“The Constraints Imposed by the Discipline”


“When I finished my dissertation, a professor who had served on the admissions committee six years earlier told me that I was more interesting when I arrived. Philosophical training is something to survive, and this professor wasn’t sure I had made it.”

That’s philosopher Nandi Theunissen (Rice), in a beautiful essay you all should read in the latest issue of The Point.

James Rosenquist, “My Mind Is a Glass of Water

How does one respond to something like that? Theunissen says “I am able to hear this now as a protective caution—don’t let them get you!—but at the time I felt dismissive. I didn’t care to be interesting; I wanted to be right, or if not right then unassailable.”

She continues:

This, too, I learned in graduate school. One of my teachers [Joseph Raz] was named “philosophy’s gentle giant” in a recent obituary (the adjective may gently raise the eyebrow of generations of students left behind). He was a giant in part because he was able, as John Bayley said of Tolstoy, to see the elephant’s skin up close. He was exacting. He was relentless. But he could see, seemingly, all of life. When we asked him what his secret was, he said, Don’t make mistakes.

Now that is also the secret to filing your taxes, but I have a sense of what he meant. You can’t intend to have vision or set your sights on being sonorous. You either have these talents or, if you lack them, you acquire them indirectly over time. But you can control your inferences. And when you are up in the night worrying about the argument you are putting together, you are not thinking about how it sounds. You want to know if the q’s are following from the p’s. I mean, you don’t follow a general into battle who blunders with elementary miscalculations. Thales would not be remembered for his sagacity had he failed to get the army across the river. Be correct and the rest takes care of itself (or it doesn’t, but that is not something you can affect directly).

The constraints imposed by the discipline provide form for the chaotic deeps. The discipline—think your thoughts, but not like that—is philosophy’s iambic pentameter. The constraints provide a container for something substantial to grow. And when it does, the elements—the hard and the generative—are held together in exquisite tension; it is a sublime art.

But disciplinary norms have a function, and they can fail to serve it. Without counterpoint, an instruction like don’t make mistakes leaves divine intelligence with nothing to move through. It produces a field of petty bureaucrats who huff on their whistles to protest imprecisely formulated claims. It makes a roomful of people take note only of what they believe a speaker gets wrong. It is easy for me to see these deficiencies in others. It is harder to see the perennial creep inside. I tell an anthropologist friend that philosophy has been reckoning with its unsociability for the last ten years. She tells me that I have been reckoning with philosophy’s unsociability for the last ten years. The unsociability of philosophy, she says, is probably constitutive

You can read the whole thing here.

Discussion welcome.

Information about the artwork used in this post, courtesy of Singulart


Related: What Are Some of Your Sayings?

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Veteran adjunct
Veteran adjunct
1 year ago

To pick up on just the last point in this lovely, thought provoking piece: I certainly hope the “unsociability” of philosophy is *not* constitutive! Stringent demands for rigour of thought and critiquing arguments and theses relentlessly can be done in an antagonistic and destructive spirit, or in a collaborative and constructive spirit, e.g.: I may not personally agree but let me see if I can help *you* make your work better by critiquing it, rather than aim to show off my cleverness by tearing it down.

Steve
Steve
Reply to  Veteran adjunct
1 year ago

I agree, but have a caveat. I’ve found that Q&A’s feel a lot less exhausting for me if a few people begin their useful criticism with “I really enjoyed this!” or “Thanks for this talk!” These kind of simple starters can help cultivate a feeling that the audience is a bunch of helpers, rather than a bunch of nitpickers. What is unsociable about philosophy is that some people use this implicit idea–that if you’re criticizing then you want to help–as an excuse to be just straight-up rude.

Ian
Ian
1 year ago

I wonder how much of this “unsociability” is constitutive or how much of it is more a thing of the moment, or a post WW2 analytic phenomenon.

Certainly, people who work in the continental tradition aren’t nearly as concerned with their Ps and Qs. Though they might have their own brand of unsociability to contend with.

Axel
Axel
Reply to  Ian
1 year ago

That has been my experience. Non-analytic philosophers are just a unsocial, but at least in analytic philosophy you can see clearly what is behind those rude remarks

Justin Kalef
Justin Kalef
1 year ago

Let’s keep the constraint of making sure that ps follow from qs (this is philosophy, for goodness’ sake!) and increase the pressure to say something interesting.

If those two constraints don’t allow people to churn out quite so many articles, then why not have fewer but better articles? What positive purpose is served by having a constant deluge of articles in which the conclusions of arguments don’t follow from theit premises?

sahpa
sahpa
Reply to  Justin Kalef
1 year ago

Objection! qs follow from ps, not the other way around!

Siddharth Muthukrishnan
1 year ago

I think there are two ways in which one can follow the dictum ‘Don’t make mistakes’. There is the narrow, “petty bureaucrat” way: pay close attention to the micro-structure of the inferences you make, be very careful about ambiguity, be explicit about premises, and so on. In mathematics, this would be analogous to being extra careful about whether the next claim follows from the previous claims.

But there is a broader way to follow the dictum, and one that is closer to “divine intelligence”. This way pays attention to whether what you are inferring fits well with the rest of your picture, and this feeling of fit can often show up in phenomenology as whether it “feels right”, which can then be articulated more precisely, but can often be quite hard to make rigorous. This broader way plays a huge role in mathematics, and perhaps should play a greater role in philosophy.

In mathematics, there are many, even important, papers that contain errors in the narrow sense; i.e., there will non-sequiturs or calculational errors. However, the results of many such papers are robust to these kinds of micro-errors. That is, one can usually find a way around these micro-errors and end up at the same conclusion. Often what is doing the heavy lifting is a kind of argumentative strategy, which identifies a collection of pathways through idea-space so that even if we fail to successfully traverse one of these pathways, there are others. Consequently, when evaluating the plausibility of an argumentative strategy one looks much less to the micro-details of the proofs and much more to coherence with well-established theorems and other fields.

These broader considerations feel less petty because they’re more holistic and forces us to think about how our narrow enterprise is connected to other broader enterprises. And it’s also more sociable, for you often rely on others to point out the constraints that other enterprises connect with yours.

ikj
ikj
1 year ago

on the off chance that prof. theunissen sees this comment thread: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3dHaMV_eXko

Gary Souza
Gary Souza
1 year ago

It’s a tensegrity model?

Cole Nasrallah
Cole Nasrallah
1 year ago

The full piece is beautiful and brutal. Thank you for highlighting it.
I treasure these moments of honest kinship and striving among us, a generally confrontational bunch.