“A whole is nothing over and above its parts.” Taken at face value, this claim seems to imply that some individuals (i.e., complex wholes) are several things. But this is puzzling: how can we make sense of one thing being identical to many things? Aaron J. Cotnoir (St. Andrews) gives an answer in a recent paper in Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, v.8 titled “Composition as General Identity.” Cotnoir presents a formal language with an identity predicate—called general identity—that accepts both singular and plural terms as arguments. The idea behind his semantics for general identity is that a plural term denoting the parts of a composite object denotes the same “portion of reality” as a singular term denoting the composite as a whole. The system is constructed and explained with extraordinary clarity, and constitutes a compelling analysis of the claim that composition is identity. Philosophers working in metaphysics, language, or logic will find a lot worth thinking about in this paper. Aaron J. Cotnoir, you’re it!