s a lot more action going on. And it goes on for a good reason: passionate, romantic, and sexual relationships are, for many people, the stuff of the good life. Since academic jobs tend to encroach on a large part of our time, can we be blamed for finding that stuff within the sphere of our work?
This topic is taboo. And taboos cause horror-excitement loops. The idea of flirting in a work setting is exciting to some people, and this excitement further upsets those who are already upset by the idea, whose upset further heightens the excitement. As soon as something is “forbidden” it becomes much sexier. I can only be grateful for the extra excitement this has brought to some of my flings.
Despite this, it is important that outrage about something taboo does not become directed at the vulnerable and the victims. I assume that many of the people who feel anger at the thought of someone flirting at conferences do so out of concern for victims of sexual misconduct. However, the anger can become directed at those victims when it targets all sexual activity within the discipline. Many victims do not fit the mold of the perfect victim. Some start the journey willingly, thinking it will be fun, harmless, or educational, before ending up harassed, stalked, or trapped in, say, toxic mentorships and subsequently blamed for it too. Meanwhile, philosophers are still flirting at conferences, despite the taboo and perhaps even because of it. Some of you have flirted with me since my last post here.
I have discussed academic workplace relationships and flirting at conferences with many people, including some who reached out to me by e-mail after my last post. A question that intrigued many readers was: is it possible to flirt at a conference without causing harm? Consider this an applied ethics post, based on those conversations, about how to flirt at conferences like a strong player.
Before we start, let’s clarify what flirting is.
What is Flirting?
Making sleazy comments is not flirting. That’s just sexual harassment. The distinction is very important. When we equate flirting with sexual harassment, it becomes possible for sexual harassers to say “I was just flirting” and “you people just don’t like flirting.”
I looked for a philosophical account of flirting and found a helpful book chapter by Lucy McDonald. According to McDonald, flirting is a dance where both parties take turns inviting the other, through their speech or behavior, to cross the line between a more distant acquaintance and a more intimate one. The dance consists of push and pull moves from both flirters. First, I might approach you as a colleague, but then I approach you, for a moment, more like a close friend or lover, implicitly inviting you to respond to me in a more intimate manner. If your response suggests you’re interested in my invitation, I might pivot on the edge or playfully pull back into colleague mode again, before venturing further into the intimate territory our exchange is creating. You push forward into intimacy and perhaps “play” at withdrawing, too. As McDonald says: “This behavior is what gives flirting an element of ambiguity; interlocutors keep each other on their toes, by introducing elements of uncertainty and making the common ground precarious. In doing so they insure themselves against being described as too forward, and they make the interaction more entertaining.”
Sexual harassment is characterized by repeated unwanted and unreciprocated push motions towards someone. Flirting, crucially, requires that there are two people actively participating. And there should be some background relationship or activity which is non-flirty to retreat into.
From that perspective, a conference is an ideal place to flirt (to be clear, McDonald does NOT say this, I do). As far as academic activities go, conferences are likely the safest place for it, since you are likely to meet people that are not your direct coworkers.
Flirting must take place under the radar, in a way that is imperceptible to outsiders, and even plausibly deniable to the other participant. Otherwise, it loses the fun and ceases to be flirting. This means that flirting should not corrupt the context in which it occurs. It should not turn a conference into a singles night. I have found that there is one style of flirting that is particularly suited to maintaining the integrity of the conference setting. This style is what I call sapiosexual flirting, or flirting aimed at the ideas or intellect of the other.
Sapiosexual Flirting
Let me demonstrate what I mean by negative example. I once had someone approach me during a conference reception and say “Hey, I wanted to tell you something. You said something at the Q&A today… It wasn’t even what you said but just the way you said it, the way your eyes were glistening, as if you were very enthusiastic about the topic. And I felt that I wanted to get to know you.”
They seemed sincere, but I was revolted. This is because they seemed to say, “It wasn’t really what you said that interested me. You were just so cute while you said it.” In this attempt at flirtation, they disengaged from my ideas and moved the focus to some other feature of me, in an attempt to pull me out of philosopher-mode and into some other mode where they could more easily flirt with me. But I go to conferences to be in philosopher-mode, with the occasional bang, of course. To me, this (poor) attempt at flirtation disrupted the conference context and even felt degrading.
If they had been interested in my ideas, they might have asked what I meant with what I said at the Q&A, and we might have gone off on a philosophical tangent together and found beauty in each other’s ideas. From a place of genuine interest in the other’s thoughts and ideas, careful, sapiosexual push-and-pull moves can be made. And if the other does not reciprocate, then you have simply had a good conversation.
However, I cannot recommend conference flirting without addressing the following serious dangers:
1. Creeping someone out
2. Creating a sleazy atmosphere
3. Losing a good colleague
Creeping Someone Out
Flirting is a mutual game. However, someone must initiate it. And initiation is a high-stakes action. Foolhardiness on this front can be prevented by imprinting into your mind that you too can be a creep, no matter how good your intentions are and how attractive you are. Not being creepy requires self-awareness and self-awareness is both introspective and extrospective. As Valerie Tiberius puts it “The self-aware person is committed to discovering her real motivations and has the ability to see herself from a third-person point of view.” (This is from a chapter in her book. To be clear, she is not talking about flirting at conferences, I am.)
First, train yourself to become aware of your real motivations for thinking or doing something. Do not fumble and throw out flirtation attempts and realize only 20 seconds later that you have done so. Be intentional about the pushes and pulls. Second, stick to the one-shot rule. If you make a push-motion, and the other does not reciprocate, retract, err on the side of professionalism, and don’t try with that person again. Imagine how your behavior looks from a third-person perspective and make sure that nobody could reasonably find you a creep.
Here’s an example of how a careful flirtation can be retracted. Once, I attempted a clumsy flirtation with someone at conference dinner. I remember making a comment about the beauty of their system of thought, coupled with a look, that was a little intense, nothing extreme, but the intention was, perhaps, palpable. My discussion partner smiled distantly and disengaged from the topic. I had an immediate moment of micro-mortification and took this as a clear sign that my intensity was not welcome. I straightened my posture, smiled back and gave them space. Years on, I maintain a good professional relationship with this person, my hope is that they did not even notice or do not remember.
I’d also done myself a favor by making sure that others did not hear this push-motion. This is as it should be. Even if your flirtation goes over well, others present are likely not willing bystanders. If the flirting is conspicuous, this might erode the otherwise pleasant professional atmosphere for others, which brings us to the next danger.
Creating a Sleazy Atmosphere
Certain types of flirtatiousness can contribute to a sleazy atmosphere. Sapiosexual flirting (where the focus is on a person’s intellect and ideas) is less likely to be sleazy. But flirting in a way that puts the focus on the other person’s body or demeanor is more likely to offend. Hence, I would avoid the latter in general. Flirting should also be targeted and non-conspicuous. It is better to direct a flirtation to one person and carefully check their response, rather than casting a wide net, which is likely to come across as sleazy and desperate. In fact, I think that casting a wide net is probably the most common flirting faux pas that I’ve seen at conferences.
Here is what it looks like: At a certain point at the dinner or reception, especially when the alcohol flows, some people begin to broadcast their push motions to whomever is there to hear. It is almost as if a person is trying to flirt with the entire company that they are with, at once, inviting everyone to step over some line. There is a wilding of the eyes, a loosening of the posture, a mischievous expression, leaning in a little too far, a familiar tone and sometimes even indulgent revelations about one’s love life or a too comfortable use of language (as if talking about fucking or even saying the word fuck might magically bring about its semantic contents.) There is nothing wrong with having a drink and relaxing a little, but there are ways not to radiate sleaze as you do so. Basic etiquette goes a long way. If alcohol makes it difficult not to, then make sure you practice drinking in another setting first.
Sometimes we feel the urge to rebel against behavioral norms. This can be justified in cases where norms are oppressive. But in many other cases, the urge to rebel has more to do with our own self-oppressive personal circumstances than whether the norms are just or not. One can often understand why the inner swine insist on making itself heard at the conference reception: a professor with little time for other pursuits, overworked, and in an unhappily sexless marriage with another workaholic. Or imagine: a PhD student who feels that they screwed up their talk and is searching for something to override the painful memory. The inner swine seizes its opportunity. This is not good for the atmosphere.
How can we guard against this? First, the professional guise is not separate from one’s personal life; it begins with one’s personal life. Therefore, make sure that you have some way to channel your inner swine, and that professional events are not the only time you can let loose. Secondly, if you feel the professional atmosphere collapsing you can help preserve it. Look around and take stock of who you are with. Are you a man in the company of four other men and one woman? Are people getting drunk? If the vibe starts to turn locker-roomy, straighten your posture, brighten your expression, select which jokes you laugh at and which you don’t, which topics you engage with and which you don’t, show your discomfort. I have seen colleagues do this in different ways: visibly cringing at something someone says or even saying “I’m not sure I feel comfortable with that remark” or a slightly lighter “too far!” Good manners will never make you less attractive either.
Flirtations often lead nowhere. But sometimes they lead somewhere consequential. Other times they lead nowhere but their impact ripples into the future. This can have consequences for you professionally. Before you flirt, be acutely aware of the fact that it may cost you a good colleague.
Losing a Good Colleague
Many people think that flirting, and anything sexual, with a colleague, or even a friend for that matter, is likely to cause a nasty tangle in one’s social circle. Even if you don’t think that, the person you flirt with might think so, and you will have to respect that. This means that flirting with someone can potentially cost you a good colleague.
Furthermore, flirting can, by its nature, complicate certain kinds of existing relationship or preclude the possibility of such relationships in the future. Especially relationships that involve some significant professional power dynamic and heightened vulnerability (such as mentorship or subordination) we tend to think of as not mixing well with anything sexual. Other types of relationships are more easily combinable without risks.
Which relationships mix well and which don’t are on a sliding scale from morally easy to morally difficult: we might see flings with colleagues at different institutions as being on the easier end of the gradient and subordinates or mentees on the extremely difficult side, with other types in between. Someone senior to you will generally be easier than someone junior to you. So how far into the morally difficult deep end can you permissibly venture?
This depends on the refinement of your moral skills. Yes, I am saying that some people may permissibly sleep with colleagues and others not. I realize there will be some readers who think that morality permits, requires, or prohibits the same actions of everyone, and hence disagree with me here. On my view, though, virtuous people justifiably have a license to do more morally difficult things. Such a license is one of the rewards of virtue, granted because to be virtuous involves having the skills that allow one to do morally difficult things well.
Before you flirt, therefore, try to determine where on the easy-to-difficult gradient that flirtation would be. Subsequently assess, with the self-honesty of someone determining whether to jump over a mile deep precipice, how skilled you are at managing such relationships. Have you flirted before? Have you had flings before? Are you psychologically in a place to be getting into morally difficult and vulnerable situations? Or are you insecure about your career? Are you insecure about your sexuality? How comfortable are you with being rejected? Do you have friends you can talk with honestly about these things? Have you been able to maintain good relationships with people you’ve flirted with or had flings with in the past? Do not venture too far out of your depth.
I tend to stick to the following: no one more junior than me, no subordinates and no direct coworkers. This of course means that me flinging with someone senior to me would require them to do something that I wouldn’t do. I do not hold myself responsible for the more senior people that decide to flirt with or have flings with me. If someone more senior decided that the connection with me is worth the risk: I assume that they are highly skilled and therefore trust that they know what they are getting into. I am responsible for my own choices and of those making riskier choices than me I demand more virtue. People in positions of more power, and who make riskier choices that are more morally difficult: I expect more of them.
Senior scholars who choose to have flings with me are not sharks that I’ve enticed by wearing a meat suit. If their desire for me leads them to act unprofessionally, then I am not responsible for that, they are. In fact, holding me responsible for their screw ups is exactly the problem. Blaming sex rather than the inappropriate conduct of people in positions of power gives power abusers an easy pass and does not encourage the development of sexual and sexual-social virtue. Again, flirting is not sexual harassment, and a fling with a colleague is not an abuse of power. It is crucial that we differentiate between them.
Some believe that by tolerating sex in a professional environment, we perpetuate gender-based violence, because immature men will inevitably end up ruining things for women. I understand that deeply pervasive patterns of gendered violence that skew our world against women from the get-go are hard to uproot, and sometimes the best we can do is ameliorate by making things a little safer, even if a little less hedonistic. However, I cannot shake the sense that by expecting immaturity of men, we might be encouraging precisely that immaturity. What if we stopped expecting immaturity from men in positions of power, and instead expect virtue, and expect even more virtue when they choose to enter morally difficult situations?
License to Play is the Reward of Virtue
I still believe that we should be talking about relationships in the sphere of our work more, even if talking about conference flings might not be good publicity for us. Some might say that it sets a bad example for our students. However, philosophers are in the business of investigating the truth and what is right, not in the business of good publicity. Talking about what is going on, if anything, should be a good example for aspiring philosophers.
My message to those young philosophers is that one should not see conferences as just another place to get laid. My point is that it is a high-risk place that requires lots of understanding of professional roles, self-awareness, and self-control. Flirting at conferences, therefore, also provides an opportunity to refine one’s moral skills on these fronts.
The thing with any difficult skill is that one needs to practice it, and practicing difficult skills generally means taking risks. Every performing musician has their first show, every ski jumper their first jump, and every surgeon their first operation. These risky feats are done at the moment that the learner is ready and has had enough practice. So it is with flirting in morally difficult settings.
Some virtue ethicists think that virtue is hard to develop because virtue tends to be dull, whereas vice glitters like black obsidian. I do not agree with this. Virtue is hard to develop but it grants the possessor the ability to live fully in peaceful coexistence with one’s inner swine, and a license to play with fire.


Something something one thought too many.
Yep.
Its baaaaaack……
“a conference is an ideal place to flirt …As far as academic activities go, conferences are likely the safest place for it, since you are likely to meet people that are not your direct coworkers.”
Only if you have a narrow, self-interested view of what conferences are for. Conferences in general should promote the interests of the profession (in addition to other functions, of course). I think it’s hard to deny that philosophy would be much better off we appropriately valued and exemplified professionalism. For this reason I say that there is a prima facie duty against flirting at conferences. Flirting is almost certainly inconsistent with professionalism, even if flirting does no harm.
To be clear, professionalism does not merely consist in prudish behavior. It consists in suspending certain attitudes and judgments that might be relevant socially but are irrelevant for practicing philosophy.
“[Professionalism] consists in suspending certain attitudes and judgments that might be relevant socially but are irrelevant for practicing philosophy.”
This precludes flirting only if you have a narrow, moralistic view of what philosophy is for.
I’m not weighing in on the merits of Rails’s argument, but just to be clear, they’re emphasizing the importance of professionalism. As I understand it, their point is that flirting must maintain professionalism, and they strongly opposed those who flirt in a way that disrupts the professional environment of the conference. I’m not sure why you think flirting is inconsistent with professionalism, given Rails’s one-shot rule.
I seem to recall some quote about not placing stumbling blocks in front of blind people.
It ruins the conference experience for those of us who might receive a lot of one-shot approaches from different people
“Rails recently got in touch with me again,” of course…
I wonder what interlocutor “Alex Rails” would most identify with – or correct – in Plato’s *Symposium*?
“Virtue is hard to develop but it grants the possessor the ability to live fully in peaceful coexistence with one’s inner swine, and a license to play with fire.”
I’m not sure what conception of virtue ethics the author is working with here, but it’s not one I’ve ever heard and seems prima facie absurd to me. Virtue is supposed to help you *get rid* of your inner swine, and while it may change the scope of what things *constitute* playing with fire, it certainly doesn’t give one a “license” to do so. A weird picture of virtue strikes me as the root of what is odd and off-putting about all of this.
The Aristotelean virtue of temperance does not require you to get rid of your inner beast, your desire for bodily things like sex and drink, it requires you to maintain such desires and to direct them moderately. To eradicate that “swine” would be to enjoy bodily pleasures too little, a vice. So Aristotelean temperance is just what A.R. is recommending. One’s “inner swine” is clearly just the desire itself here, the virtue is in the reasonable moderation that allows you to “play with fire” without crossing the line into extremity (vice).
Doubtless you disagree that this counts as proper moderation, but surely you can see the obvious virtue ethical element here?
Absolutely not. Desire for drink and sex isn’t swine-like if the agent is virtuous. The virtue of the agent makes it such that those desires are properly human, not swine-like at all.
And the definition of “playing with fire” is doing something risky for an insufficient reason. It’s necessarily vicious.
Hmm.. How do I put it? Well, I like the idea or practice of flirting, but only in the sense of superb conversational skill (that makes philosophy so fun and smooth and perhaps personal), which can very well constitute a good philosophical life. But I detest the notion of flirting with an implicit aim at fling or romance. Do the latter at conferences? Why??
“Conference” is too broad and ambiguous to admit a simple or single answer about flirting. While flirting is unlikely to be appropriate during or between formal sessions, many conferences include optional social activities and free time where attendees can mingle and flirt. My guess is that flirting is more appropriate, more likely, and more successful at a typical conference than during a typical work week.
The most surprising thing to me about this post is that people flirt and hook up at conferences. My usual conference routine consists of going back to my hotel at 2 a.m. completely drunk because I spent the evening talking to the keynote speaker about their paper, then to someone else about their new book proposal, then catching up with old grad school friends and former co-authors. After that, I read the paper for the first session the next morning until about 5 a.m., sleep for ninety minutes, and somehow make it to the opening panel next day, and then rinse and repeat.
I’m not against it in principle, and I can certainly see why conferences might make for a good dating market (though the amount of overthinking on display in this post is hilarious). But… how, when, and what exactly is supposed to happen? Maybe I’ve been doing this all conferencing business all wrong.
Sorry bro…
You mentioned a period of “catching up with old grad school friends and former co-authors”. I think for a lot of people, that includes some flirting. Possibly with the old grad school friends and co-authors, or possibly with the co-authors of old grad school friends or the grad school friends of former co-authors.
Maybe also during the talking to someone about their book proposal, less likely talking to the keynote speaker about their paper, and almost certainly not during the period of reading the paper for the first session the next morning. (Although maybe some successful flirting early in the evening leads to a multiplayer reading of the paper for the first session the next morning.)
I for one feel flirted to whenever the speaker takes out a paper and starts reading monotonously from it. What a turn on.
Are you two flirting now? just don’t want to be obtuse and want to learn from the masters. (/j in case it’s not obvious)
Just to be clear: I am not against flirting in conferences. I was just amused by the fact that it would have never occured to me to pro-actively do it.
But as I said, I totally see how for a single philosopher actively looking for a partner, such events are prime dating markets! Let us not be prudish here.
“there is a wilding of the eyes” — what a phrase! Whoever wrote this is a Jane Austen walking amongst us
sequels are never as good
but sometimes they are as bad
Having all these rules for flirting sure makes it sound like Alex Rails is actually a weak player.
Toughen up, Rails!
This post reminds me of youth group discussions about “how far you can go without going too far.”
I’d recommend Bonnie Mann’s article “Creepers, Flirts, Heroes, and Allies: Four Theses on Sexual Harassment” for phenomenological tools of distinguishing flirts from creeps.
“If flirting in a professional setting is not done, as some of the comments suggested, where do all these sweet couples come from? Did they all meet outside of work?”
Every married philosopher couple I’ve encountered met when one of them was a grad student and the other was their supervisor. (This might say more about gerontocracy in the profession than anything).
I’m glad things worked out for them, but as many women philosophers pointed out last time, we don’t want this. Nor do women (or anyone) at conferences want to be hit up for dates when trying to talk about Spinoza.
That aside, naturally, it’s possible to meet somewhere professional (like a conference) and have it develop into something later. Going for the flirt off the bat smacks of weak player energy.
Ew.
More specifically: don’t do this. Have more respect for (especially) women in the profession than to do this. The last thing we who are actually doing philosophy and interested in philosophy need is to have to wonder: (a) whether someone approaching us to talk about philosophy is actually doing what Rails advises; and (b) whether someone we approach to actually talk about philosophy is going to take that as a sexual overture.
Also, this kind of thing makes for a horrible nightmarishly sexualized environment for third parties, especially women (given the proportions in philosophy). Even when it’s confined to conferences, and not brought back to any degree to a home department (which is a conceptual possibility I have never once seen realized in fact)
I wholeheartedly agree with you – as a 20-something lesbian I’ve had multiple (young) men take “playful” passes at me in post-talk social settings at conferences and it weirds me out more than it flatters me. Even if they follow the proposed “one pass” rule and don’t try again after I decline to reciprocate, I then get to spend the remainder of the conference actively avoiding this person out of embarrassment or wondering if they were ever genuinely into my talk/paper/work or whatever we were discussing before the flirting happened. Even if I wanted to talk to them more about their work, I won’t, because there’s a risk they’ll interpret it as interest. The fact that I feel my sexuality should be obvious (just by how I dress and carry myself), but somehow isn’t to these guys, adds yet another layer of discomfort. Why should I have to explain my marginalized sexual orientation to random people that I’ve only just met, at a work event that is supposed to be about discussing work? Like please just don’t flirt with me. I feel like the sole exception to this rule is two people at a conference who already know each other and have a romantic thing going.
How does flirting make an environment nightmarish to women?
And how is flirting at conferences incompatible with talking about philosophy?
Also, I suspect there is a significant share of single women philosophers who appreciate being flirted with and hope it happens at conferences?
Flirting requires plausible deniability. This is why it can only happen in environments which are not primarily devoted to it, such as, precisely, conferences. Hoping to make it disappear by creating devoted spaces for it or by relagating heterosexual courting to apps seriously misunderstands how human sexual and romantic attraction works.
I’m going to respond to your first point, Viktor. Sure, maybe some women philosophers appreciate flirting at work events. That’s possible. But what I think you need to attend to here is that at least two women in this thread have noted the ways in which it makes them uncomfortable. If you cannot understand why that is, you should have a think about why the women in your life – assuming there are some – have never mentioned it to you.
Putting that aside, here are at least two reasons why hetero flirting might make an environment nightmarish for women. One: flirting means indicating sexual interest, which *for women specifically* then means going through burdensome labor of assessing whether this is a man who can safely be rejected or who can be safely engaged. Is he a creep, or rapist, or a threat to my professional reputation? It seems nightmarish to have to do this kind of safety assessment all of the time, including at work. Two: flirting means indicating sexual interest, which means then activating all the sexist nonsense of this world where some people and bodies are seen as objects (or more like objects) than others, which then might make a woman philosopher feel like she is not being taken seriously for her philosophical skills, or like she is being othered, or a variety of other non-equitable relations. It is like activating imposter syndrome: this man doesn’t think I’m interesting/smart, he thinks I’m sexually appealing. Many like to be sexually appealing, but not, you know, at work. Being in a non-sexual environment is a relief for those of us who are continually reduced to our bodies and flirting brings that all back to the fore.
For the record, I think flirting is good – just not at work! Flirt elsewhere. Coffee shops, concerts, bars, whatever.
“…all the sexist nonsense of this world where some people and bodies are seen as objects (or more like objects than others), which then might make a woman philosopher feel like she is not being taken seriously for her philosophical skills, or like she is being othered, or a variety of other non-equitable relations…”
Yes, all this, and there’s another thing. If some hetero woman is overtly and continually flirting with a man or men, esp in a style that I will call ‘performative-feminine’, and puts the focus on bodies, that changes dynamics for other women in the vicinity. Men will tend to generalize in a weird way (but understandable) as the flirty dynamic becomes the most salient feature in the room for them, and as a result misconstrue the intentions and actions of the other nearby women.
If for example, one of the women objects philosophically to an argument made by a woman who has been engaged in overt physical flirting, men (and many sexist women) tend to immediately perceive that act as a woman competing with a woman for the sexual attention of men, rather than specifically to do with the philosophical content. Thus not through objectification, but through uncharitable interpretation, or rather, interpretation through the lens of flirting-in-the-room, women lose the ability to be heard as philosophers.
All of this, and a thousand other variations, e.g.:
(1) Giggle-flirt-fest-damsel-woman, is Rails-style ‘sapio’ flirting with professionally powerful man, another woman objects to the philosophical content, and the man upon immediately perceiving that he’s got a shot at sex with the first and not the second woman proceeds to support the first woman’s philosophical claims and for that sex related reason, which the second woman will suspect (you are not as subtle as you think) but be unable to prove because ‘plausible deniability’ and at any rate, her philosophical ideas will not be heard
(2) the entire atmosphere becomes one in which encourages confusion between the value of philosophical ideas and arguments and the value of being laid (or even short of that, the pleasure for men of having some giggly flirty young woman stroke their ego in the ways common to such feminized flirting, and perhaps understandable ways in which men come to value that pleasure). Such confusion is understandable perhaps, and my own experience is that men often do not see that they are confused on precisely this score (after all, there’s a lot of incentive for them not to see that they are confused in this way and to instead insist that it’s mere coincidence that they think so highly of the giggly young woman batting her eyelashes, flattering his ego, and doing her best damsel act through the pretense of ‘philosophical discussion’ which is precisely what Rails has avowed she does). It’s a miserable situation for any woman who doesn’t want to play that game.
(3) For roughly the same reasons, in such an atmosphere, no evaluations of ideas, arguments, or anything else that’s the proper object of evaluations of merit in philosophy can be taken seriously when offered by either a man (or men) with whom giggle-fest-flirt woman is flirting or by giggle-fest woman herself. It undermines the entire philosophical enterprise. Cut it out.
I would appreciate it if you avoided speculating about my private life, thank you. As for flirting in bars – great, but what if I am attracted to other philosophers?
As for the rest of your comments and those below as well: I do not think we must, morally speaking, maximally rigidify, desexualise, and sanitise our norms of social interaction merely to accommodate the most neurotic people among us. We tried that in the 2010s, and it made us all miserable, isolated, and lonely, both men and women.
It is time we all start pushing back against this sort of attitude, and it is time we start denying it the moral high grounds it has claimed for itself.
Notice how you’ve not responded here to the articulate and apt *arguments* above that flirting at conferences can be detrimental to women in various ways. If you think the opposing position is wrong, fine! But tell people what’s wrong with their arguments, rather than just dismissing them. (Plainly, I hope, one not need be a neurotic to think the arguments above are plausible!)
And how, exactly, am I supposed to do that? Apparently, the reason I’m not aware of the dynamics described above is that I don’t have women in my life to tell me about them, or something.
Also, describing the messiness of ordinary adult life in particularly dark terms and simply assuming that it is obviously and inherently bad is not an argument. That, too, was common in the 2010s, and is hopefully behind us now
“the messiness of ordinary adult life” is not an excuse to be an asshole, Viktor. I assure you that there are plenty of people, men and women alike, having active sex lives, doing philosophy, and trying our best to avoid people like you who are patently unwilling to see the effects of the behavior you’re engaging in with the giggling, flattering, flirting Alex Rails’s of the world. Sometimes we pay a real cost by not stroking male egos, giggling, and batting our eyelashes. But there are an increasing number of us, even in philosophy, and it is increasingly you and the giggling flirts who are missing out on the philosophy. Adj, Runa, recentlytenured, Emily Heydon– look for us at a table the next APA, you shall know us by our lack of giggling-at-men and our direct engagement with philosophers as philosophers.
redescrbiing objectively bad conditions that undermine the philosophical enterprise generally and specifically undermine women as equal interlocutors in philosophy as, instead, “messiness of ordinary life” doesn’t make it so.
Some of us have seen that redescription tactic before, Viktor. We clock it, and we are out of f’s to give in putting up with it.
Yes, exactly!
There are a number of well-explored answers to your question (“How am I supposed to do that?”): in the literature on color blindness; in the literature on inaccessible qualia; in the literature on revealed peer disagreement; and so on. I’ll presume you know of those answers: so why don’t you tell *me* why you don’t think that the standard ways of acting on evidence to which you lack first-person access don’t work in this case.
Maybe because I have access to competing evidence, i.e, my many women friends (what do you know!), single or not, including in philosophy, whose main complaint is that men don’t talk to them, don’t approach them, never flirt with them, and whose self esteem seems irremediably damaged by that fact? Believe it or not, not every woman in the world perceives male sexual interest and attention as something inherently disgusting and degrading, including at profesional events.
Anyway this conversation went very wrong very quickly, so sorry about that, my initial point was much more moderate than that and I am clearly the bad guy here so I’ll fold.
It’s not messiness of life thats in question here, not for the most part. It’s power tripping.
It is obviously bad to be always misinterpreted or unheard as a result of sexual flattery on the parts of others going to the heads of those in power. It is obvious to those who have spent a lifetime experiencing it. There’s no reason it should be obvious to you unless you are a very reflective person, deeply aware of the alternative possibilities in life.
Some knowledgeable person once said that the oppressed or underclass or what-have-you always studies and knows the oppressor better than the other way around, because when you’re in power, you don’t have to worry about the underlings – you don’t have any cause to adopt their perspective. You can go on benightedly never questioning your own. They on the other hand have to study you closely and develop explanations of your behaviour in order to survive.
Besides following advice for acquiring evidence in cases where you fail to have first person access, you might also review literature on how prone to self deception human beings can be, and in what kinds of circumstances, and what kind of adaptation that is.
My point was not about your private life, but rather than men who are identified as safe for women often have already heard about these kinds of threats that women face in non-philosophy-blog spaces.
I think it is a really unfair, as doingmyjob notes below, to reframe ‘thing which has gone badly for women at workplaces forever’ as something only the most neurotic people worry about. I am sure that you know that predatory men have long called sexual harassment ‘flirting’ precisely so that they could get away with awful stuff.
I am disappointed that women requesting a slight inconvenience for you (to flirt with people you find attractive outside of work-related events) for the sake of their physical and psychological safety seems like a big ask.
Like ‘doingmyjob’ and others note below, it is an uncharitable reframing to suggest that asking people not to flirt at work events is overly sanitized or that the people who are making the ask are neurotic.
Flirting is supposed to be fun, but if some people are not going to experience it as fun, but rather a threat or just unnecessarily stressful *because it is at work*, it seems reasonable to ask folks not to do it *at work.* I am very much pro flirting in other venues where you’re likely to meet people with similar interests.
I don’t think people are going to be lonely and miserable just because they’re not flirting at work events.There are other ways to develop meaningful intimacy with other philosophers – friendship, for example.
As weird as it may appear to you, work used to be, and still is, the primary place where people would meet. I see no reason to expect academic philosophy to be that different.
Evidence for this, please? Searching the interwebs seems to indicate that this claim is false…
“I hope they do not remember”: they do, and word about you is quietly passed from philosopher to philosopher. Food for thought.
I prefer flirting at the laundromat waiting for the dryer to finish. Simpler moral setting, but more romantic. Still important not creep someone out and not to create a sleazy atmosphere.
If you have not seen it yet, you must see the 1985 movie:
My Beautiful Laundrette
The idea of mixing of a conference environment with one’s “inner swine” is at once confusing, revolting and probably a thought conjured up after reading Bret Easton Ellis.
If your theory of flirting with your coworkers specifically at work events requires hiding your motivations and behavior specifically to maintain plausible deniability, you’re probably just a creep. And sexual harassment can be a one shot game. It doesn’t have to be repeated, although it very well may be if your coworker is Alex rails
I suspect you would hold the view that if one has any theory* of flirting with one’s coworkers specifically at work events, one is “probably just a creep.”
That may be a fine view to hold, though I think it implies a kind of HR-aligned moralism that philosophers generally should be reluctant to embrace. Meanwhile, granting the view, I’ll note that there is still a question of more and less creepy conduct. If a creep’s theory of flirting with one’s coworkers specifically at work events is, by its consequences, a theory of less creepy conduct (as opposed to more creepy conduct), then that seems like a normatively good theory. (Even more so, in a non-ideal world full of creeps!)
*Maybe I should say “any productive theory” or “any non-trivializing theory”
Most flirting starts with an innocent glance or a smile. Eye contact can be a very dangerous thing, and sometimes all it takes is just one look.
Are looking and smiling still allowed at philosophy conferences?
I’m pretty sure that, by the time most people attain sufficient moral virtue to be entitled to ‘play with fire’ in this sense, they’re pushing ninety and probably not so into flirting anymore.
We are not a serious discipline.
Unlike in the previous post, Rails shows this time that she possesses the sensitivities of a strong player. Looking forward to next year’s post!
What I do object to is the obsession with power and differences in seniority. I don’t think power abuses happen as often as the author thinks. Moreover, the more junior participant can easily have as much power, given the damage that an accusation can inflict on the senior person’s career. But both parties of a consensual relationship between colleagues have a strong incentive to not abuse their power or engage in other gross misconduct.
I’ve been an academic philosopher for 10 years and have experienced more abuses of power than I can count. They are so, so much more common than people think and they almost always involve senior men abusing power and women are disproportionately the targets (though I have experienced one woman who abuses her power, facilitated by her also-philosopher husband).
On one hand I’m glad everyone is having fun (?) here. On the other, I find this embarrassing! It makes us look like fools. It is a silly argument concerning a silly topic on a public-facing bulletin board of the profession. No reasonable person involved in the writing or posting of this should expect that anyone will learn anything valuable about how to flirt or not flirt at conferences, or change their behavior in this arena as a result. At most, such a person should expect a lively comments section and people getting some jokes off on twitter/bluesky. To me that doesn’t seem worth it. I’m not trying to be accusatory, but – why write or post this? What do we gain? Am I too easily embarrassed?
You are right. I have talked to some female colleagues about this. Their judgement: “creepy and misogynistic”.
Yes, you’re probably too easily embarrassed if your barometer for what is worth discussing is primarily calibrated to guesses about how an unserious public (via twitter/blue sky) will perceive a distributed collective of people (a profession, not even a particular professional society).
But also, is it so strange to think that silliness could, first and foremost, be a vehicle for reaching new vistas in public discussion? Think of comedians. Or, if not those unserious jesters, maybe the logician who penned Jabberwocky?
This isn’t funny though. I don’t find it offensive or taboo or anything like that; it’s just the worst kind of pedantic philosophizing about social minutiae, like an alien trying to reconstruct human flirting from first principles. It’s embarrassing because it’s lame and makes us look like socially inept weirdos. Okay, maybe that’s not what Why? meant, but that’s my story and I’m sticking to it.
I won’t argue on a point about taste. But on the latter point: what if we actually are socially inept weirdos? If not on a bulletin board for us weird kinfolk, where else might we express our authentic weirdo selves? At the very least, I’d want to see a worked out statement of political strategy, which would justify stifling our weirdness—in our own designated spaces, no less—-out of a speculated concern about public embarrassment. (In fact, I doubt the empirical claim that this would read as an embarrassment to a wider public. But I’ll grant it here.)
I mean, we’re almost certainly socially inept weirdos. I just meant that this whole approach seems to miss the point of flirting. I suspect a broader (lay) audience would say: “just read the room and flirt if that’s the vibe.” If that’s not enough for someone, they probably need better acculturation rather than an academic essay. As for expressing ourselves, no strategy necessary; I don’t think embarrassment calls for self-censorship or anything like that. On the other hand, we might consider whether everything needs to be expressed all the time.
I think we’re pretty close to the same page, then. I just don’t want our actions to be filtered through guesses about how we’ll fair in an imagined court of social media. I might just be a bit more optimistic than you about art and wisdom being born in unpredictable places. If it’s written well, pursued in earnest, and the sort of subject others care about… then express away?
Yeah I agree that the issue here is not how we’ll be perceived by others–sorry for implying otherwise. My point was really just that *I* find it embarrassing for the reasons I gave above. I can’t help but read some of Rails’s post (certainly not all of it, I would never) and react with nothing more than “get a grip, dude.”
Sounds good. A very nearby takeaway, though, ends up in an opposite sentiment that I’m sure most of us have about all sorts of strange things we read: “weird to have put the effort into it, but nice work”.
I guess from my perspective, it is neat to get a window into the mind of another who would choose to analyze this bit of acculturation that I take for granted, and which I would never have thought to attempt to put words/argument to.
Yes that’s it. It’s just really embarrassing and makes me cringe to read. This essay and the one last year have this overtone of smug subversiveness and this sense the author thinks she is daring to apply ‘logic’ to something devilish that the rest of us are too afraid to touch…god
I hadn’t even considered the smug subversiveness angle. But you’re right, and that makes it even worse lol.
Starting to think the APA should put chemical castrating agents in the conference coffee
Alex Rails’ outpourings betray a (male) predatory mindset. Women have been exposed to this all their lives, from pre-puberty onwards. Why Justin thought this and last year’s blathering would make good reading not just for male, but also for female philosophers is a mystery. Unless…
Ridiculous insinuation. and Justin explained why he’s posting this and also (in the initial post) explained he wasn’t enitrely sure if he should. the amount of engagement (on both sides) vindicates the decision to post it, as it’s clearly not a settled matter how to think about some of these things.
How does this thread show anything like “it’s not a settled matter how to think about some of these things”? If there’s a post on whether women’s suffrage was a good idea and one woman and a smattering of men show up and say “yeah! terrible idea! where am I going to get my sammiches (deliberate misspelling) if women go out and vote?!? Maybe some women like not voting!” that in no way shows that it’s not a clearly settled matter (philosophically, among remotely reasonable people) whether women’s suffrage was a good idea. I’m posting because I want other women who are trying to do their job to know there’s support out there, and those who are trying to undermine the philosophical enterprise by turning it into a giant flirt and fuck fest to know that there are people out there who clock them.
Okay, let’s pause a moment. Women’s suffrage is a good idea. Anyone who says on a blog that it’s a terrible idea.. including a smattering of men, is wrong. And it remains settled that women’s suffrage is a good idea regardless of what men on a blog say. I don’t hold, and would reject, any principle of the form: for any subject X, if people on a blog disagree about X, that disagreement shows X is unsettled. That principle is nuts.
So let me clarify the point I was actually making, which I think is a reasonable one, and explain why it doesn’t commit me to that principle at all.
What I was doing was, firstly and in the main, was pushing back against Anselm’s insinuation that Justin is Alex Rails. That is exactly what I took the “Unless…” to be suggesting, and I think it’s ridiculous. And, this is the part especially relevant to your response to me… I was also responding to the sentence immediately before the “unless”: “Why Justin thought this and last year’s blathering would make good reading not just for male, but also for female philosophers is a mystery.”
So my post was doing two things. First, it disputed that Justin’s reasons were any mystery.. he literally stated the reasons for posting the two Rails posts, and Anselm ignored that reasoning. Second, my comment above defended my view that the post met the bar for opening up a blog topic!!! The bar I had in mind, and I’m telling you literally what I was thinking, is that a blog topic post isn’t bad if philosophers are engaging with it and there are serious people makign productive points on both sides.
Here is where I should have been clearer. I actually hated Alex Rails’ first post. I think going to conferences looking to hook up is just weird and also creates a bad and risky climate especially for women. The second post struck me as more reasonable and certainly less objectionable. But I think Justin was right to post both, including the first, because the first opened up not any one single question but a whole cluster of complicated ones, and on those questions a lot of smart, reasonable people were disagreeing in productive ways. That seems to me all to the good, and exactly what a blog is for.
There is nothing less sexy than trying to derive rizz from first principles.
Perhaps. But, as we learned from Plato, there is nothing more sexy than trying to derive first principles from rizz.
True.
(And my agreement here is perfectly consistent with previous comments pointing to the negative effects on philosophy of performative-fem flirting in work contexts.)
The post is not especially interesting, but it provoked an interesting discussion in the comments. I’d like to add a few thoughts.
Runa and doingmyjob make some great social observations, but at the same time it’s hard not to read their posts autobiographically. Their anger at other women who use their sex appeal to defect from an implicit agreement to be sex-neutral, which benefits all women philosophers in the ways they describe, is understandable. But this rather pointed and public show of women’s deep tendency to police each other’s sexual behavior strikes me as suspicious and perhaps even net-harmful. If I’ve correctly described the structure of the situation–individual women for whom the benefits of defecting will defect–then what are these comments except expressions of anger that some appealing women put their interests above yours? Before embarking on the name and shame campaign, I want to pause for a moment to reflect on its justification. I am not confident at all that this sort of policing behavior should continue.
I hesitate to endorse the name and shame campaign for two reasons. First, I’m pessimistic that the social norms could be reformed so as to prevent any particular woman with sexual appeal from using it to advance her interests. Perhaps it’s naive to think that women can be prevented from using the levers at their disposal to further their goals. By policing each other publicly you just push that behavior into the private sphere and encourage women to act in ways that are ambiguous and plausibly deniable. Indeed, that seems to be the present situation. Admittedly, there is a strong response to my pessimism, namely that even if policing cannot eliminate this behavior, policing can still achieve valuable reductions in undesirable behavior. So, even if total flirting eradication is futile, that doesn’t release us from the need to determine whether flirting should be decreased or increased if we can increase or decrease it.
Here is a second reason for my hesitation. I suspect that preferences on the matter of flirting and being flirted with are simply too diverse for there to be any stable cooperative scheme in place on this issue. Women who do not stand to benefit from flirting or cannot bring themselves to do it would prefer that nobody flirt. Women who flirt can rightly point out that other women are no less able to flirt and will add that they are happy to let everyone play the hand they’re dealt. Maybe the flirty woman’s argument carries the day: flirting to advance one’s professional goals is permissible so long as everyone is permitted to do it. Sure, particular women would be disadvantaged by this, but those harms have to be weighed against the harms and costs of policing, which may be greater. As far as I can see, the current situation is an effective compromise between these two preferences. In the current situation, as I understand it, women benefit from a sex-neutral atmosphere because overt flirting is kept to a low level. At the same time, women who stand to gain from flirting cannot be prevented from doing so in private, nor from acting in public in ways which are ambiguous (as was discussed at length above). Thus, women who stand to gain from defecting effectively cannot be prevented from doing so. On this compromise, both the flirt gets some rein to flirt and the atmosphere is kept largely professional. The flirt and the anti-flirt get a bit of what they want.
Personally, sex and romance are a large part of my good. For me, they are a deep and abiding source of pleasure, happiness, and contentment. It would be an exaggeration to say that, without them, life would be an unsufferable trudge to the grave, but maybe that’s true for some people. I’m not eager to deny those people their happiness. Even if it negatively affects my career prospects for a competitor to use all the tools at her disposal to advance her career, can I really blame her? If I look at the issue with intellectual honesty, it’s clear to me that if I stood to gain from flirting, I would both flirt and not disapprove of flirting, and that exercising restraint on this score would be supererogatory. As a psychological matter, I find it hard to blame someone for doing what I would surely do in their situation.
genius.com/Leonard-cohen-everybody-knows-lyrics
It’s interesting to think of finding some basis for cooperation between the anti-flirters and the flirters. I think my objection is to the gamification of philosophy (and, increasingly, to almost everything else that has value). But philosophy as such is different from a career in academic philosophy (or career in whatever), and that’s where my thinking might be muddled. In the latter case it makes sense to talk about self-interest. Otherwise I don’t think competitive games have anything to do with philosophy. When we say “I won the argument” that’s a joke – arguments are like (consist of) propositions, eternal and not personal. …
To defend Runa and doingmyjob, I hardly see any genuine “name and shame” and “policing” in their posts. It is totally fine to criticize broad behaviors despite the nuances you said. (conference flirtation police would indeed be terrible.)
What I don’t understand is this obsession with wanting to have sex with other philosophers. Even when I was in college, the men I had sex with weren’t even fellow students. They were men who had nothing to do with academia. I didn’t care if they knew philosophy. If you came across a very attractive philosopher who you want to have sex with, that’s understandable. It’s natural to feel attracted to them. But putting so much sexual priority into conferences is strange to me.
People who are genuinely not sex deprived or socially handicapped would not put so much hope and sexual intentions on conferences since they can easily get sex elsewhere.
Some philosophers really are just that closed-minded that they feel they can’t live a happy life without having sex with a colleague. Maybe it’s a kink. Maybe it’s arrested development. I don’t know. I’m not the type to even add co-workers on social media, let alone want to have sex with them. I guess I’ll never understand some things about some philosophers or other academics.
You’ll never understand why some (often not very suave) people might want to hook up with other (not very suave) people they have a bunch of stuff in common with at one of the rare big events where they get to interact in person, usually over drinks? That’s really tough for you to get?
Yes, because if these “not so suave” people put in the effort, they can attract others and sex outside of conferences. I’ve seen ugly people in relationships all the time! Get outside more. Conferences just don’t seem all that special to me if they want sex. Relationship, *maybe* since that requires emotional, political, and other sorts of compatibility with another person.
The problem, at least from my experience with philosophers, isn’t that they are not suave. Quite the contrary, most are average looking enough to attract plenty of average looking people. They might get lucky and attract a 10 outside of academia. If you’ve ever held a service job, you’d know how many of your awkward or a mediocre looking co-workers are in relationships or having sex.
The problem is the overly self-importance philosophers put into their identity and have unfortunately built a kink around it to the point where they can’t separate sexuality with intellectual activities.
In terms of physical attractiveness, most philosophers look no different from the general public who regularly get laid and flirt at clubs and bars every Friday night. Philosophers have very little experience with working outside of academia so they 1) think they’re not attractive enough for outsiders when that isn’t true or 2) they think the general public is beneath them in terms of attraction or sex. Though 2 is probably the result of sexualization of one’s own identity and occupation.
I feel like this—particularly the kink speculation—assumes that the philosophers in question *only* try to hook up at conferences, rather than *also* trying to do so at them (and maybe succeeding more in the latter case, because of the commonalities and such). Ultimately, I don’t know or care; I just know that I don’t like philosophers either and I CERTAINLY wouldn’t stoop to the level of hooking up with one, no matter how desperate I was, no sir/ma’am, not me.
I can understand if sex is an unintended consequence of conferences since one might meet somebody attractive there and end up hitting it off with them. But sex being on their mind when they go to conferences is the weird part. Even if a philosopher diversifies their “hookup places”, conferences shouldn’t intentionally be part of that diversification. Clubs I can understand since that’s where a lot of young people get their one night stands at. I’ve always thought that straight people could use an app similar to Grindr for specifically having sex. But because we live in a sexually puritan world and such an app is appalling to many straight people, they are forced to bring their sexuality into places that they shouldn’t. At least with a hookup app, you know exactly who is open to sex and there’s no need to flirt with people at conferences. The queer community is better at navigating sex culture than straight people. Maybe the straight community can learn from them.
I mean, I’m totally with you on the anti-puritanism bit. But there very much are sex-exclusive apps for straight people—I’d just wager that the typical dynamics on those apps are quite different, and not solely because straight people are puritans. Anyway, I agree that going to conferences *for* sex is odd; I guess I was imagining less intentional hookups.
I debated ending with some slightly-less-than-charitable irritation, but I think I’d prefer to start with it: though I think it holds more weight than Rails lets on, this topic is nowhere near as unique (nor as scandalous) as the author and commenters of these two posts are treating it. Rub shoulders with swingers, kinksters, queers, hippies, tricks, clubbers, or any of the vast number of deeply horny working professionals of all genders and sexes, and all fields and (in)dignities, who are all very familiar with the struggles of their libidos not magically disappearing at work, and an awful lot of this starts to read as falling somewhere towards the first third of a bad Dunning-Kruger effect infograph. In the previous article especially, Alex Rails seems to think that such ~sexual renegades~ as themself have only two options when things go south (and not in a fun way): patronizing explanations of how the “weaker” player is in the wrong, and scorched earth policies of social ruin. One can find these options also championed among middle schoolers. The old guard, if not the experts, of any of the aforementioned groups are generally more familiar with, say, shared methods of flagging, common issues of (and fixes for) mistaken group membership, norms about how and when to play, and unambiguous communication both before and after parties/scenes/meetups/events. (Sidenote: those with passing familiarity of “top/dom shortage” in kink circles may find Rails’ personal policy regarding the seniority of their partners of particular amusement on the re-read). These two posts are just two rather amateur drops in an ocean of sexual scholarship—which wouldn’t be irritating in the least, if they didn’t come packaged with such a misplaced sense of authority.
Ok. I’ve got most of the irritation out. On to the philosophy.
Rails’ first post sets up two situations which, when taken together, provide justification for Rails’ philosophy and actions, and also one hell of a dilemma for their opponents. Situation (A) is that there exists some number of philosopher couples that are good and/or permissible; we assume that a non-zero percentage of these couples formed at philosophy conferences or similar professional venues. Situation (B) is that flirting takes place at philosophy conferences, with an amount of related romantic and sexual activity occurring as a result. Part of Rails’ argument goes something like: if one prohibits (B), then one is prohibiting (A) from occurring, which would deprive not only the would-be couple, but also coworkers, mentees, students, publications, etc, AND, if one agrees that (A) is permissible/good, then one cannot prohibit (B), since (B) is causally linked to (A), AND THEREFORE (B) must be permissible.
Let’s ignore the flagged assumption in (A) for a moment. One could argue that although the existence of some philosopher couple is a permissible and/or good thing on its own, that the origins of the relationship are NOT permissible/good if they included (B). That is, after all, how absolute prohibition works: no matter how uncomfortable you are with morally/ethically complicated situations, if X is absolutely prohibited, it does not matter whether some good resulted from X: it is still absolutely prohibited. Therefore, we can agree that situation (A) is good, and still think (B) is bad. If we want to be as antsy as Rails is about absolute prohibition, then that’s fine. We need not have an ABSOLUTE prohibition against (B); a general one will suffice. What Rails’ posts need is some argument for WHY a potential causal link between (B) and (A) implies that the ideal amount of situation (B) is non-zero (not to mention why Rails’ approaches fits that of the ideal). It is not enough to show a causal link (possibly) exists and bar absolute prohibition. We still need an argument.
The matter of the causal link is also merely assumed. For how much weight it carries in the argument, one wonders why the assumption has stayed an assumption, especially given possible alternatives like “they met at an unrelated event,” or, “a philosopher whose dating profile lists their occupation goes on to favor other profiles that list the same occupation,” or even, “they met at a conference, worked together for decades, and then woke up one day and realized they were in love.” But I digress. We have some issues: not only is there a problem of this crossing into a sociological query that could potentially be answered with some surveys or interviews, there’s also a methodological problem brought up by this very post: that a common feature of flirting is ambiguity. If person O meets person P at a philosophy conference, and later O and P form a relationship, O and P might retroactively frame earlier conversations as flirtatious when at the time neither O nor P would have described their actions as flirting. Similarly, if O and P feel a spark at a conference, but do not start the kind of intentional push-and-pull dance that Rails describes until after the conference, the eventual existence of flirting between the two may cause their prior interactions to still be treated ambigiously by themselves and others. These are just blog posts, but for such a central piece of the argument, the slapdash way this was treated is disappointing.
Rails’ idea that the more virtuous you are, the more license you have to act in morally difficult situations is….interesting, as others have noted. On the face of it, I’m actually tempted to agree. After all, we might say that the better musician you are, the better you will fair with musically difficult situations. In other words, you have a license to get vibed by the cool cats. But this isn’t going to hold for, say, every accomplished cellist specializing in baroque arrangements that tries their hand at the saxophone for the first time during a bebop jazz festival. What does “being a virtuous person” mean here? Are there specific virtues we need in order to gain the license to do something like dating a colleague or coworker? What are they? And if we would prefer to NOT enumerate the virtues and vices, then what exactly stops someone whose only (secret, un-self-aware) vice is the abuse they put their sexual partners through from being called a paragon of virtue and so deciding that they have the license to play? And, there’s that tricky problem again of absolute prohibition being the bread and butter of an awful lot of virtue ethicists: it does not matter how virtuous you are sexually, some virtue ethicists are still going to argue it would be bad for you to commit rape (distinguished or not from CNC, as you see fit).
A related issue: if sleeping “up” the power chain is less morally taxing than sleeping “down,” and if how virtuous one is gives one a corresponding level of moral license to do morally difficult things, then it seems likely we’re looking at pairing (with some amount of frequency) slightly-less-virtuous underlings with slightly-more-virtuous overlings on the basis that the underlings *need the additional moral expertise* of the overlings to maintain such a “morally difficult” situation. Er, relationship. In which case, I’m suspicious that this argument may rely quite a bit more on the old cultural patterns of powerful (white) men having license to sleep with (nearly) anyone they please while their sexual partners have significantly less license to decide who they sleep with, than on any coherent moral theory. Rather, it seems possible that this description echoes that cultural pattern well enough to give itself (purely or as a support) an illusion of force.
One last big quibble: the epistemic issues. The characterization used here of “self awareness” as a form of both honesty, and capability to perceive oneself “in the third-person,” goes by waaaaaaay too fast. Although this post dwells on the honesty bit for a few paragraphs, we don’t get much of a breakdown on how exactly (or in what sense) one can “perceive oneself in the third-person” outside of using one’s imagination. But an assertion that any given person’s imagination approximates actual third-person perceptions well enough for this advice to be functional is fishy at best. Additionally, there’s the common issue where one can mistakenly convince oneself that one is being “self aware” when in reality one is making an ass of oneself: as indicated in comments made by doingmyjob, Emily Heydon, and adj, among others, and also as has hopefully been indicated in all of our personal experiences at some point or another, it is far too easy to stumble into this mistake. One wonders: is it ever necessary to consult actual third-person perceptions (or rather descriptions) of one’s behavior? And what happens when those descriptions conflict? I would also ask: who exactly counts as “the third-person” here? From this kerfuffle of a comments section alone, it’s clear that “the third-person” is going to include VERY different perceptions and interpretations of the same sets of actions. Whose counts? Who exactly get to be “reasonable” when trying to ascertain whether anyone could “reasonably find you a creep?” Because I have a sinking feeling the honest answer to that for many on this post would lead to a few more invitations to settle things in the parking lot than I would really like to extend at this time. (For legal reasons: that was a joke).
There’s a number of other things I could dig into with this post (an incomplete list: “a fling with a colleague is not [necessarily] an abuse of power” but it may still constitute as something else that we take ethical/moral issue with; a lot of these two posts very nearly touch Lugones-type pluralism in a way that’s fascinating and infuriating; the distinction of flirting from creeping swung and missed with the “one-and-done” policy and was unsurprisingly underdeveloped; any treatment of flirting as leading primarily to sex rather than romance (or vice versa) is going to leave out some portion of the population—and we would be here all month if we started touching on the different consequences for people of different backgrounds should any of Rails’ “advice” blow up in any faces, or the alarmingly sexist talking points made by people of all genders and positions in the comments, or the overwhelmingly white/anglo and heteronormative constructs an awful lot of people have brought into this). That fact, and the fact I was able to write any of the above, is disappointing to me. I don’t even like L&O: SVU.
Alex Rails: you had something here, and you dropped it. You can do better.
finally, we get to hear from Sartre’s date! guess it was less an example of bad faith than bad academic flirting. heyoooo
Some people so good at putting things in a nutshell.