Philosophy to the Rescue of Science
The pessimistic meta-induction—the argument that since past scientific theories have been shown to be false, we should expect that today’s will turn out false, too—makes the New York Times.
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Elay Shech, professor of philosophy at Auburn University, takes up the topic in the context of current political disputes about science and our government’s seemingly increasing disregard of expertise:
Robert F. Kennedy Jr., the secretary of health and human services, made a version of this argument in August when defending his decision to halt hundreds of millions of dollars in mRNA vaccine development despite the objections of vaccine scientists. He said that “science is always evolving” and the experts could not always be trusted.
Shech accepts that “many widely accepted [scientific] theories have been discarded” but that the question, “why should we trust the ones we have now?” is misleading. Why?
It implies that the only possible attitudes toward science are naïve faith and wholesale pessimism. It assumes that science is a single global entity that rises or falls all at once, when in reality, science is an array of local domains of inquiry, each with its own standards of evidence and degrees of reliability.
In place of skepticism, Shech recommends “disciplined trust.”
The first step in the direction of disciplined trust is recognizing that “there is no single scientific method used in all of science.” Shech writes:
Newton’s deduction from observed phenomena is very different from Darwin’s inference to the best explanation, which in turn differs radically from Einstein’s thought experiments with light beams, trains and elevators. What people call “the scientific method” is really many distinct ways of investigating the world—different strategies for representing, experimenting and classifying.
Since different areas of science employ different methods and rely on different kinds of evidence, to make a case for skepticism “you need to look at the evidence and methods in a specific area of inquiry.” And that case will not be “a sweeping claim about all of science” but rather about that particular area of inquiry with, for example, what might turn out to be “well-understood methodological problems.”
Shech’s piece is “Science Keeps Changing, So Why Should We Trust It?” (NYT gift link).
Discussion welcome (readers are advised to keep in mind that Shech’s piece is an op-ed in a popular newspaper, which constrains its length and depth).
[Note: At the suggestion of a couple of commenters on this post, I’ll be trying to post more about some items I would have normally listed in the Heap of Links; this post is an example of that.]
I especially liked this (reminded me of Stephen Toulmin):
A question to science doubters: “What particular science do you distrust and why?
Right now, science and society need philosophers who can explain why we sometimes have extremely strong reasons to believe that certain results from science are true/correct, not more skeptical arguments. I think Naomi Oreskes’s Why Trust Science and Peter Vickers’s Identifying Future-Proof Science are good examples.
I do not think Peter’s book is up for the task. There is a very good and fair critical discussion of Peter’s book at Metascience. I attach the link to Peter’s replies to his critics:
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11016-023-00926-w
But I think the critics get the better of him.
I prefer a weakening of both some requirements and some conclusions, compared to how Peter puts it, but I think the approach is broadly correct and important.
It would be nice to put these two into conservation. In Why Trust Science, Oreskes writes “We simply do not know which of our current truths will stay and which will go” (p. 75).
I seem to remember that Peter comments on that in the book. I think (as I believe Peter does) that that is too defensive a position, and not quite believable, if no distinction at all is made across currently accepted science.
This is a nice argument against the pessimistic induction. But despite RFK Jr.’s oblique invocation of it, I doubt that the pessimistic induction is actually the problem — that it is on the minds of the distrusters and best explains their distrust. There are other, more plausible competing explanations.
And how does a non-expert in a particular scientific discipline come to trust an expert in that discipline, or the discipline in general, given that they’re a non-expert? I know biologists who can’t explain their trust in biochemistry, let alone physics. Even those who have “some actual knowledge of science and some intellectual humility,” as Shech puts it, revert at some point to non-expert trust in credentials, credentialing institutions, anecdata, and the like. (C. Thi Nguyen has one or two great papers on this.)
There is an assumption here that trust is earned (entirely) through rational argumentation.
For one, I’m not sure if readers of the New York Times are the key demographic we need to influence. Second, I think the problem is the public’s relationship to science. Relationships are not rational, and they aren’t built on perfection. They are built on consistency and the reciprocation of goodwill.
This exactly. I love chatting about the philosophy of science as much as anyone, but people refusing to vaccinate their children are not doing this because they’ve read a bunch of papers on the pessimistic metainduction.
There is a broad breakdown of social trust caused by the discrediting of elites due to economic underperformance since 2008 and various high profile screwups (e.g. failed wars). Irresponsible political figures (e.g. michael gove in uk saying people are fed up with experts) and crackpots like RFK jr have recklessly aggravated and fed off this breakdown, with science being one casualty amongst many (and really this means medical treatments and global warming – most people don’t have opinions about the ontology of effective field theories or whatever, genuinely important and fascinating though these topics are).
Putting the toothpaste back in the tube will be hard…
Yes. These are things I’d include under what I referred to above as “more plausible competing explanations” of (certain sectors of) the public’s lack of trust in science.
Newton did not “deduce” from “observations”; he invented hypotheses to account for the findings of Huygens, Kepler, Galileo, etc. (some of which are not exactly observational, either) and provided explanations that attempted to refute the hypotheses of some of these (as well as, explicitly, Descartes). Getting the details right IMO matters.
As for the pessimistic metainduction, I have never bought it as a problem for two reasons: (1) all scientific work recognizes (tacitly in some cases) the idea that “more true” or “closer to completely true” is relevant as an idea. I. Asimov’s excellent popular article “The Relativity of Wrong” is useful here, IMO (2) findings in one field can prop up (characterizing this is interesting as a task) findings in another; not all findings are isolated and I would argue that an isolated finding is likely these days to be impossible, at least in natural science where matters like conservation laws are in play (3) We’re owed an account of “theory” which results in systems of ideas being rejected en-masse or not at all; this almost never happens and it has been argued it has only happened once in physics. Even Aristotle’s “laws of motion” are subsumable into Galilean, Newtonian, etc. contexts. (Exercise to complexify what I’ve been on about: chemistry).
Owed – by the partisans of the metainduction idea.
First class reply.
Even Sir Karl popper wrote about Verisimilitude.
To add.
I’ve never seen the evidence but I’d bet that there are way more guesses and hypothesis made that fail either deeper exploration or experiment than pass in any way. But few are entirely wrong. The whole process is one of launching off in likely looking directions; and eventually failing. It’s called learning and both the history and philosophy of science are bad at discussing that.
“Newton did not “deduce” from “observations”; he invented hypotheses to account for the findings of Huygens, Kepler, Galileo, etc. (some of which are not exactly observational, either) and provided explanations that attempted to refute the hypotheses of some of these (as well as, explicitly, Descartes). Getting the details right IMO matters.”
IMO, maybe read the literature on Newton. This is normally referred to as Newton’s “deductions from the phenomena” in the literature, but given the audience of a NYT op-ed, it makes complete to use ‘observations’ rather than ‘phenomena’ (at least, IMO).
Stats that show the near eradication of some diseases due to vaccinations and then posed against the new arisen appearance of them due largely to vaccine skepticism by government agencies and on merely subjective/political grounds is enough to ground the fact that vaccines are demonstrably effective. Meta-style arguments against this are ridiculous and self-serving for nothing but those subjective/political ends. The fact that we have collectively done this to ourselves through the ballot-box is only a reflection of our thus collective stupidity.
“The history of science is indeed a graveyard of theories.” Although often taken for granted (based on a few cherry-picked episodes from the history of science), the “graveyard” picture of the history of science is a myth (https://philpapers.org/rec/MIZTPI; https://philarchive.org/rec/MIZTHO).